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ABSTRACT 
Circling the Waters: 
The Keichō Embassy and Japanese-Spanish Relations in the Early Seventeenth Century 
Joshua Batts 
 This project examines the fraught diplomatic and commercial relations between 
Tokugawa Japan (1600–1868) and the Habsburg Spanish empire in the early seventeenth 
century. Vessels from Japan called at the port of Acapulco in New Spain three times within a 
decade, the first attempt in world history at a bilateral commercial relationship across the Pacific. 
In doing so, the ships also challenged the Spanish monopoly over the waterways between Latin 
America and Asia. Japanese commercial and diplomatic outreach peaked with the Keichō 
Embassy to Southern Europe (1613–1620), an effort that dispatched Japanese representatives to 
the court of Philip III in Madrid, but failed in its mission to secure regular contact between New 
Spain and northeastern Japan. In analyzing these events, I contrast Japan’s pursuit of commercial 
and diplomatic expansion with Spanish ambivalence and insularity, inverting essentializing 
narratives defined by Japanese isolation and European engagement. The project also compares 
the diplomatic models employed by each polity. I argue that Spain’s established imperial vision 
and the shogunate’s emerging hierarchical model of foreign relations placed both polities at the 
pinnacle of their respective diplomatic frameworks, handicapping efforts to communicate, build 
trust, and integrate each into the worldview of the other. Ultimately, a Spanish policy of 
containment closed off the Americas to Japan; soon after, the Tokugawa divested from its 
relationship with the Spanish Philippines in the face of alternative commercial partners and 
ongoing religious tension. The project thus integrates Japanese history into world history and the 
history of the Pacific, while questioning the notion of a straightforward commitment to 
expansion among Europe’s early-modern empires. 
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Note on Places, Dates, and Names 
 
Places 
 The city of Edo was the de facto capital of the Tokugawa shogunate, and is the present-
day city of Tokyo. “Mexico” refers to the capital city of New Spain, not to the contemporary 
country. In order to avoid repetition and confusion in the text, “the archipelago” always refers to 
Tokugawa Japan, and “the islands” always refers to the Spanish Philippines. 
 Date Masamune’s political base in northeastern Japan went by multiple names in the 
sources. As a daimyo, Date ruled over Sendai domain (仙臺藩, Sendai han), and governed from 
a city of the same name. However, Spanish documents most often referred to Date as the “King 
of Ōshū” (Rey de Voxu, and so on). “Ōshū” (奥州) denoted a large province in the northeast 
under the imperial system predating both the Tokugawa and Date. The daimyo’s holdings 
constituted a significant portion of Ōshū, but Date did not lay formal claim to the entire province. 
Today, the entire northeastern region of the island of Honshu is referred to as Tōhoku (東北, 
literally “east-north”), denoting an area much larger than either Sendai domain or the imperial 
province. Sendai City remains by far the largest urban center in Tōhoku. I refer to Date’s domain 
as Sendai when discussing events in Japan, but replicate the Spanish use of “Ōshū” or “King of 
Ōshū” when discussing European sources and use Tōhoku when discussing contemporary Japan. 
Dates 
 In the seventeenth century Japan used a twelve-month lunar calendar and marked the 
years through a succession of eras proclaimed by the imperial court. Most of the events discussed 
in the following pages took place during the Keichō (1596–1615) and Genna (1615–1624) eras. 
For example, Date’s vessel the San Juan Bautista first departed Japan in the eighteenth year of 
the Keichō era, on the fifteenth day of the ninth month (Keichō 8.09.15), corresponding to 
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October 28, 1613. Dates throughout have been converted to the Gregorian calendar, unless 
Japanese dates are quoted in the source. In these instances, the Gregorian date follows. The 
footnotes present dates in yyyy.mm.dd format. Thus January 26, 1615 is rendered 1615.01.26. 
When Japanese chronicles are cited, the Gregorian date again follows its Japanese counterpart. 
Names & Spellings 
 Spanish officials and representatives are referred to by their family name or a shorthand 
of their noble title. Instances of the latter kind include “Salinas” for Luis de Velasco, Marqués de 
Salinas, “Lerma” for Francisco Gómez de Sandoval, Duke of Lerma, etc. Unless otherwise 
specified, “Habsburg” refers to the Spanish branch of the House of Habsburg, most notably 
Philip III. 
 As noted above Spanish sources most often referred to Date Masamune as the “King of 
Ōshū,” distinguishing him from Tokugawa Ieyasu, the “Emperor of Japan” (emperador de 
Japón). The daimyo was not a king, nor was the retired shogun an emperor, but the two 
appellations were accurate as a bald statement of hierarchy. Unless otherwise noted, the 
“Emperor of Japan” always refers to a Tokugawa, not to any member of the imperial family in 
Kyoto. Ieyasu’s son Hidetada held the position of shogun from 1605 while Ieyasu presided over 
affairs in “retirement.” Spanish sources most often referred to the younger Tokugawa as “the 
prince” (el príncipe) until he became “emperor” himself after Ieyasu’s passing. Conversely, 
Japanese source approximated the names and titles of Spanish counterparts phonetically or 
applied Japanese words such as “lord” (国主, kokushu) and “king” (国王, kokuō). The use of 
these titles in Japanese and Spanish sources are discussed in more detail in the relevant chapters.  
 Finally, all quotes from Spanish sources retain the original orthography. 
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List of Abbreviations – Archives and Source Collections 
 
AGI Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla 
AGS Archivo General de Simancas 
ASV Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Vatican City 
DNS Dai Nihon shiryō 

















 The output is individual but the input was a group effort. Greg Pflugfelder’s mentorship 
has been instrumental. He moves seamlessly from the finer details to the big picture, spotting an 
out of place en-dash in one breath before elegantly reformulating an entire line of argument in 
the next. He has enthusiastically supported me wherever my sources and interests led.  
 Many faculty members at Columbia lent their time and energy to this project. Carol 
Gluck pushed me to tighten my writing and focus my ideas. She also encouraged me to stay in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Adam McKeown reaffirmed my interest in world 
history, and introduced me to the world of maritime history. Pamela Smith improved my critical 
faculties as a reader. Eugenia Lean taught me to take useful notes, and encouraged me to develop 
the kernel that became this dissertation. Robert Goree provided trenchant readings of early work 
and trenchant questions of early assumptions. David Lurie permitted me to bounce some of my 
wilder ideas off his office walls. 
 I benefitted from the feedback of a stellar committee. Catrina Pizzigoni opened my eyes 
to new sources and kept her door open for conversations about where they were taking me. 
David Spafford sifted through drafts with a fine-toothed comb and good humor, and showed me 
how to structure prose for new audiences. Antonio Feros provided incisive feedback on future 
pathways and challenged me to better conceptualize diplomatic encounters across empires. Tonio 
Andrade graciously responded to a cold email with warm words, and encouraged me to think 
about my connections to larger debates. 
 In Japan, Matsukata Fuyuko gave generously of her time, and provided me with 
opportunities to present my work. Umemori Naoyuki sponsored my affiliation at Waseda, and 
allowed me to join his interdisciplinary and international seminar of scholars. Kamiya Nobuyuki 
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made me feel at home in his seminar, and my classmates there cheerfully shouldered the burden 
of helping me keep pace. Igawa Kenji advised me on the state of Japanese sources in European 
archives. Shimizu Yūko answered questions and graciously shared her work. Birgit Tremml-
Werner lent her time and insight to discussions of research questions and archival logistics. She 
also recommended the scholarship of Emilio Sola, who kindly met with me in Salamanca and in 
turn introduced additional Spanish-language resources. Adam Clulow provided advice and 
feedback while modeling how to research and write a diplomatic history of the Tokugawa world. 
Timon Screech, Peter Shapinsky, and Robert Eskildsen all lent an ear, providing comments, 
questions, and encouragement. Robert Hellyer introduced me to all three, and first put me in 
touch with Professor Matsukata; he also reached out each time he passed through Tokyo and 
offered feedback and advice along the way. Robert Marks helped start me on this path over a 
dozen years ago, and has offered encouragement every year after.  
 A fellowship from the Fulbright Student program supported my initial research in Japan; 
a Waseda 125 Visiting Scholar grant permitted me to return the following year. In the interim, an 
International Dissertation Research Fellowship from the Social Science Research Council 
enabled a semester-long research outing to southern Europe, an indispensable experience for a 
budding historian operating outside his comfort zone. A Dissertation Completion Fellowship 
from the American Council of Learned Societies allowed me the time and financial support to do 
just that. The Weatherhead East Asia Institute and the Department of East Asian Languages and 
Cultures at Columbia supported summer research trips in Japan. The administrative staff across 
these organization answered questions, assuaged concerns, and smoothed over bumps in the 
road. I am especially grateful to Matt Sussman and Jinko Brinkman at Fulbright Japan, and 
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Matthew Goldfeder at ACLS for their help. Brenna Greer provided valuable lessons in self-
presentation and feedback on materials at an ACLS seminar in Minneapolis.  
 Researching this project brought me into contact with wonderful archive, museum, and 
library staff. In Japan, the Waseda University Central Library functioned as my home away from 
home a great number of days. The Historiographical Institute at Tokyo University, the Toyo 
Bunko, the Sendai City Museum, and the Miyagi Sant Juan Bautista Museum opened their doors 
and sources to a scholar not always sure what he was looking for. Fr. Renzo de Luca, sj, and the 
staff at the Twenty-Six Martyrs Museum in Nagasaki were particularly gracious hosts, allowing 
me to peruse the museum’s private library. In Spain, the repeated, patient explanations of the 
staff of the Archivo General de Indias in Seville and the Archivo General de Simancas eased my 
transition into archival work, and made a daunting process manageable. Staff of the Archivio 
Segreto Vaticano in the Vatican put up with my attempts to speak Italian via Spanish, and 
provided a wealth of materials in a short time. Similarly, the staff of the Archivum Romanum 
Societatis Iesu (ARSI) helped me navigate their collection in a focused, all-too-brief research trip 
to Rome. Finally, Tomás Díaz Zamudio, Miriam Nagashima, and Mariano Ponce all aided my 
quest for increased linguistic dexterity. A special thanks to Mariano for taking me to Coria del 
Río, and introducing me to the head of the Japón family resident there. 
 Back in New York, the Mellon Interdisciplinary Fellows Program proved indispensable 
once my focus shifted to writing. The program provided work space, funding, and an attentive 
audience through its biweekly seminars. Program Director William McCallister set a high bar for 
dialog across disciplines, and his infectious passion, confidence, and curiosity has provided a 
mentorship model I will aspire to for years to come. Program administrators handled funding 
requests and logistical support while exuding a friendly professionalism that is the exception but 
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should be the rule. My fellow “Mellonites” created an atmosphere of relaxed collegiality and 
intellectual engagement. They all helped take my mind off my own work and kept it nimble 
considering theirs, both in the seminar room and in the happy hours that followed. Special thanks 
to Nasser Abourahme, José Tomás Atria, Neda Bolourchi, Abigail Coplin, Elizabeth Marcus, 
Zachary Ugolnik, and Emily Yao.  
 From here onward, the debts run longer and deeper. My cohort at Columbia offered 
critical eyes and sympathetic ears across classes, continents, and years. Andre Deckrow has 
traded banter, anxieties, and diversions with me since day one, from Kent Hall to the banks of 
the Douro River. Pau Pitarch Fernández reminded me how to pitch my project and helped me 
navigate the menu at Hamilton Deli. Tom Gaubatz guided me through Jinbōchō and taught me 
proper bedside manner. Clay Eaton has been an indefatigable source of positivity and cheer, 
providing ideas for work and excursions alike, from Brooklyn to Ibaraki. Glenda Chao gave 
trenchant feedback on drafts, and encouraged me to think about how our work translates into the 
classroom. Matthieu Felt served as my captive audience more than once, and took one for the 
team. I am sorry we could not play basketball more often. Joshua Schlachet humored long 
discussions on under-developed ideas and reminded us all of the power of family. Colin Jones 
livened up the banter in Kikuicho and New York while elevating the discourse. Arunabh Ghosh 
taught me the proper soundtrack for dissertation writing, and provided a road map on what to 
apply for and how to do so. Sayaka Chatani, Yumi Kim, and Chelsea Schieder helped me get my 
bearings my first year at Columbia, and have been putting up with my questions ever since.  
 Finally, my family, inherited and chosen alike. Adam Witten has been my intellectual 
inspiration, sparring partner, and sounding board for over a decade. More importantly he has 
been my closest friend, from Whittier to Miyagi and everywhere between. Kristina, Ken, and the 
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entire Wisdom clan constantly remind me of the joy and energy that comes from having family 
near at hand. Bruce Batts read through almost as many drafts as my advisor, and asked the 
grounding questions one misses when they are up in the clouds. Together, he and Debbie 
provided a welcome refuge away from New York City. My brother and sister, Elijah and Olivia, 
have always made it feel like home wherever we were, and for however long we had. Theresa 
and Larry Hawk have been nothing but supportive since I first time told them I was moving to 
Japan (and all the times thereafter). Theresa, my mother, has a knack for calling whenever I 
remember just how much I rely on her. Finally, Christine has been a star and has been my buddy. 
Neither of those words alone quite captures my meaning, but the two together seem right. The 
research and writing of this dissertation has asked more of her than was fair, and she gave back 
more than it, or I, deserved. From kind words as I draft the prospectus to care packages while I 









 This dissertation reassesses the relationship between Tokugawa Japan (1600–1868) and 
Habsburg Spain (1516–1700) in the opening decades of the seventeenth century. For nearly two 
decades, Japanese leadership embarked on a program of outreach across the Pacific, attempting 
to establish commercial ties between the Viceroyalty of New Spain (present-day Mexico) and the 
Japanese archipelago. The effort began with correspondence between Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–
1616) and the Spanish Philippines; it culminated with the unprecedented site of three ocean-
going vessels built in Japan departing for Acapulco over the course of four years. The effort 
entailed sustained diplomatic investment in the foreign correspondence, the intermediaries that 
carried it, the goods that accompanied both, and the vessels that transported all three across the 
world’s largest body of water. Most of all, it required a vision that extended beyond the horizon 
to another continent. 
 There is no shortage of narratives devoted to vision, expansion, and ambition in the early 
modern world. Traditionally, their protagonists are disproportionately European and their arcs 
chart the traits of contemporary human society: sovereign states, a global economy, growing 
claims to mastery of the natural world, a notion of historical progress, and the conviction that the 
culture and contributions of Western Europe contain the seeds of such progress. English speakers 
embed this perspective in our appellations (“New World,” “Old World”), in our labels (“Age of 
Discovery”), in our eras (“Early Modern”), and in how we frame historical inquiry (“The Rise of 
the West”).1 
                                                             
1 See, for example, William McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (London: University 
of Chicago Press, 1970). For debate on the term “early modern” see Jack Goldstone, “The Problem of the ‘Early 
Modern’ World,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 41, n. 3 (1998), 249–284, and Kären 
Wigen, “Mapping Early Modernity,” Early Modern Japan 5 n. 2 (1995), 1–13. Goldstone is critical of the term’s 





 Scholars of world history have produced counter-narratives in abundance, challenging 
notions of straightforward progress and frameworks that root development exclusively in the 
European experience. These narratives contend that divergence between “the West” and “the 
Rest” manifested in the eighteenth, not the fifteenth century. They suggest the world’s economic 
engine steadfastly remained in eastern, not western Eurasia. They demonstrate that innovation 
did not stagnate outside of Europe, nor did Europeans hold a monopoly on natural inquiry, 
territorial ambition, or a robust public sphere and civic culture. Moreover, they offer sobering 
correctives by illustrating that the path to apparent European dominance relied as much on 
exploitation, prejudice, and subjugation as on enlightenment, progress, and science. These 
narrative counterweights remain crucial to any honest and reflective appraisal of the past.2 
 At the intersection of East Asian and world history, two aspects of the above counter-
narratives stand out in contrast to this dissertation: many focus on China, and in turn many 
attempt to explain why the peculiar alchemy of culture, character, and circumstance that 
presumably drove Europe’s transformative achievements did not manifest in the Middle 
Kingdom. Numerous scholarly works and textbooks point out that Ming China sent massive 
treasure fleets as far as eastern Africa eight decades before Columbus, and explain how and why 
Ming leadership soon after turned its attention to inland borders and coastal defense.3 Other 
                                                             
facilitates productive comparison among societies. I use the term throughout in reference to the Japanese and 
Spanish polities. 
2 Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998); Alfred Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 (Westport: 
Greenwood Publishing Company, 1972); Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, 7 vols. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1954–); Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); Mary Elizabeth Berry, Japan in Print: Information and Nation in the 
Early Modern Period (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2006), among many others. 
3 For a recent monograph, see Edward Dreyer, Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1405–





works emphasize that vibrant Chinese merchant diaspora fueled a vast maritime marketplace but 
did not benefit from the marriage of state and commerce that sent successive waves of European 
traders crisscrossing the globe.4 Additionally, historians have argued China’s demand for silver 
and production capacity powered the first truly global economy, requiring us to adjust the axes of 
world history.5 The Middle Kingdom may have even been punished by its own success, its 
impressive capacity to organize a large population through an agricultural regime dissuading 
concentrated investment in the energies powering industry.6 The “great divergence” between 
China and West may have stemmed from the absence of cotton, coal, and colonies that powered 
the Industrial Revolution in England.7 Whether the focus is on exploration or encounter, 
economy or energy, these inquiries explain absence and embrace alterities. At their best they 
disabuse us of the notion that the drives for exploration and innovation, and the capacity for 
progress (however contested and circuitous), are proclivities inherent to the West and adopted by 
the rest. These counter-narratives cleave apart ahistorical essentialisms from people and cultures, 
but still must explain choices and priorities, action and reaction, during a particular era. Put 
                                                             
Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Ecological Narrative (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015) 
is one example. 
4 Wang Gungwu, “Merchants without Empire: The Hokkien Sojourning Communities,” in The Rise of Merchant 
Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 400–421. 
5 Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, “Cycles of Silver: Global Economic Unity through the Mid-Eighteenth 
Century,” Journal of World History 13 n. 2 (2002), 391–427. 
6 Mark Elvin, “The High-Level Equilibrium Trap: The Causes of the Decline of Invention in Traditional Chinese 
Textile Industries,” in Economic Organization in Chinese Society, ed. W.E. Willmott (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1972), 137–172. 
7 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy 





simply, they often explain why Asia “did not” and why Europe “did”—explore, expand, and 
develop. 
 By contrast, I investigate what happened when an Asian polity—in this instance, Japan—
reached out across an ocean. It did so precisely at a time when we conceive of open water as an 
invitation to European expansion, and the northern Pacific as doubling as a Spanish lake.8 
Japanese efforts did not encounter a warm reception. Spanish officials warily greeted letters, 
vessels, and representatives from the archipelago, displaying the caution and insularity 
traditionally ascribed to their counterparts in East Asia. Spanish galleons sailing annually 
between Acapulco in New Spain and Manila in the Philippines established the first commercial 
link between the Americas and Asia—in some tellings, the birth of a truly global economy—but 
Japanese outreach marked the first attempt to bridge the Pacific diplomatically.9 In doing so, 
Japan pushed to reconfigure the Pacific as a site of inter-societal commerce rather than intra-
colonial trade. Manila granted entry to Spanish Asia, just as Acapulco marked entry into Spanish 
America. Spain’s logic may have been global in scale but it was imperial and mercantilist in 
nature, defined by attempts to control the flow of goods, people, and access between its 
American territories and its outpost in Asia. Japan’s Pacific foray thus inverts a familiar dynamic 
by revealing an Asian polity seeking long-distance commercial connections, and a European 
polity balking at the proposition. 
                                                             
8 William Schurz introduced the term “Spanish Lake” in his eponymous articles. See Schurz, “The Spanish Lake,” 
The Hispanic American Historical Review 5, no. 2 (1922): 181–94 
9 Arturo Giráldez explores the relationship between Manila and the global economy in The Age of Trade: The 





Much Ado about Something “Little to Do” with Japanese History 
  Japan may seem an unlikely candidate to upend the dynamic of an open Europe and an 
insular Asia. The country exhibits a complicated and contradictory history with concepts like 
East and West, with notions of progress and modernity, and with attendant ideas of being early 
or late to history. Japan always seems to be catching up or falling behind, as measured against 
some vague, but usually external and often Western, barometer of cultural, economic, or political 
development. This problematic standard has been applied to the country’s achievements and 
offenses, its triumphs and transgressions, in equal measure. Thus debates raged about the origins, 
consequences, and significance of Japan’s rapid ascent up the industrial and international order 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the “miracle” of its postwar economic growth, and the 
ontology and pathology of the nation’s particular brand of empire, aggression, and fascism.10 
Early works on these large questions adopted the language of diagnosis, delineating what Japan 
got “right” and explaining what went “wrong.” More recent studies productively mine the human 
experience in Japan rather than treating the Japanese experience of the human, tackling the 
meaning, maintenance, and construction of a plethora of concepts from modernity to empire, 
gender to germs.11 
                                                             
10 Thomas C. Smith, The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), Maruyama 
Masao, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), W. G. 
Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), E.H. Norman, Origins of the Modern 
Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), Gavan McCormack, 
“Nineteen-Thirties Japan: Fascism?,” Critical Asian Studies 14, no. 2 (1982): 20–32, Chalmers Johnson, MITI and 
the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).  
11 Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985), Anne Walthall, The Weak Body of a Useless Woman: Matsuo Taseko and the Meiji Restoration (Chicago, Ill: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), Ruth Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-
Port China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), Brett L. Walker, Toxic Archipelago: A History of 
Industrial Disease in Japan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: 





 Historiography of Japan’s foreign relations at the beginning of the Tokugawa (also called 
Edo) period (1600–1868) is dominated by the Janus of unification and exclusion, with the latter 
supposedly being the price extracted to achieve and maintain the former.12 The implications have 
been profound, welding Japanese historical identity to self-imposed isolation, and establishing 
conflict between internal coherence and external influence as a canonical dynamic to be 
accepted, modified, or rejected by generations of historians. Scholars have found much to mine 
and much to question. Did the Tokugawa adopt a policy of overzealous exclusion or judicious 
containment? Should the period be defined by the archipelago’s contact with, and ultimate 
expulsion of, Catholic Europe? Or is it better understood as a realignment of Japan’s role within 
East Asia? Did isolation set the stage for two centuries of stability or did the archipelago forfeit a 
voice and forgo opportunity in the realm of world affairs? The development of global and 
transnational history has stimulated efforts to transcend easy contrasts and stark binaries. It has 
also raised questions about the relationship between Japanese and world history, and the 
contributions each can make to the other. 
 Relations between Tokugawa Japan and Habsburg Spain factor little into these debates, 
especially those in English. The rupture between the two polities fed into an original grand 
narrative of Japan’s “Christian Century,” defined by the arrival, spread, persecution, and 
expulsion of Catholicism and its European adherents.13 The encounter with the Portuguese 
defines this century of contact, bookended by their initial arrival on a Chinese junk in 1543 and 
                                                             
12 Edo (present-day Tokyo) was the seat of the Tokugawa shogunate, which ruled Japan from the beginning of the 
seventeenth century until the 1868 Meiji Restoration. Periodization always comes with caveats. 1603–1868 is 
another common set of dates given for the Tokugawa period. Tokugawa Ieyasu assumed control of Japan following 
the battle of Sekigahara in 1600, but was not named shogun until 1603. I adopt the earlier dates here, as Ieyasu’s 
engagement with Spanish authorities predated his title as shogun. 





their final expulsion from the country in 1639. Contact with Spain began later and ended earlier, 
roughly coinciding with the establishment of Spanish Manila in 1571 and Tokugawa rejection of 
a final commercial vessel from that settlement in 1625. The letters and goods, as well as the 
promises and threats, exchanged between Spanish officials and authorities in Japan thus fit into a 
narrative path already laid out in terms of the failed encounter with Catholic Europe, and by 
extension, the West. There are compelling episodes—a shipwreck off the island of Shikoku in 
1596, a marooned governor-general in 1609, but their emplotment serves an exogenous narrative 
of Japan’s reception and rejection of “the West.”  
 The best-known episode of Japanese-Spanish encounter is often used as the exception 
proving the rule of Japan’s isolationist impulse. In 1613, the daimyo Date Masamune (1567–
1636) dispatched his retainer Hasekura Tsunenaga (1571–1622) and the Franciscan friar Luis 
Sotelo (1574–1624) from his domain in northeastern Japan to pay their respects to Pope Paul V 
(1550–1621, r. 1605–1621) and to request that Philip III (1578–1621, r. 1598–1621) of Spain 
authorize direct trade between Japan and the Viceroyalty of New Spain. The lead delegates of 
what is now called the Keichō Embassy to Europe (1613–1620) made their case in the palaces of 
Madrid and Rome, marking one of the very few times any Japanese person traveled to Europe 
prior to the nineteenth century.14 Existing accounts, especially those in English, explain that 
growing persecution in Japan hamstrung the endeavor from the start, and Hasekura returned in 
                                                             
14 “Keichō” (慶長) is the Japanese era name (年号, nengō) spanning the years 1596–1615 of the Gregorian calendar. 
Date’s embassy departed in 1613, or Keichō 18. The full modern-day title of the mission is 慶長遣欧使節 (Keichō 
ken’ō shisetsu). The earlier Tenshō Embassy to Europe (天正遣欧少年使節, Tenshō ken’ō shōnen shisetsu, “The 
Tenshō Youth Embassy to Europe” in contemporary scholarship) visited during the Tenshō (天正) era, in the 1580s. 
The Jesuits sponsored this mission, escorting four Japanese youths sent by the Kyushu Christian daimyo Ōtomo 
Sōrin (1530–1587). Its purpose was to garner papal support for the Jesuit Mission in Japan. See Michael Cooper, 
The Japanese Mission to Europe, 1582-1590: The Journey of Four Samurai Boys through Portugal, Spain and Italy 





1620 to a country well on the way to closing its doors to outside influence.15 This framework has 
existed since the nineteenth century and casts Date and Hasekura as visionary victims, felled by 
the intolerance and differing priorities of their Tokugawa superiors.16 Equally problematic, 
Date’s efforts are often severed from earlier Tokugawa outreach, isolating the daimyo’s mission 
from the broader current of Japanese history and precluding potential for instructive analysis.  
 The Keichō Embassy has attracted a steady trickle of scholarly attention in Japan since 
the early years of the Meiji period (1868–1912). In the early twentieth century, Murakami 
Naojirō pioneered the collection, transcription, and translation of Japanese and European-
language sources chronicling Japan’s contact with Catholic Europe. His edited volumes of 
primary sources remain standard references today, and this dissertation draws upon them 
extensively.17 In particular, Murakami oversaw the compilation and publication of multiple 
volumes of the Dai Nihon shiryō (大日本史料, hereafter DNS), a monumental chronicle of 
Japan’s history comprising chronologically-arranged excerpts from myriad primary sources.18 
Strikingly, Murakami and his fellow editors broke from precedent for the Keichō Embassy, 
opting to collate every known source pertaining to the embassy in one separate volume rather 
                                                             
15 Boxer, Christian Century and Mark Caprio and Kōichirō Matsuda, eds., Japan and the Pacific, 1540-1920 
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an Account of His Embassy to Rome,” Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan 21 (November 1893): 1–106. 
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than embedding each of the sources in the series’ overall chronological narrative. The preface 
explains why: “As, however, the Embassy had very little to do with other events which occurred 
in Japan during that time, and as most of the materials are from European archives and libraries, 
we have thought it advisable to devote one complete volume to the materials relating to the 
mission, instead of following our usual chronological scheme.”19 Murakami thus produced an 
indispensable collection of disparate sources while perpetuating the mistaken idea that the 
Keichō Embassy was an event exhibiting “little to do” with the flow of Japanese history. 
 Postwar scholars have produced multiple accounts of the embassy drawing on the 
relevant DNS volume and additional archival work. The works of Matsuda Kiichi and Gonoi 
Takashi in particular provide a fount of information on Japanese-Spanish relations and the path 
of the Keichō Embassy respectively.20 However, they present accounts within a delineated 
Japanese history, less concerned with the interplay between Japan and broader histories. The full 
title of Matsuda’s first (1969) monograph on the embassy is indicative of this perspective, titled 
The Keichō Embassy: The First Japanese Crossing of the Pacific Ocean (Keichō shisetsu: 
Nihonjin hatsu no Taiheiyō ōdan).”21 Rather than presenting an account of a Japanese first, this 
dissertation asks what Japanese endeavors might contribute to our understanding of a regional or 
global whole.  
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Tokugawa Ieyasu and the ‘Southern Barbarians’] (Tokyo: Chōbunsha, 1992), and Gonoi Takashi, Hasekura 
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both authors’ work. 
21 Matsuda, Kiichi, Keichō shisetsu—Nihonjin hatsu no Taiheiyō ōdan [The Keichō Embassy—The First Japanese 





 The mission’s exotic status garners consistent public and published attention within 
Japan. A museum in Ishinomaki City (historically a part of Date Masamune’s Sendai domain) 
commemorates the Keichō Embassy, replete with animatronic figures, an immersive theatrical 
experience, and most impressively, a full-scale floating replica of Date’s vessel, the San Juan 
Bautista, meticulously constructed in consultation with historical sources. The nearby Sendai 
City Museum houses the bulk of the embassy’s material and documentary remains, including 
Hasekura’s certificate of Roman citizenship, as well as portraits of the Japanese ambassador and 
Pope Paul V brought back to Japan by the former. The Japanese government designated forty-
seven items National Treasures, while in 2013 UNESCO inscribed materials related to the 
embassy into its Memory of the World Register.22 Local scholars working with these materials 
have produced thoughtful studies of their history, while the museum has produced detailed 
catalogs and in 2010 collaborated in the publication of translated sources related to the embassy, 
augmenting the DNS volume from a century before.23 Speculative histories have also cropped up, 
arguing for Date’s conversion to Christianity, and for the embassy’s (and by extension, Date’s) 
secret purpose: Spanish aid in a planned coup against the Tokugawa shogunate.24 This conjecture 
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March 20, 2017,  http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/memory-of-the-
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The Keichō Embassy to Europe] (Sendai: Sendai City, 2010). Hereafter abbreviated as SDS. Hirakawa Arata has 
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Ieyasu,” The Bulletin of the Tohoku Culture Research Room 52 (2010), 1–20 (the article is in Japanese).  
24 Ōizumi Kōichi has maintained a version of this argument spanning multiple decades and multiple books. His 
translations of primary sources and archival work have been recognized by scholars such as Gonoi, though his main 
contention that Date sent the Keichō embassy to muster support for a coup against the Tokugawa has received much 
less support and scholarly consideration. Hirakawa, cited above, allows for Date’s ambition but does not accept that 
formal military alliance was the primary purpose of the embassy. Though the Tokugawa-Date relationship is both 
fascinating and under-sourced, I have seen no direct evidence in support of Ōizumi’s contentions, and provide a 
more cooperative account here. Ōizumi’s latest works revisit the same themes for a popular audience with 





does not accord well with the sources or circumstances, but it does coincide with Date’s rising 
profile as a character for pop-culture consumption across anime, manga, and video games set in 
fictionalized versions of Japan’s Warring States, or Sengoku, period (1467–1603). The recent 
400-year anniversary of the Keichō Embassy’s 1613 departure, as well as the 2011 Tōhoku 
earthquake and tsunami, have also raised the national profile of Date, Hasekura, and the region 
both men inhabited.25  
 Meanwhile, the study of early modern Japan’s foreign relations marches on. The accepted 
wisdom of a “Christian Century” leading inexorably to isolation eroded in the 1980s. Tashiro 
Kazui rejected the notion of willful seclusion and emphasized Tokugawa efforts to carve out a 
role for itself independent of China’s system of tributary relations.26 Soon after, Ronald Toby 
penned the definitive monograph in English, underscoring Tokugawa efforts to establish a 
diplomatic framework within the context of East Asia rather than wondering at its dissociation 
from the West.27 
 Subsequent studies proceed from the recognition that only a thoroughly Eurocentric 
historical gaze could equate the expulsion of the Iberian powers with a rejection of the world, 
and many understandably focus their attention elsewhere. Arano Yasunori continued the study of 
Japan’s diplomatic role in East Asia, positing a “Japanocentric world order” (Nihon gata ka’i 
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25 “Tōhoku” (東北, literally “east north”) refers to the northeastern region of Honshu, the largest island in the 
Japanese archipelago. Date’s Sendai domain lay in the Tōhoku region. 
26 Kazui Tashiro, “Foreign Relations during the Edo Period: Sakoku Reexamined,” trans. Susan Downing Videen, 
Journal of Japanese Studies 8, no. 2 (July 1982): 283–306. 
27 Ronald P Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 





chitsujo) as the Tokugawa shogunate’s operative diplomatic framework.28 This conceptualization 
placed Japan in the center of a hierarchy of its own creation and for its own convenience, 
managing a series of bilateral relations through “four entrances” (yottsu no kuchi) to the 
archipelago: Satsuma domain (handling relations with Ryukyu), Tsushima domain (with Korea), 
Matsumae domain (with the Ainu people, living in present-day Hokkaido), and the port city of 
Nagasaki (with Dutch and Chinese merchants). Scholars in more recent decades typically focus 
on one or more of these “portals” into Japan.29 Additional work on the overall character of 
Japan’s diplomatic order continues in dialog with the parallel study of the nature and operation 
of domestic authority.30 Thus scholarship has delved into the many relationships managed by a 
not-so-secluded country and shown how all of these fed into the building and maintenance of 
Japan’s particular brand of diplomatic fiction, against the recognition that all diplomacy is a form 
of state-driven fiction. 
 The turn to Asia has not precluded further study of relations with the Dutch, the one 
European group that maintained a presence, however contained, in Tokugawa Japan.31 Recent 
work has explored the utility of the Dutch East India Company’s (Verenigde Oostindische 
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Compagnie, or VOC) “service” to successive Tokugawa shoguns, making use of the voluminous 
records kept by VOC factories and operatives. In the realm of English-language scholarship, 
Adam Clulow has explored how the Tokugawa “tamed” the Dutch over the course of the 
seventeenth century, transforming company agents into vassals with concrete expectations of 
service and rigid control over their actions in Japan and in the waters far beyond.32  
 An understandable focus on maintained relationships raises question about the potential 
contributions of studies on curtailed encounters. No longer burdened by the responsibility of 
establishing a paradigm of exclusion, Japan’s relations with Spain and Portugal remain 
underrepresented in recent literature. In the realm of diplomatic history, Juan Gil and Emilio Sola 
have authored Spanish-language works on Spain’s encounter with Japan. Gil in particular 
outlines events and peruses the documentary record, including valuable commentary on extended 
passages of primary sources.33 However, both authors draw almost exclusively on Spanish-
language material, and narrate an ill-fated relationship rather than analyzing its potential for 
instruction. Finally, scholars have begun to explore the role of Manila in early Tokugawa foreign 
relations, arguing for the importance of the Franciscan community in the pursuit and 
development of the archipelago’s commercial and diplomatic ties to Spain’s largest settlement in 
Asia.34 Birgit Tremml-Werner provided one of the few recent works in English, outlining the 
triangular relationship of China, Japan, and Spain converging on that city during the height of 
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cultural, economic, and political contact among all three. In delineating what she calls the 
“Manila System” operating from 1571 to 1644, the author forefronts the interplay between local 
conditions and global dynamics.35 
 This dissertation contains elements of, and is influenced by, the above, but tells a 
different story. It cleaves Japanese-Spanish relations from incomplete narratives over-reliant on 
Christianity’s rise and fall in Japan, no longer in vogue but still in need of reassessment. It does 
not offer a “system,” as a work focused on inconsistent bilateral ties over a quarter century 
would reach too far if it reached for anything systematic. Instead, it examines a period of 
diplomatic and commercial outreach unburdened by the assumption that its collapse must be 
rooted in an inherent Japanese bent toward isolation. Rather than juxtaposing dispositions, it 
contrasts differing and changing priorities across the composite, hierarchical polities headed by 
the Tokugawa shogunate in Japan and the Habsburg monarchy in Spain.  
 This dissertation also demonstrates how halting and difficult global and globalizing 
contact could be. World history after 1500 often takes globalization as a core concept, and like 
many of our dearest concepts the word is easy to use but hard to define. Perhaps the latter is what 
enables the former; perhaps it is the other way around. Here I take “globalization” to signify 
intensification: of trade, of conflict, of industry, of exploitation, and most relevant here, of inter-
societal encounter. Without doubt the world has “globalized” over the past five centuries, so 
much so that the process is assumed, and we often set the stage for world history against a 
backdrop of streamlined and inevitable intensification of contact. Those communities or societies 
that appear to buck the trend—such as Japan—become marked as outliers.  
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 But encounters can be trying to maintain. The fraught relationship between Japan and 
Spain demonstrates the challenges inherent to bridging distances political, conceptual, and 
geographic. The last should not be discounted or given mere token acknowledgement. The 
Spanish ambassador in London could write Philip III and expect a reply in three months. From 
Antwerp, the turnaround was but one to two months.36 By contrast, a one-way voyage across the 
Pacific took three to four months if conditions held, and up to six if they did not.37 The Spanish 
traversed the yawning distance between the Americas and Asia just once a year, meaning the 
governor-general in the Philippines wrote his king knowing a reply was at least two years away. 
Tokugawa Ieyasu waited five years before receiving a reply from Philip, and neither the wait nor 
the response pleased him. 
 Distance also shaped the endeavor of imposing institutional order. Layers of Spanish 
administrative hierarchy impeded Tokugawa efforts to find a suitable partner with which to 
pursue expanded relations. What started as a request to the governor-general in Manila became a 
policy debate for the king and his councilors half a world away. The politics of who to ask 
mirrored the politics of who could ask. The Tokugawa, recently established and exploring 
options, opened audience chambers and sea lanes to a host of foreigners at various levels of 
official authority. By contrast, the Spanish monarchy adopted more circumspect measures when 
evaluating the credentials of its Japanese interlocutors. When Date Masamune dispatched 
representatives to Spain, officials debated who he was and the related question of his standing as 
much as they considered his requests. However, distance is its own form of credibility, and 
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Philip agreed to an audience with Date’s representative. Nevertheless, the crown never treated 
Date or Hasekura as authorized to ask for what they wanted. Pacific commerce was a matter to 
be discussed between sovereigns, not subordinates. This conception hindered the Tokugawa 
dialog with the king’s servants in the Philippines and undercut efforts by a Japanese daimyo 
when petitioning the Spanish crown. 
 Who might deliver a message became entangled with how it should be sent and 
delivered. The shogunate experimented with both the means of trade and the modes of encounter. 
Within the emerging Tokugawa framework of governance, space emerged for regional authority 
to mediate bilateral foreign relations. The arrangement grew out of established regional ties 
predating political unification under the Tokugawa. It lessened the potential for direct diplomatic 
insult, and bolstered the profit and prestige of the intermediary. However, the elasticity granted 
by this approach doubled as opacity. Tokugawa flexibility made Date’s embassy possible, but 
the shogunate’s public distance from the endeavor cast doubt on the mission in the eyes of 
administrators in New Spain and Europe. Moreover, the Tokugawa discourse was one of 
permission, offered quite freely for a time. Early on, all parties interested could trade in Japan so 
long as they went through the appropriate, shogunate-directed channels. By contrast, Spain 
pursued more direct and exclusive control of its imperial pathways and portals. Thus, while the 
Tokugawa operated permission structures undergirding a developing hierarchy, the Habsburgs 
confronted challenges to the logic of economic exclusivity. For Spain, opening the Pacific did 
not present an opportunity for expansion but a threat to control. 
 Attempts were made to assuage these challenges absent the aid of clear economic 
incentives. The Manila galleons facilitated the great exchange of Asian silk for American silver, 





ambivalence. Japan maintained its own thirst for Chinese textiles, and acted as a major supplier 
of silver as well. Common exports made it difficult to find common ground, weakening the case 
for trade between silver-rich Japan and silver-rich New Spain. Moreover, Tokugawa incentives 
for trade—a need for political legitimacy at home, a base for foreign trade near the Tokugawa 
capital of Edo, a desire to import Spanish mining and navigational technology—stoked Spanish 
anxieties over the economy and effective governance of the Indies and control over the 
technologies that made that governance, however strained, possible. Individuals made the case 
for and against trade between Japan and the Americas for different reasons and in different ways, 
but the variety of opinions fueled uncertainty rather than encouraging experimentation among 
decision-makers in Spain. The absence of a clear commercial impetus increased the friction 
inhibiting connection across the Pacific. 
 This is the history of an aborted encounter, but Japanese-Spanish relations should not be 
treated as a dead-end, as has been the inclination of previous histories and narratives of the 
Keichō Embassy. We can read an abandoned encounter as an opportunity lost or gained. Earlier 
historiography of Japan’s foreign relations adopted the former perspective, lamenting the 
archipelago’s willful seclusion from other (Western) societies. Conversely, from Tashiro and 
Toby to the present, scholars argue that unwillingness to orbit the sinocentric order as a tributary 
satellite catalyzed the construction of the Tokugawa diplomatic order. “Open” and “closed” are 
descriptors that continue to define Japan for audiences foreign and domestic, despite scholars’ 
longstanding efforts to distance themselves from these appellations and the narratives supporting 
them. To adopt the metaphor of grammar, we would do better to focus on verbs rather than 
adjectives, to reassess choices and actions without undue reliance on past characterizations. 





outreach to Spain exemplified a concentrated period of experimentation with and exploration of 
relationships as the shogunate decided the twin questions of foreign relations and domestic rule. 
Outside of the Philippines, Spain demurred from this outreach, unable to find any benefits 
outweighing the threat to its perceived prerogative. Having cast a wide net, the Tokugawa opted 
for alternate pathways, but only after giving dogged chase to trade across the North Pacific. 
Communicating across Composite Hierarchies  
 Tokugawa and Habsburg leadership attempted to sustain dialog across conceptual and 
administrative systems premised on composite hierarchies, a term I use to describe both. Spain’s 
composite monarchy (monarchia compuesta), presided over a complex assemblage of crowns 
and kingdoms in the Iberian Peninsula, extensive territories in Europe (including much of the 
Italian Peninsula and the Spanish Netherlands), and colonial possessions across the East and 
West Indies divided into multiple levels of administration.38 The crown united these disparate 
holdings under the same ruler but not the same methods of rule, which differed within Europe 
and between Europe and the Indies.  
 I focus on the three-tiered administration flowing upward and eastward from Manila to 
Mexico to Madrid. A governor-general and audiencia oversaw secular executive and judicial 
administration in the Philippines, with the islands forming part of the Viceroyalty of New Spain. 
The Viceroy of New Spain reported to the king and his Royal and Supreme Council of Indies 
(Real y Supremo Consejo de Indias), the administrative body responsible for overseeing Spain’s 
extra-European territories. The monarch’s conceptual claim to rule and his place at the summit of 
authority was clear and direct in theory, even if reality and geography constrained Madrid’s 
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efficacy and day-to-day oversight. By 1600, the composite monarchy was a century into its 
tenure governing across oceans, including nearly forty years of activity in the Philippines. 
Though still expanding its effective territorial reach in the New World, Habsburg Spain sought to 
maintain, not establish, its political power and administrative control.39 
 Tokugawa Japan was both composite and hierarchical, but along different lines. Over two 
hundred regional lords or daimyo ruled discrete areas of the archipelago, a century of strife and 
alliance deciding the borders among them. The Tokugawa shogun was first among these lords, 
invested with the title and nominal right to rule by the Japanese emperor.40 The latter held little 
direct political power but remained a source of legitimacy. The Tokugawa and their direct 
retainers ruled roughly a quarter of the Japanese archipelago, the daimyo governing the rest with 
a great deal of autonomy. Many daimyo were either collateral branches (親藩, shinpan) or 
hereditary vassals (譜代, fudai) of the Tokugawa house, while the remainder were tozama (外様, 
“outsider”) daimyo who only swore allegiance to Ieyasu following the climactic battle of 
Sekigahara in 1600. Several tozama domains were located to the southwest, where foreign trade 
across the China Seas predated Japan’s political unification. The Tokugawa thus governed at the 
apex of a composite system but had not integrated the archipelago under its singular rule. 
Scholars of Japan have deemed this the bakuhan taisei (幕藩体制, “bakuhan system”), 
referencing the relationship between the shogunate, or bakufu (幕府), and daimyo domains, or 
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han (藩).41 In the early 1600s the system remained far from established, and memories of open 
conflict, competition and aspirant rule under clans other than the Tokugawa remained fresh.  
 During this unsettled time, foreign relations functioned as a sphere where the shogunate 
could assert itself. For the Tokugawa, prerogative in foreign trade and domestic self-definition 
were overlapping aspects of the same project. Leadership constructed a clear hierarchy abroad to 
justify the emerging one at home. This process of launching and regulating contacts with players 
throughout Asia played out precisely during the time in question here (1600–1625), as the 
Tokugawa moved unevenly toward a conceptual system of foreign trade and relations reinforcing 
the shogunate’s purported pride of place in the region. Tokugawa ascension and conscious 
expansion thus overlapped with Habsburg efforts to maintain primacy at home and abroad.  
 The Tokugawa program of mediated access butted up against Spain’s network of imperial 
pathways. The former welcomed as many partners as possible, as long as trade ran its course 
under Tokugawa sanction. The latter sought to maximize extraction through exclusive 
administrative and commercial channels, inevitably flowing toward the Iberian Peninsula. Both 
proved to be enduring but porous frameworks. Daimyo pursued their own agendas within but not 
necessarily in accordance with Tokugawa priorities. Smuggling and piracy continued, especially 
throughout the overextended Spanish empire. The Philippines embodied the limits of effective 
control. Rule of the islands followed the logic of colonial and evangelical labor, but economic 
survival depended on trade with foreign powers and merchants the Spanish metropole had very 
little influence over. These circumstances produced ongoing debates about the role of the islands 
within the empire during this time and beyond. However, once Asian goods entered the Spanish 
                                                             
41 John Whitney Hall and James L. McClain, “The Bakuhan System,” in The Cambridge History of Japan, by James 





orbit in Manila they followed a clearly demarcated path eastward to the Americas and Europe 
under Spanish control. This arrangement permitted Japanese ports and a Spanish settlement to 
trade without the respective sovereigns of each needing to acknowledge one other. The 
Tokugawa complicated this picture when they pursued trade with New Spain, initiating a 
conversation neither polity’s political apex could sustain through existing frameworks.  
 An eclectic group of men tried to bridge the gap. A shipwrecked governor-general with 
dreams of ambassadors and unrealistic mineral-sharing arrangements. A general charged with 
searching for islands that did not exist. An opportunistic daimyo with an interest in the wider 
world looking for new economic opportunities. A friar convinced of the potential of the Japan 
Mission and confident of his ability to lead it. A minor vassal and son of a recently disgraced 
house with some experience in domestic political matters. All operated in an ambiguous space 
between hegemons with conflicting priorities, and none of them succeeded in gaining the trust of 
both. These intermediaries variably praised a foreign god, extolled the virtues of a pagan people, 
denounced one another, claimed sanction they did not possess, and at times remained 
conspicuously silent. Their collective efforts animated much of the encounter between Tokugawa 
Japan and Habsburg Spain; their choices, demands, and aspirations also did much to undermine a 
connection that was fragile from the start. They remind us that inter-polity relations hinge on 
individual encounters. The shorthand “Japanese-Spanish relations” masks the internal political 
dynamics in Japan and subsumes the different nodes of the Spanish empire. The term also draws 
attention away from the nebula of individuals moving through these spaces. In the absence of 
agreed-upon protocols, reliable communication, and clear economic incentives, personality and 
personal ambition found yet more room in which to operate. My study explores the role 





 Finally, Tokugawa Japan’s encounter with Spain challenges our assumptions about the 
development of the Pacific as a commercial and diplomatic space. For brevity, I often refer to 
“the Pacific” when the “North Pacific” or a similar appellation is more accurate. Japanese 
outreach in the early seventeenth century complicates our understanding of the (North) Pacific as 
a Spanish lake. The Tokugawa made the first attempt to establish bilateral commercial ties across 
the world’s largest “lake.” Japan also pursued a relationship for which there was then no 
template: reciprocal trade between an Asian and European polity where the latter did not 
function as a conduit for Asian wares.42 Manila complicates this picture, as a Spanish territory 
whose primary purpose was trade with Asia. But it also proves the import of Japan’s outreach: 
once the Tokugawa attempted to trade with a Spanish territory whose sole purpose was not trade 
in Asian goods, the monarchy reacted defensively. Ultimately, Spain closed off the Eastern 
Pacific to Japanese outreach; soon after, Japan severed its connection with the Philippines in the 
Western Pacific. This directional inversion—Spain guarding the east, Japan pursuing less 
troublesome partners in the west—parallels the inversion of expected societal roles, where 
Europeans expand outward and Asian powers opt for isolation. The inversion also reminds us 
that historical actors do not always conform to the roles we give them. 
Chapter Organization 
 Chapter 1, “Sailing East,” explores the initial Tokugawa endeavor to turn the potential of 
trade with New Spain into a reality. These efforts were consistent, persistent, and part of the 
broader goal of attracting foreign trade to eastern Japan. The bulk of existing trade flowed 
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through Kyushu ports in Japan’s southwest; Pacific trade with New Spain offered the possibility 
of foreign commerce farther to the northeast, nearer the center of Tokugawa power. While Ieyasu 
(d. 1616) lived, the Tokugawa pursued relations with Spain more assertively than with any other 
European community and most other partners as well, a fact underappreciated today. The 
Spanish were one of the few to resist Japanese outreach at this time.43 Ieyasu moved through 
concentric circles of Spanish authority to get what he wanted, corresponding with the Philippines 
before dispatching a ship to New Spain in 1610 with a trading license issued to Philip III’s court 
in Madrid. The shogunate’s interactions with its various Spanish interlocutors produced mixed 
results. The viceroy of New Spain sent an ambassador to Japan in response to Ieyasu’s vessel, 
authorized to offer thanks and request permission to survey the coast but little else.  
 Tokugawa dissatisfaction with the lack of diplomatic progress, combined with the loss of 
a second ship bound for New Spain, opened the way for the northern daimyo Date Masamune to 
insert himself into the proceedings. With Tokugawa sanction, Date sent his own embassy in 1613 
on the San Juan Bautista, the largest ship yet to depart Japan for New Spain. The arrangement 
established Date as a diplomatic player in his own right, albeit under Tokugawa auspices. It 
paralleled existing intermediary positions occupied by other daimyo, but preserved the 
Tokugawa goal of attracting foreign trade to northeastern Japan. Date’s gambit suggests one path 
by which individual daimyo might better their situation within a domestic political hierarchy 
headed by the recently-ascendant Tokugawa. Unfortunately, Date’s outreach, meant to provide a 
more flexible and nimble response to Spain, blurred the lines of authority for the party’s Spanish 
hosts in the Americas and in Europe. 
                                                             
43 Resistance came from the most important potential trading and diplomatic partner of all, China. Tokugawa Japan 
traded extensively with private Chinese merchants for over two centuries, but never established formal relations 





 Chapter 2, “Confounding the Court,” analyzes the Keichō Embassy’s struggle to achieve 
the diplomatic standing required to petition the Spanish monarchy effectively. Franciscan friar 
Luis Sotelo emerges here (and throughout) as the key figure and voice of the embassy away from 
Japan. Sotelo initially tried to serve the mission’s ends by distinguishing himself from it, 
claiming to represent the Tokugawa directly while escorting Date’s chief Japanese representative 
Hasekura Tsunenaga. By grafting himself to Japan’s recognized central authority, Sotelo sought 
a stronger position from which to petition the Spanish crown. However, the friar’s detractors, 
Date’s letters, and Sotelo’s own actions told a different story. The muddled picture that resulted 
undercut Spanish trust in the “King of Ōshū” (Date) and raised lasting doubts about the 
“Emperor of Japan’s” (Ieyasu’s) sanction of the enterprise. Additionally, the San Juan Bautista’s 
unbidden, unwelcome arrival in Acapulco provoked Spanish anxiety about Japanese maritime 
and commercial encroachment. The combination of the ship’s arrival and its passengers’ mixed 
messages shaped Philip III’s long-awaited reply to Ieyasu. The monarchy ruled against any 
commercial traffic between New Spain and Japan, even as Sotelo and Hasekura arrived in 
Madrid to petition on behalf of the “king” rather than the “emperor.” Philip’s reply to Ieyasu 
offered little beyond token goodwill, and marked his only direct correspondence with the 
Tokugawa even as Date’s embassy started a conversation of its own in Europe.  
 Chapter 3, “Submitting to Orders,” tracks parallel developments in Spain and Japan, 
examining the fraught relations between diplomatic parties and their hosts. In Catholic Europe, 
Sotelo embraced the rhetoric of piety once it became clear that the party lacked the political 
standing to achieve its ends. Piety played well, as both Philip in Madrid and Pope Paul V in 
Rome embraced the optics of sponsorship and religious patronage. Philip witnessed Hasekura’s 





Sotelo to travel to the Eternal City. Hasekura’s symbolic and ceremonial entrance into Rome as a 
pilgrim from afar marked the high point of the embassy. However, devotion and submission to 
Catholic authorities did not secure secular concessions, and Spain’s diplomatic network ensured 
that the papacy did not grant any requests the crown did not condone.  
 Meanwhile in Japan, the optics of enforcement, not patronage, were in play. Philip’s 
representatives—three friars—handed Ieyasu a reply that pointedly did not touch on the matter 
of trade, but did request protections for Christian missionaries two years after the Tokugawa had 
ordered their expulsion. Philip had offered nothing, thus leaving little to discuss. Ieyasu died 
soon after meeting the party from Spain, and his son had less patience. Tokugawa Hidetada 
(1579–1632) refused an audience and returned all of the gifts earlier presented to his father. 
Following this cold reception the San Juan Bautista departed once more for New Spain in order 
to be rid of Philip’s envoys and retrieve Date’s. 
 Chapter 4, “The Gate Ajar,” examines the practical steps officials in New Spain took to 
close off the Eastern Pacific to Japanese commerce while protecting the Philippines’ trade with 
Japan. A customs dispute in Acapulco involving the San Juan Bautista highlighted the intra- and 
inter-societal tensions framing debates about how best to structure relations between Japan and 
outposts of the Spanish empire. The viceroy of New Spain initially ordered the Bautista to pay 
customs at the same rate levied against goods imported from Manila. The Japanese contingent, 
represented by Sotelo and Hasekura, protested the decision. Surprisingly, representatives of the 
Spanish Philippines joined them, fearing crippling retaliatory tariffs by the Japanese in Manila. 
The viceroyalty reversed its original decision and granted the Bautista permission to trade tax-
free, but it also took steps to ensure no other Japanese ship would call on Acapulco in the future. 





Tokugawa in later decades, and demonstrate that Japan did not possess a monopoly on closure or 
control. They also brought an end to the most concerted effort by any polity to sustain bilateral 
trade across the Pacific prior to the nineteenth century.  
 The final chapter, “Lost at Sea,” chronicles the end of Japanese-Spanish ties in the 
Western Pacific following Spain’s successful efforts to close the eastern seaboard. Japan had 
pursued diplomacy across concentric rings of Spanish imperial authority; the unraveling 
similarly rippled across multiple locales. The Keichō Embassy came to an anticlimactic ending. 
Following a delay in the islands, Hasekura returned to his lord in 1620 with portraits, gifts, and 
strange tales, but little more. Sotelo mounted an ill-advised return to Japan, only to be 
imprisoned and executed in Kyushu. With peninsular Spain and New Spain uninterested, final 
diplomatic overtures came from the Philippines, but by 1625 the shogunate had washed its hands 
of Spain’s inflexible demands and its minimal interest in meeting Japan’s own. Thus the 
thwarted potential of Japan’s relationship with New Spain injured the real commercial link active 
between the islands and the archipelago. Ieyasu’s successors contented themselves with ensuring 
adequate—though never complete—oversight of foreign trade to the south, west, and north, 
abandoning any such enclave in the east. The end of Pacific trade ensured that the centers of 
Japanese domestic political power and foreign trade remained at a distance from each other. The 
Tokugawa relationship with Spain developed and deteriorated more rapidly than with almost any 
other community, and the Spanish were the first—of but two—groups excluded from the 
archipelago. Yet this severance came a half-dozen years after Spain closed off the Americas. 
 A brief conclusion discusses the rediscovery of the Keichō Embassy in the nineteenth 
century by another famous Japanese mission abroad, as well as the place of the Keichō Embassy 





isolation, as a model of engagement for a country again reassessing its global role and 
relationships in the twenty-first century. The assignation of a doomed foresight allows Date and 
Hasekura to achieve their salience as symbols of intrepid encounter. Both men are depicted as 
ahead of their time, and thus victims of it. The West’s willingness to engage is unassailable and 
assumed in these conceptions, which reinforce the need for Japan to once again “open up.” The 
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1. Sailing East: Tokugawa Diplomatic Outreach 1600–1613 
 
First Contact, Ten Years in the Making 
Addressing the Duke of Lerma, of Spain, 
The matter of black ships (kurofune) crossing from New Spain to Japan has been passed 
along to the former lord (kokushu) of Luzon. [The ships may] make landing at any port 
in Japan, and there will not be even the slightest reservation [in receiving them]. This 
padre, Fray Luis Sotelo, can speak of the particulars. 
Keichō year 14, 12th month, 28th day [1610.1.22] 
(seal of Ieyasu)1 
 So reads the full text of Tokugawa Ieyasu’s first and only letter to the court of Philip III 
of Spain. Concise and reserved as always, Ieyasu left much unsaid. The Tokugawa hegemon 
made no mention of his decade-long effort to integrate Japan directly into Spain’s Pacific 
commerce. Similarly, though “black ships crossing from New Spain to Japan” indicated trade, 
Ieyasu omitted mention of any specific imports or exports he hoped might sustain that trade. Nor 
did he request that New Spain (present-day Mexico) dispatch the empire’s experts in mining 
technologies, navigation, or shipbuilding, all matters that had been points of conversation and 
contention with Spanish officials in Manila and Japan. Finally, Ieyasu demurred from explaining 
the “former lord of Luzon’s” presence in Japan, or his apparent relevance to the matter at hand. 
Fray Luis Sotelo would have many details to cover, had he made the journey. But Sotelo’s tenure 
as a diplomatic agent took a meandering path, as we shall see. 
                                                             
1 AGI,MP-ESCRITURA_CIFRA,30. Accesible online vía the Portal de Archivos Españoles (PARES), 
http://pares.mcu.es  (accessed March 25, 2017). An annotated print version is also available in Murakami Naojirō, 
ed., Ikoku ōfuku shokanshū (Tokyo: Sunnansha, 1929), 93-94 (doc. 32). 
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 The present chapter delineates Japanese efforts to engage with the Spanish Empire across 
the Pacific, and analyzes the Tokugawa shogunate’s approach to doing so. Ieyasu’s ambitions for 
trans-Pacific commerce culminated with Date Masamune’s 1613 embassy, the final iteration of a 
decade of experimentation bent on opening New Spain to Japan. The archipelago’s relationship 
with Spain was never the most important connection, but in terms of effort, outlay, and vision, 
the pursuit may have been the shogunate’s most ambitious. After all, Ieyasu was attempting to 
open an ocean. The pages that follow trace the evolving approaches to several interrelated 
questions: who should front the engagement with New Spain; how best to navigate the layers of 
Spain’s imperial administration; whom to appoint and trust as a representative; what was worth 
writing, and how to initiate a relationship between Tokugawa Japan and Habsburg Spain while 
skirting the issue of how shogun and monarch should relate to each other. Maintaining 
conversations over layers of authority across an ocean proved a formidable challenge. From the 
beginning, Spanish officialdom adopted a guarded, cautious stance, trying to protect its 
prerogatives in an empire that stretched effective administrative capacity. Conversely, a 
Tokugawa regime new to the political and diplomatic stage moved nimbly to pursue its 
developing interests. Tokugawa experiments with the form, function and scale of diplomacy 
turned into the only attempt, outside of an expressly imperial or colonial context, to establish a 
trans-Pacific relationship prior to the nineteenth century. 
 The text of Ieyasu’s letter and the context of its dispatch suggest a great deal about how 
the Tokugawa shogunate pursued relations with Habsburg Spain, a political and commercial 
presence in Asia but a diplomatic unknown. Above all, the letter functioned as much as a license 
as it did as diplomatic correspondence. Ieyasu stated and declared; he did not ask or request. The 
document’s implied petition—that Spanish ships from New Spain be sent to Japan—was buried 
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as a “matter…passed along,” thereby evading any language of permission. Ieyasu paid no 
homage. Just how the two polities might structure their relations or establish relative rank 
remained vague, a matter that plagued subsequent diplomatic efforts. Technically, Ieyasu did not 
write the king himself, opting to write instead to the king’s favorite at court, or privado, the Duke 
of Lerma.2 Addressing Lerma made it easier to obfuscate the delicate issue of title and the 
implied hierarchies contained therein, a quandary that vexed the shogunate on multiple 
diplomatic fronts during this time.3 In writing Lerma, Ieyasu also demonstrated a basic grasp of 
Habsburg court politics and political institutions. The reference to the “former Lord of Luzon” 
(前呂宋国主, zen Ruson kokushu) suggested knowledge of the Spanish empire’s administrative 
system as well one potential source of such knowledge. This “lord” (国主, kokushu) referred to 
the outgoing interim Governor-General of the Philippines, Rodrigo de Vivero, who shipwrecked 
off the coast of present-day Chiba in 1609 on the return voyage from the Philippines to New 
Spain.4 Noting his status as a “former lord,” Ieyasu understood the appointed nature of Vivero’s 
office, and in turn, the need to deal with the authority conferring such appointments. 
 Less was more. Lean prose and sparse phrasing defined the letter, and Ieyasu provided 
little context. Vivero’s unexpected arrival catalyzed the shogunate’s outreach, and Ieyasu’s brief 
remarks belie the considerable effort the shogunate invested in delivering the letter. Most 
notably, the letter was not the only delivery. The Viceroyalty of New Spain had thought Vivero 
                                                             
2  The address reads ゑすはんや・とふけい・てい・れるま to render the Spanish España Duque de Lerma. 
3 In negotiating the reopening of relations with Joseon for Korea, for example, the shogunate ultimately adopted the 
neologism taikun (大君) to avoid the hierarchical implications of titles associated with Chinese diplomatic relations. 
See Kamiya Nobuyuki, Taikun gaikō to Higashi Ajia (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1997), and in English, Ronald 
Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
4 Vivero’s time in Japan is discussed in more detail below. 
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lost, and returning the “Lord of Luzon” unharmed demonstrated the shogunate’s good faith and 
intentions. A cargo hold full of goods also accompanied lord and letter, supervised by Japanese 
merchants trying their hand in the American market. The merchants’ presence made it clear what 
type of relationship Ieyasu envisaged and how he proposed to pursue it, even prior to obtaining 
official approval. The means of delivery doubled as a declaration. 
 Ieyasu returned Vivero and sent his letter via the archipelago’s first vessel outfitted for a 
trans-Pacific crossing. Commissioned by the shogunate, designed by the Englishman Will 
Adams (1564–1620), and constructed in Japan, today the 120-ton vessel is known by its Spanish 
name: San Buena Ventura.5 In requesting kurofune from New Spain, Ieyasu had dispatched a 
“black ship” of his own. The vessel sent the clearest message of all, declaring Japanese interest 
in opening the waterways of the Pacific to its own shipping, thereby ending the Spanish 
monopoly on the only commercial route between the Americas and Asia. The Viceroy of New 
Spain welcomed Vivero, his nephew by marriage, but met the vessel with considerably less 
cheer.6 
 Sending a clipped message protected the shogunate from overextension or 
embarrassment, but it also necessitated delegating a great deal of responsibility, and placing a 
great deal of trust, in the messenger. This was all the more true when corresponding with a polity 
that possessed no knowledge of Classical Chinese, the lingua franca of East Asian diplomacy. A 
letter to Joseon Korea or the polities of Vietnam would be read by the recipients, but a letter to 
                                                             
5 The three Japanese vessels intended for trans-Pacific voyages are known today by their Spanish names, reflecting 
the presence of the Spanish speakers who helped construct and sail them to their destinations. Japanese records most 
often called European galleons kurofune (黒船), and extended the practice also to the few galleons constructed in 
Japan. Will Adams was an advisor to Ieyasu who appears in the records of Japanese and Europeans alike. On the 
San Buena Ventura, see Gonoi Takashi, Hasekura Tsunenaga (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2003), 32. 
6 The viceroy at the time was Luis Velasco, Marqués de Salinas. Salinas returned to Spain in 1611, and advised the 
monarchy as the head of the Council of the Indies, thus debating the response to Japan.  
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Spain required translation, and trust in the translators.7 It is fitting that the only concrete detail 
Ieyasu provided in his letter was the name of the man to be entrusted with all others: the 
Franciscan friar Luis Sotelo.  
 The choice of representative followed existing precedent and made sense logistically, but 
still gives pause. Successive generations of political leadership in Japan had made use of 
Buddhist monks to draft their foreign correspondence and to head missions to China and other 
locales.8 A literate Catholic missionary fulfilled an analogous role for any outreach to the 
Spanish monarchy, and the archipelago’s resident missionary population was the best equipped 
to travel between the political leadership of the shogunate and the empire. Unlike earlier 
prominent missionaries, Sotelo came with the added benefit of being a Castilian and native of 
Seville, peninsular Spain’s terminus for all trade with the Indies.9  
 However, the role of missionaries and the scope of their evangelical mission concerned 
Japanese leadership even prior to Tokugawa ascension in 1600.10 Catholic missionaries answered 
to a “higher” authority, raising doubts as to the loyalty of their growing flock at a time when a 
new regime was in the process of asserting, defining, and protecting recently-won political 
                                                             
7 Ieyasu had his scribes write to Lerma in sōrōbun (epistolary Japanese) rather than classical Chinese, though the 
shogunate used the latter in contact with Manila. Classical Chinese would have been legible to the Chinese merchant 
community in the Philipppines, though it is unclear if that fact influenced the shogunate’s choice of writing.  
8 The role of monks in Japan’s commercial and diplomatic relations with Asia is discussed in Charlotte von 
Verschuer, Across the Perilous Sea: Japanese Trade with China and Korea from the Seventh to the Sixteenth 
Centuries (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2006). See as well von Verschuer’s article “Ashikaga Yoshimitsu’s Foreign 
Policy 1398 to 1408 A.D.: A Translation from ‘Zenrin Kokuhōki,’ the Cambridge Manuscript,” Monumenta 
Nipponica 62 (2007): 261–97. 
9 Francis Xavier was from the present-day Basque Country—ruled by Spain but considered separate from the crown 
of Castile; Alessandro Valignano was Italian; and both Luis Frois and Joao Rodrigues were Portuguese. 
10 Toyotomi Hideyoshi issued an edict prohibiting Christianity in 1587. Tokugawa Ieyasu announced his own in 
1614. These developments will be discussed in more detail below. 
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prerogatives.11 The nature of the project and the distance involved guaranteed that envoys would 
represent Tokugawa interests for multiple years while abroad. The choice demonstrated a 
continued reliance on and trust in missionaries’ expertise in foreign relations at a time when the 
shogunate was ambivalent about their role in Japan.12 As long as Japan’s central leadership 
remained committed to commerce with the Spanish empire, it could find common ground with 
sympathetic missionaries who saw commercial relations as a pathway to spiritual dividends. It 
chose specifically to rely on Franciscans, who were the religious order most active in both the 
Philippines and New Spain, and who used Manila as a staging ground for their mission in 
Japan.13 In time, both Japan and Spain would come to question the trustworthiness of the 
intermediaries traveling between them.  
 Finally, it is worth noting that the Tokugawa shogunate reached out directly rather than 
through an intermediary. Ieyasu welcomed the black ships of New Spain to any port in Japan, 
and thereby asserted suzerainty over the entirety of the archipelago. The Spanish could 
disembark anywhere, but wherever they disembarked would be a Tokugawa port. This 
geographical blank check was but part of the shogunate’s evolving system of relations, a system 
in which the Tokugawa also established direct control over certain locales while outsourcing 
specific bilateral ties to well-placed daimyo. In 1610, Satsuma domain was serving as the portal 
                                                             
11 C.R. Boxer estimated that the Japanese Christian population reached 250,000–300,000 in the early seventeenth 
century. See his The Christian Century in Japan: 1549–1650 (Berkeley: University of California Press 1951), 320–
21. 
12 Sotelo’s replacement was also a Spanish Franciscan missionary, Alonso Muñoz. As discussed later, the change 
occurred either due to illness or the objections of other missionaries in Japan, not because of Tokugawa displeasure. 
13 The Jesuits, though active in the Philippines, traditionally ventured to Japan from Macao, i.e. via the Portuguese 
empire. Rivalry between Jesuits and the Franciscans mirrored the commercial tension between Macao and Manila, 
and by extension, the Portuguese and Spanish empires. Dominicans and Augustinians were also active in Japan, 
albeit on a lesser scale. C.R. Boxer’s The Christian Century remains a readable overview of the growth of various 
Japan missions and the intrigue surrounding them. See also Michael Cooper, They Came to Japan: An Anthology of 
European Reports on Japan, 1543-1640 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965). 
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to Ryukyu; Tsushima domain continued to mediate the resumption of ties with Joseon Korea; the 
Matsumae administered trade and contact with the hunter-gatherer population of Ezo (present-
day Hokkaido); and the Dutch East India Company (VOC) had just established a commercial 
outpost on the island of Hirado. For its part, the shogunate directly managed the important port 
of Nagasaki and the trade conducted there by Chinese and Portuguese merchants, among others. 
It further oversaw the important domestic port of Sakai, linking the imperial capital of Kyoto to 
the Inland Sea.14 None of these locales were close to the shogunate’s base of power at Edo on the 
Kantō Plain, and over the previous decade the shogunate had unsuccessfully encouraged the 
Spanish, Dutch, and English to drop anchor nearer its rapidly-growing capital. In contrast, 
Ieyasu’s 1610 overture came with no such strings, and with no proposed mediator, yet. 
The Potential of (New) Spain 
This year the Lord Daifu writes to Your Lordship in response to the letter you sent him 
last year. 
Many ships from Japan have come to your land, and [you] the lord governor do not like 
that so many go; I would know the reason for this. [If] Your Lordship indicates the 
[number of] ships that you want to go, only those will go, carrying the ‘chapa’ of the 
emperor. Those that do not carry [a chapa] should not be received. 
 
The Lord Daifu always writes to Your Lordship [asking if] you have sent a request for 
the trade of New Spain [with Japan], but you have never responded to him [regarding 
this matter], which is most lamentable. Your Lordship will inform him whether or not it 
                                                             
14 At the time, the city was also called Miyako (都, “the capital”), but for convenience’s sake I refer to the city as 
“Kyoto” throughout. 
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is possible, because he will take great pleasure in knowing it, with which the ports and 
the sea will be much safer from thieves. The sixth day of the tenth month of the sixth 
year of the Lord Daifu. Your Lordship will respond to me. 
       —Nagasaki Bugyō Terasawa Hirotaka to the Governor-General of the Philippines, 160115 
 
 Potential defined the Tokugawa relationship with Spain: potential for trade, for conflict, 
and for cooperation. Ieyasu pursued a campaign of consistent outreach, but consistently reaped 
only frustration. The Tokugawa hegemon regularly corresponded with the Governor-General of 
the Philippines from 1600 through 1610, as did proxies such as Tokugawa Hidetada and 
shogunate officials like Terasawa.16 Various Kyushu daimyo also exchanged letters with secular 
and religious officials in Manila.17 Just as importantly, the Philippines became one of the most 
common destinations for ships sailing under Tokugawa permission and protection after Ieyasu 
established the shuin (red-seal) system of licensed trade. The Portuguese carrack out of Macao 
continued to import large quantities of silk to Japan, but Manila served as an important additional 
source of Chinese silk. Furthermore, relations with the New Spain might offer Tokugawa 
leadership commercial expansion on a level the Portuguese could not match, and bring trade to 
areas of Japan under direct Tokugawa control.  
                                                             
15 “Copia de carta de Tarazaua Ximono Cami,” AGI,FILIPINAS,19,R.3,N.36. My translation from the Spanish 
original. The translator muddles the date and ruler. 1601 corresponds to the sixth year of the Keichō Era, while 
“Daifu” refers to Ieyasu. One was not named for the other, nor had Ieyasu been in power for six years. The original 
Japanese is lost, but a Japanese rendering of the AGI manuscript can be found in Murakami Naojiro, Ikoku ōfuku 
shokanshū (1929), doc. 28. AGI gives the year as 1602, the date of the translation, but not the original letter.  
16 Many of these letters have been published in Murakami, Ikoku ōfuku shokanshū. 
17 The Matsuura of Hirado and Nabeshima of Saga both corresponded with the Philippines. For examples, see 
Murakami, Ikoku ōfuku, docs. 9, 18, and 40. 
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 When it came to Tokugawa efforts, outlay, and expectations, Spain occupied pride of 
place among the nanbanjin (南蛮人, “southern Barbarians”). Relations with the Dutch 
bookended this first decade of Tokugawa self-definition and experimentation in commerce and 
diplomacy, but contact with the nodes of the Habsburg Spanish Empire helped define it. 
Tokugawa-VOC relations rightly command scholarly and popular attention as Japan’s most 
durable connection to the opposite end of Eurasia, and as a case study in the fictions, 
compromises, and conflicts that undergirded relations between early-modern polities across 
political traditions. However, the VOC established itself as a credible, reliable trading presence 
in Japan through a long, haphazard process. The English did not set up a factory in Japan until 
1613, but the English East India Company left Japan of its own accord in 1623, unable to turn a 
profit in the archipelago without ready access to Chinese silk or American silver. The Portuguese 
trade was important but established, and established far away from the Tokugawa power base in 
Edo. Against this backdrop, the Spanish in Manila were close, hosted a reliable population of 
Chinese merchants and their silk, posed no direct military threat, and offered additional markets 
in America and trade involving northeastern Japan. Ieyasu thus focused on efforts to increase ties 
to the Spanish, and pursued this relationship the most consistently and aggressively of any of his 
encounters with European communities. 
 However, treating Japan’s relations with Spain solely in the context of the country’s 
encounter with the West is insufficient; the Spanish also belong squarely in the context of 
Japan’s relations with East Asia.18 The Habsburg dynasty predated the Tokugawa as a political 
                                                             
18 The same contextual shift applies to the Portuguese, Dutch, and English. Though the Japanese distinguished 
between nanbanjin (南蛮人) and established East and Southeast Asian actors, the appellation tracked little with 
contemporary conceptions of the “West.” Before Europeans were western they were southern, as all of them 
approached the Japanese archipelago from the south. 
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actor in Asia by more than three decades, even if population, geography, and history made 
“Japan” the more formidable, stable power. In terms of consistent effort, outlay, and interest, 
Tokugawa outreach to the Spanish paralleled contemporary diplomatic outreach to Joseon Korea 
and Ming China in the wake of Hideyoshi’s disastrous invasions of the Korean peninsula. In 
1607, the first of three “Reply and Prisoner Repatriation Envoys” arrived in Japan from Korea, 
before relations completely normalized through the “communication envoys” (通信使, Jp. 
tsūshinshi, K. tongsinsa) of the following two centuries.19 Formal contact with the Joseon 
dynasty outside of a Chinese framework granted Japan access to goods and information from the 
Asian mainland while bolstering Tokugawa claims to diplomatic independence. This diplomatic 
success helped cushion the fallout from the shogunate’s inability to establish formal relations 
with Ming China on favorable terms. Efforts towards a Ming rapprochement persisted 
throughout Ieyasu’s lifetime and continued after his death; only in 1621 did Hidetada finally turn 
away from the Ming court, a major step in consolidating an alternative Japanese diplomatic 
hierarchy with the Tokugawa shogunate at its center.20 
 “Success” with Korea and “failure” with China are both instructive in an examination of 
relations with Spain. All three involved consistent, multi-year (sometimes multi-decade) efforts 
to achieve Tokugawa commercial and diplomatic goals. These goals varied: expanding trade to 
new parts of Japan (Spain), normalizing diplomatic relations with a nearby neighbor (Korea), 
and rejoining the paradigmatic system of foreign relations in East Asia and direct access to its 
largest market (China). Bundled together, all three served to stabilize commerce and diplomacy 
                                                             
19 See James Lewis, Frontier Contact between Choson Korea and Tokugawa Japan (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
20 Toby, State and Diplomacy, 62–64. See also Tashiro Kazui, “Foreign Relations during the Edo Period: Sakoku 
Reexamined,” Journal of Japanese Studies 2 (1982), 283–306, and Arano Yasunori, “The Formation of a 
Japanocentric World Order,” International Journal of Asian Studies 2 (2005), 185–216. 
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under the Tokugawa banner, reinforcing Ieyasu’s claims to domestic authority and access to 
resources, wealth, and information attendant on trade.  
 Japan’s “failure” to secure official ties with Ming China has become a cornerstone of the 
academic work outlining the evolution of a Tokugawa “world order” and evaluating its 
achievement. Exclusion from China’s tributary hierarchy spurred the creation of the diplomatic 
framework attendant upon Pax Tokugawa for over two centuries. The collapse of the Ming in the 
seventeenth century seems further to validate the Tokugawa path of independence and 
experimentation well after the fact. In contrast, inability to establish lasting ties with Spain is 
entwined with the flip-side of Tokugawa independence: Japan’s supposed seclusion, and the 
forced exclusion of Catholic Europe from the archipelago’s shores. Yet, as this chapter (and 
indeed, the entire dissertation) argues, in order to understand Japan’s turn away from Spain 
properly, we must examine the assertive, multi-pronged engagement with the Spanish empire 
that preceded it. Habsburg Spain never assumed the significance of Ming China, whether in 
terms of commercial importance or diplomatic legitimacy, but relations with Spain demonstrate 
both the breadth of the early Tokugawa vision and the limits of its capacity and willingness to 
expand when confronting weary, obfuscating interlocutors. 
 In contrast, the successful resumption of relations with Korea informs our understanding 
of how the Tokugawa navigated the inherent dissonance of a functionally equal (or at least 
equivalent) bilateral relationship within a hierarchical diplomatic framework. Rapprochement 
succeeded through the opportunistic actions of the Tokugawa’s chosen mediators, the Sō clan of 
Tsushima. Sō forgery of select titles and documents passed between the shogunate and the 
Joseon court papered over continued differences of protocol. Ieyasu eventually learned of the 
deception, but given the benefits of smoother relations, opted for light punishments.  
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 The most common intermediaries between the shogunate and the Spanish were 
missionaries, who were also not above manipulating the ambiguities present in the documents 
they carried and often helped translate. As we shall see, however, in the case of the daimyo Date 
Masamune’s eventual mission to Spain, ambiguities regarding the mission’s true sponsor and 
goals gave Fray Luis Sotelo less, not more, room in which to operate. Similarly, Korea and 
Japan’s willingness to skirt the issue of hierarchy for mutual gain contrasts with the inability of 
the Tokugawa and Habsburgs to navigate each other’s diplomatic logics, commercial interests, 
and political motivations, if only to agree to ignore the same sensitive issues. 
 The shogunate’s commercial contact with the Spanish Philippines during this first decade 
stalemated: Tokugawa requests for more trade farther north butted against Spanish hesitancy and 
equivocation. Trade with New Spain loomed in the background; Ieyasu and his proxies inquired, 
and successive governors-general demurred. Nagasaki magistrate Terasawa’s early letter and its 
reply laid bare those dynamics.  
 From the onset, Manila and Edo differed on what constituted a desirable volume of trade. 
Both sides sought restriction, albeit for dissimilar reasons. The Tokugawa worked to exclude 
trade outside its sanction, but did not yet aggressively curtail the volume of trade conducted 
under its purview.  Conversely, Manila sought to limit trade volume and curb the growth of the 
Asian merchant populations supporting it. Chinese and Japanese traders vastly outnumbered their 
Spanish counterparts and the city’s garrison, a fact that put the Spanish perpetually on edge in 
their own city. Thus, the shogunate sought to manage trade while the Spanish Philippines 
endeavored to set and enforce limits.21 Terasawa’s initial framing of the shuin trade system 
                                                             
21 I do not suggest that Manila’s Spanish population avoided trade or profit. Rather, it feared losing control of its 
own settlement and grew uneasy at the swelling numbers of Chinese and Japanese residents in and around the city. 
Concern about the number of Japanese present in Japan continued well into the next decade. In 1619, the 
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evidenced this tension. His letter delineated what type of ship should be allowed to trade—those 
with a pass—but left the number of vessels to the Governor-General’s discretion. Terasawa’s 
translated letter anticipated that the Governor-General would decide on a low number: “Many 
ships from Japan have gone to your land, and [you] the lord governor do not like that so many 
go; I would like to know the reason for this.”22 Terasawa requested an explanation rather than 
expressing displeasure, echoing Ieyasu’s willingness to accommodate the Spanish up to a point. 
Responding in June 1602, the recently-arrived Governor-General Pedro Bravo de Acuña 
stipulated that no more than six Japanese ships arrive in Manila annually, three with each 
monsoon. Six years later Rodrigo de Vivero lowered that number to four. No doubt illicit trade 
swelled the number of ships above stated limits, but such limits were of more concern to the 
Governor-General than to the shogunate. 
 Spanish officials also resisted Tokugawa efforts to bring trade farther north. Ieyasu 
wished to see Spanish ships bringing goods to the ports around Edo. A later letter relayed 
Ieyasu’s desire that foreign ships call at ports near the de facto capital, and his disappointment 
that none were coming. The Spanish made a half-hearted effort to comply. Acuña and Vivero 
each ordered ships to call on harbors close to Edo, bypassing the established commercial ports of 
Kyushu. At least two Spanish vessels conducted trade at one such harbor, Uraga, in the first 
decade of the seventeenth century, while one other made landfall on the island of Shikoku after 
faltering on the way to Edo. But the overwhelming majority of Spanish ships coming up from 
Manila preferred Kyushu ports such as Nagasaki. 
                                                             
procurador general of the Philippines Fernando de los Ríos Coronel cited a Japanese population of 2,000 and asked 
Philip to order its expulsion. See AGI,FILIPINAS,27,N.108. 
22 AGI,FILIPINAS,19,R.3,N.36 
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 In this preference the Spanish were not unique. The Tokugawa consistently tried, and 
consistently failed, to draw foreign trade into the ports of the Kantō Plain. The Dutch and the 
English preferred the existing commercial opportunities of Kyushu to the potential benefits of 
trading near Japan’s new political center. Despite Ieyasu’s invitation to trade anywhere, the 
Dutch and English East India Companies settled in the southwest. The Dutch VOC established 
an outpost (“factory”) in Hirado in 1609, and the English followed suit in the same port four 
years later. Will Adams, by now a trusted Tokugawa advisor and merchant in his own right, 
recommended to both that they establish their outposts near Edo, to no avail. The VOC was still 
building out the network of entrepôts throughout East and Southeast Asia that would sustain the 
company’s fortunes for the next century. Maritime aggression fueled the Company as much as 
legitimate trade, as attested by its many attempts to capture the cargo of Iberian ships. The 
ongoing conflict between the Habsburg crown and the Low Countries fueled maritime 
misadventure in Asia, despite the Pax Hispanica in Europe during 1598–1621. For their part, the 
English had no ready access to Chinese silk, but hoped to secure it through exposure to existing 
markets. Self-isolation near Edo would not have helped them with these goals.  
 By contrast, Chinese merchants do not appear to have been courted in this way, likely 
due to their long history of trade with southwestern Japan, and the lack of formal diplomatic ties 
to the Ming. Similarly, the annual Portuguese carrack reliably carried its lucrative cargo between 
Macao and Nagasaki, continuing a connection between the Portuguese and western Kyushu 
nearly as old as Ieyasu himself.23 Together the Chinese and the Portuguese (with their Chinese 
                                                             
23 Ieyasu was born in 1543, the year the Portuguese first set foot in Japan on the island of Tanegashima. Portuguese 
trade spurred the development of Nagasaki as a commercial port under the Kyushu daimyo Ōmura Sumitada (1533–
1587). The Society of Jesus directly managed the port for a brief time before Hideyoshi brought the port under his 
direct control. The Tokugawa continued the practice of direct administration, though the rest of Kyushu remained 
under the control of various daimyo.  
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silk) formed the axis of Japan’s foreign trade, establishing a commercial gravity that other 
trading partners found difficult to ignore.24 
 If the Spanish were not unique in avoiding trade with Edo, the Tokugawa were uniquely 
invested in bringing them there. These efforts reveal the connection that existed between Manila 
and New Spain in the eyes of shogunate officials. While the English and Dutch did not wish to 
sail the monsoon winds all the way to Edo, the Spanish sailed by northeastern Japan every year 
with a cargo hold full of silk on their annual voyage eastward to the Americas. Ieyasu knew of 
this route even before his victory at Sekigahara, while still a member of the five-man council 
ruling on behalf of Hideyoshi’s heir. Ieyasu learned of the route of the Manila Galleon no later 
than 1598, when he held an audience with a visiting Portuguese missionary who explained the 
route of the ships. The galleons traveled north on the Kuroshio (“Black Tide”) Current near the 
Pacific coast of Japan before reaching the North Pacific Current propelling them eastward across 
the Pacific. Edo and the surrounding area seemed a natural waystation for Spanish ships before 
the long open-water voyage across the northern Pacific. The silks carried back to the Americas 
were also in demand in Japan, especially in the growing consumer center of Edo. Spanish 
expertise in silver mining, developed in Latin America, could augment Tokugawa efforts to 
exploit Japan’s silver-rich mineral deposits. Finally, the Americas possessed no direct 
commercial ties with Asian polities, meaning trade could be established in Edo without having to 
dislodge merchants from Kyushu. With so much to recommend it, it is little wonder Ieyasu 
continued to press the issue of trade with New Spain in letters to the Philippines. 
                                                             
24 Merchants from the polities of Vietnam and the Kingdom of Siam, among others, also regularly traded with Japan. 
Further research could determine to what extent, if any, the shogunate attempted to entice these merchants 
northward. 
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 Yet nothing happened, as economic and political forces provided little incentive for 
Manila to cooperate. The Spanish settlement remained apprehensive about the economic 
ramifications of Japan’s entrance into Pacific commerce. The outpost enjoyed a monopoly on the 
trade goods of an entire continent. Moreover, that monopoly was the Philippines’ lifeblood; 
without the galleons from Acapulco the settlement would collapse, a fact not lost on its 
inhabitants. They could not afford to dismiss any potential threat or disruption to the galleon 
trade. Moreover, Ieyasu’s request was not Manila’s to grant. The Governor-General was the 
junior partner in Spain’s intra-colony trade across the Pacific, for the crown administered the 
Philippines as an exclave of the Viceroyalty of New Spain. Though Philip’s highest-ranking 
Spanish representative in Asia, the Governor-General answered to the Viceroy in Mexico, as 
well as to the crown in Madrid. Commercial anxieties aside, rerouting the galleons was a 
decision for those above the Governor-General’s rank. Nor could he arrange for additional ships 
in New Spain to call on Japanese ports directly. At best, he could forward the request up the 
ladder. Acuña relayed Ieyasu’s request for ships out of the Americas, and even lent his support to 
the idea, but that was the extent of his influence.25 The Tokugawa were asking Manila to agree to 
terms it could not dictate.  
  Manila traded with Japan under the new Tokugawa regime, but never to the satisfaction 
of Ieyasu and top officials. The Governor-General accepted the licensed trade of the shuin 
system, recognizing Tokugawa authority in the process. But the Philippines tried to keep the 
number of Japanese ships and Japanese people at a level it thought manageable. Ieyasu invited 
                                                             
25 I have not yet been able to track down the Spanish court’s response to Acuña on this matter, if there was one. The 
relevant holdings at the AGI in Seville do not contain a sustained debate on the question of trade between Japan and 
the Americas until Japanese ships began arriving in Acapulco in 1610. The ships forced the issue, though it is 
possible that the court commented to Acuña on the matter earlier. It is highly unlikely any such response would have 
given concrete support to Ieyasu’s requests. 
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ships north to Edo, and the Spanish acquiesced in fits and starts, driven more by the desire to 
mollify the Tokugawa leader than any commercial opportunity. The bulk of the Japan-Spain 
trade continued over the sea lanes linking Manila to the ports of Kyushu. Similar efforts to pull 
trade north throughout the decade met with little success, as the newly-arrived VOC settled far 
from Edo.  
 Ieyasu’s government was not removed from the mechanisms of commerce. Tokugawa 
officials controlled Nagasaki, and the shogunate routed silk through a sanctioned cartel of 
distributors limited to merchants from major markets. Together these measures ensured a 
prominent role for the shogunate regarding the price and volume of silk imports. Control over 
Japan’s mines also gave the shogunate a say in the export of silver. Finally, the shuin system 
reinforced the shogunate’s authority at home and influence abroad, establishing Japan as an 
arbiter of official trade in the East and South China Seas. 
 But Ieyasu sought more, and his city of Edo remained geographically isolated from 
foreign trade even as his administrative mechanisms took hold. Spain’s route to the Americas 
appeared as a straightforward way to ameliorate the issue. If, however, the Spanish proved 
unwilling to venture to Edo, the Tokugawa could strike out on their own. Ieyasu had the 
resources to fund such a venture. In Will Adams and other advisors, he had capable shipwrights 
on hand. But the Pacific crossing was the longest open-ocean voyage that one could attempt. 
Ieyasu lacked sailors knowledgeable and capable enough to handle the crossing. He also lacked 
the assurance that a Japanese dropping anchor in the Americas would be permitted to trade and 
purchase provisions. In 1609, a violent storm happened to spit up remedies to both problems off 
the coast of the Bōsō Peninsula. 
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 1609 ushered in the peak of Tokugawa involvement in exploration of foreign affairs.  
Developments unfolded on multiple fronts that year. With Ieyasu’s permission, the Shimazu clan 
of Satsuma invaded the Ryukyu kingdom to the south (present-day Okinawa), and sent the 
subdued king to pay homage to the Tokugawa in Edo. Thereafter, Ryukyu sent annual tribute 
missions to the Tokugawa, mediated by the Shimazu. The VOC established itself in Hirado, 
marking the beginning of a sustained Dutch presence in the archipelago. A scuffle between 
Japanese and Portuguese in Macao spilled over into Nagasaki, capped off by the dramatic 
sinking of the Portuguese Madre de Deus in the city’s harbor at the hands of its own captain, 
disrupting trade with Portugal until 1612.26 The incident and its aftermath, along with growing 
unease about the influence of Portuguese missionaries in Japan, increased Tokugawa willingness 
to explore alternatives. The shuin trade continued to thrive, as the Tokugawa shogunate 
authorized over a hundred passes to sixteen destinations through 1609.27  
 That year an autumn storm contributed to the flurry of diplomatic activity, catching three 
Spanish ships making the eastward journey from Manila to Acapulco. The San Antonio 
weathered the storm and completed its journey, while the winds blew the smaller Santa Ana 
toward the coast of southern Kyushu. The third and largest ship, the San Francisco, broke up on 
shore much farther north, and deposited outgoing Governor-General of the Philippines Rodrigo 
de Vivero northeast of Edo.28 Vivero’s surprise sojourn in Japan would catalyze the next decade 
of Japan’s bold experiment with crossing the Pacific. 
                                                             
26 The Madre de Deus affair is recounted in Boxer, Christian Century, 278–285. 
27 Nakamura Tadashi, Eiinbon Ikoku nikki: Konchiin Sūden gaikō monjo shūsei (Tokyo: Tokyo Bijutsu, 1989), 3–4. 
28 See Juan Gil, Hidalgos y samurais (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1991), 149–51. The Santa Ana departed Kyushu 
the next year and reached Acapulco in October 1610. 
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Red Seals, Black Ships, and Mixed Messages 
 Rodrigo de Vivero’s unexpected arrival in Japan brought Tokugawa and Habsburg 
authority closer together than ever before, yet his sojourn revealed how far apart the two polities 
remained. His visit also foreshadowed the difficulty of locating a singular “Spanish” or 
“Japanese” authority for contemporary actors (and present-day scholars), and the challenge of 
sustaining a conversation between dissonant diplomatic frameworks. The web of representatives, 
letters, and ships produced in Vivero’s wake exemplified the complications dogging outreach 
efforts between the shogunate and the court. Vivero departed Japan in 1610, accompanied by a 
Franciscan friar carrying letters from the Tokugawa to Philip’s court in Madrid. In the next 
decade, the king of Spain, the retired Tokugawa shogun, the sitting shogun, two viceroys of New 
Spain, a daimyo of northern Japan, two governors-general of the Philippines, and the pope all 
tried to make sense of one another through correspondence and representatives. Replies lagged, 
ambassadorial parties overlapped, representatives pursued their own agendas, and ships arrived 
where they weren’t expected or welcome. Distance and disparate interests conspired to foil 
persistent Japanese efforts to deepen commercial ties and establish the diplomatic common 
ground necessary to support them. 
 Temporarily, the shipwrecked Vivero bridged the distance. Having survived the tempest 
that washed him onto Japan’s Pacific coast, the outgoing governor-general of the Philippines 
spent close to a year in the archipelago. The Tokugawa quickly realized the value of their guest, 
and escorted him to the halls of power. Hidetada first received Vivero in audience in Edo before 
Ieyasu summoned the Spaniard to his complex in Sunpu to the southwest. Vivero described these 
meetings as amicable encounters with affable, inquisitive leaders. Hidetada purportedly “smiled 
Joshua Batts 
Ch. 1 – Sailing East 
47 
 
as he told the interpreters how much he had looked forward to receiving and meeting me.”29 
Hidetada (referred to as “the prince”) appeared in “two green and yellow robes, which they call 
kimono, and his sword and dagger, or katana, were girded over them.”30 Vivero sat a few paces 
away from the shogun, and the two men conversed for half an hour as Hidetada inquired about 
maritime navigation and Vivero’s ship.  
 After meeting with “the prince,” Vivero journeyed to meet the “emperor” (Ieyasu). 
Vivero recognized where power resided, commenting that Hidetada “did not dare arrange 
anything without telling his father.”31  The audience with the elder Tokugawa was more formal, 
but also proceeded cordially. Evidently, he was well-received in Ieyasu’s residence. “[T]hanks to 
the Prince’s proclamation I was welcomed and greeted so warmly everywhere that if God were 
not lacking among these barbarians and they were my king’s vassals, I would renounce my 
country in favor of theirs.”32 Vivero had corresponded with the elder Tokugawa from the 
Philippines; now the two continued their conversation in person. Vivero contrasted his 
interaction with Ieyasu to the deference shown by “one of the greatest lords of Japan,” who paid 
tribute to the Tokugawa in Vivero’s presence. “At a hundred paces from where His Highness 
was seated this lord prostrated himself on the floor, lowering his head so much that he seemed to 
want to kiss the ground. Nobody spoke a word to him nor did he raise his eyes to the Emperor as 
he entered and left.” By contrast, chamberlains led Vivero to sit in a chair “some six paces” away 
                                                             
29 Michael Cooper, An Unscheduled Visit: Rodrigo de Vivero in Japan, 1609-1610 (Tokyo: Asiatic Society of Japan, 
2008), 13. Cooper translates Vivero’s report, appending comments and an extended introduction. Citations using 
page numbers, as most do here, draw on Cooper’s translation of Vivero’s text. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 6. 
32 Ibid., 14-15. Hyperbolic statements like this one played up Japan’s merits and the potential for deeper ties. 
Vivero’s Avisos, written after relations between Japan and Spain collapsed, showed less enthusiasm.  
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from Ieyasu, and upon reaching his arranged seat, “the Emperor…slightly inclined his head and 
with much affability smiled at me, raising his hand and gesturing that I should be seated.” Vivero 
paid his respects in the manner of one addressing the Spanish throne, while Ieyasu offered 
assurances that he would provide whatever supplies Vivero might require. The audiences 
Hidetada and Ieyasu granted Vivero were the highest-level direct communication ever between 
the Tokugawa and Spanish officialdom.33 
 The audiences yielded a repatriation plan, a direct diplomatic overture, and a flight of 
fancy. The first doubled as the second. Returning Vivero safely to New Spain served Tokugawa 
diplomatic objectives on multiple fronts. The goodwill gesture increased the likelihood of a 
positive response. Vivero’s repatriation also provided Ieyasu a solid pretense for sending a ship 
across the Pacific and jumpstarting the commercial relationship he had pursued for a decade. 
Additionally, direct contact with New Spain bypassed Manila, moving the shogunate further up 
the ladder of Spanish imperial administration. But Ieyasu’s initiative did not stop on the shores of 
Latin America. Previous governors-general had rebuffed the shogunate’s proposals regarding 
New Spain by citing the need for their sovereign’s review and approval. Thus, the Tokugawa 
sent their appeal straight to the top. The San Buena Ventura sailed for Acapulco, but Ieyasu’s 
letter and seal were bound for Madrid. Rescuing and returning a high-ranking official, combined 
with dispatching the first foreign ship to call on Acapulco for peaceable trade, ensured that 
Ieyasu’s letter would reach its intended recipient.  
 Delivering Vivero across the Pacific required an ocean-going vessel and a knowledgeable 
crew, preconditions the Tokugawa were fortuitously able to meet. Tokugawa advisor Will 
                                                             
33 These details draw from Cooper, Unscheduled Visit, 18–21. In his introduction (i) Cooper suggests that “probably 
no Westerner of his rank and experience reached it [Japan] until diplomatic relations were established with foreign 
nations in the second half of the nineteenth century.” 
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Adams provided the first by constructing the San Buena Ventura, an ocean-going ship capable of 
making the crossing. The Manila galleons dwarfed Adams’ 120-ton vessel, but the San Buena 
Ventura was nonetheless outfitted for the multi-month crossing.34 In early August the vessel 
departed Uraga, on the southeastern side of the Miura Peninsula guarding the entrance to Edo 
(now Tokyo) Bay. Departing near Edo modeled the commercial avenue the Tokugawa sought: a 
connection between northeastern Japan and the Americas close to the heart of the shogunate’s 
power.  
 As for sailors, a group of Vivero’s surviving compatriots crewed the San Buena Ventura. 
Their navigational expertise was as critical as the ship they sailed. In 1610, Spain alone sailed the 
Pacific with regularity.35 After Magellan’s successful westward crossing in 1520–21, it had taken 
the Spanish over four decades to discover the eastward voyage back from Asia to the Americas.36 
The Spanish navigator and Augustinian friar Andrés de Urdaneta charted the route in 1565. 
Urdaneta’s navigational breakthrough enabled a sustained, if tenuous, Spanish presence in the 
Philippines anchored by the annual crossing and return of the Manila galleons.37 Without 
Spanish sailors and pilots (or their charts) any ship would be sailing blind, a perilous proposition 
                                                             
34 William Schurz estimated that Manila galleons from this period regularly topped 1000 tons, at times even 
approaching 2000. See Schurz, The Manila Galleon (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1939), 193–94. 
35 The Englishmen Francis Drake and Thomas Cavendish both circumnavigated the globe in the sixteenth century, 
but raided New Spain’s Pacific coast rather than pursuing trade. Like Magellan before them, both men crossed 
westward near the equator. 
36 Magellan’s fleet of five ships ranged in size from 75 to 120 tons, making the San Buena Ventura comparable in 
size to the first European vessels to navigate the Pacific. 
37 This first eastward crossing exacted a toll on the ship and crew, taking 130 days to complete and costing over a 
dozen men their lives. Technically, Urdaneta was the second to cross. The rebellious Alonso de Arellano had 
abandoned the rest of the expedition and arrived in Acapulco some weeks earlier. The combination of Arellano’s 
mutiny and Urdaneta’s more useful navigational notes ensured that the eastward crossing became known as 
“Urdaneta’s route.” See Walter McDougall’s colorful account of the origins of the route in his Let the Sea Make a 
Noise (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 25–26. 
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for three months—or more—over open water. European, including Spanish, criticism of 
Japanese ship craft has contributed to longstanding dismissal of the archipelago’s maritime 
capabilities, but certainly the Tokugawa were willing to develop maritime capacity at the highest 
levels when it suited their interests.38 They could not have a picked a higher bar to clear than the 
single longest open-water voyage in the world.  
 The risks of the voyage and the rarity of the opportunity necessitated a return on 
investment, and the San Buena Ventura set sail also looking to make a profit. The shogunate 
hoped to pull more Spanish ships to Japan, but in the meantime a Japanese ship ventured out to 
New Spain. Twenty-three Japanese were on board, all merchants.39 Among these, the Kyoto 
merchant Tanaka Shōsuke would be recognized by the Spanish as leader of the group, and 
honored as such by the viceroy.40 As with later voyages, details on the contents of the cargo hold 
are lacking. Textiles featured prominently, perhaps along with Japanese lacquerware and rarities 
like folding screens and sets of armor.41 Tokugawa Hidetada sent five sets of armor as a gift to 
the court in Madrid, and merchants may have supplemented them with additional sets for sale. 
                                                             
38 Boxer, for example, noted that Japanese shipbuilding lagged behind its peers, and characterized requests for 
shipwrights as evidence for technological deficiencies rather than an interest in developing capacity. See The 
Christian Century, 266-67. 
39 Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 32. 
40 See Chimalpahin, Annals of His Time (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 171-77. The Nahuatl chronicler 
put the number of Japanese at nineteen or twenty, three of whom were baptized in New Spain. 
41 Circumstantial evidence supports this speculation. The Japanese and Spanish participated in the silk-for-silver 
trade in East Asia as suppliers of silver. However, it is unlikely that a cargo hold of silver could be brought to 
Acapulco without remark. Commenting on a later Japanese vessel, a Spanish Franciscan fretted that the ship would 
trade for American silver, strongly suggesting the Japanese were not taking bullion to Acapulco. It is possible that 
Japanese mimicked the Manila galleons and brought Chinese silks for sale in the Americas. Lacquerware featured in 
Japan’s trade with East Asia, and Japanese folding screens (屏風, byōbu) are known to have crossed the Pacific. 
Finally, a limited quantity of katana, armor, and arms for sale may have accompanied those presented as gifts. For 
an overview of Japanese trade policy at this time see Michael Laver, The Sakoku Edicts and the Politics of 
Tokugawa Hegemony (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2011), 100–108. 
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 Ieyasu’s letter to Madrid mirrored the ship’s overlapping diplomatic and commercial 
missions. Notarized with the hegemon’s vermillion seal, the letter doubled as a license 
authorizing Spanish ships to call on any port in Japan. A translation of it opens this chapter. The 
document elaborated on the same format as the dozens of passes the shogunate issued to foreign 
and domestic merchants that decade: matter-of-fact text, followed by the date, and then the 
official seal, proceeding from right to left across the paper. Speaking to a foreign authority rather 
than an individual merchant, the text of Ieyasu’s 1609 missive was slightly more verbose. Passes 
issued to individuals stated only the origin, the destination, the date, and the seal. Ieyasu went so 
far as to mention discussion with “the former governor” and named Sotelo.  
 A pass issued to the Dutch earlier in 1609 provides additional comparison. Here as well 
Ieyasu talked at relative length by stating clearly that the Dutch were to be permitted to venture 
to Japan without interference. Written five months earlier than the letter to Madrid, the two 
documents contain stretches of near-identical language, with one or two characters changed or 
the order of a certain clause rearranged. The Dutch, for example, were to be allowed “at any 
inlet” (何の浦に, izure no ura ni) in Japan, while the Spanish were granted permission to arrive 
“in any port” (何の湊へ, izure no minato e). Regardless of where they landed, Ieyasu assured the 
Dutch that “not even the slightest offense would be allowed” (聊疎意在間敷候也, isasakamo 
soi aru majiku sōrō nari), and promised the Spanish that “no offense would be allowed” (疎意在
之間敷候, soi kore aru majiku sōrō). The primary formal difference lay with the placement of 
the names. “The Duke of Lerma, of Spain” preceded Ieyasu’s text. Conversely, the name Jacques 
Groenwegen, written out phonetically in Japanese (ちやくす・くるうんべいけ, chakusu 
kurūnbeike) trailed Ieyasu’s seal, written in the bottom-left corner of the document issued to the 
Dutch. The difference may have stemmed from status, the Duke being a high-ranking 
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government figure, in contrast to Groenwegen’s position as private merchant. Additionally, 
Ieyasu was reaching outward to Spain, but in the Dutch case was responding to the appearance of 
VOC merchants in Japan. This difference may have called for a higher grade of formality. 
Lerma’s address paralleled the styling Ieyasu used for himself. Documents bearing not just his 
seal but his name and title often referred to “Minamoto Ieyasu of Great Japan” (大日本源家康); 
addressing “The Duke of Lerma, of Spain” (えすはんや・とふけい・てい・れるま; the 
Spanish “Duque de Lerma” emerges here in Japanese as “Dōkei dei Reruma”) established 
equivalence, if not quite equality. However, in this instance Ieyasu’s name appeared only in his 
formal seal as 源家康忠恕 (Minamoto Ieyasu, with sincerity and consideration).42  
 The 1609 letter to Lerma also functioned as a pass, gradations of respect and a higher 
word count notwithstanding. Ieyasu packaged the matter of vessels from New Spain as a grant 
rather than a request, assuming a hierarchical relationship with himself occupying the superior 
position. Ieyasu thus issued more than a letter; he granted Spain a place within a commercial 
system dictated by the Tokugawa. Intermediaries, informal contact, and successive translations 
might frame the missive as a request to the Spanish crown, but Ieyasu himself avoided any 
pretense of supplication or seeking favor. The text of the license declared, it did not question. 
The request remained implicit: “the notion that black ships should be sent from New Spain to 
Japan has been passed along to the former lord of Luzon.”43 Conducting the message through 
Vivero shielded Ieyasu from having to sort out his relationship with the sovereign of Spain. 
                                                             
42 For information on the form and function of the seals used by Ieyasu and others among the Japanese elite, see 
Ishii Ryōsuke, Inban no rekishi (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1991), and Nagazumi Yōko, Shuinsen (Tokyo: Yoshikawa 
Kōbunkan, 2001), 1–6. 
43 In the original: のひえすはんやより日本に黒船可被渡由前呂宋国主被申越候 (Nobi Esupan’ya yori Nihon ni 
kurofune watasareru beki yoshi, zen Roson kokushu mōshikosare sōrō). 
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Ieyasu may have addressed his letter to Lerma rather than Philip for much the same reason. 
Furthermore, mentioning the former governor-general reminded the recipient of Ieyasu’s role in 
providing for his safe return.  
 Ieyasu also declined to mention any gifts.44 The omission was in keeping with the 
document’s function as a pass while asserting Tokugawa authority, and perhaps supremacy. 
Here, the dual heads of the Tokugawa government played off each other to the shogunate’s 
benefit. Hidetada’s letter did mention gifts, the five suits of armor mentioned above. Though 
formally invested as shogun since 1605, the younger Tokugawa remained second-in-command 
while his father lived. The arrangement produced a rough parallel in status between Hidetada and 
Lerma, at least in terms of influence within their respective contexts.45 Aside from the gifts, the 
rest of Hidetada’s language followed in the vein of his father, granting Spanish ships leave to 
dock in Japan’s ports and mentioning Vivero. Unlike his father, Hidetada announced himself in 
the document, adopting the style “Minamoto Hidetada, Barbarian-quelling Generalissimo of the 
Country of Japan” (日本国征夷大将軍源秀忠, Nihon koku seii-taishōgun Minamoto no 
Hidetada). He also addressed Lerma as the “lord of the Spain” (えすはんや国主), a 
construction paralleling Vivero’s appellation as the “lord of Luzon.”46 Hidetada appended 
                                                             
44 Ieyasu certainly condoned the five suits of armor sent by Hidetada. 
45 I do not wish to overstate this similarity, just to note that they functioned as the second-most influential public 
personage. The two men had very different relationships to official power, and different relationships (personal and 
political) with their superiors. 
46 AGI,MP-ESCRITURA_CIFRA,31. Accessible online via the Portal de Archivos Españoles (PARES), 
http://pares.mcu.es (accessed March 25, 2017). The letter also appears in Murakami, Ikoku ōfuku, doc. 33. “Lord” 
here did not imply the supreme authority of all Spain. Hidetada was not mistaking Lerma for Philip III. The word 国
主 (kokushu), rendered here as “lord,” is slippery. Combined, the characters “country” (国) and “master” (主) could 
denote the sovereign of a petty kingdom or circumscribed area, as well as a powerful figure within a larger 
governmental structure. Daimyo might also be referred to as kokushu. Given that Vivero and Lerma were assigned 
the same title, it is more likely that they were perceived as the chief delegates of the Spanish crown within the 
Philippines and Spain respectively. Date Masamune would directly address Philip in his 1613 letters, referring to the 
Habsburg sovereign as teiō-sama (帝王様), perhaps best translated as “Your Highness.” Date used the same 
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Lerma’s name with 机下 (kika, literally “under the desk”), respectful language absent from 
Ieyasu’s missive. These differences in appellation, content, and format suggest a conscious effort 
by Tokugawa leadership to define itself vis-à-vis the Spanish monarchy, and to strike a balance 
in asserting its authority without unnecessarily giving cause for offense. 
 Still, the balance erred on the side of assertion. Letters and passes aside, Ieyasu elected to 
send a ship to Spanish America without seeking permission to do so. Vivero’s presence served as 
convenient cover, as did his willingness to be part of the endeavor. The former governor-general 
could have returned to Manila and boarded a ship to Acapulco from there. Vivero initially 
considered this option, but opted to travel via Ieyasu’s ship to demonstrate his own goodwill and 
enthusiasm for building relations across the Pacific. As the nephew of the Viceroy of New Spain 
and Marqués de Salinas Don Luis de Velasco, Vivero expected to facilitate a warm reception for 
the Japanese in Acapulco and put in a good word. Unfortunately for Vivero, those words were 
the aforementioned flight of fancy.  
 Vivero drafted an account of his time in Japan, and packaged this together with a formal 
report to the crown upon his return to New Spain. Vivero’s writings include a record of his 
shipwreck and survival, a recounting of meetings with Tokugawa leadership, and his general 
impressions of Japan’s people and customs. Vivero commented on general demeanor, bathing 
customs, and standards (or the lack thereof) of sexual propriety, amongst other matters, but the 
centerpiece of his account consisted of a blueprint for Japanese-Spanish relations based on his 
conversations with the Tokugawa and his understanding of Philip’s priorities. The terms laid out 
                                                             
appellation for Ieyasu, while referring to the Viceroy of New Spain as the kokushu (国主) of New Spain. This 
suggests a clear distinction between the two terms in the imaginations of Japanese leaders when addressing Spanish 
officials and the monarchy. For more information, see Chapter Two of this dissertation. The title of  teiō (帝王) was 
also used to refer to James I. See Timon Screech, “The English and the Control of Christianity in the Early Edo 
Period,” Japan Review, no. 24 (January 1, 2012): 3–40. 
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by the eager former official touched on preparations for Spanish ambassadors stationed in Japan, 
establishing a Spanish fort in the archipelago, and taking soundings of the Japanese coast in 
support of vessels from New Spain. 
 Subsequent negotiations between Tokugawa officials and Vivero produced provisional 
terms, unrealistic on both sides. Things started simple enough. Vivero stated three goals to the 
shogunate in his capacity as makeshift representative: tolerance of the Catholic mission in Japan, 
closer Japanese-Spanish ties, and Dutch expulsion. Already there was a problem, as the 
expulsion of the Dutch was a non-starter. Earlier that year Ieyasu had renewed his open-handed 
commitment to Dutch trade by issuing the pass discussed earlier. The shogunate would not alter 
its foreign policy at the request of one wayward Spaniard, nor be amenable to reneging its pledge 
of trade and protection. Vivero continued to push the issue over the course of his stay but made 
no headway, even admitting his failure to nudge the Tokugawa in his Account.  
 Ieyasu’s interpretation of closer ties produced overambitious expectations. According to 
Vivero, the Tokugawa elder requested fifty miners from the Spanish Americas to work in and 
develop mines in Japan.47 Direct traffic—technological and commercial—between New Spain 
and the archipelago was implicit in the request, which lay beyond any claim to authority Vivero 
could credibly make. In response, Vivero presented a particularly onerous set of preconditions. 
Vivero insisted that the miners keep half of the silver they extracted, with Philip and Ieyasu 
evenly splitting the remainder. In other words, Vivero required that fully seventy-five percent of 
Japanese silver be remanded to Spain and its subjects as the price for access to its expertise.48 
                                                             
47 Cooper, 23. Tokugawa records do not contain these details, making it difficult to assess what the shogunate 
promised, considered, or implied during the back and forth with Vivero. 
48 Ibid., 34–35. 
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Philip dispatching fifty miners to Japan stretched credulity; Ieyasu willingly parting with three 
quarters of his mineral wealth and primary export approached the absurd. Michael Cooper 
suggests neither party offered these terms expecting compliance.49 Vivero may have deliberately 
countered Ieyasu’s unrealistic proposal with one of his own to provide diplomatic cover on both 
sides, dampening Tokugawa expectations while not committing the Spanish crown to an 
arrangement Philip might reject. Whatever the case, Vivero did not elaborate on any such logic 
in his Account, presenting the proposal straight-facedly. The two parties did not come to a firm 
commitment on the matter, though Ieyasu purportedly did not reject the idea outright. 
 The mining technology in question concerned methods for extracting high-grade silver 
from impure ore. Japanese mines melted down alloys of silver and metals like iron, using a bed 
of ash or charcoal to drain away the base metals from the silver. This cupellation process, known 
as haifuki (灰吹, literally “ash-blowing”), entered Japan via the Korean peninsula in the 
sixteenth century and catalyzed the archipelago’s silver production. By contrast, most Spanish 
mines in the Americas relied on mercury and other compounds to extract silver from ore in a 
process of amalgamation.50 Vivero oversaw the Taxco mines (in present-day Mexico) as part of 
his prior administrative career and knew the importance of the metal—and related extraction 
methods—to the Spanish Indies. Ieyasu displayed similar concern when he brought the 
archipelago’s mines under direct Tokugawa control. The precious metal’s value to both sides 
helps explain Ieyasu’s request, Vivero’s high price, and the ambiguous result of their 
                                                             
49 Ibid., xiii. Cooper presents this analysis in the foreword to his translation.  
50 For an overview of mining techniques in Americas, see, D. A. Brading and Harry E. Cross, “Colonial Silver 
Mining: Mexico and Peru,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 52, no. 4 (1972): 545–79. 
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negotiations. Importantly, Ieyasu’s communication with Philip made no mention of silver, 
avoiding any potential friction.  
 The remaining terms structured Spain’s anticipated presence in Japan, and Vivero 
reported little pushback from the Tokugawa on these issues. The governor-general requested safe 
port and conduct for Spanish ships in the archipelago, and fair prices for any necessary riggings 
and provisions. Land would be granted for a Spanish outpost, and missionaries would be free to 
come and go without persecution. Future Spanish ambassadors would also be permitted to bring 
missionaries with them, and the Spaniards would govern their own affairs. Finally, Spanish 
vessels would be permitted to conduct soundings of Japan’s coastline in support of their voyages 
and the expected trading post.51 Ieyasu’s letter granting trade privileges overlapped with 
Vivero’s stipulation of open ports, safe conduct, fair prices, and fair treatment. Tensions over 
Christianity simmered but had not yet exploded, and the shogunate might yet have tolerated 
limited missionary activity if trade with America became regular. Additionally, Vivero and 
Ieyasu possibly held different interpretations of what it meant for the Spanish to govern their 
own affairs in Japan, and the two sides may have left the issue sufficiently vague for Vivero to 
claim agreement. In any case, Ieyasu made no mention of it in his writing to the Spanish 
monarchy. In contrast to Vivero’s silver scheme, these concrete terms laid the groundwork for 
increased Spanish shipping and were met with more support from Edo. 
  Vivero did not draft these provisions alone. Following audiences with Hidetada and 
Ieyasu, Vivero journeyed to Kyushu to check on the Santa Ana and possibly return to the 
Philippines from there. Deciding to cross on Ieyasu’s ship instead, Vivero again headed north 
toward Uraga and Edo. During these travels, he encountered the Franciscan friar Luis Sotelo, a 
                                                             
51 Cooper, 34–36. 
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veteran of the Japan mission recognized for his Japanese-language abilities. Soon after their 
meeting, Sotelo began coordinating with Tokugawa officials and drafting terms on Vivero’s 
behalf. The missionary’s involvement recommended him to the shogunate as well, as reflected 
by mention of him in Ieyasu and Hidetada’s missives to Philip. The division of labor and 
imagination between Vivero and Sotelo is not clear, but many of Vivero’s terms appeared in 
subsequent diplomatic efforts involving the friar. 
  Ultimately, the Tokugawa looked to exploit Vivero’s fortuitous appearance more than 
they valued his proposed terms. As the outgoing interim governor-general of an Asian outpost of 
an American colony of a European empire, Vivero was several degrees removed from the 
authority necessary to treat effectively with the shogunate. The Tokugawa were cognizant of his 
status, noting that Vivero was the “former” (前, zen) lord of Luzon.52 They did not bind 
themselves to Vivero’s proposals, rejected out-of-hand his request for the expulsion of the 
Dutch, and avoided a firm commitment on silver. The shogunate corresponded on its own terms, 
granting permission rather than presenting conditions. Additionally, Ieyasu demurred from 
naming Vivero his representative. Instead of sending an accidental envoy, he elected to dispatch 
a representative of his choice: first Sotelo, then the friar Alonso Muñoz.53  
 Similarly, Vivero exerted little influence on his superiors in Spain, though he did 
correctly identify the crown’s principal areas of concern. Vivero’s Account reached Madrid, but 
the king and his Council of the Indies (Consejo de Indias) debated the contents of the Tokugawa 
missives without referencing Vivero’s in any detail. As the next chapter relates, Spanish 
                                                             
52 See the translation of the Ieyasu’s letter and footnote 1 above for Vivero’s title as the “former” governor-general. 
53 Muñoz’s presence requires explanation, and is elaborated on below. Muñoz did not appear in Ieyasu’s letter, but 
Hidetada named both friars in his own, penned later, a change Ieyasu no doubt knew of and approved. 
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enclaves, ambassadors, and miners did not factor into the discussion. However, concerns over 
silver, unease over the state of the Catholic mission, and anxiety about the Dutch presence in 
Japan did flavor official conversations in Madrid, Acapulco, and Mexico for as long as Japanese 
trans-Pacific commerce remained a possibility. Vivero spoke presciently when he asked the 
Tokugawa to turn away the Dutch and protect missionaries, and when he set a high price on 
exporting Spain’s mining expertise across an ocean. 
 The San Buena Ventura departed Uraga on August 1, 1610. Ieyasu’s ship left the port of 
his choice, carrying missives from the two heads of the shogunate. The ship ferried Vivero and 
the friar Muñoz, along with a group of Japanese merchants and their cargo. The first vessel not 
under Spanish control to follow “Urdaneta’s route,” the ship lived up to its name and delivered 
cargo, crew, and parchment safely to Acapulco after an uneventful crossing.  
 After receiving his nephew Vivero, the viceroy of New Spain (the Marqués de Salinas) 
split the response to this unexpected and ongoing diplomatic effort in two. Salinas forwarded the 
Tokugawa letters and their courier onward to Spain for Philip’s consideration. But Vivero’s 
return and Tokugawa outreach necessitated a quicker response than Spain could provide. Salinas 
thus named the general Sebastián Vizcaíno as the head of a response embassy from New Spain, 
charged with formally thanking the Japanese, conducting soundings of the archipelago’s 
coastline, and returning the Japanese merchants who had arrived on the San Buena Ventura. 
Soon after the viceroy dispatched Vizcaíno, Philip recalled Salinas to Madrid to assume the 
presidency of the Council of the Indies. Salinas would thus participate in the crown’s 
deliberations on Japan from Spain for the bulk of the next decade.   
 Vivero had no further contact with Japan, but continued his career in colonial 
administration. He rose to the governorship of Tierrafirme, in present-day Panama, and then the 
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presidency of the audiencia of Veragua, similarly located on the isthmus. In these capacities, he 
helped coordinate the safe transport of South America’s mineral wealth onward to peninsular 
Spain through the so-called treasure fleet.54 Vivero had embraced a model of cooperation 
between Japan and Spain with an enthusiasm matched by very few of his peers. Conversely, the 
dissonance between his Account and Ieyasu’s communication spoke to the divide in interest and 
priorities of each polity. Vivero’s Avisos, written much later, took a dimmer view of the country 
and its inhabitants. They also contained the suggestion that Japan and Spain conduct a joint 
invasion of the Korean peninsula, suggesting Vivero maintained a flair for the fanciful.55 
A Second Stranded Spaniard 
 Sebastián Vizcaíno’s mission to Japan also blended the imaginative with the practical. 
Vizcaíno led an eventful life. Upon his arrival in Japan in June 1611, he was sixty-three years 
old, and had campaigned as a soldier in Europe, assisted in the governance of New Spain, and 
been the victim of Thomas Cavendish’s famous plundering of Spanish ships and treasure in Baja 
California in 1587. Cavendish spared Vizcaíno—then a merchant—and many others but made 
off with a cargo hold full of their goods, following in Drake’s footsteps in both plundering and 
circumnavigating the globe. Vizcaíno’s career then shifted toward exploration. In 1602, he sailed 
up Alta California to map the coastline and to scout potential safe harbors for the galleons 
crossing from Manila.56 Though not the first Spaniard to reconnoiter that far north, Vizcaíno’s 
names for many locales—San Diego Bay, Santa Catalina Island, Monterey Bay, among them—
                                                             
54 Cooper, An Unscheduled Visit, viii–ix. 
55 Ibid, xx-xxi. 
56 These ships crossed the Pacific far enough north that first sight of land was usually the coastline of present-day 
California. Only then would the vessels tack south to Acapulco.  
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remain in use today.57 Salinas considered this experience when naming Vizcaíno to head the 
response mission to Japan. The viceroy charged Vizcaíno with more than delivering a response 
and conducting soundings; he also tasked the explorer with searching the Northwestern Pacific 
for the rumored mineral-rich islands Rica de Plata and Rica de Oro. The fabled islands garnered 
European attention in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, with many convinced 
that yet more wealth lay beyond the Japanese archipelago.58 The mission to Japan dovetailed 
nicely with the search for the islands, as their discovery would justify the cost of maintaining 
Spanish activity in the area around Japan. Together, the soundings of a real coastline and the 
pursuit of an imaginary one focused Vizcaíno’s attention further north than any Spaniard before 
him, facilitating interactions with a Japanese daimyo northeast, rather than southwest, of Edo.  
 Both Tokugawa leaders granted Vizcaíno an audience within weeks of his arrival, but 
mounting tensions defined his two-year tenure in Japan. Diplomatic protocol was one flashpoint, 
as Vizcaíno chafed at the imposition of Tokugawa etiquette. The Tokugawa permitted 
Vizcaíno’s soundings, but later soured on the enterprise when Will Adams suggested that the 
Spanish were taking advantage of Japanese largesse.59 Additionally, weather and water conspired 
to keep Vizcaíno in Japan past his welcome. A tempest forced Vizcaíno to turn back to the 
archipelago after his initial departure. The storm damaged the ship enough to preclude another 
voyage back to the Americas, leaving the shogunate with a second stranded Spaniard on its 
                                                             
57 Juan Rodriguez Cabrillo was the first European to explore the California coastline, in 1542. 
58 For a brief history of these islands in the European imagination, see Oka Mihoko, “Elusive Islands of Silver: 
Japan in the Early European Geographic Imagination,” in Cartographic Japan: A History in Maps, ed. Kären Wigen 
et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 21–23. 
59 See, J.F. Schütte, “Don Rodrigo de Vivero de Velazco y Sebastián Vizcaíno en Japón,” in La expansión 
hispanoamericana en Asia: siglos XVI y XVII, ed. Ernesto de la Torre Villar (México: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1980), 121. Schütte bases this speculation on Adams’ actions from a Jesuit letter, reproduced on pages 
110–18. 
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hands. Soon after, Ieyasu’s own attempts to send a second ship to New Spain were dashed when 
the vessel sank within a day of setting sail. All the while, continued missionary intransigence 
tested the shogunate’s religious tolerance as it waited for commercial results.  
 In Vizcaíno, the Tokugawa again faced a foreign representative unable to respond to their 
principal objectives. Vizcaíno had no answers for them; Salinas had authorized his representative 
to give thanks and repay debts but little more, and Vizcaíno avoided any firm commercial 
commitments. Where Vivero arrived unauthorized to treat but eager to do so, Vizcaíno arrived 
with the full authority of the Viceroyalty of New Spain but little else. His mission was to restore 
the status quo, not to advance the conversation. Vizcaíno stated as much when requesting an 
audience: 
“[I come] only to bring to Your Majesty (Ieyasu) news of how the said Marqués 
received the passes and letter that the father Fray Alonso Muñoz, in the name of 
Your Majesty, brought him. Likewise, to bring to this kingdom Josquendono 
(Tanaka Shōsuke) and the rest of the Japanese vassals of Your Majesty who last 
year left from this [kingdom] to that of New Spain with Don Rodrigo de Vivero, 
and [for] the return of the silver lent to the said Don Rodrigo by order of Your 
Majesty and the value of the ship San Buena Ventura…”60 
 The letter, copied in the official chronicle of Vizcaíno’s embassy, offered little.61 The 
viceroy had “received” the letter but demonstrated no commitment to action. Similarly, Vizcaíno 
                                                             
60 Quote taken from Gil, 319. Gil reproduces the Relación del viaje de Sebastián Vizcaíno in full, pp. 309–383. 
Citations from this section are of the transcribed primary source rather than Gil’s analysis. In these instances I 
provide the chapter and paragraph numbers of the Relación (i.e. Relación, 3:12). 
61 Juan Gil’s analysis of the chronicle’s authorship suggests the account was written in Japan as events unfolded. 
The viceroy forwarded a manuscript copy to Madrid upon Vizcaíno’s return in 1614. See Gil, 284–285, 305–308. 
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did not acknowledge here that Ieyasu had written to the Duke of Lerma in Madrid; read alone, the 
letter gives the impression that Ieyasu had addressed the viceroy. 
 Moreover, the fate of the San Buena Ventura and Vizcaíno’s own route spoke to the tepid 
reception Ieyasu’s overture garnered in New Spain. For one, the viceroy had taken the Tokugawa 
ship away. In the same letter, Vizcaíno offered a vague explanation as to why, stating that the San 
Buena Ventura purchase “was not [made] with the intention to [use the vessel to] return to this 
kingdom, for reasons that the said Xosquendono (Tanaka Shōsuke) and the rest of the Japanese 
will tell Your Majesty.”62 Salinas purchased the ship, likely to forestall Japan’s Pacific shipping 
efforts while Philip considered the monarchy’s response to Ieyasu.63 We do not know what reasons 
Tanaka and his companions offered the shogunate, and the Tokugawa do not appear to have left 
written comment on the matter. However, Vivero reported that Ieyasu had given permission to sell 
the Buena Ventura if necessary.64 Perhaps Ieyasu anticipated that once the ship delivered Vivero 
the Japanese would be unable to sail back on their own absent Spanish expertise. Perhaps Vivero 
exaggerated. Either way, it would not be the last time the Spanish purchased a Japanese ship to 
clear the ocean, nor would it be the last time the Japanese owner appeared to abide by the decision 
with little comment.65 
                                                             
62 Ibid., 319 (Relacion, 3:12). 
63 Salinas mentioned the purchase in a letter to crown dated 1611.03.18. AGI,MEXICO,28,N.13. At the time he 
considered using the Japanese vessel to search for the islands Rica de Oro and Rica de Plata. Upon combining the 
return envoy to Japan and the expedition to the islands under Vizcaíno, Salinas sought a different boat. See Gil, 
277–78. 
64 Cooper, An Unscheduled Visit, 36–37. 
65 A future article will investigate in more depth the construction, voyages, and the fate of Japan’s three trans-Pacific 
vessels from this time. 
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 Vizcaíno also framed his direct travel from New Spain to Japan as a favor to the shogunate, 
thereby downplaying the route’s potential as a commercial crossing. Vizcaíno’s San Francisco 
was the first vessel to sail directly from the Americas to Japan, the first time a Spanish vessel sailed 
west across the Pacific without Manila as the destination. Vizcaíno reported that while Salinas 
could have sent him the usual way, the viceroy opted not to out of consideration for the long 
journey and the danger posed by the Dutch near the Philippines. A direct route avoided risking 
“the return of the silver and the value of the ship and all the rest that we bring from the Marqués 
in the name of my king and lord.”66 In other words, Vizcaíno journeyed directly to Japan as a 
special favor rather than to establish regular commerce. As with the purchase of the ship, 
Vizcaíno’s framing foreshadowed ongoing Spanish ambivalence about sailing anywhere aside 
from Manila, and its proprietary attitude toward the Pacific. 
 The Dutch remained a point of contention, as did other familiar issues. Vizcaíno repeatedly 
denounced the Dutch as heretical and rebellious subjects, naming their expulsion as a precondition 
for any sustained commerce between New Spain and Japan. Vizcaíno also advocated on behalf of 
the missionary community, noting the growing Tokugawa distrust of their intentions. Furthermore, 
Vizcaíno could not have endeared himself to the Tokugawa through his resolve to impose Spanish 
court etiquette in Japan. He flatly refused to prostrate himself as requested, on both knees with his 
head and hands pressed to the floor. Nor would he remove his shoes or arms in Hidetada’s presence. 
When shogunate officials protested, Vizcaíno threatened to leave without delivering his letters 
from the viceroy. The shogunate relented, though in contrast to Vivero’s meeting two years before, 
Hidetada remained silent during this audience. 67  Ieyasu made similar accommodations, and 
                                                             
66 Gil, Hidalgos y samurais, 319 (Relación, 3:12). 
67 Ibid., 325–329 (Relación, 5:7–12). 
Joshua Batts 
Ch. 1 – Sailing East 
65 
 
likewise did not speak directly to Vizcaíno. After the general departed, the elder Tokugawa spoke 
on friendly terms with the friars Pedro Bautista and Luis Sotelo, who were also in attendance.68  
 Though commerce, religion, foreign relations, and protocol divided host and guest, there 
was temporary agreement on the matter of soundings. Vivero had argued for their necessity 
while in Japan, and Ieyasu remained amenable to action facilitating Spanish traffic. For 
Vizcaíno, the soundings were a prudent support measure for any Spanish ship sailing to, from, or 
past the archipelago, be it directly from New Spain or via the existing route out of Manila. 
Soundings would also help prepare his expedition in search of the islands Rica de Oro and Rica 
de Plata, though he did not mention this purpose. Vizcaíno did not lack for gall, requesting 
permission to survey Japan’s coast “from Nagasaki to Akita,” that is, the archipelago’s entire 
Pacific coastline from southwestern Kyushu to the northern tip of Honshu.69 Vizcaíno agreed to 
remit copies of the resulting charts to Hidetada and Ieyasu. The shogunate granted this request, 
and in Vizcaíno set out north overland in fall 1611.70 
 Vizcaíno’s road north brought him to Date Masamune’s stronghold in Sendai, furthering 
ties between the Spanish ambassador, the northern daimyo, and the friar who helped mediate 
their conversations, Luis Sotelo. The three had first become acquainted in Edo. Vizcaíno’s report 
logged a chance encounter with Date in the streets of that city in summer 1611. Sotelo 
accompanied Vizcaíno during much of the latter’s time in Japan, including this excursion north. 
While hosting the duo in Sendai, Date spoke of his interest in commerce with New Spain, and 
potentially building a ship of his own. Date’s large Ōshū domain, anchored by his castle town in 
                                                             
68 Ibid., 338–39 (Relación, 6:8–9). 
69 Ibid., 341–42 (Relación, 6:11). 
70 Ibid., 348–350 (Relacion, 8:1–6).  
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Sendai, had easy access to the northeast Kuroshio Current used by the Spanish in the eastward 
crossing to the Americas. Conversely, the ports in his domain could also serve as safe harbor for 
Spanish vessels harangued by inclement weather. All three men reconvened again in Edo 
following the completion of Vizcaíno’s survey work in the north, continuing a pattern of 
sporadic meetings among the daimyo, the general, and the friar. 
 In time, even Vizcaíno’s sounding activities became a flashpoint of Tokugawa 
discontent, catalyzed in part by infighting in the archipelago among the “Southern Barbarians.” 
European political prejudice was not new to Japan. The Portuguese and Spanish, though both 
subject to Habsburg rule, coexisted as uneasy rivals rather than allies or partners in Japan. The 
Portuguese had traded with Japan out of Macao for decades, and resented the more recent growth 
in trade between Japan and Manila. This commercial rivalry paralleled jealousy among the 
religious orders active in Asia. Most notably, the Jesuits who had arrived in Japan in conjunction 
with the expansion of the Portuguese Indies complained of the intrusions of Spanish Franciscans 
operating out of the Philippines.71 The arrival of merchants from the rebellious, and Protestant, 
Low Countries led to Iberian denunciation of the Dutch and vice-versa. England was no 
different, and in this instance Tokugawa advisor Will Adams (now a twelve-year veteran of 
Japanese politics) raised suspicions about the motivations underlying Vizcaíno’s surveying 
activities. Adams framed Vizcaíno’s actions as a breach of sovereignty, stating that no European 
monarch would let a foreign power survey his or her coastline. This line of argument spoke 
directly to Ieyasu’s concern with establishing and maintaining Tokugawa prerogative in foreign 
                                                             
71 For an introduction to the papal bulls regulating missionary activity in Japan, and the tension between orders, see 
Joāo Paulo Oliveira e Costa y Pedro Correia, “Felipe III y la disputa luso-castellana por Japón [Philip III and the 
Luso-Castilian Dispute over Japan],” in Las vecindades de las Monarquías Ibéricas, ed. José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez 
(Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2013), 334–39. 
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relations. Vizcaíno’s counter claims and denouncement made little difference, especially in the 
absence of a concrete commitment to trade with New Spain. By summer 1612, it was time to go.  
 In August of that year, Vizcaíno received replies from Ieyasu and Hidetada to the 
viceroy. These letters differed markedly from the licenses that traveled with Vivero earlier. The 
text was longer and didactic. Whereas Ieyasu’s missive to the Duke of Lerma impassively 
granted permission, this letter sternly laid out what the shogunate expected going forward. Ieyasu 
and Hidetada reaffirmed their invitation to Spanish ships, but declared that missionaries were not 
welcome on Japan’s shores. Ieyasu paraphrased language employed by Hideyoshi decades 
earlier: “Now, our realm is the land of the gods. Since antiquity, we have honored the gods and 
revered the Buddha…The laws in practice in your country have an altogether different character, 
and have no connection to our realm’s [teachings].”72 A group of Franciscans, the omnipresent 
Sotelo among them, translated the document (faithfully) into Spanish at Vizcaíno’s behest.73 
Clearly the tide was turning against the Christian mission, but not yet to the point that the 
Tokugawa were willing to abandon their interests in New Spain. 
 Nevertheless, the fissure with Vizcaíno yawned wide enough that the Tokugawa response 
diverged into two paths. Vizcaíno left first, departing Japan in search of Rica de Oro and Rica de 
Plata. This was the general’s primary mission, undertaking an expedition that the Viceroyalty 
had been mustering support for over multiple years.74 Officials in New Spain had debated 
whether or not the endeavor was better pursued from Japan or New Spain; Tokugawa overtures 
                                                             
72 Murakami, Zōtei ikoku nikki-shō (Tokyo: Sunnansha, 1929), 65–66. The Japanese reads: “ 抑吾邦者神國也。自
開以来、敬神尊佛...貴国之所用法、其趣甚異也、於吾邦無其縁歟.” 
73 The translation was made in Uraga on 1612.08.31. For a transcription of the Spanish, see DNS 12-9, pp. 964–967.  
74 See Gil, Hidalgos y samurais, 271–278 for an introduction to and analysis of the initiative in search of the islands.  
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conveniently settled the issue.75 Vizcaíno chased the mythical islands for two months, traveling 
as far north as forty-two degrees latitude, near the island of Hokkaido, before a storm crippled 
the San Francisco, forcing a decision about whether to risk a crossing to Alta California or 
simply retreat to Japan. Vizcaíno ordered the latter, and his vessel returned to Uraga and an 
uncertain welcome in late 1612. 
 The Tokugawa initiative fared worse. The shogunate constructed a second ocean-going 
vessel that summer, loading it down with merchants, cargo, and their chosen representative, 
Sotelo. The friar occupied the awkward position of being a missionary charged with delivering a 
warning against the arrival of additional missionaries. Evidently, the Franciscan’s experience 
negotiating between the shogunate and secular Spanish authorities still recommended him to the 
Tokugawa. What documentation he carried on behalf of the Tokugawa is unclear. Ostensibly, the 
letters Vizcaíno had translated into Spanish that August were for Vizcaíno to bring back to New 
Spain. Perhaps the Tokugawa gave Sotelo copies, or perhaps Vizcaíno was made to return them 
(though no such insult is present in the record of Vizcaíno’s trip). In short, it is difficult to 
determine if the Tokugawa intended this second voyage as an alternative or an addition to 
Vizcaíno, or if they just wanted to send another ship to trade in Acapulco. It is even possible they 
deputized Sotelo both because of his familiarity with matters and as an easy means of sending a 
missionary out of the country. Regardless, the planned voyage tangled the web of diplomatic and 
commercial outreach still further, and drove a wedge between Vizcaíno and Sotelo that was 
never remedied. The two men would argue over whom each represented or did not represent, and 
would fight over the letters and gifts sent from Japan to the confusion and consternation of 
Spanish authorities in Europe and the Americas. 
                                                             
75 Ibid., 276–277. 
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 Flaws in the second Tokugawa vessel gave Vizcaíno and Sotelo ample time to argue with 
each other in Japan as well. The ship, named the San Sebastián in Spanish records, launched in 
September 1612 but foundered within a day. Vizcaíno commented on the vessel prior to his own 
departure, and dismissed it as not up to the journey.76 Most onboard survived, Sotelo among 
them, but the ship’s sinking remained an expensive fiasco. Although Vizcaíno had reimbursed 
the shogunate the value of the Buena Ventura (as determined by Spanish authorities), Ieyasu had 
lost two ocean-going ships in three years. Beyond time and resources, each vessel required the 
integration of foreign shipbuilding design and technology still unfamiliar in the archipelago, to 
say nothing of the navigational expertise required to attempt the journey. 
 The year 1612 closed on an uneasy and uncertain note. Ieyasu needed to decide whether 
to send another ship to New Spain. So far, the Japanese had followed the Spanish schedule, 
mounting voyages but once a year in a window stretching from late summer to early fall. The 
San Sebastián’s foundering left Ieyasu a few months to contemplate his commitment to the 
project. Vizcaíno found himself stranded, without the means to provision his vessel and attempt 
another crossing. The Tokugawa refused to issue him a loan to fund repairs, signaling their 
continued displeasure with the ambassador. Sotelo returned in earnest to his missionary 
activities. In 1613, he focused his attentions in Edo, ignoring at his peril the recent Tokugawa 
prohibitions against missionary activity in land under its direct control.77 All the while, the 
shogunate’s initial outreach to imperial Spain remained unanswered.  
                                                             
76 The crew may have been inexperienced. There were likely some onboard with experience in open-ocean sailing, 
but Vizcaíno must have retained the bulk of his crew for his own return journey.  
77 The Tokugawa and their house vassals directly governed less than a third of Japan, though this area did include 
both Edo and Nagasaki. Thus the 1612 prohibition did not apply to the domains of daimyo such as Date.  
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 Vizcaíno’s mission to Japan accomplished little, constrained by the Spanish chain of 
command, and hampered by the ambassador’s failure to make a good impression. Vizcaíno 
repaid Spanish debts, but disagreements and tension soured relations, while the weather foiled 
pursuit of his other mission. It is telling that the viceroy of New Spain put as much stock in 
searching for hypothetical islands as in cementing relations with existing ones.78 Moreover, 
Vizcaíno demanded much and offered little, requiring the expulsion of Spain’s enemies and the 
protection of its missionaries without committing to commerce. Finally, both the general’s forced 
return and the San Sebastián’s short life at sea reminded all involved of the cost and perils of 
crossing the Pacific.  
 Still, the route remained a possibility for those who might pursue it. Ieyasu needed a ship. 
Vizcaíno needed a patron. Sotelo, as it turned out, would need someone to get him out of jail. 
Fortunately, there was a figure willing and able to give all three what they wanted.   
Outsourcing Diplomacy 
 A year after the San Sebastián’s ignominious departure, sailors, carpenters, and 
merchants readied the largest Japanese craft yet to attempt the voyage east. The San Juan 
Bautista dwarfed her predecessors, her 500-ton capacity fully four times that of the Buena 
Ventura from three years prior. Built with Japanese cedar and pine, she was a triple-masted 
galleon in the Spanish style. Nearly two hundred men—sailor and merchant, Japanese and 
Spanish, missionary and ambassador—prepared to cross the Pacific and once again tether 
American markets directly to eastern Japan.  
                                                             
78 The Spanish also pursued Rica de Oro and Rica de Plata at the expense of a sustained exploration of Alta 
California, which in fact contained a wealth of gold deposits.  
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 Twelve months had wrought some changes. The Bautista sailed from Tsukinoura, a small 
inlet within Sendai domain, rather than the shogunate’s preferred port of Uraga at the mouth of 
Edo Bay. This time the diplomatic personnel carried letters addressed to leaders religious and 
secular alike, in New Spain as well as European capitals half a world away. These letters warmly 
welcomed more missionaries into Japan, bucking the rising tide of Tokugawa suspicion of 
religious orders and their foreign faith. Most importantly, the ship, the letters, and the men who 
carried them all—for now—counted Date Masamune, not the Tokugawa, as their patron.  
 However notable these changes, the emerging Tokugawa order is what continued to 
frame them, and the venture comprised another iteration in Ieyasu’s dozen-year engagement with 
New Spain through diplomatic trial and error. Sendai lay in northeastern Japan, and Date’s ship 
still carried with it the promise of bringing Spanish goods and vessels to an area closer to the 
center of Tokugawa control.79 The concrete terms Date offered Spain closely tracked those 
informally agreed upon by Vivero and the Tokugawa themselves. Where they differed—on 
silver, the Dutch, and missionaries, Date made concessions seemingly favorable to Spanish 
interests. These differences reflected Tokugawa flexibility as much as Date’s initiative and open-
mindedness. The shogunate permitted Date to sponsor the voyage in part because he could adopt 
positions that the Tokugawa could not without reversing previous stances. This diplomatic 
outsourcing promised maximum flexibility and lowered the risk of compromising the 
shogunate’s dignity.  
 Over the last decade, the shogunate had implemented similar policies of diplomatic 
outsourcing to daimyo in geographically advantageous positions. The Sō family mediated 
                                                             
79 When the Bautista returned to Japan in 1615, it docked at Uraga, near Edo, not in Sendai domain. The extant 
documents make no mention of the vessel ever returning to Date’s domain, though he remained the vessel’s 
recognized owner. 
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relations with Joseon Korea from Tsushima Island between the Japanese archipelago and the 
Korean peninsula. The Shimazu clan of Satsuma domain conquered the Ryukyu Kingdom with 
Tokugawa permission in 1609, and thereafter mediated relations, masters of one polity (Ryukyu) 
and vassals to another (the Tokugawa). To the north on Hokkaido, Toyotomi Hideyoshi had 
deputized the lords of Matsumae domain to regulate relations with that island’s Ainu population, 
and the Tokugawa renewed this responsibility. Each “portal” adhered to its own peculiarities and 
dynamics: the Sō forged certain documents and fudged signatures to grease the wheels of 
diplomacy; the Shimazu and the shogunate encouraged Ryukyu to continue its tributary 
relationship to China in order to maintain access to trade and information; the Matsumae handled 
relations with a people, not a polity, and became increasingly forceful and exploitative as a 
result.80 At the same time, the Tokugawa maintained direct control over Nagasaki, the most 
important port for foreign commerce.  
 Date Masamune’s direct outreach to the centers of Spanish power adhered to this 
precedent. For a dozen years, Ieyasu had worked to entice Spanish ships to northeastern Japan 
and open the commercial gateway to the Americas. Letters to successive governors-general in 
the Philippines yielded the occasional extra vessel from Manila and the occasional promise to 
move the matter up Spain’s administrative ladder. Efforts to limit the number of Japanese ships 
via the shuin system had consolidated the shogunate’s control over commerce but had not 
sufficiently encouraged a Spanish response. Vivero’s shipwreck yielded a mixed bag of terms 
and conditions with an unauthorized representative, and led to the arrival of an unhelpful 
authorized representative more interested in mapping the Japanese coast for Spanish ends than 
                                                             
80 These relations have been covered in-depth by scholars in Japan and the Anglophone world. For a succinct 
introduction to the topic in English, see Arano Yasunori, “The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order,” The 
International Journal of Asian Studies 2, no. 2 (July 2005), 185–216. 
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establishing commerce. Vizcaíno was now stranded himself, and by the summer of 1613, 
Ieyasu’s letter to the court in Madrid approached three years unanswered. In Date, the Tokugawa 
hit upon a surrogate willing to mediate between a reticent commercial and diplomatic partner, 
and to shoulder the outlay required by the outreach. By taking a step back, the Tokugawa both 
reinforced and protected their prerogative in foreign affairs while distancing themselves from the 
cost and risk of embarrassment. Date, for his part, gained a stake in any future commercial 
activity and the prestige of mediating relations with a foreign power. It was a shrewd, sensible 
move for both parties.  
 Unfortunately, the new mission confused the boundaries of authority for Spanish officials 
trying to make sense of the endeavor. Debates over who represented whom would undercut 
Date’s representatives every step along the way to Seville, Madrid, and the Eternal City.  
 Date Masamune (1567–1636) was well-positioned geographically, politically, and 
personally to assume a direct role in relations between Japan and New Spain. 1613 found him 
just entering middle age, Ieyasu’s junior by over two decades, but a dozen years older than 
Hidetada. Born into the intrigue and military campaigns of the late Sengoku period, Date led 
skirmishes as a youth and assumed the headship of his clan in 1584, two years after the great 
warlord Oda Nobunaga’s death. He swore loyalty to the rising Hideyoshi, but noticeably dragged 
his heels in helping the latter’s forces stamp out resistance in the northeast. Nevertheless, Date 
deployed to Korea and led troops in both of Hideyoshi’s continental campaigns in the 1590s. 
Preparations for them necessitated a residence of some months in Kyushu, where Date may have 
come across foreign merchants and missionaries firsthand. Date supported Ieyasu at the decisive 
Battle of Sekigahara in 1600, and the Tokugawa confirmed him as the first lord of the newly 
created Sendai domain, which overlapped extensively with the old imperial province of Mutsu, 
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or Ōshū.81 The domain was extensive, one of the largest in the archipelago in terms of area and 
agricultural production, and the largest in the north.82 As Ieyasu had done with Edo, Date 
established and built up the town of Sendai after his arrival. The domain also included a long 
stretch of coastline and easy access to the currents of the North Pacific.  
 The “king of Ōshū,” as dubbed by Spanish sources, had entertained thoughts of 
participating in overseas commerce prior to 1613, and possessed both reason and opportunity to 
do so. The Tokugawa periodically ordered that daimyo attend shogunate leadership in person, a 
measure that drained daimyo coffers while they traveled and maintained themselves in Edo or 
Sunpu, allowing the Tokugawa to keep an eye on recent allies and old rivals.83 This peripatetic 
life put Date into direct contact with Ieyasu, his officials, and key Spaniards such as Sotelo and 
Vizcaíno. As mentioned earlier, Date met both the general and the friar first in Edo, and hosted 
both (in person and in absentia) at Sendai. Date also called on Ieyasu at Sunpu multiple times, 
and received formal support for his trade venture in April 1613. The daimyo had also dipped his 
toes into the waters of foreign commerce the year prior, placing two retainers aboard the ill-fated 
San Sebastián. 
                                                             
81 Date’s holdings and castles shifted throughout his career before he settled in as the first lord of Sendai under the 
Tokugawa. However, his base of power always lay in northern Japan. For Date’s move to Sendai see, Kobayashi 
Seiji, Date Masamune no kenkyū [Study of Date Masamune] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2008), 202–227.  
82 Domain holdings were conventionally measured in terms of koku (石), a unit of volume—roughly 180 liters—
meant to denote the amount of rice necessary to feed a man for a year. In the Tokugawa period, a lord had to control 
land assessed at over 10,000 koku to qualify for daimyo status. Date’s holdings officially amounted to more than 
600,000 koku, though true production may have been higher. This put Date in select company, although the largest 
daimyo domain, Kaga, was assessed at over 1 million koku. Taken collectively, Japan held roughly 26 million koku 
by this system around 1700, with the Tokugawa and their direct vassals governing about 6.5 million koku. See 
Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan 117–20. 
83 These measures developed into the system of alternate attendance (sankin kōtai, 参勤交代), by which daimyo 
spent alternate years in residence at Edo and in their domains, holding to a consistent schedule. Daimyo wives and 
families remained in Edo as hostages to the shogunate. Ieyasu’s grandson Tokugawa Iemitsu (1604–1651) 
formalized the practice in the 1630s; in Ieyasu’s time the policy had not yet cohered into a regular system. 
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 Japanese scholars have recently argued that Date may have viewed foreign trade as a 
means to secure domestic recovery. In 1611, a large earthquake and the ensuing tsunami 
destroyed much of the domain’s coastline, disrupting local commerce and agriculture. The 2011 
Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami—and the ensuing meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Plant—affected a similar area, including present-day Miyagi, Iwate, and Fukushima 
prefectures. Local and regional recovery efforts in the twenty-first century have encouraged a 
reexamination of measures taken in the seventeenth. In this line of thought, Date pursued foreign 
trade in part to swell his treasury and augment his ability to fund public works and rebuild 
infrastructure in his domain.84 This state of affairs helps explain his placing commercial agents 
on the San Sebastián in 1612, and sponsoring construction of the Bautista the next year. 
 Date needed not just money but expertise; fortunately, he found a willing collaborator in 
Vizcaíno. The daimyo got along well with the general during the latter’s initial tenure in Japan. 
By 1613 Vizcaíno was stranded in Japan and the Tokugawa had refused further financial 
support, continuing the friction between the general and his hosts. In Date, Vizcaíno found the 
local support he needed. The two agreed to divvy up responsibility for the design and 
construction of the ship, the salary of its crew, and ultimate authority over both. The Bautista 
would be Date’s ship, unequivocally. However, Vizcaíno would help oversee construction of the 
vessel and enjoy final say over all crew and passengers on the open water. Date and Vizcaíno 
were to divide evenly the responsibility for crew salaries; presumably Vizcaíno’s half would be 
paid upon docking in Acapulco. The agreement placed Vizcaíno in charge of the ship’s safety 
and navigation, with an ambiguous role in its commercial activities. The general readily entered 
                                                             
84 Hirakawa Arata, “The Great Earthquake in Eastern Japan and the Way We Look at History,” Rekishigaku kenkyū 
884 (October 2011), 2–7. 
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the agreement, but soon chafed at the direction the venture took as Date developed his diplomatic 
agenda with the help of another. 
 By 1613, Fray Luis Sotelo was a veteran of the halting negotiations between Tokugawa 
Japan and Habsburg Spain. Sotelo was born into a powerful family in Seville in Andalusia, 
peninsular Spain’s commercial and political gateway to the Indies. A younger brother, Sotelo left 
the business of city politics to his elder sibling and joined the Franciscan order. Seville housed 
the Casa de Contratación (House of Trade), the imperial institution charged with administering 
Spain’s relations with its growing network of colonies. Growing up in the shadow of the Casa, 
together with his bountiful missionary zeal, instilled in Sotelo a powerful impetus to go abroad, 
and he departed for the Philippines in 1600. Fascinated with Japan, he practiced the language in 
Japanese settlements around Manila before embarking for the archipelago in 1603. He did so as 
part of a trickle of mendicant missionaries who journeyed directly from Manila to Japan even 
before Pope Paul V authorized the mendicant orders to travel from the Philippines to Japan. The 
energetic friar made his way up north through Japan from Kyushu. Vivero crossed paths with 
Sotelo in 1609, and the erstwhile governor-general discovered a man just as, if not more, excited 
at the prospect of expanding Spain’s missionary and commercial relations with Japan. Sotelo 
helped steer negotiations with the Tokugawa, and as previously noted, Ieyasu intended to send 
the friar to Spain on the shogunate’s behalf. 
 Sotelo’s enthusiasm was a double-edged sword. He worked tirelessly to promote relations 
between his sovereign and his Japanese hosts, but fell out of favor with authorities every step of 
the way. Alonso Muñoz replaced him on the San Buena Ventura’s 1610 voyage. Sotelo later 
claimed this was due to illness, but there is evidence that the Franciscans active in Japan objected 
to the choice and lobbied to have the Franciscan comisario Muñoz take his place. Sotelo 
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remained in Tokugawa good graces long enough to represent the shogunate on the ill-fated San 
Sebastián expedition. That grace was exhausted soon after, when the friar ventured back into 
Edo. Sotelo established a church in the Tokugawa capital, disregarding the shogunate’s 
prohibition of all missionary activity and churches in territories under its direct control. In 
summer 1613 Tokugawa authorities destroyed Sotelo’s church, located near present-day 
Asakusa, and imprisoned the friar and his companions, executing many of the latter. The friar 
had fallen from Tokugawa representative to Tokugawa prisoner in less than year. 
 Date brought things full circle when he successfully petitioned for Sotelo’s release in 
August 1613. The friar’s reemergence served the interest of prisoner, jailer, and petitioner alike. 
Sotelo presumably preferred freedom to incarceration. Beyond personal liberty, Date’s 
commercial outreach and diplomatic gambit fit Sotelo’s view of Japanese-Spanish relations, and 
provided an opportunity to aggressively expand the Japanese mission aggressively in the 
northeast.85 The friar had both negotiated commercial terms with the Tokugawa and felt the sting 
of their growing distrust of missionaries; he recognized that trade might be the only path to 
securing religious tolerance. Working with Date, Sotelo also had the chance to shape the tone 
and tenor of the embassy in a manner more palatable to Spain, advocate for the Japan mission at 
the highest levels, and advance his own position in that mission.  
 By releasing Sotelo for Date’s endeavor, the shogunate benefitted from his experience 
and expertise without tethering itself to the friar directly. Sotelo remained useful, but his recent 
actions also made him an annoyance. Remanding him to Date leveraged Sotelo’s expertise to 
                                                             
85 By the 1610s, Jesuits and the mendicant orders had a presence in Tōhoku, but their numbers paled in comparison 
to Kyushu. Opening a new front in the northeast avoided the convoluted politics and tension surrounding Nagasaki. 
A commercial and missionary nexus in Tōhoku may have engendered the same tension over time, though Sotelo 
undoubtedly remained optimistic on this front. 
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maximum effect while minimizing potential fallout from failure. This replicated the logic behind 
Date’s involvement as well. If the daimyo succeeded in attracting Spanish trade, all the better. 
Either way, Ieyasu avoided having to outfit another ship. Similarly, if Sotelo facilitated the 
mission’s success, his release from jail would have been worth it. If he failed, Ieyasu would be 
conveniently rid of him. For his part, Date gained the services of the shogunate’s chosen 
representative for his own high-profile mission. Sotelo may have been an imperfect vessel, but 
he remained the most qualified candidate to guide the mission. The friar was arguably more 
conversant in both the Tokugawa and Habsburg political systems than anyone else in Japan. 
 Vizcaíno and Sotelo’s involvement eased logistics and provided a reservoir of relevant 
experience, but Date’s mission hinged on the support of the shogunate. The daimyo secured it 
through a series of meetings with Ieyasu as well as Mukai Shōgen (1582–1641), the Tokugawa 
Admiral of the Fleet (funate bugyō, 船手奉行). Records of these meetings exist, though details 
on their contents are scarce. The presence of Date retainers on the San Sebastián clearly signals 
both the daimyo’s interest and a central authority amenable to his participation in trade with 
Spain. Ieyasu granted Date permission to mount his own diplomatic expedition in May 1613, and 
Mukai mediated relations between the daimyo and the Tokugawa hegemon.86 Mukai had also 
worked with Will Adams to build the Buena Ventura, and appears to have aided in the Bautista’s 
construction as well, sending workers north to Sendai.87 Ultimately, ten Mukai retainers sailed on 
the Bautista to Acapulco, cementing the shogunate’s permission, participation, and oversight.88 
                                                             
86 Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 47-51. Date’s visit to Ieyasu in Sunpu is logged in the Tokugawa jikki, Shintei zōho 
kokushi taikei, vol. 38 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1998), 620–21 (Keichō 18.04.10–19, 1613.05.29–06.07). 
87 Ibid., 46. Date wrote Mukai thanking him for sending carpenters to aid in the Bautista’s construction. See Date 
chike kiroku vol. 2, Sendai-han shiryō taisei (Sendai: Hōbundō, 1972), 587 (Keichō 18.03.10, 1613.04.29). 
88 Ibid., 55. 
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 While Date worked with Vizcaíno and Mukai to build his ship, he consulted with Sotelo 
to craft his message. The friar helped shape the content, scale, and tone of Date’s self-
introduction to Spanish officials. The daimyo’s choice of correspondents reflected Sotelo’s 
influence, and the final list grew quite long: the viceroy of New Spain, King Philip III, Pope Paul 
V, the heads of the Franciscan order in New Spain and Rome, and the city of Seville, Sotelo’s 
hometown. Sotelo also may have been responsible for convincing Date to send messages and 
messengers all the way to Europe, rather than contenting himself with leadership in New Spain. 
A Jesuit active in the area around Sendai reported that his mendicant rival successfully amplified 
the scope of the enterprise by manipulating one of Date’s Christian retainers and threatening to 
back out of the endeavor if it did not venture on to Europe.89 The animosity between religious 
orders may have tinged this account of Sotelo’s actions and means of influence. Even so, the idea 
was not so radical. Ieyasu had established the precedent of sending a message to Spain three 
years earlier. Furthermore, in financial terms the bulk of the mission’s expense resided in the 
cost of building, outfitting, and loading the ship. Once in New Spain, it was presumed that the 
mission’s hosts would assume the cost of hospitality, as indeed proved to be the case. 
 Having decided whom Date would write, the friar and daimyo needed to decide what to 
say. The two settled on familiar terms in a new package. Date, no doubt with Sotelo’s input, 
systemically excised or addressed the issues that had divided Vivero and the shogunate three 
years prior. Date’s letters made no mention of silver, miners, or mining technology. He vowed to 
refuse any Dutch who might be foolish enough to arrive in his domain. Most importantly, the 
daimyo welcomed missionaries with open arms, and promised them every courtesy when they 
arrived. Date framed his outreach first and foremost as a request for missionaries. He further 
                                                             
89 Ibid., 59-62. 
Joshua Batts 
Ch. 1 – Sailing East 
80 
 
welded his petition to a personal narrative of discovery and wonder at the word of God, 
facilitated by a certain Franciscan friar. While unable to convert due to “present difficulties,” he 
expressed his desire that all subjects in his domain convert to Christianity.90 This pledged piety, 
however teasing, reinforced a position of deference the Tokugawa could not and would not 
adopt. Whereas Ieyasu had impassively granted permission to Philip’s subject, Date respectfully 
petitioned for the king’s favor as one beholden (if not quite committed) to the same God. The 
daimyo adopted the humility that the shogunate could not afford to inhabit. Date’s entire gambit 
rested on this pivot from sovereign to subject, and the paradoxical flexibility granted by the latter 
position within a framework where the shogunate had to maintain the image of absolute 
authority. 
 Proclamations of a faith deferred dressed up a set of familiar provisions. The requested 
missionaries needed some means of transportation, and Date happily offered his own vessel in 
addition to any ships New Spain might send on its own. The daimyo’s proposals for managing 
the anticipated traffic of ships, men, and supplies echoed the less problematic items Vivero had 
negotiated before: permission to dock at any port in Sendai, fair treatment of all Spanish, fair 
prices for any provisions, land set aside for a trading station and residences, and the right of the 
Spanish to govern their own affairs. This “term sheet” was separate from Date’s letter of 
introduction, and more matter-of-fact in tone. What had been the basis of Vivero’s proposition to 
the Tokugawa shogunate was now offered by a Japanese daimyo for the approval of the Spanish 
monarch. Sotelo played a formative role in both exchanges, though in the intervening three years 
the offer and recipient had switched. 
                                                             
90 Date Masamune to Philip III, 1613.10.17. SDS doc. 140. 
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 Date’s apparent concessions to Spanish sentiments diminished under scrutiny. For one, 
the Dutch had not yet ventured as far north as Sendai, nor had they expressed any interest in 
doing so.91 Date made this paper promise knowing full well there was little chance he would 
need to enforce it. Similarly, the nascent state of Sendai’s mining industry made it easy to omit 
any mention of the precious metal and the capricious terms its potential extraction had imposed 
on earlier talks. In contrast, warmly inviting missionaries was a true departure from the 
shogunate’s stated priorities. Still, one daimyo mediating relations with one foreign community 
would be easier for the Tokugawa to manage than the collection of interests entrenched in 
Kyushu. There is no proof that Date cleared each provision with Ieyasu or Mukai, so it is 
possible they remained in the dark. However, Mukai’s involvement in the planning and the 
presence of his retainers on a voyage prominently featuring a zealous Franciscan monk would 
have demanded a risky policy of selective silence that is difficult to accept. In any event, the 
1612 prohibition on Christianity applied only to direct Tokugawa holdings; technically Date was 
still free to invite as many missionaries as he wanted. It is tempting to speculate that the 
Tokugawa limited the 1612 edict at least in part to grant Date additional flexibility. Such 
speculation, however appealing, remains precisely that. 
 Date’s decision to send a message all the way to Spain was not new, but his decision to 
send a Japanese representative along with the letters departed from Tokugawa precedent. The 
role played by Japanese representatives in the back and forth between the Tokugawa and 
Habsburg administrations defies easy explanation. In 1610, the Kyoto merchant Tanaka Shōsuke 
                                                             
91 The situation changed in 1642, when a VOC expedition charged with searching out the islands Rica de Oro and 
Rica de Plata—evidently as appealing to the Dutch as they had once been to Vizcaíno—sought provisions in Nanbu, 
a domain north of Sendai. A Dutch vessel involved received a warm welcome when it put into harbor on their way 
up, but ten men were captured and sent to Edo after coming ashore on the return voyage south. See, Reinier H. 
Hesselink, Prisoners from Nambu: Reality and Make-Believe in 17th-Century Japanese Diplomacy (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2002). 
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was treated as something like an ambassador while in New Spain. The famous Nahuatl 
chronicler Chimalpahin described him as such, and mentioned that Tanaka was honored by the 
viceroy during his stay.92 Tanaka is mentioned in Tokugawa records, and he again journeyed to 
New Spain on the Bautista.93 But his name did not appear on outward-facing Tokugawa 
documents, most notably the 1610 letters sent to Lerma that did mention Sotelo and Muñoz. 
Tanaka appears to have assumed practical responsibilities such as establishing ties with local 
officials and perhaps overseeing the sale and transfer of Japanese goods. These responsibilities 
did not require a formal diplomatic role in Tokugawa eyes, despite the merchant’s treatment as 
such while abroad. Instead, Ieyasu’s letter outlined his own thoughts, his seal legitimated the 
document, and the named Franciscans could elaborate if the Spanish court had any questions. 
 Date extended this logic further. Sotelo still featured prominently. Date’s letters 
mentioned Sotelo repeatedly by name, assigned him a personal role in the daimyo’s spiritual 
awakening, and entrusted the friar with “the details.”94 Aside from the flirtation with 
Christianity, Date’s treatment of Sotelo paralleled Ieyasu’s. However, Date also mentioned—
though not by name—two retainers who would journey to New Spain, and a third who was 
charged to continue on to the courts of Madrid and Rome.95 Practically speaking, this 
circumstance ensured a higher chance of a reply, or at least a report back. Letters were meant to 
                                                             
92 Domingo Francisco de San Antón Muñón Chimalpahin Cuauhtlehuanitzin, Annals of His Time : Don Domingo de 
San Antón Muñón Chimalpahin Quauhtlehuanitzin, trans. James Lockhart, Susan Schroeder and Doris Namala 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).171–175.  
93 Following his return to Japan in 1611, Tanaka presented purple felt cloth to Ieyasu at Sunpu. See Tokugawa jikki, 
561 (Keichō 16.09.22, 1611.07.10).  
94 See, for example, Date’s letters to Philip III, the Viceroy of New Spain, and the Director-General of the 
Franciscan Order in Rome, all dated 1613.10.17. (SDS docs. 140, 70, 142, respectively). 
95 The content and form of Date’s letters are examined in more depth in the following chapter.  
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prompt a reply, but the document itself journeyed one way. Barring death or catastrophe, a 
personal representative traveled roundtrip. In three years, Ieyasu’s letter had not yet garnered a 
response, nor had the letter-bearer, Muñoz, returned. By sending a personal retainer, Date raised 
the probability of receiving some sort of response, in contrast to the silence frustrating the 
Tokugawa. 
  There was also a symbolic dimension to the appointment of a Japanese representative. In 
his letters, Date charged the third envoy with “delivering the letters to Your Majesty,” alongside 
Sotelo’s mission to speak on the daimyo’s behalf and hammer out the details of any agreement. 
Date thus assigned communication of intent to Sotelo and symbolic action to his own retainer. 
Unlike Ieyasu, Date adopted a respectful, referential tone to both the secular (Philip) and 
religious (Paul) leadership of Catholic Europe. The Tokugawa sent a document granting 
permission, but Date opted to dispatch a physical stand-in to petition favor and demonstrate 
conviction. In effect, Date sent a Spaniard to be his mouth and a Japanese retainer to be his heart. 
The daimyo already had a chatty friar, but who might serve as his symbolic representative? 
 The “King of Ōshū” selected Hasekura Tsunenaga (支倉常長, 1571–1622), a trusted 
retainer, but also one he could afford to lose. He embodied the personal ties, complicated familial 
politics, and varying fortunes of minor retainers in an age of political turbulence. Hasekura was 
born to Yamaguchi Tsunenari but was adopted by Tsunenari’s older brother Hasekura Tokimasa, 
who lacked an heir. Tokimasa later fathered male heirs, and in 1596 Tsunenaga became the head 
of a Hasekura branch family. A few years Date’s junior, Hasekura served his lord from a young 
age as an envoy and mediator of local disputes.96 Both Hasekura and his uncle fought under 
Date’s banner in Korea, reinforcing the defense of Busan and guarding the subsequent Japanese 
                                                             
96 Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 16. 
Joshua Batts 
Ch. 1 – Sailing East 
84 
 
retreat. Hasekura married multiple times and fathered four children, while his holdings ranked 
him as a mid-level retainer. These biographical details are scant, but sketch out the life of a loyal, 
capable, if unremarkable, vassal of the new Sendai domain and its founder. 
 Family scandal conspired to make Hasekura expendable. Hasekura’s birth father 
Tsunenari was found guilty of fraud, and Date ordered that he commit seppuku (切腹, literally 
“cutting the belly,” a form of ritual suicide) for his crimes.  Given away for adoption or not, the 
sins of the father became the sins of the son. Date’s writ ordering Tsunenari’s execution also 
ordered Hasekura’s expulsion, condemning him to the life of a rōnin (浪人, masterless samurai). 
The extant execution and expulsion order omits the year, but upon surveying the circumstantial 
evidence, Gonoi Takashi postulates that Date meted out his verdict in 1612.97 If this is true, the 
clan’s fall came just as Date began to solidify plans to build the Bautista and dispatch a mission 
to Spain. Appointing a disgraced but competent retainer offered Date the best of both worlds. If 
Hasekura succeeded in establishing trade with Spain, Date could credibly welcome him back into 
the fold. Conversely, if Hasekura failed or met misfortune along the way, the daimyo only lost an 
already-disgraced retainer. It appears that Date reestablished Hasekura and his family on a 
smaller plot of land in spring 1613 in anticipation of the latter’s service.98  
 By summer 1613, Date had assembled the necessary personnel and secured permission 
for his venture from the Tokugawa. Preparations, and the relationships undergirding them, 
                                                             
97 This debate is covered in Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 7-8, and 65–72. There is an alternate theory that Tsunenari 
was executed up to ten years earlier. Gonoi sifts through the dates, details, and format of related documents at 
length, but the most direct evidence comes from a 1619 letter by the Jesuit missionary Jeronimo Angelis, active 
around Sendai at the time. Angelis, no friend to the Franciscans, related that Date selected Hasekura to head the 
mission a few months after his father’s execution. Angelis also stated that Hasekura’s role in the mission spared him 
the same fate as his father. For more information see Satō Ken’ichi, “‘Hasekura Tsunenaga tsuihō monjo’ no nendai 
nit suite [A Note on the Date of the ‘Hasekura Tsunenaga Expulsion Document’],” Sendai-shi hakubutsukan chōsa 
kenkyū hōkoku 8 (1988). 
98 This timeline and its implications reproduces Gonoi’s logic, cited above. 
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proceeded in line with established character. Date continued coordinating with Mukai, who lent 
aid to the construction efforts and sent men to journey on the Bautista. Vizcaíno eventually 
soured on the enterprise, alleging that Date reneged on their original terms and chafing at 
Sotelo’s growing influence in the diplomatic sphere. The chronicle of Vizcaíno’s misadventure 
in Japan concluded by noting that the general “embarked as a passenger” rather than a leader.99 
Sotelo continued to be a volatile, outspoken asset. Date secured his release from prison in 
August, and soon after the friar helped draft Date’s letters. Documents mention Hasekura, but 
none ascribe to him much influence in preparations for the voyage. Vizcaíno’s anger, Sotelo’s 
agitation, and Hasekura’s silence would all continue across the water. 
 The ship launched out of Tsukinoura (near present-day Ishinomaki City) on 28 October, 
1613.  The vessel measured over 35 meters long, almost 11 meters wide, and 28 meters tall. Date 
records state that the ship was full of “hundreds” of containers of merchandise, while Vizcaíno 
noted that construction and provisioning continued until the date of launch. Joining Hasekura, 
Sotelo, and Vizcaíno were a handful of other Date retainers, Mukai’s ten hand-picked men, 
roughly forty Spaniards (nanbanjin, 南蛮人) and a large number of merchants.  
 All told, merchants, crew, and leadership numbered 180 men. Vizcaíno went out to Japan 
like a lion but was coming back a lamb. Sotelo, now on his third try, finally had his chance to 
sail eastward. Date had built his ship, and through his efforts, the Tokugawa hoped to force an 
answer to a question they had been asking for a decade.  
Conclusion – Mixed Currents 
 Date’s mission was not a singularity but the outgrowth of an iterative process of 
diplomacy pursued by the Tokugawa since the turn of the seventeenth century. The Bautista set 
                                                             
99 Gil, 383. 
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out as the third ship to sail for New Spain, not the first. Nor was Date the first to send word to the 
monarchy in Madrid. Ieyasu and Hidetada reached out a few years prior, after a decade of 
navigating Spanish colonial administration. Date built upon previous efforts by sending a 
Japanese retainer to accompany his missives to Europe. Here he struck new ground, as Hasekura 
became one of the very few Japanese to reach Europe prior to the nineteenth century, and the 
only one to petition a European monarch directly on behalf of a political power in Japan.100  
 The daimyo’s gambit took place within the pliant framework of Tokugawa foreign 
relations. The shogunate sought control over the archipelago’s entanglements abroad, but was 
flexible in the pursuit of this objective. Control could assume the form of direct administration, 
as with the archipelago’s mines and the port of Nagasaki; it could assume the form of licensing, 
as with the adoption of the shuin system for merchants foreign and domestic; it could also 
assume the form of delegating mediation to well-positioned and ambitious daimyo, as happened 
in the shogunate’s relationship with Ryukyu (via Satsuma), Korea (via Tsushima), and Ezo (via 
Matsumae). The dynamics of these relations differed, and the autonomy granted the daimyo 
involved introduced the potential for friction.101 However, a degree of regional autonomy could 
further foreign relations without unduly risking domestic order. This autonomy allowed Date to 
frame his mission in a religious and diplomatic manner the Tokugawa shogunate was unwilling 
to adopt. If successful, daimyo and shogunate alike stood to gain from the development of 
                                                             
100 The Tenshō embassy had traveled to Europe thirty years prior, but the mission was structured around building 
support for Jesuit activities in Japan rather than negotiating a more formal political and commercial relationship 
between Japan and European sovereigns. Put another way, Hasekura was the first Japanese to bring terms on behalf 
of his sovereign to a European polity. Hasekura was himself accompanied by a small contingent of Japanese all the 
way to Rome. 
101 “Friction” took many forms. The best-known example was the forgery committed by the Sō family to smooth 
over relations between the shogunate and the royal court in Korea. The Satsuma conquest of the Ryukyu kingdom 
provides another notable example.  
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foreign trade in eastern Japan. Date altered Tokugawa tactics but adhered to the same strategy: 
establish foreign commerce wherever possible in a manner that maintained the shogunate’s 
dignity and reinforced its hegemony. 
 These collective efforts by the Tokugawa and Date enjoin us to reconsider Japan’s 
relationship with Europe, particularly Catholic Europe, in the seventeenth century. Tokugawa 
outreach to Spain, persistent and prolonged, challenges a narrative defined by European 
discovery and expulsion. Ieyasu pursued relations with Spain more doggedly than he did with 
any other recent arrival from Europe. The Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and English all came to 
Japan. But the Japanese reached out directly to (New) Spain. The shogunate sent letters early and 
often to the governor-general in the Philippines encouraging ships from the Americas. Ieyasu 
lowered ship quotas to appease concerns in Manila. He consistently invited Spanish vessels up 
into the Tokugawa heartland. When a tempest delivered Vivero ashore, the Tokugawa delivered 
him back to New Spain on a Japanese vessel, complete with a message for the top of the Spanish 
imperial hierarchy. Throughout, the shogunate proceeded with measured confidence and from 
the position of granting favors, not requesting them. These actions demonstrate the long reach of 
Tokugawa influence and ambition, and prompt the question of how Spain would react to a 
Japanese polity with the means and desire for commercial expansion. 
  The implications ripple through world history as well. Tokugawa and Date entreaties 
marked Japan as the only polity besides Spain dispatching vessels to trade across the Pacific 
during the so-called Age of Discovery. A succession of firsts punctuates histories of discovery—
first circumnavigation, first landfall, first flag planted—most often at the hands of Europeans. If 
firsts are to be one of our criteria, then Japan was the first society in global history to pursue a 
commercial relationship across the world’s largest natural barrier. Spain regularly crossed the 
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ocean, but perceived of the Pacific as a mercantilist site of intra-imperial exchange, a route to be 
guarded and maintained. The Pacific was an ocean for Spanish ships to cross between Spanish 
ports. The crown’s answer to how to trade with Asia was to colonize a small slice of it and 
control the route between. The Tokugawa also focused on control, but played a different game. 
Ieyasu pursued foreign trade wherever he might find it, and looked to weld that trade into a 
system of relations undergirding Tokugawa authority. Date’s embassy adhered to this model. 
 The Bautista departed Japan as the best-equipped venture to date. Date dispatched a 
larger vessel than the two before, entrusted to capable navigators along a known route, sent 
knowledgeable intermediaries and personal representatives, and penned a multitude of letters to 
authority figures in the Americas and Europe. Most importantly, Tokugawa sanction came with a 
degree of flexibility, permitting Date to present a different diplomatic voice and represent a 
different set of intentions. The “King of Ōshū” could ask for the favor of Philip in a manner that 
the “emperor of Japan” would not. After devoting a dozen years to outreach only to be met with 
equivocation, and silence, the shogunate let someone else handle organization and execution. 
 But the vessel was also laden with tension and potentials pitfalls. The viceroy had 
charged Vizcaíno with returning Japanese merchants to Japan and explaining away the Buena 
Ventura sale. Now a larger ship, with more merchants, was charting a course to Acapulco 
unbidden, with the erstwhile ambassador reduced to a passenger. Vizcaíno and Sotelo were also 
now at odds: over control of the ship, control of the mission, and control of the message to be 
delivered. The vessel’s appearance further complicated the diplomatic picture. By fall 1613, 
multiple paths were active: the viceroy’s ambassador returning to Japan, a previously-unknown 
Japanese daimyo reaching out to Catholic Europe, and the Spanish monarchy finalizing its 
response to Ieyasu’s original missive. The diplomatic channels between the Tokugawa shogunate 
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and Habsburg monarchy were not well established, but already they were becoming 
overcrowded.  
  These complications contributed to the fundamental problem of demonstrating authority 
and establishing trust, and it is precisely on this point that Tokugawa flexibility and Spanish 
caution ran aground of each other. The arrival of Date’s ship in New Spain did not reinforce 
Tokugawa commitment, but threw into question just whom Hasekura and Sotelo represented, 
and by extension, whom the Spanish were dealing with. Through letters, interviews, and reports, 
officials attempted to triangulate the relationship between the Bautista’s passengers, the “King of 
Ōshū,” and the (Tokugawa) “Emperor of Japan.” Luis Sotelo shifted between these two Japanese 
authorities in his efforts to gain favor and secure an agreement in Spain, but his attempts to 
redraw the lines of authority only succeeded in blurring them. The following chapter brings these 
concurrent efforts into focus. 
Joshua Batts 
Ch. 2 – Confounding the Court 
90 
 
2. Confounding the Court: The Keichō Embassy Departs for Europe 
The Keichō Embassy failed not from lack of trying, but from a lack of trust. Geographic, 
conceptual, and political distance complicated the already difficult task of communication and 
building trust among the composite parts of Tokugawa Japan and Habsburg Spain. Date’s 
embassy and vessel embodied that challenge. The San Juan Bautista’s voyage to New Spain 
spoke to the shogunate’s mounting frustration at the lack of a reply from Spain and Tokugawa 
willingness to entrust outreach to an auxiliary power. However, the ship’s appearance in 
Acapulco caused a new wave of distrust to ripple through Spanish officialdom and precipitated 
Philip III’s rejection of trade between his American colony and his neighbor in Asia. Rather than 
bridging gaps the mission pushed the two polities further apart, and as time passed there was less 
and less reason to bother making up the distance. 
This chapter traces the Spanish monarchy’s attempts to assess and formulate a response 
to Tokugawa and Date outreach from 1611 to the early part of 1615, and the impact of Date’s 
embassy on that response. I map the monarchy’s initial 1613 resolution to permit Spanish vessels 
to sail between New Spain and Japan, and its subsequent reversal after the Bautista docked in 
Acapulco in 1614. The Keichō Embassy, rather than representing Japanese authority to Spanish 
officials, fractured it. The vessel registered as a commercial threat, the reports it brought to New 
Spain were contradictory, and Date Masamune was an unknown entity. All of these factors 
undermined the standing of the daimyo’s party from the start. Fray Luis Sotelo attempted to 
overcome the atmosphere of mistrust with a rhetoric of half-truths, claiming to be an “imperial” 
envoy of the Tokugawa shogunate. Date’s letters and reports of Sotelo’s Spanish colleagues 
rebutted this point, and the friar never succeeded in lending the embassy “imperial” credibility. 
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Instead the crown referred to reports generated by the Keichō Embassy’s arrival and 
travel to come to a final decision on Ieyasu’s invitation. Here logistical and geographical friction 
worked in the monarchy’s favor. King and council used the information and opinion produced by 
layers of administration to decide the matter of direct trade well before Hasekura and Sotelo 
addressed the king. In this way, deliberations on memorials from the embassy and impressions 
from officials stood in for negotiations or direct appeal. Where the Tokugawa used symbolic 
distance to enable Date’s diplomatic initiative, the Spanish crown used geographic distance to 
shut that same initiative down. By the time the party officially met with Philip in early 1615, the 
only questions for the court were what extent to honor and patronize the embassy. But the matter 
of trade was already decided, as Spain used the daimyo’s unwanted advances to justify closing 
the Pacific to Ieyasu. 
Sent to expedite a Spanish response, the Keichō Embassy delayed it by an additional two 
years. For Tokugawa Ieyasu, the lack of a timely reply from the Spanish monarchy eroded the 
possibility of expanded commerce at a time when he was quickly losing patience with the 
evangelizing efforts of Spanish missionaries. By 1613, the shogunate outsourced the capital and 
labor to Date, and abandoned constructing and provisioning ships across the Pacific. The 
daimyo’s gambit to secure relations between New Spain and his domain doubled as the 
shogunate’s latest attempt to trade with Spain beyond the Philippines after a decade of outreach 
and encouragement. 
Philip had reasons to delay. Any agreement with the Tokugawa or Date required 
expanding Spain´s tenuous Pacific network beyond the Manila galleons.1 But protection, not 
                                                             
1 Often, but not always, two ships sailed annually during this time. See William Schurz, The Manila Galleon (New 
York: E.P. Dutton, 1939), 193–94. 
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expansion, occupied leaders in the wake of English and Dutch expansion into East Asian waters, 
and continued piracy in the Caribbean. The crown also struggled to curtail smuggling and 
regulate the amount of American silver bound for Asia.2 Governing the Philippines strained 
administrative and material resources, and the crown received constant supplications from the 
islands for more men, more ships, and more provisions.3 Traffic between Acapulco and Japan 
would open New Spain to direct foreign trade and necessitate a significant relative increase in 
the volume of goods, the number of ships, and the number of sailors committed to Pacific 
commerce. Ships would sail beyond Spanish authority, into a realm with a reputation for 
bellicosity and a recent history of political instability. The Tokugawa missive merited a reply, 
but the shogunate had not made a light request.  
Date’s mission compounded the problem, and prompted a wave of contradictory 
correspondence for the monarchy that differed on the level of Tokugawa involvement and 
approval, and the motivations of an unknown northern daimyo (Date), his stoic Japanese retainer 
(Hasekura Tsunenaga), and the vocal friar who spoke for both (Luis Sotelo). The Spanish crown 
referred to Date as the “King of Oshu” (Rey de Voxu), and were vexed about how treatment of 
Date’s representatives might impact the monarchy’s relationship with Ieyasu, the “Emperor of 
Japan” (Emperador del Japón). This was especially problematic if the “emperor” had not 
condoned the “king’s” legation. Date’s murky credibility eroded trust about who the Spanish 
                                                             
2 Many of these rules and restrictions were compiled and published in 1680 as Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias, 
nine volumes in total. These restrictions are discussed in more depth in Chapter 4, drawing on Volume 9, Chapter 45 
of the Recopilación. 
3 Examples of such petitions abound in Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson, eds., The Philippine 
Islands, 1493-1803 (Cleveland: A.H. Clark Company, 1903). Volumes XVII–XIX cover the years 1610 to 1620, and 
will also be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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were dealing with, who they should be dealing with, and what to expect from Japan’s suddenly 
variegated leadership. 
It did not help matters that in 1613 Sotelo and Hasekura were but one of four interrelated 
diplomatic veins traversing the political and geographic space between Tokugawa Japan and 
Habsburg Spain. Alonso Muñoz remained in Spain, his 1610 mandate from the Tokugawa 
unfulfilled as Ieyasu waited for a reply. Sebastián Vizcaíno traveled aboard the Bautista, but 
carried letters of reply from the Tokugawa to the viceroy of New Spain. Confined coexistence 
alongside Sotelo further degraded the deteriorating relationship between the two men, and the 
enmity between Vizcaíno and Sotelo followed Date’s mission to Spain. Finally, by late 1613 
Philip’s response embassy to Ieyasu was en route, only to be stalled in New Spain early the next 
year in reaction to Hasekura and Sotelo’s arrival. When the monarchy reconsidered the issue in 
1614, the Council of the Indies took into account all four of these diplomatic thrusts, and the 
discordant reports accompanying them. Thus Spain continued to take its time, even as patience 
thinned elsewhere. 
These competing narratives and the uncertainty accompanying them coalesced around the 
person and accounts of Fray Luis Sotelo. The friar served as the legation’s voice, and his 
memorials spurred responses from Spaniards on each leg of the mission’s journey from Date’s 
Sendai domain to the kingdom of Castile and beyond. Sotelo claimed a direct mandate from 
Tokugawa Ieyasu, and initially presented himself to Spanish authorities as a Tokugawa envoy 
accompanying Date’s separate legation. The daimyo’s Japanese letters to Spanish officials 
contradicted this account, as did letters by Vizcaíno and others. These claims stretched the truth 
to varying degrees, at a time when Philip’s council had a limited capacity to sort them out. Sotelo 
accurately warned of Tokugawa impatience and argued for the shogunate’s complicity in Date’s 
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endeavor, but the friar never convinced the Spanish that he spoke on behalf of the Tokugawa 
“emperor.”  
The Bautista’s arrival spurred a final decision in Madrid on the original Tokugawa 
invitation even as Hasekura and Sotelo made their way to Spain. The ship spoke more loudly 
than the men aboard. Conflicting accounts sowed caution, if not distrust, but the arrival of a 500-
ton Japanese vessel in Acapulco registered as a distinct threat. By the latter half of 1613, Philip 
and the Councils of State and Indies had belatedly accepted Ieyasu’s original terms and ruled to 
permit a single Spanish ship to travel directly between Japan and New Spain. The San Juan 
Bautista pulled into Acapulco in late January 1614, sent by a “king” the Spanish did not know, to 
a port that was not open, carrying merchants and merchandise from a polity Spain could not 
exert any measurable control over. 
The present exploration of the Spanish government’s deliberations during 1611–1615 
raises two additional points. First, concerns over persecution in Japan were not the sole or 
immediate causes of Madrid’s decision to retreat from direct “correspondence” 
(correspondencia) between eastern Japan and New Spain. Spanish displeasure over Christian 
persecution played a major role, but so did the perceived commercial threat of Japanese maritime 
activity. Second, the embassy embodied these threats, even as its principal figures attempted to 
negotiate on the basis of friendship and faith. Together, the ship and the mission aboard 
presented their Spanish hosts with the thorny question of how to stonewall Date’s overtures 
without incurring Tokugawa displeasure at a time when the balance of power between the 
Spanish East Indies and Japan tilted decidedly in the latter’s favor. 
The pages that follow examine the monarchy’s efforts to sort out who to trust, and 
analyze the way in which Date’s mission—the party, the ship, and the news both carried—
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complicated those efforts. Finally, the monarchy’s deliberations reveal why the Tokugawa 
waited so long for a reply; subsequent chapters will address the consequences of that delay. 
Careful Consideration: 1611–1613 
The first diplomatic representative sent to Spain was not Sotelo or Hasekura, but the less-
known friar Alonso Muñoz.  Muñoz departed with Don Rodrigo de Vivero, leaving Uraga on 
August 1st, 1610 and striking out northeast across Pacific.4 The paths of the principals divided 
soon after their arrival in New Spain. The viceroy Salinas “purchased” the San Buena Ventura 
and sent the Japanese back with Sebastián Vizcaíno, Vivero continued his career in the 
Americas, and Muñoz continued on to Spain. 
 The Marquis de Salinas also departed for Europe, bringing an end to his long 
administrative career in the Indies. Once returned to Spain, he assumed the Presidency of the 
Council of the Indies. The “Indies” were disparate, encompassing the Spanish holdings in North 
and South America, the islands of the Caribbean, and the Philippine Islands (named after Philip 
II, the current king’s father) across the Pacific.5 Salinas returned to Spain as one of the king's 
most well-informed advisors on any matter concerning trade between Asia and the Americas.6 
He also maintained a personal connection in the matter, for beyond their gifts to the king, the 
Tokugawa shogunate had returned his nephew. Salinas’ ambivalent response to Tokugawa 
outreach—engaging diplomatically but avoiding commercial commitment—presaged the 
Council and monarchy’s deliberations as they decided what to make of the letters and gifts 
Muñoz brought to Spain. 
                                                             
4 Gonoi Takashi, Hasekura Tsunenaga (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2003), 32.  
5 The Portuguese Indies were overseen by the Council of Portugal despite the unification of the crowns. 
6 Salinas served as viceroy of New Spain twice, and as viceroy of Peru much of the time in between. 
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Muñoz reached Spain in 1611, and upon receiving the letters he carried the monarchy 
began deliberating how to respond. The question of administrative jurisdiction was an early 
issue. Muñoz debriefed Philip III’s Council of State, the consultative body charged with advising 
the king on matters of foreign relations. However, late in 1611 the monarchy brought the Council 
of the Indies into the fold.7 Both bodies drew from the nobility, with the King appointing a 
President and the President appointing his fellow councilman, who might number up to a dozen 
at any given time.8 State continued to sporadically weigh in, especially once Hasekura and Sotelo 
arrived in Europe, but Indies took the lead in most discussions. Technically the latter organ 
oversaw “domestic” policy, tied to the governance of the crown’s colonies. However, the 
monarchy’s existing relationship with Japan ran through the Philippines, and any expansion 
would integrate New Spain, both parts of the Spanish Indies. The shuffling between Councils 
reflected the underdeveloped institutional architecture for dealing with direct overtures from 
polities in East Asia. 
In May 1612, the Council of the Indies advised Philip “that henceforth communication, 
trade, and commerce with that kingdom [Japan] be permitted through New Spain, as there is now 
through Manila.”9 The Council’s decision followed consultation with Muñoz, noted as the one 
responsible for bringing the Tokugawa letters to the throne’s attention. The Council held no 
reservations on the issue, stating that it “has appeared very suitable to the service of our Lord and 
to the universal good of these kingdoms [of Spain].”10 The memorial was direct and brief, and 
                                                             
7 Duke of Lerma to the Council of State. 1611.12.12. DNS 12-12, CCIII. 
8 On council organization, see Patrick Williams, The Great Favourite: The Duke of Lerma and the Court and 
Government of Philip III of Spain, 1598-1621 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 35–37. 
9 Consulta del Consejo de Indias (Draft). 1612.05.18. DNS 12-12, CCIV.   
10 Ibid. 
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left the specifics of implementing the policy for future discussion. In addition to Muñoz’s letter 
and testimony, the Council no doubt considered Vivero’s reports of his kind treatment and return 
to New Spain, not least because a blood relative —Salinas—sat as its head. The early positive 
response set the stage for a major expansion of Spain’s Pacific commercial network and a 
significant commitment to deeper ties with Japan. 
However, what registered as the “universal good” in Madrid manifested as a threat in 
Manila. The city was no longer Japan’s preferred route for contacting the Spanish throne, but it 
was not out of the loop. News of Vivero’s time in Japan, and the resultant traffic in ships, letters, 
and people between Japan and New Spain soon reached the Philippines. Alarmed by the 
direction and pace of events, the audiencia of Manila, the senior legislative and judicial body of 
the Philippines, opposed direct American trade with Japan in a 1611 letter to the king. The 
former viceroy’s unilateral decision to send Vizcaíno to Japan provoked the most concern, 
suggesting to the audiencia that the viceroy’s administration “wished to open voyages and trade 
from Japan to New Spain without attention to the great damages and disadvantages that would 
result from this.”11 The audiencia elaborated on these ill consequences, warning of the Japanese 
proclivity for violence—a common refrain—and the archipelago’s growing ties with the Dutch, 
heretics and rebels in Spanish eyes. Japanese bellicosity and cozy relations with the Dutch were 
bad enough, but opening the Pacific would pave the way for the Japanese to master its navigation 
and harass Spanish settlements on the American coast. Piracy and privateering vexed Spanish 
authorities in the Caribbean; here authorities in the Philippines warned of making the Pacific 
coastline similarly vulnerable to haranguing by a violent people under the pernicious influence of 
                                                             
11 Audiencia letter to Philip III, 1611.7.21. AGI, FILIPINAS,20,R.5,N.40. When the Council of the Indies reviewed 
this memorial, Salinas would be reading a critique of his own actions as viceroy. 
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Dutch rebels.12 The audiencia claimed to write in response to the concerns of “the city,” and 
hoped Philip would rule accordingly.13 
Drafted in July 1611, the audiencia’s remonstrations did not reach Spain until after the 
Council of the Indies decided in favor of direct ties in May1612.14 Conducting diplomacy with 
Japan was a slow process, but the specific issue of opening trade between the archipelago and 
New Spain added another level of complication. Beyond the glacial pace of “direct” 
communication between the shogunate and the monarchy, Madrid needed to review—and wait 
for—information and opinions from the Philippines and New Spain. The notice from Manila was 
a case in point; in response the Council paused discussion until more information arrived from 
the Philippines. In other words, it decided to wait until letters drafted in Manila in 1612 arrived 
in Spain in 1613 to help decide how to respond to a letter from the Tokugawa written in the 
summer of 1610. 
The political calculus of the appeal also draws attention. The Manila audiencia drafted its 
protestations primarily in terms of the potential damage to New Spain. It claimed to write in 
response to the concerns presented by “the city,” but did not include specific discussion of 
Manila's potential discomfiture. Despite an oft-uneasy relationship with their neighbors, the 
Spanish Philippines depended on trade with Asian partners, primarily the Chinese diaspora but 
also with Japan. Manila’s status as the clearinghouse for American silver fueled this trade. The 
annual Manila galleon was the colony’s lifeline; adding routes out of New Spain to additional 
ports in Asia would end the Philippines’ monopoly on the America trade. These fears became 
                                                             
12 For an overview of the piracy vexing Spanish authority in the New World, see Kris E. Lane, Pillaging the Empire: 
Piracy in the Americas, 1500-1750 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1998). 
13 Audiencia letter. AGI,FILIPINAS,20,R.5,N.40 
14 Ibid. 
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explicit in later letters, so much so that the mission—Sotelo foremost among them—found it 
necessary to argue against them when Date’s embassy arrived on a Japanese vessel two years 
later.15 The question of relations with Japan doubled as a question of how to administer the 
Philippines and role of the Spanish Indies in Asia. The letter also demonstrated that the agenda 
of Philippines did not always align with their superiors in New Spain or the peninsula when it 
came to Japan. This dynamic continued throughout the years of the Keichō Embassy. 
The audiencia rejected expanded relations with Japan on secular grounds, professing 
concerns about Japanese piracy on the American coast and anxiety about commercial threats. 
The collapse of relations between Japan and Spain often takes on a religious character, be it 
discussion of Tokugawa concern over the political threat presented by Catholic missionaries, 
persecution of the wider Christian community, or infighting and intrigue among religious orders. 
All of that drew near on the horizon, but this letter made clear the commercial concerns of 
Spaniards who regarded Japanese experiments with Pacific trade as a threat to their livelihood 
and that of New Spain. Primed to move forward, the monarchy in Madrid took these concerns 
seriously enough to table discussion; reports of persecution would soon make them even more 
cautious. However, the material concerns of whom and what should be allowed across the 
Pacific continued to weigh on Philip and his councilors as they devised their strategy. 
Deliberations on the Tokugawa proposal recommenced one year later, though the delay 
accomplished little. The expected updates from the Philippines were late, and in the spring of 
1613 Alonso Muñoz wrote the Council warning against any further delay in responding to the 
Tokugawa. Bereft of additional pertinent information, Indies upheld its judgment from the year 
                                                             
15 Embassy memorial to Philip III and the Council of the Indies (1614?). AGS, EST,LEG,256.1,2. The memorial is 
also published as DNS 12-12, VII. 
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before and recommended the king order one ship annually depart New Spain for Japan.16 This 
time around the king’s advisors offered a rationale, perhaps anticipating arguments to the 
contrary. The Council’s consulta stated that trade with Japan would not be a true threat because 
the islands had little to bring back to New Spain; a roundabout way of saying that ties with Japan 
would not negatively impact the Philippines’ commercial lifeline with New Spain. More 
importantly, commerce with silver-rich Japan would not require draining silver from America, 
something “that the King desires very much.” The ship might even be able to take silver from 
Japan to the Philippines, easing the silver drain still further. Furthermore, New Spain could serve 
as an additional channel for missionaries voyaging to Japan. In light of Muñoz’s testimony, the 
letters and gifts from the Tokugawa, and the hospitable treatment offered Rodrigo de Vivero, the 
Council saw no “disadvantages” arising from one ship traveling to Japan each year. 
The Council also embraced a new sense of urgency in response to Muñoz’s prodding. 
They urged the king to rule on the matter soon, so that his own letter and gifts might depart Spain 
in the next fleet departing Seville for New Spain. Said letter should thank the Tokugawa for their 
treatment of Vivero and offer of hospitality to Spaniards in Japan. The king should also take 
especial care to write of his gratitude at the tolerance of missionaries. Finally, proper presents 
must be selected and purchased for both “that prince [Tokugawa Ieyasu] and his son [Tokugawa 
Hidetada].” Presents and letters alike were to be entrusted to Muñoz, who would return to Japan 
on behalf of Philip. The King signaled his agreement, and arrangements began in earnest.17 
                                                             
16 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1613.5.10. DNS 12-12, CCVI. The next two paragraphs summarize and quote the 
content of this memorial. 
17 Ibid. 
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Preparations proceed simultaneously on multiple fronts in May and June 1613. The 
monarchy drafted the official letter, issued orders to subordinates in New Spain and the 
Philippines, and decided on appropriate gifts. As this was to be the first official communication 
between the King of Spain and the ruler of Japan, there was also the important diplomatic 
question of the latter’s title of address.  
Philip’s orders to his senior representatives in New Spain and the Philippines were 
straightforward. To Diego Fernández de Córdoba, Marquis of Guadalcázar (1578–1630), 
Salinas’ successor as the viceroy of New Spain, the king summarized the agreed terms and 
ordered that Guadalcázar be responsible for outfitting and dispatching one ship a year to Japan. 
The first would include a diplomatic legation of missionaries headed by Muñoz and the letters 
and presents they carried for the Tokugawa. A ship was to be sent every year after, but “always 
taking into consideration the state of things in Japan,” effectively leaving the matter to the 
viceroy’s discretion.18 Either way, Guadalcázar was commanded to keep the monarchy abreast of 
developments. Guadalcázar would also have the option to send the ship directly to Japan or 
indirectly via the Philippines. As such, the king sent separate contingent orders to the governor-
general of the Philippines, commanding that any ship bound for Japan be well-provisioned and 
promptly sent onward to its final destination.   
The monarchy also decided and arranged payment for a slate of gifts for the Tokugawa.  
An undated list from around this time included prestigious items such as embossed leathers, a 
dozen paintings of “emperors and empresses,” and ten large maps from Antwerp. The crown also 
elected to send luxuries such as glasswork from Barcelona and Venice, and four boxes of soap, 
                                                             
18 Philip to Viceroy, 1613.6.17. DNS 12-12, CCXI. 
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two colored.19 The Tokugawa had sent eight suits of armor and a katana with Muñoz, and there 
was some debate about how and if to respond in kind.20 A decree by Philip II forbade the 
presentation of Spanish arms as gifts to foreign rulers. The initial list skirted the issue by 
ordering that four suits of armor (two infantry, two cavalry) be purchased in Japan.21 Phillip III 
spared the sword and ordered twelve suits of armor sent out, declaring that defensive weapons 
did not present a problem.22 
The final piece of the puzzle, and the last to be finalized, was Philip’s official reply to 
Tokugawa Ieyasu. By 1613, Spanish subjects in the Philippines had been in contact with the 
archipelago for roughly fifty years. Secular and religious authorities had treated with Japanese 
daimyo in the southern island of Kyushu and around the traditional capital at Kyoto. Both 
Tokugawa Ieyasu and his predecessor Toyotomi Hideyoshi traded letters with the governor-
general of the Philippines, while Vivero’s sojourn in Japan had opened diplomatic 
communication between the Tokugawa and the Viceroyalty of New Spain. Correspondence on 
both sides had gradually climbed the chain of political command, and had finally reached the 
summit of each. But it did so early into the shogunate’s rule. The Tokugawa were but a decade 
into their two and a half century political dynasty, following a hundred years of political 
instability and three decades of bloody unification. Their control remained uncertain, their 
method of governance and mode of diplomacy still developing. This was all the more true from 
the perspective of the Spanish monarchy half a world away. Conversely, Habsburg Spain was an 
                                                             
19 The above list is not quite comprehensive. One hundred pieces of crystal glass and 150 “baras de albernizes que 
no sean negros” were also included. See, “List of Presents” (1613). DNS 12-12, CCVIII. 
20 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1613.05.10. DNS 12-12, CCVI. 
21 “List of Presents.” DNS 12-12, CCVIII. 
22 Consulta, DNS 12-12, CCVI. 
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established entity but was conducting diplomacy in a part of the world where its reach was thin 
and its settlements exposed. Thus, Philip not only addressed a foreign ruler for the first time, he 
was establishing a relationship with an opaque political entity neighboring a vulnerable part of 
the empire. 
The letter consisted of superficially straightforward content ripe with additional 
implications.23 Philip wrote of receiving notice from his subjects of Ieyasu’s prudent and just 
reign, and the kind treatment offered Vivero. The Duke of Lerma had also reported Ieyasu’s 
offer of support and aid to Spanish vassals in all the ports and places they might arrive. Philip 
was pleased, declaring that “the friendship and communication of Your Serenity will be very 
agreeable to me.”24 The king noted the gifts he sent in recognition of those so generously offered 
by Ieyasu and his son Hidetada, "who has demonstrated this same intent and will with the esteem 
of his person."25 Muñoz was to bear letter and gifts alike back to the shogun who had first 
dispatched him to Spain, and would provide further details of the king's intentions and good 
wishes. The king also entrusted the well-being of his subjects, and in particular the missionaries, 
into Ieyasu's capable hands.  The heart of the letter resided in how the king proposed to give 
material expression to his good intentions: "In order to demonstrate the pleasure I will receive 
from the good correspondence, friendship, and commerce which my vassals will have with those 
of Your Serenity, I have ordered...that each year a ship from the kingdom of New Spain go [to 
Japan] laden with goods absent from there."26 
                                                             
23 This paragraph summarizes Philip III to Tokugawa Ieyasu (draft) 1613.06.20. DNS 12-12, CCX. 
24 Ibid. The Spanish reads “me será muy agradable la amistad y comunicación de Vuestra Serenidad.” 
25 Ibid. “…a quien significo esta misma yntención y voluntad con estimación de su persona.” 
26 Ibid.  
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On its face friendly, generous, and direct, the text also revealed where the king's priorities 
lie. Concern for the missionaries and their evangelical efforts ran through the text. Philip 
described the budding friendship between himself and Ieyasu as "aimed principally at the glory 
and honor of the true God."27 He placed Catholic missionaries into the care of the Tokugawa 
leader, and designated Muñoz, a missionary, the continued bridge between the two polities. On a 
material level, the king established clear boundaries on the manner and make-up of trade, even as 
he authorized it. The ship that traveled between New Spain and Japan would be Spanish; no 
mention was made of any Japanese vessel crossing to Acapulco. In this, the monarch hedged 
against the concern over any Japanese learning how to sail the Pacific independently and thus 
ending the Spanish monopoly on the ocean. In addition, the letter only approved cargo that Japan 
“lacked.” Here, Philip guarded against the export of any additional silver out of New Spain. The 
Japanese archipelago's silver reserves were well-known, but Philip evidenced the continued 
Spanish suspicion that Japanese merchants might develop a taste for exporting American bullion. 
In fact, king and council hoped the new proposed arrangement might encourage the opposite, 
with the ship from New Spain picking up silver in Japan for eventual sale to Chinese merchants 
in the Philippines.28 In all this, the king adopted the positions recommended by the Council of 
the Indies the month before: allow trade under favorable circumstances, cite the importance of 
the missionaries and their work, delegate communication to Muñoz, and respond quickly.  
                                                             
27 Ibid. 
28 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1613.5.10. DNS 12-12, CCVI. 
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The Council's final recommendation addressed style, not substance, and deliberated how 
to address the "king of Japan" and thereby insert him into Spain's diplomatic order.29 To help, 
they sought the aid of precedent, specifically Philip II's letters to the "King of China" in the 
1580s and Philip III's letter to the "King of Persia." Philip II had addressed the Chinese sovereign 
with the second-person pronoun "vos,” then a form of polite address.30 The Council surmised 
that "the referred style was used [because of] the King of China being such a powerful prince."31 
However, the Council advised Philip to adopt "Your Serenity" (vuestra serenidad) for Japan, as 
had recently been done with the king of Persia. The title slotted Japan in as commensurate with 
the Safavid dynasty, another Asian polity the Spanish treated with at the time, but beneath Ming 
China. This may have been due to recognition of China's perceived power, or to the desire to 
avoid any form of address placing Spain in the inferior position. Likely it was both. However, 
"Your Serenity" remained polite, and the Council recommended that the respect it conferred be 
properly emphasized to the Tokugawa so as to avoid any slight in the latter’s honor. Evidently, 
this question of address was the last piece of language decided, as Philip ordered the address to 
be inserted into the text of the rest of the letter. The king also ordered the missionaries entrusted 
with the letter to explain the significance of the title clearly. Thus the completed letter opened by 
addressing, "The Most Serene, Powerful, and Much Esteemed Minamoto no Ieyasu, Universal 
Lord of Japan," and addressed "Your Serenity" throughout.32 
                                                             
29 This paragraph summarizes Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1613.06.14. DNS 12-12, CCIX. Once Date’s embassy 
arrived in New Spain, it became much more common to refer to Ieyasu as the “Emperor” of Japan and Date as a 
“king” to distinguish between the two. At this time, however, the Council referred to Ieyasu as the “Rey del Japón.” 
30 “Vos” has since dropped out of use in Spain, and is an informal second-person pronoun, similar to tu, where still 
in use in Latin America. 
31 Consulta, 1613.06.14. DNS 12-12, CCIX. 
32 Philip III to Tokugawa Ieyasu (revised draft), 1613.06.20. DNS 12-12, CCXVI. The date given in the texts 
adheres to the original June 1613 draft, but the revisions in response to the Bautista’s arrival in New Spain could not 
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Resolved to take quick action, Madrid attended to the letter, gifts, and requisite orders to 
officials by the end of June 1613. Philip's envoys appear to have caught the outbound fleet from 
Seville to New Spain in time, and departed that summer. Unfortunately, they departed without 
their intended leader, Alonso Muñoz. The Council authorized Muñoz to lead a delegation of 
three other friars, but ill health deterred him from attempting the long journey, much as Sotelo’s 
own ill-health forced him to stand by and let Muñoz bring Ieyasu’s letter to Philip in 1610.33 
Muñoz’s absence deprived the party of a missionary with ties to the Tokugawa, but his continued 
presence in Spain gave the monarchy a recognized source of expertise on Japanese leadership. 
The Council would not forget this when Sotelo and Hasekura led the next round of diplomatic 
overtures. Muñoz remained active in the interim, continuing to memorialize the King on how 
best to pursue relations with Japan. Successful in lobbying for speedy action earlier in the year, 
Muñoz pivoted to redressing a potential breach in decorum in Philip’s letter. 
In November 1613, the friar’s remonstrations convinced the Council of the Indies to 
consider an addendum to the letter and gifts sent out that summer.34 At issue was the need to 
address a separate letter to Ieyasu’s son, Tokugawa Hidetada. Muñoz had delivered a letter from 
each to Spain, both addressed to the Duke of Lerma.35 Philip’s original letter acknowledged the 
receipt of gifts from both and praised the good intentions of father and son alike. However, 
                                                             
have been ordered until 1614. Additionally, the DNS editors appear to have turned the letter into two separate 
documents. In the AGI manuscript copy, the ordered revision is noted in the margins rather than forming a separate 
document. This manuscript is available as AGI,MEXICO,1065,L.6,80v–81v, available online through 
http://pares.mcu.es 
33 Muñoz and the three friars’ appointment to carry Philip’s letter back to Japan is mentioned in Consulta del 
Consejo de Indias, 1613.06.14. DNS 12-12, CCIX. Muñoz’s ill health is cited in a later consulta dated 1613.11.12. 
DNS 12-12, CCXIII, discussed in the next paragraph. 
34 Consulta del Consejo de Indias. 1613.11.12. DNS 12-12, CCXIII. I summarize the consulta throughout this 
paragraph. 
35 See Chapter 1. 
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Philip addressed his letter to Ieyasu, and only spoke of “Hidetada Minamoto, your son.” The 
Council reported Muñoz’s recommendation to pen a separate letter to Hidetada so as to avoid 
any slight arising from sending presents with no accompanying letter. The Council, via Muñoz, 
also raised the possibility of causing displeasure in the event that Hidetada succeeded his father 
as ruler by the time Philip’s embassy arrived. A letter drafted soon could reach New Spain via 
postal ships prior to the embassy departing New Spain for Japan.36 The Council saw no harm in 
an additional letter and endorsed Muñoz’s proposal. In the name of expediency, it even drafted a 
letter to Hidetada in advance and requested the king's signature. Philip complied later that month, 
and by late November, Hidetada had his letter.37 
This November addendum matters less for its consequence, and more for what it reveals 
about how Madrid understood it fledgling diplomatic partner. As Muñoz knew well, sending a 
letter to Tokugawa Ieyasu and “his son” misunderstood the practice and perception of power in 
Japan at that time. Tokugawa Hidetada, as acting shogun, was the face of government. His 
father, Ieyasu, remained at the summit of power, but ruled away from the Tokugawa capital at 
Edo.  Ieyasu vacated the title of shogun in 1605, passing it to his son in order ensure that the 
office and its attendant authority remained the prerogative of the Tokugawa family. Though the 
Spanish referred to Hidetada internally as the “prince,” Philip had not just received letters from a 
ruler and his heir (though this was technically true), but from two men working together. Muñoz 
recognized the need to respond to the man in office and the man behind it. 
                                                             
36 It must be remembered that ships left New Spain for Asia but once a year, in early spring. Though Philip’s 
embassy likely arrived in New Spain in late summer of 1613, it was not scheduled to leave New Spain until March 
1614. Thus a letter drafted in Madrid in November 1613 had a good chance of getting to the embassy before its 
departure. 
37 Philip to Hidetada. 1613.11.23. DNS 12-12, CCXIV. 
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The challenge of titles did not end there. The Spanish vacillated between calling Ieyasu 
the “emperor” (emperador) and “king” (rey) of Japan, with Hidetada often simply “his [Ieyasu’s] 
son” (su hijo) or the “prince” (principe). None of these titles—save perhaps “son”—were ever 
claimed by either Tokugawa. The full appellation for title of shogun was Sei-i taishōgun (征夷大
将軍, meaning “Barbarian-quelling Generalissimo”), a military title conferred by the figurehead 
imperial court in Kyoto. Japanese emperors held little effective power, though successive 
Tokugawa shoguns continued to rely on their symbolic authority and court titles.38 Philip’s letter 
to Hidetada included one such title. Rather than address the letter to the “shogun,” Muñoz 
advised it be sent to “Dainagonsama” (大納言様, “Chief Councilor of State”), referring to 
Hidetada’s title as a member of the imperial court rather than his military title.39 The suggestion 
revealed Muñoz’s more nuanced comprehension of Japan’s political and symbolic hierarchies, 
though even his added consideration failed to yield consistency.  The final letters referred to the 
father as “Minamoto no Ieyasu" as part of a longer appellation, and the son simply as 
“Dainagonsama.” The former was a name, the latter a title.40 Ultimately, Philip recognized 
Ieyasu alone as “The Universal Lord of Japan,” the king addressed both Tokugawa as “Your 
Serenity,” placing Hidetada on par with his retired father.41 More importantly, the Council’s 
back-and-forth demonstrated its ongoing attempts to establish a credible diplomatic vocabulary 
                                                             
38 Though some form of imperial institution at varying levels of influence survived through the Meiji Restoration of 
1868, the archipelago was ruled by successive military shogunates or endured periods of political disorder from the 
late twelfth century through the end of the Tokugawa period. 
39 In his letter to Spain, Hidetada referred to himself as Sei-i taishōgun. 
40 See PIII’s letters to Ieyasu and Hidetada. The superlatives in front of each were slightly different. Ieyasu was 
“Most Serene, Powerful, and Much Esteemed,” while Hidetada had to make due to with “Most Serene and Much 
Esteemed.” 
41 Philip to Ieyasu, DNS 12-12, CCXVI; Philip to Hidetada, DNS 12-12, CCXIV. 
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with the Tokugawa, and the challenges contained therein. The arrival of another embassy, from 
yet another authority figure would complicate the picture still further. 
Philip’s supplementary letter to Hidetada also evidenced strategies for maintaining 
distance between the two apex rulers of each composite hierarchy. The king praised Hidetada for 
imitating his father’s just rule, a compliment, but one that reinforced the elder Tokugawa’s 
primacy.42 Additionally, Philip inserted Lerma between himself and the two Tokugawa 
hegemons. In both letters, the king mentioned that Lerma brought word of Tokugawa 
correspondence. Thus, though Philip wrote directly to both “Serenities,” he also communicated 
that a subordinate had brought their words before the crown. The rhetorical move imposed 
symbolic distance, as correspondence remained one step removed from the royal person. Ieyasu 
played a similar game when they addressed their licenses to the Lerma rather than the king, 
thereby adopting the language of permission and the hierarchy it implied while minimizing the 
risk of offense.   
Philip’s supplementary letter gave Hidetada his titular due, but added nothing of 
substance to the original correspondence. The text also contained many of the same hints 
towards missionaries and the type of material exchange the Spanish monarchy envisaged. Philip 
“affectionately” remitted his messengers into Hidetada’s hands, doing the same for all the other 
missionaries present in Japan “in the service of our true God.”43 The gifts Philip sent Hidetada 
were again goods from Spain that the king understood to be absent from Japan. The language 
paralleled Philip’s description to Ieyasu regarding what types of goods he would permit in the 
trade between New Spain and Japan. However, Philip did not mention trade in this later letter to 
                                                             
42 Philip to Hidetada, DNS 12-12, CCXIV. 
43 Ibid. The rest of this paragraph draws on the letter. 
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Hidetada. His discussion of material goods began and ended with the note on the gifts. The 
remainder of the letter contented itself with pleasantries, hope for continued relations, and wishes 
for the good health of “Your Serenity.”  
Thus, through the end of 1613 the Spanish crown remained committed to a direct trade 
relationship between New Spain and Japan. Philip and his advisers had taken their time, 
suspending deliberations a full year in response to concerns raised by the Manila audiencia. By 
the summer of 1613 the need for a timely reply precluded further waiting, and the Council took 
up the matter again in response to Muñoz’s calls for urgency. Once roused, Philip’s 
administration addressed it in the span of six weeks; it chose a delegation, decided on appropriate 
presents, drafted a formal letter to Tokugawa Ieyasu, and decided a framework for addressing 
him. Five months later Philip incorporated Hidetada into that same framework as an actor in his 
own right, again due to Muñoz’s petitioning. The proposed arrangement provided Spanish 
vessels with safe harbors, and extended protection to Spanish subjects across the Japanese 
archipelago. Philip’s wording also subtly established Spanish control of the terms and tenor of 
commerce. Ships would only carry goods Japan “lacked”—a check on the export of American 
silver, and said ships would invariably be Spanish. The successful expansion of trade might even 
come at the expense of the rebellious Dutch, recent interlopers in the trade with Asia. Finally, the 
king’s representative in New Spain reserved the right to terminate or alter the voyages at their 
discretion, as circumstance demanded. It had taken over three years, but the Tokugawa were to 
get their reply, and a path to pry open the Pacific. 
 But the Tokugawa had grown impatient, and Date Masamune had seen an opportunity. 
As Philip finalized his letter to “Dainagonsama” in November 1613 Date’s embassy looked out 
over the open ocean on their journey to Acapulco. The diplomatic party headed by Sotelo and 
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Hasekura came to ask for a less palatable version of what Philip had just granted. The king 
authorized Spanish ships to depart New Spain for Japan, but Hasekura walked the deck of a 500-
ton Japanese ship. The king resolved that goods be brought to Japan, but Sotelo sailed in the 
company of Japanese merchants intent on selling their merchandise directly in New Spain. The 
king treated with the “Universal Lord of Japan” and “Dainagonsama,” but Sotelo and Hasekura 
carried letters from a third figure yet unknown in Spain. King and council approved trade in part 
due to the positive reports and kind treatment of Rodrigo de Vivero, but among the passengers 
on Date’s vessel was the aggrieved Sebastián Vizcaíno, whose letters denouncing the embassy 
would follow the party to Spain. Even as Sotelo and Hasekura sought to gain Philip’s favor, they 
personified the concerns of the king and his advisors. In the coming year, news of the embassy 
traveled together with doubts as to its purpose and warnings against the growing danger 
presented by Japan. 
The 1614 Turn 
1614 marked the Spanish throne’s pivot from cautious optimism to guarded pessimism in 
its relationship with Tokugawa Japan.44 Ironically, this was also the year the monarchy 
encountered the most determined diplomatic effort yet to originate from the archipelago. When 
Hasekura and Sotelo arrived in Seville in fall 1614, they faced a steep uphill climb in their 
mission to (re)open Japan to New Spain, something Philip himself had ordered the year before. 
By the time Hasekura enjoyed a formal audience with the king in early 1615, the embassy’s 
hopes were dead in the water. This failure to establish commerce has relegated study of the 
embassy to the minutiae of its itinerary, remarks on its uniqueness, comments on Hasekura’s 
                                                             
44 The Spanish throne is not the same as “Spain,” as the Philippines would continue to pursue the relationship in 
earnest for another decade, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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character, and speculative work on Date’s intentions.45 But the Spanish government still had to 
decide what to do with the embassy itself, and how to address the disruption presented by a 
Japanese vessel calling repeatedly on the port of Acapulco. Whatever solution it arrived at also 
had to rebuff Japanese leadership without threatening the isolated and vulnerable Spanish 
presence in the Philippines, or endangering missionaries still active in the face of intensifying 
persecution in Japan. These concerns played out across the monarchy’s territories the rest of the 
decade, but tracing them requires examining the pivot away from the resolutions of 1613. 
In 1611, the letter from the Manila audiencia had stalled Philip’s response to the 
Tokugawa for a year; in early 1614 a letter from the viceroy of New Spain delayed the reply an 
additional year and fundamentally changed its character. Philip’s instructions to the viceroy 
Guadalcázar from summer 1613 gave the latter discretion over how to organize the trade with 
Japan, and Guadalcázar exercised this discretion before the inaugural voyage. The viceroy halted 
all diplomatic activity after confronting the arrival of another Japanese ship at Acapulco and 
receiving reports of increased hostility towards Catholicism in the archipelago. He kept Philip’s 
diplomatic representatives—all missionaries themselves—in New Spain, along with the letters 
and presents they carried. The men and material had been scheduled to depart in a Spanish vessel 
bound for Japan early in the spring of 1614; the viceroy canceled this voyage as well and putting 
everything on hold until the monarchy could respond to the changing conditions.46 
                                                             
45 For example, Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga (2003); Tanaka Hidemichi, Hasekura Tsunenaga: bushi, Rōma o 
kōshinsu [Hasekura Tsunenaga: A Samurai Marches into Rome] (Kyoto: Mineruva Shobō, 2007); Kōichi Ōizumi, 
Date Masamune no misshi: Keichō kenʾō shisetsudan no kakusareta shimei [Date Masamune's Secret Messenger: 
The Hidden Orders of the Keichō Mission to Europe] (Tokyo: Yōsensha, 2010). 
46 Guadalcázar first wrote to the king of these developments in a letter dated 1614.02.08. That letter does not appear 
to have survived, but others sources repeatedly cited and summarized its contents. See Consulta de Consejo de India, 
1614.12.23, DNS 12-12, CCXV; Viceroy of New Spain to Philip III, 1614.05.22, DNS 12-12, V & VIII, etc. 
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Communication to and from New Spain illustrates the convoluted information networks 
undergirding the Spanish monarchy’s administrative capacity, and the inherent challenge of 
weighing in on events in Japan from the Iberian peninsula. Valiant as the empire’s attempts at 
global logistics may have been, the viceroy penned letters east to Madrid and west to Manila 
knowing the wait for responses could stretch half a year or beyond depending on the vagaries of 
transport and the king’s prerogative. At best, Guadalcázar might read the reply to a letter he 
penned to the Philippines just prior to the Manila galleon’s departure in March upon its return 
sometime in October or November. If a letter missed the boat, the viceroy waited another year. A 
letter eastward to Spain might receive a reply within five to six months, but here the viceroy 
awaited the king’s pleasure.47 For example, Philip did not reply to the viceroy’s February 1614 
report on the Bautista’s arrival until just before Christmas, meaning a year passed before 
Guadalcázar laid eyes on it.48 
This time-lag dampened the impact of the shogunate’s growing hostility toward 
Christianity in 1614 during deliberations across the monarchy in 1614–1615. Writing to Spain in 
February 1614, the viceroy was current on events in the Philippines through late summer 1613. 
The Philippines in turn lagged behind events in Japan by a few weeks to a couple of months.49 
The Council of the Indies did not discuss the issues Guadalcázar raised until October 1614. The 
cumulative imposition of logistics and geography meant that when the Indies reached a decision 
                                                             
47 Graciela Márquez states that the crossing between Seville and Veracruz took two to three months. See the relevant 
pages in her chapter “Commercial Monopolies and External Trade,” in The Cambridge Economic History of Latin 
America vol. 1, eds. Victor Bulmer-Thomas, John Coatsworth, Roberto Cortes-Conde (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 401–405. 
48 Philip III to the viceroy of New Spain, 1614.12.23. DNS 12-12, CCXVII. 
49 Skipping ahead in the narrative, news of the Bautista’s arrival in Manila in August 1618 reached Date in roughly 
two months. 
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that December it was responding to information from Japan dating to over eighteen months prior. 
Though Guadalcázar cited martyrdoms, expulsions, and the Japanese “doing other things very 
much against our religion,” he did not know of edict proclaimed by the Tokugawa finally 
expelling all missionaries from the archipelago, also in February 1614. A “manifesto” against 
missionaries, scholars consider the issuance of this prohibition the pivotal turn against the 
Catholic Church in Japan.50 Guadalcázar duly passed on word of this edict and its deleterious 
effects when he first learned of it in 1615. His February 1614 letter (no longer extant) may have 
alluded to earlier measures prohibiting worship and churches in Tokugawa lands, as well as the 
fallout from a recent corruption scandal involving a Christian daimyo and shogunate official.51 
The expulsion edict is, appropriately, given a great deal of weight when discussing the “end” of 
orthodox Catholicism in Japan, but Spain’s decision to back away from commerce was made 
prior to the news reaching European shores. 
Upon hearing of the Bautista’s arrival, the viceroy did more than send word east to Spain; 
he also clamped down on diplomatic traffic westward. First and foremost, this entailed holding 
Philip’s envoys in New Spain. The party, now led by Fray Diego de Santa Catalina in Alonso 
Muñoz’s absence, adopted a holding pattern until Philip’s new orders could arrive. By canceling 
the voyage the viceroy also (knowingly) imposed a full year’s delay on the mission. A February 
letter to Spain drafted weeks before Santa Catalina’s group was to originally depart had no hope 
of receiving a response in time to allow the party to sail with the Manila galleons that year. If 
                                                             
50 For a recent article on the prohibition as a “manifest,” see Timon Screech, “The English and the Control of 
Christianity in the Early Edo Period,” Japan Review, no. 24 (January 1, 2012): 3–40. 
51 The Okamoto Daihachi Incident involved bribery and a rumored assassination plot on the Nagasaki magistrate. 
Both the daimyo (Arima Harunobu) and the shogunate official (Okamoto Daihachi) implicated were Christian. 
When the plot was revealed in 1612, the Tokugawa executed Okamoto and sentenced Arima to death. For an 
overview see, Jurgis Elisonas and James L. McClain, “Christianity and the Daimyo,” in The Cambridge History of 
Japan, ed. John Whitney Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 365–68. 
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they left at all, they would do so in 1615, five years after Ieyasu and Hidetada first sent their 
greetings to the king. 
More than Tokugawa intolerance, the arrival of Date Masamune’s vessel and envoys 
prompted Guadalcázar to write his letter and delay Philip’s reply. The San Juan Bautista 
dropped anchor in Acapulco on January 28th, 1614, roughly 430 kilometers from the viceroy’s 
residence in Mexico. News of the ship and its diplomatic pretensions prompted the viceroy to 
write to Philip ten days later. The letter would have combined news from the regular Manila 
galleon of last fall and early reports on the Bautista and its passengers. The viceroy now had two 
legations on his hands at a very sensitive time. Moreover, he had a foreign ship in Acapulco, the 
second Japanese vessel in four years to arrive at an ostensibly closed port. This latest 
development amplified the trepidation brought on by news out of the Philippines the previous 
fall. Sotelo and Hasekura’s sudden arrival and Vizcaíno’s disgruntled return gave Guadalcázar 
pause. As a result of timing and circumstance, Date’s embassy, ship, and ambassadors were all 
initially introduced to Philip as part of a problem. News of the mission reached Spain arm-in-arm 
with reports of hostility toward Christianity and concerns over Japanese sailing the Pacific and 
calling on Spanish ports. Sent to propose deeper relations, Date’s embassy actually fed doubts 
about the wisdom of trading with Japan on the terms proposed by its leaders. The group swam 
against this current throughout its sojourn abroad. 
The viceroy’s correspondence with Madrid on the matter of Philip’s return embassy 
continued for a year after Guadalcázar’s initial letter, becoming more cautious with each new 
entry. The viceroy updated the monarchy in May 1615, reporting disruptions caused by some of 
the Japanese who had come to Acapulco and forwarding a copy of a decree confiscating the arms 
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of all but a select few in order to “avoid other disgraces.”52 As for relations with Japan as a 
whole, Guadalcázar cautioned that “as the people [of Japan] come to be known, the consideration 
and prudence necessary in [addressing] the connection they desire with this [kingdom] becomes 
more apparent each day.” Guadalcázar cautiously sent Sotelo and Hasekura on their way to 
Spain even as he held Philip’s return embassy in New Spain and prohibited the San Juan 
Bautista from returning to Japan until he received word from his king. He also forwarded 
memorials from the embassy along with others opposed to it. One common thread in those letters 
were negative appraisals of Date’s chosen spokesman Sotelo, who tried to sell the embassy in an 
atmosphere of growing distrust and muddled narratives. 
An “Imperial” Envoy Makes His Case 
 Sotelo never managed to close the sale. From the beginning, Date’s embassy had a 
credibility problem. His ship carried letters and reports, but not all embraced the embassy’s point 
of view. One such letter alleged that the Tokugawa did not condone Date’s actions, if they even 
knew of them. The embittered Vizcaíno was no longer an ally, if he had ever been, and so the 
Spanish arriving onboard the vessel did not present a united front. Sotelo tried to override these 
obstacles by grafting the embassy directly to the Tokugawa, claiming that he had been sent by 
the shogunate to accompany Date’s Japanese ambassador. The friar fatefully chose to combat 
mistrusts with a strategy built on half-truths. However, in parallel to the Bautista, Sotelo’s 
attempts to establish credible simply raised further doubts. 
 Hasekura Tsunenaga is often thought of as the embassy’s leader, and visually arresting 
documents such as a portrait and his certificate of Roman citizenship keep him in the mind’s eye. 
                                                             
52 Viceroy of New Spain to Philip III. 1614.5.22. DNS 12-12, VIII. The remaining quotes in the paragraph are from 
this same source. 
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But Sotelo wrote, translated, or otherwise organized the vast majority of the embassy’s 
documents. He was the group’s primary voice and principal filter. Both the friar’s memorials on 
behalf of the embassy and Spain’s response make clear the importance of integrating the Keichō 
Embassy into earlier Tokugawa efforts rather than treating it as a curious enterprise motivated by 
Date’s singular vision. Additionally, the basis for Sotelo’s arguments, Date’s agenda in sending 
him, and the cautious reception of Spanish officials to both challenge a frame setting Catholic 
expansion against Japanese insularity when considering how relations between the Tokugawa 
shogunate and Habsburg Spain frayed. 
 Despite traveling on Date’s ship with Date’s retainer carrying Date’s correspondence, 
Luis Sotelo chose to present himself as an “imperial” (i.e. Tokugawa) representative in early 
memorial and announcements. Writing to Philip while off the coast of Spain in the fall of 1614, 
Sotelo reported that “the emperor and his son ordered me to come [to Spain].”  To the influential 
Duke of Lerma, the king’s favorite at court, he noted “the emperor [is] sending me for the 
response to his letter and for another which comes anew from the King of Voxu [Ōshū].”53  
Sotelo used this supposedly “imperial” association to fashion himself into an important 
axis of the Japan-Spain relationship. The longer documents, especially, laid out Sotelo’s 
experience in Japan and influence in high circles, and emphasized the friar’s self-reported 
dexterity in Japanese. In a letter to his native Seville, Sotelo recorded that “his divine Majesty 
[God] was served by communicating to me that language in a short time.”54 A sympathetic 
pamphlet published in Seville that year was less modest, declaring that Sotelo had “in a few 
                                                             
53 Luis Sotelo to Philip III, 1614.10.01, and Sotelo to the Duke of Lerma, 1614.09.26. DNS 12-12, III & XLII 
respectively. 
54 Sotelo to the City of Seville, 1614.09.30. DNS 12-12, XII.  
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months developed such a capacity with the language that he could begin to communicate, as he 
has done, in a manner that controlled wills, as with the Emperor and his son [Ieyasu and 
Hidetada], so with the rest of the kings and grand lords of that empire.”55 
As the pamphlet baldly stated, Sotelo connected linguistic ability to influence in the 
emperor’s court.56 He recorded his participation in early discussions to expand trade with New 
Spain, most prominently during Rodrigo de Vivero’s time in Japan in 1609–1610. Sotelo also 
sought to assuage concerns over the intensifying persecution of Christians in Japan by claiming 
to have calmed the emperor in the wake of a recent crackdown.57 A lengthy memorial to the 
viceroy written collectively by the embassy reported that Sotelo checked the emperor’s anger by 
reminding him of the open negotiations with the Spanish king. The Tokugawa hegemon then 
held back, “all because of the hope he had for the positive response of Your Majesty.”58 This 
resourceful move simultaneously drew attention to Sotelo’s ability to serve Spain’s interests in 
Japan while emphasizing the imperative of a “positive response” lest that service come to 
naught.   
Sotelo also asserted that he had been Ieyasu’s original choice to deliver letters to Spain 
four years prior. The friar repeatedly recounted how the “emperor” charged him to accompany 
the shipwrecked Vivero back to New Spain in 1610 and deliver letters to Philip. Unfortunately, 
illness waylaid Sotelo just as Vivero embarked—on a Tokugawa ship, necessitating the 
                                                             
55 “Relación breve y sumaria del edito, que mandó publicar en todo su reyno del Boju…” (1614). DNS 12-12, XIII. 
56 Here I draw examples from his letter to Philip (cited above), the most robust in this regard, but similar narratives 
of varying length are present in other letters. 
57 Sotelo referenced the Okamoto Daihachi incident and the persecution that followed. 
58 Memorial presented by the Embassy to the Viceroy of New Spain (1614). DNS 12-12, VII. 
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appointment of another in his place.59 Three years passed without a reply, while the Dutch and 
English pressed their competing agenda on the “emperor.” Vexed by the late response but still 
committed to friendship with Spain, the emperor had dispatched a recovered Sotelo to retrieve a 
formal answer.60 Beyond furthering the Tokugawa shogunate’s diplomatic project, Sotelo was 
completing an errand that had been his from the beginning. Moreover, the contrast between the 
Spanish monarchy’s tardiness and Dutch and English encroachment served again to encourage a 
swift, positive reply. 
Sotelo’s claim to principally be a Tokugawa representative was not true, nor was it 
ultimately accepted.61 However, the friar’s clear record of previous experience, acknowledged 
even by those who vilified him, made it difficult to dismiss the man and the embassy outright. 
Date’s letters to authorities in New Spain clearly stated that Sotelo served as his envoy. Even 
without direct knowledge of the original Japanese —dependent as they were on Sotelo and his 
companions for translation—Spanish officials treated the embassy as one party, not two, with 
Sotelo acting as the principal liaison for Date’s ambassador rather than as a separate, recognized 
representative of the shogunate. This left the friar to serve in the role Date intended, though 
bereft of any “imperial” prestige and damaged by his attempt to argue for it.  
Date Masamune dispatched letters to secular and religious authorities in New Spain both 
times he sent out the San Juan Bautista, in the fall of 1613 and again three years later. In his 
                                                             
59 This was the Franciscan friar Alonso Muñoz, who delivered the shogunate’s letters to Philip and was in Spain 
when Sotelo and Hasekura arrived late in 1614. 
60 DNS 12-12, VII. 
61 None of the above is an outright lie, though Sotelo certainly exaggerated or filtered the information to his benefit. 
He also glossed over problematic aspects of his time in Japan, such as his incarceration in Edo for preaching 
Christianity just a few months before the embassy set sail in 1613. The memorial does mention this imprisonment, 
making sure to note that it was the “prince” rather than the “emperor” who jailed him. His letter to Philip also notes 
vaguely that “a variety of things happened at that time.” 
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1613 letter to the Viceroy of New Spain Date explained the makeup of the diplomatic contingent 
as follows: “I entrusted Fray Luis Sotelo to serve as an envoy-priest (使僧, shisō). Similarly, I 
send three retainers (侍, samurai) to accompany [the friar]. Of these, I have instructed two to 
return to court (帰朝, kichō, referring to Japan) from your noble country (New Spain). I now 
send one as far as the inner country (奥国, okuguni, i.e. Spain) to accompany your letters, and I 
humbly entrust him into your care along the road.”62 Date started the list with Sotelo, the only 
one to be named or given the title of envoy. The daimyo sent the three retainers to accompany 
Sotelo rather than the other way around. Hasekura was the single retainer sent to the “inner 
country,” though Date never gave his name in any communication with the Spanish. Whatever 
the internal debates about leadership of the legation and chain of command, the daimyo’s formal, 
outward correspondence positioned Sotelo as the most prominent member of the embassy. 
Although the three retainers disappeared from the letter following their initial 
introduction, Date mentioned Sotelo repeatedly before and after. The daimyo requested that 
missionaries (along with some cargo) be sent to his domain, “until bateren Sotelo returns to this 
country (Japan),” defining the diplomatic mission in terms of Sotelo’s actions and presence.63 
Upon outlining his requests for the passage of ships, missionaries, and goods, Date closed the 
letter by noting that the details had been communicated verbally to Sotelo. Finally, the daimyo 
framed the entire endeavor as stemming from his encounter with the Christian faith and his 
                                                             
62 Date Masamune to the viceroy of New Spain, 1613.10.17. SDS, doc. 70. The full text reads: “此布羅以類子曾天
呂を使僧二相頼、同侍三人相添差越候、此内二人を従尊国致帰朝候様に申付候、今一人ハ奥国迄指遣候
間、貴札被相添、路次中諸事万端奉頼候.”The use of shisō is notable, connecting Sotelo to the Buddhist monks 
who often served Japanese lords as diplomatic envoys. 
63 Ibid. 
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meeting Sotelo. Throughout this 1613 correspondence, the daimyo portrayed the friar as a 
catalyst for the embassy and its foremost member. 
To jump ahead briefly, Sotelo remained prominent in Date’s second wave of letters, 
penned in fall 1616.64 The daimyo described his embassy in familiar language: “An envoy 
accompanied the bateren Sotelo, to present (進上) himself to the ‘Sovereign of the Inner 
Southern Barbarians.”65 “Envoy” (使者) referred to Hasekura, described previously only as a 
“retainer” (侍). However, he still “accompanied” Sotelo, and Date credited Sotelo with 
requesting that the Bautista be sent to Acapulco once more to ferry the group back to Japan. 
Furthermore, in the 1616 letter Date referred to another Japanese retainer by his name, 
designating Yokozawa Shōgen (横沢将監) his “captain” (かびたん). Date further stated that he 
had communicated details of the current voyage to Yokozawa, much as he had to Sotelo three 
years earlier. Hasekura, however, remained nameless.66 These later letters demonstrate Date’s 
willingness to note the names of specific Japanese retainers when their role merited the attention. 
Hasekura served as a symbolic and spiritual proxy, not a spokesman, a role requiring less explicit 
explication in the daimyo’s correspondence. 
Though fully aware of the content of Date’s letters, Sotelo consciously chose to change 
tactics and associate himself with the Tokugawa instead. Beyond high self-regard, the answer 
appears to have been that most important currency of diplomacy: legitimacy. The embassy faced 
a hard sell, attempting to convince officials in both New Spain and Spain to expand trade in a 
                                                             
64 This batch of letters was shorter and more direct, and again I focus on the letter to the viceroy. See Date 
Masamune to the viceroy of New Spain, 1616.09.05. SDS, doc. 303. 
65 The Japanese reads: 奥南蛮之帝王様へ、伴天連曹天呂二使者相添進上申候. Ibid. 
66 Internal Date records do mention Hasekura by name. 
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manner that might threaten their control over commerce across the Pacific, and to do so with a 
previously-unknown regional power from a country known for its volatility. Sotelo sought to 
demonstrate both that the Tokugawa would condone any agreement Spain brokered with Date, 
and that Date’s standing and faith warranted Spain’s trust and resources. Paradoxically, this led 
Sotelo to the belief that his best chance of aiding Date’s endeavor would be to establish some 
distance from it. Hasekura’s presence aided this effort, allowing Sotelo to juxtapose himself with 
the man increasingly identified as Date’s primary ambassador. 
The embassy's 1614 memorial to the viceroy, forwarded to Madrid, provided the fullest 
account of Sotelo’s line of thought. The document characterized the Tokugawa “emperor” as 
pragmatic and desirous of expanded commerce. In this arena, the primary threat to Spain lay in 
the possibility that the Dutch and English might present the emperor with a more practical 
alternative. Without Spanish trade, the emperor had no reason to condone Catholicism. In 
contrast, Date’s secular power merged with his openness to and interest in the Catholic faith. The 
embassy claimed that Date wrote in friendship to the King of Spain and the Holy Father, and 
“sent his ambassador to kiss the feet [of the pope] on his behalf.” The daimyo’s requests for 
pilots, mariners, and cargo supported the larger purpose of propagating the faith in his domain. 
Furthermore, Date was a powerful ally, and “in the opinion of all it is understood that he will be 
emperor, because there arms determine this succession.”67 Here then, the danger lay in foregoing 
the opportunity to win the friendship of a powerful lord willing to provide safe haven to Spanish 
merchants and missionaries alike.68  
                                                             
67 Date’s potential to become “emperor” was a consistent theme in Sotelo’s writing, though he did allow for Date 
simply remaining a powerful “king.” Hidetada’s succession to power after Ieyasu’s death forced Sotelo to change 
tactics. Lines such as this also fuel speculation that the true purpose of the embassy was to establish a military 
alliance between Date and Spain and overthrow the Tokugawa. See for example, the writings of Ōizumi Kōichi. 
68 Both quotes from this paragraph are from the embassy’s memorial, DNS 12-12, VII. 
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The memorial presented the embassy as the most common-sense means to give 
everybody what they wanted. For the emperor of Japan, Date’s embassy was “killing two birds 
with one stone” (literally, “con una piedra se matan dos pájaros”), for it provided a convenient 
means by which the emperor could finally secure trade with New Spain and receive his overdue 
reply from Philip.69 Sotelo, of course, was the one charged with acquiring it. As for Date, the 
embassy allowed him to pay his proper respects to the secular and religious heads of the church, 
and secure the material means by which to further missionary work throughout his kingdom. As 
proof of his devotion, he sent not just letters, but a spiritual proxy in the person of Hasekura. 
Finally, the embassy also handed Spain one stone and two very enticing birds. Pleasing the 
Tokugawa would come at the expense of the Dutch and English and advance Spain’s security 
and commercial interests in the area. Partnering with Date specifically would ensure the progress 
of the Catholic mission in Japan. This joint embassy, as portrayed in the memorial, was the key 
to obtaining both objectives. 
 Sotelo’s rhetorical strategy transformed Hasekura into a singular symbol of his master’s 
devotion and the potential of the Japanese mission writ-large, a tactic the embassy would adopt 
throughout its time in Europe. Sotelo noted to Philip that “The Ambassador is a dignified person 
of high status in his land, as Your Majesty will come to see.”70 The friar did not draw attention to 
any of Date’s other “retainers,” making sure to focus attention (beyond himself) on Hasekura. A 
1615 pamphlet summarizing Hasekura’s audience with Philip emphasized the retainer’s piety 
and recorded his wish—translated by Sotelo—to be baptized by Philip’s own hand. The same 
tract mentioned that the Japanese ambassador purposely held off on the ceremony until reaching 
                                                             
69 Ibid. 
70 Sotelo to Philip, DNS 12-12, III. 
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Spain.71 Hasekura’s faith reflected his master’s resolve, and demonstrated the potential of a 
Japanese church guided literally and figuratively by Sotelo. Where Date had thought it best to 
emphasize his connection to Sotelo, the friar judged it necessary to promote Hasekura’s piety in 
order to vouch for the intentions of the embassy’s patron. This image of Hasekura as devout, 
both to his lord and his Lord, exists into the present day. Initially, the mission paired Hasekura’s 
piety with Sotelo’s supposed credentials. As the latter deteriorated, the party increasingly relied 
on the former. 
Spanish authorities never accepted Sotelo as a Tokugawa representative. The Council of 
the Indies consistently referred to a single ambassador guided by the friar. They wrote of “the 
ambassador of the King of Voxu,” clearly in reference to Date, not the Tokugawa.72 The friar 
remained a crucial figure, but authorities described a man escorting an embassy from a king, 
rather than a man sent as the envoy of an emperor. 
It is possible, even likely, that Sotelo enjoyed some measure of Tokugawa approval. 
After all, the shogunate had permitted Date to free Sotelo from an Edo prison, and did so fully 
cognizant of Date’s mission. The embassy’s memorial mentioned a separate document written by 
the Tokugawa “General of Ships” to an official in New Spain as corroboration for Sotelo’s claim 
of being a Tokugawa envoy.73 That letter remains hidden, if it is still extant, and whatever Sotelo 
may have possessed did not convince his hosts in New Spain and elsewhere. Sotelo, ever 
conscious of the need for a sense of grandeur and legitimacy, implied a lukewarm reception in 
                                                             
71 See “Relación que propuso el embajador del Japón al rey de España y la respuesta del rey,” (1615). DNS 12-12, 
LIX. The editors of the DNS volumen suggest the text was compiled from a letter Sotelo authored. 
72 See for example Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1614.11.11. DNS 12-12, L. 
73 Embassy memorial to the viceroy, DNS 12-12, VII. The Spanish reads “general de las funeas,” the final word 
meant to represent fune (船). The person in question was Mukai Shōgen (向井将監), the Tokugawa Admiral of the 
Fleet and Date’s primary collaborator in the shogunate. 
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New Spain, and requested that Seville prove a more gracious host.74 Sotelo’s exuberance may 
have originated in the perceived need to lend the embassy as much splendor as possible, a motive 
consistent with his repeated invocations of the “emperor’s” trust and approval.  
 Ultimately the Bautista delivered a clearer message than the friar, even if the message 
received was not the one sent. The vessel’s arrival and the muddled information accompanying it 
to Acapulco convinced the Spanish monarchy to close a door that Date’s representatives were 
never permitted to reopen. Spain’s subsequent treatment of the party displayed a mix of caution, 
accommodation, and exasperation. Sotelo’s failed gambit left the mission with the question of 
how to find leverage without at least the illusion of Tokugawa blessing. Hasekura’s faith and its 
proper display continued to define the embassy’s efforts to fulfill its mandate. 
Reaching a Decision 
Date’s embassy fell victim to its own poor publicity as it made its way across the Spanish 
empire. After spending two months in Mexico, the group departed New Spain in June 1614 
aboard a Spanish vessel before arriving off the coast of Andalucía in late September.75 Each stop 
between Japan and Spain generated documents and impressions that made their way to Madrid 
alongside the group: letters from other missionaries in Japan, reports from an embittered 
Vizcaíno, details from a wary viceroy, and the first impressions of officials in the port of 
Sanlúcar and Seville. The voices, discussed below, countered the vision and arguments offered 
by Sotelo, and helped undermine the embassy in advance of its arrival to the king’s court. 
                                                             
74 Luis Sotelo to the City of Seville, 1614.09.30. DNS 12-12, XII. 
75 Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 84–86. The party did not travel directly from New Spain to Spain, encountering 
inclement weather on the journey and stopping for roughly two weeks in Havana. 
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Philip III held an audience with Hasekura in early 1615, but in truth the embassy made its 
pitch to the monarchy in the six months leading up to this meeting. This timeline worked to the 
monarchy’s advantage. Philip and his council used reports and memorials issued in the wake of 
the embassy’s arrival to decide the matter of trade with the Tokugawa. However, by doing so 
before the group’s arrival, the monarchy could render its verdict without ceding diplomatic space 
to the unknown “king of Ōshū.” Throughout 1614 Philip’s response embassy remained in New 
Spain awaiting word on whether and how to proceed to Japan. In December 1614, the Council 
decided to proceed with the king’s embassy but removed all reference to trade. Date’s 
representatives played a pivotal role in this decision without ever participating directly in it. By 
outsourcing diplomacy with Spain to Date, the Tokugawa had (indirectly) succeeded in sending a 
sturdy vessel to Acapulco and a Japanese party to Madrid, but the very act of strategic 
detachment raised suspicions among the Spanish. The daimyo’s embassy would make their case 
directly to king and council, but by the time it did, the only serious question remaining for the 
monarchy was what sort of welcome to grant the envoys of the upstart king of Ōshū, and what 
degree of hospitality would befit his station and add luster to the Spanish crown. 
The king’s advisors weighed the discordant opinions confronting them for two months. 
The Council of the Indies wrote a lengthy memorial to Philip in October 1614, summarizing 
correspondence from the viceroy, Sebastián Vizcaíno, and the friar Sebastián de San Pedro, as 
well as Sotelo’s letter to the king.76 This consulta stressed the need to prevent the Japanese from 
learning to sail the Pacific, and set the tone for subsequent policy. The Council of the Indies 
considered additional letters the next month, most notably translations of those brought by 
                                                             
76 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1614.10.30. DNS 12-12, XLVI. San Pedro was a Franciscan missionary who 
helped translate the Tokugawa letters Vizcaíno received in 1612. San Pedro remained in Japan. 
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Sebastián Vizcaíno from Japan.77 The Council of State submitted an ambivalent statement on 
how best to deal with Date’s embassy, preaching caution overall but divided on how much was 
necessary.78 Two days before Christmas, Indies advised that any mention of trade be removed 
from Philip’s letter to Ieyasu.79  Though the monarchy met Date’s representatives early the next 
year, the ambiguities surrounding the mission were sufficient to convince Philip’s advisors that 
direct trade with Japan would do more harm than good. Not only was Date’s proposal off the 
table, but his embassy had inadvertently and irreversibly tabled Ieyasu’s proposition as well.   
Critics developed their warnings against the embassy along interrelated lines: the 
perceived strategic disadvantages of open Pacific waterways, intensifying Christian persecution 
in Japan, and suspicions over the legation’s motivations. Strategic concerns featured prominently 
in Guadalcázar’s oft-quoted letter from February 1614, summarized at length in the Indies’ 
consulta that October.80 The viceroy warned that Spain should proceed with extreme caution in 
pursuing the “correspondence” (“correspondencia”) proposed by the Japanese. A well-armed 
and warlike people in his estimation, encouraging their transit to New Spain could endanger 
settlements and ships along the Pacific coastline. The threat of Japanese maritime aggression 
resonated with officials constantly striving to rebut the corsairs and pirates plaguing Spain’s 
imperial traffic in the Atlantic and Caribbean.81 Guadalcázar reported that one hundred and fifty 
                                                             
77 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1614.11.11. DNS 12-12, L. 
78 Consulta del Consejo de Estado, 1614.11.22. DNS 12-12, LI. 
79 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1614.12.23. DNS 12-12, CCXV. 
80 Consulta, DNS 12-12, XLVI. The rest of the paragraph draws on this source to summarize the viceroy’s positions. 
81 Fears about potential Japanese aggression were not unfounded. Tokugawa Ieyasu denounced piracy (as well as 
unsanctioned trade) and encouraged foreign leaders to deal with Japanese pirates as local law demanded. However, 
sporadic Japanese involvement in violence abroad persisted throughout the early decades of the seventeenth century, 
fueling fears in Macao and Manila, among other locales. Additionally, during Ieyasu’s rule the Japanese were but a 
few years removed from the large-scale invasions of Korea under his predecessor Toyotomi Hideyoshi. For early 
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Japanese arrived on Date’s ship, too many to his liking.82 Though they asked for missionaries, 
Guadalcázar suspected (correctly) the Japanese also desired knowledge of navigation and how to 
build ships, and (falsely) reported that a Portuguese “maestro” helped construct Date’s current 
vessel.83 The viceroy also questioned trade on its own merits, claiming the Japanese had brought 
little of import but might well export silver out of New Spain. Here Guadalcázar presented an 
early formulation of Spain’s subsequent policy: deter the Japanese without rousing them. In a 
follow-up letter from May 1614 the viceroy recommended that Spain restrict contact with Japan 
through the Philippines and refuse the embassy its inconvenient requests.84 
Various authors, Guadalcázar included, drew on the deteriorating condition of the Church 
in Japan as they warned the throne against endorsing direct trade with either the Tokugawa or 
Date. The Council of the Indies summed up these opinions in its October 1614 consulta.85 The 
viceroy contrasted Date’s request for more missionaries with reports that the “emperor” had 
executed Christians, and that “his son the prince” had expelled missionaries from his monarchy, 
a clear reference to the 1612 edict Sotelo had violated. As previously mentioned, Fray Sebastián 
de San Pedro wrote from Japan that Sotelo induced Date to send an embassy without Tokugawa 
                                                             
Tokugawa efforts to restrain the Japanese populace, see Mariko Takeda, Sakoku to Kokkyō No Seiritsu, Dōseisha 
Edo Jidaishi Sōsho (Tokyo: Dōseisha, 2005). 
82 The viceroy’s estimate roughly aligns with Date sources, which record roughly 180 people aboard, 40 of whom 
were “Southern Barbarians” (i.e. European). See Volume 2 of Date Chike Kiroku: Sendai-Han Shiryō Taisei, 
(Sendai-shi: Hōbundō, 1972), 596 (entry for Keichō 18.09.15). 
83 Potential Portuguese aid suggests the ongoing tension between Spanish and Portuguese interests and subject in the 
Pacific during the time of the two crowns’ unification (1580–1640). Rivalry rather than cooperation often defined 
the relationship, especially as it related to entrance to Asian markets. Here, though Guadalcázar erred. Will Adams, 
an Englishman, had built earlier Tokugawa ships, and Date’s liaison with the shogunate, Mukai Shōgen, had worked 
with Adams, but the main source of foreign expertise for Date’s vessel came from Spaniards. 
84 Viceroy to Philip, DNS 12-12, VIII. See also AGI, MEXICO,28,N.18. 
85 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1614.10.30. DNS 12-12, XLVI. Subsequent summarizations from this paragraph 
derive from this consulta, itself a summary of other petitions. 
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sanction. San Pedro claimed that treating with Date’s embassy would incite the “emperor” 
against Christians in Japan, implying the danger of a legation organized by a rogue friar.86 
Sebastián Vizcaíno rejected any claim that Japan wanted Christians as an outright lie, and 
reported the emperor forcing thousands to recant, closing churches, and expelling missionaries 
from the “reino del Quanto” (“kingdom of the Kantō”), in reference to the shogunate’s holdings 
and the city of Edo in the Kantō Plain.87  
These secular and spiritual concerns fueled suspicion of Date’s and his representatives’ 
motives, common to all the letters trickling into Madrid aside from those presented by the 
embassy itself. Date requested missionaries, but he also desired an intolerable degree of 
control—in the eyes of Spanish officials—over the means, material and personnel involved in 
any “correspondence.” Philip’s original letter offered trade via Spanish ships, but Date sent his 
own galleon across the sea. The daimyo bettered the Tokugawa’s tacit toleration of Christianity 
in earlier letters by requesting missionaries, but his requests also assumed a prominent role for 
Japanese vessels in transporting them to and from the archipelago. In effect, Date offered a 
potential safe haven for Catholic missionaries and Spaniards at the cost of opening Acapulco and 
facilitating a transfer of maritime technology. The monarchy was amenable to the invitation, 
ambivalent about the opening, and emphatically opposed to any transfer. Additionally, letters 
from outside the daimyo’s legation cast aspersions on any offer to harbor, let alone encourage, 
Christianity in Japan. San Pedro saw Date’s mission as the product of Sotelo’s machinations, and 
argued that the church required the friendship of the emperor more than it needed the favor of 
                                                             
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. See as well Vizcaíno’s letter to Philip, 1614.05.20, DNS 12-12 XLIX. 
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any one lord. He concluded that the latter would come at the cost of the former.88 Without 
explicit Tokugawa sanction, Date’s legation offered too little and asked too much. Sotelo’s 
inability to furnish proof of Tokugawa approval, despite his best efforts to do so, undercut the 
mission every step of the way. 
Perhaps more than any other single factor, the divisions among Spaniards active in and 
involved with Japan prevented Date’s mission from gaining the credibility needed to secure the 
daimyo’s terms or negotiate a similar deal in good faith. The monarchy had to sort through a 
mess of bitterly conflicting accounts operating on multiple levels of authority, resulting in a 
guarded response. In November 1614 Vizcaíno wrote Salinas, the former viceroy and current 
president of the Council of the Indies, to report on his time in Japan. Vizcaíno appended his letter 
to two from the Tokugawa together with their Spanish translations.89 Taken together, the three 
documents demonstrate the fractured relations among Spain’s own representatives, as well as the 
difficulty of establishing which layer of Japanese political authority the crown dealt with. 
Vizcaíno did not pull punches. He alleged Sotelo “goes to Castile and Rome with 
chimeras of letters,” and detailed his mistreatment at the hands of the Japanese aboard the ship 
and in Acapulco.90 The erstwhile representative reported the Japanese had confiscated the 
Tokugawa presents entrusted to Vizcaíno, ostensibly to use for Date’s mission instead. 
Guadalcázar intervened and ordered the gifts remitted to Salinas as originally intended. 
Contemporary sources from Mexico at the time corroborate that Vizcaíno was mistreated, and 
                                                             
88 Ibid. 
89 Vizcaíno to the President of the Council of the Indies, 1614.05.20. DNS 12-12, XLV. Here I focus on the Spanish, 
as this is what Salinas and the Council would have read. The Japanese versions are discussed in Chapter 1. 
90 Ibid. “…pues va á Castilla y Roma con quimeras de embaxadas.” Unless otherwise noted, the details here derive 
from Vizcaíno’s letter. 
Joshua Batts 
Ch. 2 – Confounding the Court 
131 
 
possibly injured, as a result of his standoff with the Japanese.91 The scuffle also caused the 
viceroy to confiscate most Japanese arms and order that some remain in Acapulco while the rest 
proceeded to Mexico.92 In Vizcaíno’s estimation, the request for missionaries was just a pretense 
to send a ship full of cargo each year. He closed the letter by again acknowledging the conflict 
with Sotelo, and warned Salinas to expect nothing but cross words from the friar regarding 
Vizcaíno’s own character. 
The Spanish network in Japan was small, and when it turned on itself, sorting out the 
truth became difficult. The history, if not the bad blood, between Sotelo and Vizcaíno extended 
beyond the latter’s missive to the letters he acquired from Tokugawa Ieyasu and Hidetada. Sotelo 
helped translate both, along with Sebastián de San Pedro and the scribe Gregorio Lopez. The 
original letters dated from July 1612; the translations were completed and approved a month 
later. Two years later Vizcaíno and San Pedro had turned on Sotelo so vehemently that Vizcaíno 
declared Sotelo in control of a fake embassy and San Pedro recommended that Sotelo and 
Hasekura not be permitted to leave New Spain. Conversely, the translations demonstrated 
Sotelo’s continued role in Spanish affairs in Japan, and may have lent credibility to the friar’s 
repeated claims to that effect.  
Unfortunately, the Tokugawa letters Vizcaíno forwarded to Salinas did little to clarify 
matters.93 They addressed the viceroy of New Spain, not Philip, and did not mention, condemn, 
                                                             
91 Domingo Francisco de San Antón Muñón Chimalpahin Cuauhtlehuanitzin, Annals of His Time: Don Domingo de 
San Antón Muñón Chimalpahin Quauhtlehuanitzin (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 275. “The said 
señor Sebastián Vizcaíno is also still coming slowly [to Mexico], coming hurt; the Japanese injured him when they 
beat and stabbed him at Acapulco, as became known here in Mexico.” 
92 See DNS 12-12, V for a transcription of the viceroy’s order that most Japanese surrender their arms while in 
Acapulco.  
93 Transcription of the Japanese originals and the Spanish translations for both letters can be found in DNS 12-9, pp. 
959–81. Note that this is a different volume than the one (12-12) most often cited. 
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or condone Date´s enterprise, predating it by over a year. They expressed continued interest in 
trade and assumed its enactment, but gave few specifics. As discussed in the preceding chapter, 
Ieyasu clearly stated that Japan was a land of kami and Buddhas, not a foreign god, though he did 
not condemn Christianity outright.94 However, the letters were two years old by the time Salinas 
or anyone else in Spain read them, and did not shed any light on how to interpret Date’s 
embassy, despite arriving with the daimyo’s letters on the Bautista. Sotelo needed clear 
Tokugawa sanction, but did not have it. Furthermore, though Date’s motives could be mapped 
onto the Tokugawa’s stated goals, Vizcaíno, San Pedro, and Guadalcázar consistently called 
these motives into question. 
The reactions of officials in Spain who met with Date’s recently-arrived embassy in fall 
1614 provided one final pathway for information to reach the Council of the Indies. Here again 
the results were mixed. The monarchy began receiving reports early in October, when the Duke 
of Medina Sidonia announced Sotelo and Hasekura’s arrival to the Council of State.95 He 
submitted a matter-of-fact report from Sanlúcar de Barrameda, situated at the mouth of the 
Guadalquivir River connecting the inland port of Seville to the Atlantic. He noted that the 
mission arrived with thirty servants, and spoke of passing on to Madrid and Rome. Medina 
Sidonia provided the group with accommodations but thought it unnecessary and expensive to 
send the entire party on to Seville. He also promised to solicit documentation of the party’s 
business with the monarchy.96 A more flattering report followed from Seville five days later, 
when a city official announced the embassy’s impending entrance into the city. Juan Gallardo de 
                                                             
94 Ibid. 
95 Medina Sidonia to Secretary Juan de Ciriza, 1614.10.09. DNS 12-12, X. 
96 Ibid. It appears Medina Sidonia was unsuccessful in detaining any members of the party, who all continued to 
Seville. Don Francisco de Varte later put the number of the mission’s detail at twenty. 
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Cespedes wrote of an embassy “much greater than can be imagined,” and was one of the few 
officials to speak of two distinct ambassadors, one “from the emperor of Japan and the other 
from the king of Voxu [Ōshū].”97 But the mission had not reached Seville, and Cespedes based 
his enthusiasm on letters to the City of Seville forwarded by Sotelo. A letter from Date numbered 
among them, a testament to Sotelo’s strategy to ingratiate the embassy to his home town. The 
stratagem worked well early on, as Cespedes was sufficiently impressed to arrange lodging for 
the mission’s key figures in the Alcazar, the royal palace in Seville.98  
Don Francisco de Varte authored a more balanced account for the Council of the Indies 
the following month. He served as the head of the Casa de Contratación (“House of Trade”) in 
Seville, the agency tasked with overseeing commerce with the Indies. His report leveled 
criticism at Vizcaíno and Sotelo alike, rather than taking the side of one over the other. He 
characterized Sotelo as having left Japan after many years either “from a just zealousness and 
lack of caution or from some ill-founded ambition.”99 Varte in turn noted Vizcaíno’s 
complacency in bringing Japanese back to New Spain and helping them construct their own ship 
in the process. The letter’s critique resonated with its intended recipient. Varte addressed Salinas, 
the very man who had charged Vizcaíno to return the Japanese then in New Spain without 
bringing any back. Varte went so far as to say that Vizcaíno had contravened Salinas’ orders. 
Critical of both Spaniards, Varte appraised Hasekura more favorably. He spoke with the 
Japanese ambassador on two occasions, with Sotelo translating, and regarded Hasekura as a 
                                                             
97 Cespedes to Philip III, 1614.10.14. DNS 12-12, XV. See also AGS,EST,256,2,47. 
98 Ibid. “Alcazar” most often referred to a castle or palace built in Iberia under the Moors. The Alcazar in Seville has 
been designated a World Heritage Site.  
99 Varte to Salinas, 1614.11.4. DNS 12-12, XLVIII. 
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“man of esteem, relaxed, sharp and well spoken, modest.”100 Varte also wrote of his intention to 
help the ambassador in any way he could, visiting Hasekura and presenting him with gifts 
outside of any orders to accommodate the representative.101 
Varte’s letter also distilled the Spanish monarchy’s core concern: the veracity of the 
embassy. The author attempted to sort out the issue, cognizant of “the inconveniences that could 
occur by admitting it (the mission) with parsimony or generosity without verifying the substance 
of it and the true sponsor, and if it [comes] with the knowledge of the Emperor of Japan.”102  
Varte set himself upon a tougher task than he supposed. The official juxtaposed other letters 
arguing against the mission’s credibility with the documents Sotelo and Hasekura carried. 
Conversations with the two men made clear to Varte that the mission represented the “King of 
Ocio [Ōshū],” not the “Emperor of Japan,” but he provided no concrete answer regarding the 
Tokugawa’s acknowledgment of Date’s initiative. Varte concluded by acknowledging the he-
said, he-said nature of the argument: “The controversies among friars, their zeal and concealed 
ambitions, in particular those which have marked the Indies, Your Lordship [The Duke of 
Salinas, President of the Council of the Indies] is more familiar with…I will not dare to 
characterize anything of those [missionaries] that have come nor those that remain in Japan.” 
Varte’s assessment exemplified the struggles of officials in Spain to parse the various accounts 
they received from half a world away, and their concern about the mission and its true sponsor. 
As the embassy approached Madrid, king and Council needed to decide the interrelated issues of 
                                                             
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. Varte also criticized Vizcaíno for failing in his charge to find the islands Rica de Oro and Rica de Plata. 
102 Ibid. This paragraph continues to quote and paraphrase Varte’s letter.  
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trade with Japan and the proper treatment of Date’ mission, even if the embassy would not be 
permitted to position itself as a direct continuation of Tokugawa outreach. 
Varte remained silent on the merits of Date’s proposals, but weighed in on the question of 
how to receive the daimyo’s mission and tied it to the glory of Spain. He did not acknowledge 
Sotelo as a separate representative of the “emperor,” but doubting the friar did not equate to 
dismissing the party out of hand. He advised Salinas to give the mission an honorable welcome 
and thereby build Philip’s reputation abroad. Varte also asserted that whatever issues Vizcaíno 
raised regarding relations with Japan, the Tokugawa had received the Spaniard with “a grand 
demonstration” at their court.103 In Varte’s eyes, Spain needed to do the same. The author 
advised against confusing issues of state with the mission’s formal reception, and portrayed the 
party as a cost-effective way to raise the profile of Spain at a time when it competed with the 
Dutch and English in East Asia. Varte thought the monarchy could host the party honorably, 
quickly, and cheaply, and thus advocated a proper welcome to serve the glory of the crown. 
The Council of the Indies and the Council of State sifted through this growing pile of 
reports, memorials, and impressions. A diplomatic mission from a foreign country in the Indies 
allowed room for both to weigh in on the matter.104 State adopted the quick and efficient 
reception advocated by Varte while Indies favored the commercial protectionism recommended 
by the viceroy Guadalcázar.  
State memorialized the throne in November, recommending that the king grant the 
mission an audience, arrange accommodations in Madrid, and provide the party a daily 
                                                             
103 Ibid. 
104 This led to a measure of bureaucratic in-fighting over who had access to certain information when. See Secretary 
Antonio de Arostegui to the Duke of Lerma, 1614.11.16. DNS 12-12, XLVII. 
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allowance of two hundred reales.105 The Council acknowledged the “variety” of things said 
about the mission, but determined that giving Sotelo and Hasekura their say would help the 
monarchy better ascertain the truth. However, the Council anticipated the mission’s request for 
aid along the road to Rome, and advised against providing any help. The memorial suggested the 
request was beneath the king’s dignity, though costs were also probably a concern. For its part, 
State also rejected the idea of maintaining “correspondence” (correspondencia, meaning contact, 
commercial or otherwise) with Date, citing recent Tokugawa hostility toward Christianity. 
Finally, and somewhat unusually, the memorial closed with the dissenting opinion of the Duke of 
the Infantado, one of the more prominent members of the nobility and Council of State at this 
time.106 The Duke evinced much more suspicion of the mission. He opined that Philip risked the 
wrath of the Japanese “emperor” against Christians by treating with a mission sent—in the 
Duke’s estimation—without his approval. The councilor suggested refusing the party’s entry into 
Madrid and notifying the emperor that Spain had rejected Date’s mission because it did not bear 
the emperor’s letters. The Duke dissented vehemently enough that the Council could not present 
a united front, and left Philip to chart what he deemed to be the proper course. 
The matter came to a head in the Council of the Indies two days before Christmas of 
1614, when the Council formally advised Philip to revise his original letter to Tokugawa Ieyasu, 
removing any mention of trade between Japan and New Spain.107 The memorial acknowledged 
the importance of the viceroy Guadalcázar’s input in its decision, and concerns over persecution. 
                                                             
105 Consulta del Consejo de Estado, 1614.11.22. DNS 12-12, LI. This paragraph summarizes the consulta’s content. 
106 The Duke was one of the wealthiest members of the nobility and at this time began challenging Lerma’s authority 
at court. See Williams, The Great Favourite, 195–97, 216–17. 
107 Consulta, 1614.12.23. DNS 12-12, CCXV. For the original manuscript of this important consulta, see 
AGI,FILIPINAS,1,N.152. 
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“Because matters of the faith in that kingdom [Japan] are in a different state, it must be 
appropriate to omit and remove from [the letter] a clause… [stipulating that] a ship carrying 
merchandise go [to Japan] each year from New Spain.”108 The Council further summarized the 
viceroy’s reports of killings and expulsion of Christians, and Tokugawa leadership “doing other 
things very contrary to our religion.”109 The simple cause-and-effect suggested between 
persecution and denying trade dominates accounts of the mission’s failure and the collapse of 
relations between Japan and Spain. However, the memorial did not stop there.    
The council decided that Philip’s embassy to the Tokugawa and the attendant presents 
could continue on to Japan, raising the question of how to get them there. Indies suggested that 
Philip’s gifts and envoys return on Date’s ship, still quarantined in Acapulco.110 This resolution 
presented new dilemmas connected to the secular priority of checking Japanese ambitions in the 
Pacific. Spanish sailors were to help Date’s ship return to Japan and deliver Philip’s envoys and 
presents, but the council forbid envoy and sailor alike from returning on any Japanese vessel on 
pain of death. Furthermore, the council ordered the viceroy to send the bare minimum of sailors 
required, under express command not to allow the Japanese to become capable of independent 
navigation. In this way, the council sought to avoid ever again having to deal with a Japanese 
vessel in a domestic port in the Americas. Even under the terms of Philip’s original letter to 
Ieyasu the crown provided that the ship be Spanish. The monarchy had no room for Japanese 
vessels in their vision of the Pacific, and the Bautista’s arrival clearly contributed to the retreat 
from any commercial relationship between New Spain and Japan. 
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The Council decisions in late 1614 demonstrated the extent to which Date’s mission and 
Sotelo’s stratagems backfired. The daimyo and the friar intended the mission to simultaneously 
serve Japan’s commercial ambitions and the Spanish monarchy’s support for missionaries, but 
the endeavor threw into sharp relief the divergent priorities of the two polities. The daimyo’s 
embassy impacted the monarchy’s decision-making, but never in the manner his representatives 
hoped. The Councils of State and the Indies treated the question of trade as one to be decided 
between the Tokugawa and Philip, and the king settled the matter by altering his reply to Ieyasu. 
Date’s overtures simply complicated the issue and drove home the need to protect the empire’s 
maritime capacity. The monarchy did not formally consider Date’s terms, nor did it consider 
using the daimyo as a bridge to the Tokugawa. As his missives to the monarchy show, Sotelo 
correctly surmised the need to burnish Date’s mission with Tokugawa legitimacy, but his failure 
to accomplish this limited the group’s potential to achieve an agreement of any substance in a 
clime of caution and growing mistrust. When the council considered Date’s ship and mission, 
they considered how best to dispense of both, albeit elegantly and cordially. Sotelo and Hasekura 
remained in Europe two years, but the party spent that time attempting to negotiate from an 
increasingly desperate position. Actions spoke louder than words, and the San Juan Bautista’s 
unwelcome arrival in Acapulco spoke with more force than Sotelo could ever muster. The ship’s 
appearance made the monarchy less, not more, open to the idea of trade. Date’s mission thus 
played a decisive role in determining commercial relations between Philip’s Spain and Ieyasu’s 
Japan, but it was not the role the daimyo intended, and the mission’s diplomatic impact crested 
before its members met with the king in Madrid. 
The symbolic import of the embassy in Spain peaked in January and February of 1615, 
even as the king’s orders to abandon trade between Japan and New Spain traversed the Atlantic. 
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Philip granted a formal audience to Hasekura Tsunenaga in January 1615. The ceremony 
discouraged concrete proposals or potentially fraught negotiations, and Hasekura demurred from 
either. However, with Sotelo translating, Hasekura professed his Christian faith and requested 
that the king himself serve as godfather during his anticipated baptism.111 Date’s ambassador was 
baptized in Madrid the next month; the Duke of Lerma served as godfather with Philip in 
attendance.112 But even before the baptism ceremony, the Council of the Indies expressed its 
desire to put the whole affair behind the monarchy. A consulta from February 1615 fretted over 
the mounting costs of hosting the mission, and expressed frustration that Hasekura had not yet 
discussed the substance of his mission even after meeting the king.113 The Council knew what 
Hasekura intended to ask, having read numerous memorials detailing or denying the mission’s 
agenda for months. Yet the tone of the memorial showed just how soon the monarchy lost 
patience with the mission, and suggests how soon the party may have resorted to tactical delays. 
Sotelo and Hasekura made clear their intentions to pay their respects to the pontiff in Rome and 
their hope that Philip fund the excursion. Attending the pope kept the party in Europe, bolstered 
Hasekura’s (and therefore Date’s) spiritual credentials, and might pay secular dividends as well 
if the group could convince the pontiff to put in a good word with the Catholic king of Spain. 
Soon after Hasekura’s February baptism king and council would debate the merits of sponsoring 
the mission’s journey to Italy, and much of that debate centered on the appropriate amount of 
resources to devote to the “King of Ōshū” and his representatives. 
                                                             
111 A record of this audience, including Hasekura’s translated declarations and Philip’s response, was published in 
Seville, probably in 1615. See “Relación que propuso el embajador del Japón al rey de España y la respuesta del 
rey,” DNS 12-12, LIX. The editors of the DNS volume suggest the text was compiled from a letter Sotelo authored. 
112 Gonoi, 112–117. See as well Chapter 20 and 21 of Scipione Amati’s contemporary record of the embassy, 
Historia del regno de Voxu del Giapone, reproduced as DNS 12-12, LVII & LXII. 
113 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1615.2.4. DNS 12-12, LXI. 
Joshua Batts 
Ch. 2 – Confounding the Court 
140 
 
Philip III followed the recommendations made by the Councils of State and Indies in the 
closing months of 1614 without alteration. The crown housed the mission in the Convent of San 
Francisco in Madrid, and provided a per diem of 200 reales. This conformed exactly to the 
majority opinion of State’s consulta from late November, as did the decision to grant Hasekura 
an audience. Similarly, the king adopted the course of action outlined by the Council of the 
Indies on the matter of any trade between New Spain and Japan. Indies presented its consulta on 
December 23rd. Philip’s affixed his seal to the revised instructions for the viceroy the same day, 
announced the revisions to his original letter, provided instructions on how to deliver it, and 
detailed orders for those Spaniards sailing on Date’s vessel.114 In all cases, the instructions 
mirrored those recommended by the Indies: omit any discussion of trade from the letter, dispatch 
Date’s ship but forbid any Spaniard from returning on a Japanese vessel, and prevent the 
Japanese from learning to navigate on their own.  
The monarchy decided these broad strokes at the close of 1614, but addressed an 
additional loose end early in the new year: Fray Alonso Muñoz’s role in Philip’s embassy. 
Muñoz had been Indies choice to lead Spain’s response embassy to the Tokugawa in 1613. 
Illness kept Muñoz in Spain in 1613 and Philip’s party left without him. Eighteen months later 
Muñoz had recovered enough to request permission to rejoin the party, still detained in New 
Spain following the arrival of Date’s ship. As a result, three months after Philip ordered the 
viceroy to dispatch his legation on the Bautista as quickly as possible, the monarch wrote again 
in March 1615 to announce Muñoz’s recovery and impending return to New Spain, ordering that 
the friar be given charge of the legation.115  
                                                             
114 Philip III to the viceroy of New Spain, 1614.12.23. DNS 12-12, CCXVII. 
115 Philip III to the viceroy of New Spain, 1615.03.08. DNS 12-12, CCXIX. 
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Ieyasu’s choice once and Philip’s choice twice over, Muñoz offers a counterpoint to his 
colleague and fellow missionary-cum-diplomat Luis Sotelo. Muñoz retained the monarchy’s 
trust after delivering Ieyasu and Hidetada’s letters, and achieved the sort of standing with the 
monarchy Sotelo wrangled for but never achieved. Muñoz memorialized the throne repeatedly 
from 1611–1614, and presciently but fruitlessly stressed the importance of an expedient reply to 
the Tokugawa. Sotelo emphasized the same point in his own memorials to the crown in 1614 and 
cited Ieyasu’s displeasure with the lack of a timely response.116 As discussed above, Muñoz also 
successfully lobbied the Council of the Indies to draft a separate letter to Hidetada. 
The Council continued to call on Muñoz after the Bautista complicated Philip’s response 
to the Tokugawa. It summoned Muñoz to Madrid from Salamanca to advise the monarchy as it 
dealt with conflicting reports in fall 1614, and proposed Muñoz and Sotelo be brought together to 
confer on the matter.117 However, the Council made clear that this should happen only after 
Muñoz was questioned, an attempt to check Sotelo’s version of the facts against Muñoz’s grasp 
of the situation. These actions also suggest lingering doubt about just how far the monarchy 
could trust missionaries who had been active half a world away. Still, Muñoz’s bearing and 
opinions left a positive impression on the councils. Indies remarked on Muñoz’s character when 
summoning him to Madrid, stating that the friar was a “person of whom there is much 
satisfaction and [one who is] of intelligence,” praise it never extended to Sotelo.118 
Muñoz’s sway in Madrid, or at least his standing there, contrasted markedly with Sotelo’s 
struggles establishing and pursuing his diplomatic mission in Spain. The two men—both 
                                                             
116 Sotelo to Philip III, 1614.10.01. DNS 12-12, III. 
117 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1614.11.11. DNS 12-12, L 
118 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1614.10.30. DNS 12-12, XLVI. 
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Franciscans, both veterans of the Japan mission, both knowledgeable regarding Japanese 
domestic leadership—occupied similar positions, but there is little evidence that they worked 
toward common interests once Sotelo and Hasekura arrived in Spain. They had been acquainted 
soon after Muñoz’s 1606 arrival in Japan as lead Franciscan missionary, at a time when Sotelo 
was proselytizing in the region south of Kyoto.119 There are no records of their interaction upon 
Sotelo’s return to Spain in 1614, or what they may have said to one another when conferring at 
the behest of the Council of the Indies. They may no longer have been on amicable terms, as a 
contemporary Jesuit report suggested the displeasure of his fellow Spaniards, not illness, led to 
Sotelo’s replacement by Muñoz in 1610.120 Muñoz helped shepherd Philip’s initial positive 
response to the Tokugawa, while Sotelo unintentionally brought about the recension of the same 
agreement. Muñoz’s unambiguous Tokugawa credentials clearly bolstered his reputation, while 
Sotelo’s muddled credibility weakened the latter’s standing. Still, the monarchy knew that Sotelo 
had not completely fabricated his connection to the shogunate. Philip’s original reply to Ieyasu 
acknowledged both men, introducing Muñoz as a “discalced [friar] of the Order of the Seraphic 
Father San Francisco, who came with the letters of Your Serenity (Ieyasu), in place of Luis 
Sotelo and returns with this [letter to you].”121 Ieyasu and Hidetada’s Japanese letters mentioned 
Sotelo, and this fact had been translated for the Spanish king. Whatever the monarchy might 
think of Sotelo and the mission he accompanied in 1614, it could not claim that the man was a 
complete unknown. Sotelo stressed this prior connection, but proof of the “emperor” of Japan’s 
                                                             
119 Kiichi Matsuda, Keichō Kenʾō Shisetsu: Tokugawa Ieyasu to Nanbanjin (Tokyo: Chōbunsha, 1992), 71–76. 
120 Josef Franz Schütte, “Don Rodrigo de Vivero de Velazco y Sebastián Vizcaíno en Japón (1609–1610, 1611–
1613),” in La expansión hispanoamericana en Asia: siglos XVI Y XVII, ed. Ernesto de la Torre Villar (México: 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1980), 110–112. The pages cited here form part of the transcription of a letter sent by 
the Jesuit Pedro Morejon from Japan in early 1613. 
121 Philip to Ieyasu (draft), DNS 12-12, CCX. 
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blessing in 1610 did not serve as sufficient evidence of his continued goodwill four years later. 
The monarchy recognized Muñoz as the messenger of the Japanese “emperor,” but bound Sotelo 
inextricably and exclusively to Date, the “king of Ōshū.” 
Personality may have also contributed to Muñoz’s acceptance and Sotelo’s plight, as the 
latter failed to ingratiate himself to many of the Spanish officials who might have provided 
support and assistance. Vizcaíno plainly disliked the man, and Guadalcázar remarked that Sotelo 
was of “low station,” and “set in motion more things in this [mission] than were necessary.”122 
As seen above, Varte also commented that he was unsure if Sotelo acted out of righteous zeal or 
naked ambition, in contrast to his praise of Hasekura’s bearing and demeanor.123 Varte’s 
characterization informs the opinion of Japanese historians into the present, who often portray 
Hasekura as stoic and dutiful in contrast to Sotelo’s ample ambition. The friar entertained grand 
plans for the mission and held high expectations for what it might achieve, but his efforts left 
officials unconvinced, and his tactics endeared him to few. Though more respected, Muñoz’s 
actions proved equally infertile. His attempts to rejoin Philip’s embassy played out in keeping 
with the general tenor of the monarchy’s haphazard, halting attempts to send Ieyasu a reply. In 
short, he missed the boat. Philip announced Muñoz’s departure for New Spain to the viceroy in a 
letter from early March. Guadalcázar’s replied in May that Date’s vessel departed Acapulco in 
April with Philip’s letters and presents onboard.124 Fray Diego de Santa Catalina led the party in 
Muñoz’s absence.  
                                                             
122 Viceroy of New Spain to Philip III, 1615.05.25. DNS 12-12, CCXX. 
123 Varte to Salinas, DNS 12-12, XLVIII. 
124 Philip III to Viceroy of New Spain, 1615.03.08. DNS 12-12, CCXIX. For the Viceroy’s reply see CCXX above. 
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The viceroy authored an earlier report to the king that January, with the San Juan 
Baptista still quarantined and Guadalcázar still awaiting Philip’s revised orders. This letter took 
into account the latest reports from the Philippines from the previous fall. The viceroy passed on 
word from the Governor-General of the Philippines that the Tokugawa had ordered all 
missionaries out of Japan, and were gathering them in a port to expel from the archipelago. The 
news deepened Guadalcázar’s conviction that Spain proceed cautiously with regards to Japan, 
and that he was justified in holding the Japanese in New Spain. Philip’s letter affirming that 
conviction and disavowing further trade between New Spain and Japan was already en route.  
Increasing intolerance of Christianity did contribute to Guadalcázar’s decision to hold 
Philip’s embassy in New Spain until Madrid reevaluated the situation. However, the viceroy also 
detained the king’s embassy expressly because of the Bautista’s unexpected appearance in 
Acapulco. On the surface Date offered favorable terms, but he also upended the diplomatic 
process Madrid had cautiously pursued the last three years. New Spain and Japan were to be 
linked, if at all, by Spanish vessels, yet here was a Japanese vessel arriving unannounced. Sent as 
a catalyst to encourage relations, the embassy registered at best as a nuisance and at worst a 
threat, and there was little Sotelo could do to talk his way out of that perception. Christian 
persecution dampened Spanish willingness to engage with Date, but conversely, Date’s mission 
and the manner of its arrival was itself a fatal blow to the fraught diplomacy conducted between 
the monarchy of Spain and the Tokugawa shogunate. When news of the 1614 edict reached 
Madrid some eighteen months later, it confirmed a decision already made rather than closing a 
door that had been open. 
Joshua Batts 




 In the summer of 1613 Tokugawa Ieyasu obtained much of what he wanted with regards 
to New Spain; he just didn’t know it. Philip III and his councils sent the senior Tokugawa kind 
words, large portraits, fine glass, fresh soap, and the promise of a Spanish ship calling annually 
on the ports of Japan direct from New Spain. Five months later they even sent the shogun 
Hidetada a letter of his own. Philip’s envoys anticipated crossing the Pacific in spring 1614, 
arriving in eastern Japan that summer. All the shogunate need do was wait. But four years was a 
long time to wait, and developments in Japan outpaced the Spanish monarchy’s ability to debate, 
formulate, and dispatch a reply.  
 Where the Tokugawa grew restless from waiting, Philip’s administration grew cautious 
from not knowing. The shogunate gave Date’s mission its blessing, but demurred from 
proclaiming its sanction in writing. When a foreign ship dropped anchor in Acapulco, Spanish 
officials became keen to know who they were dealing with, and it was precisely this point that 
proved the hardest to pin down. Sotelo attempted to establish Tokugawa sanction and thus the 
mission’s credibility, but the Spanish monarchy only trusted the friar and Hasekura as far as it 
could control them. Unfortunately, the Bautista unbidden arrival pointed out the limits of Spain’s 
control to viceroy and king alike, as well as auguring the potential dissolution of that control if 
Japanese traffic continued. Thus the council debated the party’s itinerary in Europe, but did little 
to engage the party’s requests to expand the flow of missionaries, mariners, and merchandise half 
a world away, and actively shied away from these ideas in its final orders to Guadalcázar. 
 From 1615 the two remaining diplomatic veins—Philip’s response envoy and Date’s 
embassy—stalled out on two separate continents, unwanted envoys occupying uncertain 
diplomatic space.  
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Had Muñoz sailed with the rest of Philip’s party to Japan the group might have fared 
better, but a trusted messenger could not overcome an empty message. Philip sent warm words to 
the “Universal Lord of Japan," but offered little else. The legation would be present during an 
eventful period, marked by a final domestic battle to solidify Tokugawa rule and Ieyasu’s death 
the following year. The transition from Ieyasu to his son Hidetada accelerated the development 
of the shogunate’s diplomatic ideology and posture, while Philip’s envoy raised the question of 
Spain’s place within—or without—an emerging order of relations.  
Date’s tireless duo remained in Europe another two years. Unwilling to license talk of 
trade, the king did permit the party to travel on to Rome, where Hasekura could make his 
submissions before the pope in the place of his patron. Bereft of political standing, Sotelo and his 
companion turned to the symbolism of piety, performing rituals of submission in order to display 
their sincerity and thereby salvage their mission. However, symbolic actions only won them 
symbolic victories, and soon enough their exasperated Spanish hosts debated how best and how 
soon to be rid of them.  
Joshua Batts 
Ch. 3 – Submitting to Orders 
147 
 
3. Submitting to Orders 
 Hasekura Tsunenaga formally entered Rome on 29 October, 1615. He passed through the 
Porta Angelica, abutting the nearly complete St. Peter's Basilica on the west bank of the Tiber 
River.1 The gate was a common point of entry for pilgrims from afar. The Japanese ambassador 
progressed into the heart of the city along a path familiar to tourists today. Hasekura and his 
party, however, were escorted into the city by a company of men on horseback and the pope's 
cousin, Cardinal Scipione Borghese. The legation struck east from St. Peter's to the five-pointed 
fortress of Castel Sant'Angelo, and crossed the Tiber on the bridge of the same name. It passed 
through the neighborhoods of Ponte and Parione, making its way to the Capitoline Hill. Rome’s 
curious inhabitants lined the streets to catch a glimpse of the group and the “Japanese 
Ambassador” at its head as it progressed through the heart of the Eternal City.2 Hasekura arrived 
at the Franciscan monastery of Aracoeli, looking out over the Roman Forum just behind the 
present-day Piazza Venezia.3 He, Sotelo, and the rest of the group lodged in the monastery and 
would reside in the city into January 1616 as honored guests, often in the company of city 
nobility. A trip to a country house included "the cousin of the pope and all the gentlemen of 
Rome, the cardinals, their relatives, and the ambassadors that were in [the city]."4 Date’s 
representatives became temporary residents of the papal court. 
                                                             
1 Construction of the Basilica continued from the early sixteenth century well into the seventeenth. The façade in 
front of Michelangelo’s dome had just been completed in 1612, and commemorates Pope Paul V. The basilica was 
not completed until the 1620s, and work continued on the colonnade and St. Peter’s Square for another fifty years.  
2 DNS 12-12, C. 
3 The monastery no longer stands.  
4 “Relación verdadera del recibimiento que la santidad del Papa Paulo Quinto y lose más cardenales hizieron en 
Roma al embaxador de los Japones…,” 1616. DNS 12-12, CVI. 
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 But first Hasekura had to complete his pilgrimage to the heart of Catholic power. 
Following its entrance through the pilgrim’s gate and progress through the city, the party 
dismounted at the foot of the Quirinal Palace northeast of the Roman Forum, atop the highest of 
Rome’s seven hills.5 They proceeded to an audience chamber where a gathering of bishops and 
diplomatic luminaries filled the gallery of the pope’s court. Hasekura approached the papal 
throne, went down on one knee, and presented the letter of his lord Date Masamune to the Holy 
Father. The Japanese retainer declared his great joy at being able to represent his lord's 
submission and goodwill, the pope warmly welcomed Date’s “ambassador,” and the ever-present 
Luis Sotelo translated the remarks of each to the other. Pope and public celebrated Hasekura’s 
arrival as a testament to the power of the Christian faith to bring together lords and kingdoms 
from opposite ends of the earth. A pamphlet recording Hasekura's "solemn entry into Rome" was 
published soon after in Italian.6 
 At the opposite end of the earth, Fray Diego Santa Catalina endured his own solemn and 
somber entry into the heart of Tokugawa authority. His party was not accompanied so much as 
guarded. The friar and his two companions brought letters and presents from Philip III, the 
"Universal Catholic Monarch" to both the shogun Hidetada and his father Ieyasu, "the Universal 
Lord of Japan." Ieyasu granted the party an audience at his residence in Sunpu, 180 kilometers 
southwest of the shogunate’s seat in Edo. The retired shogun remained silent at the group’s 
appearance, accepting its gifts and letters without comment, question, or outward sign of 
                                                             
5 Following the palace’s construction in the sixteenth century, the site served variously as a papal summer retreat, 
residence, and the administrative center of the Papal States. From 1870 the palace functioned as a royal residence, 
and from 1946 to the present has been an official residence for Presidents of the Italian Republic. Mayu Fujikawa’s 
recent article provides more information on the palace, the papacy’s diplomatic aspirations, and a fresco depicting 
various foreign embassies, Hasekura among them. See Fujikawa, “Pope Paul V’s Global Design: The Fresco Cycle 
in the Quirinal Palace,” Renaissance Studies 30:2 (2014), 192–217. 
6 “Relatione della solenne entrata…,” DNS 12-12, C. The pamphlet was later translated into French as well. 
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interest.7 Hidetada proved even colder, delaying any audience and ordering the party confined to 
Uraga. Following Ieyasu's death in 1616, Hidetada denied them a formal meeting. He also denied 
the group leave to depart for the Philippines on a Spanish ship out of Nagasaki. Instead, the 
shogun returned all of Philip's gifts and forced the missionaries to return directly to New Spain 
aboard the San Juan Bautista. Their compulsory passage on Date’s galleon directly violated 
Philip III’s standing orders neither to return directly to New Spain nor return on a Japanese 
vessel. Humiliated, dispirited, and now afraid of reprisal in New Spain, Santa Catalina and his 
fellow friars prepared for their departure with little to show for their misadventures. 
 As previous chapters have suggested, there never was a time when Tokugawa and 
Habsburg leadership saw eye-to-eye long enough to build a tenable relationship. Divergent 
conceptions of governance, differing priorities over resources and their management, and 
evolving conceptions of diplomacy undermined any initial good faith, sustained lobbying, and 
individual self-interest attempting to bridge the Pacific Ocean. There was too much geographical, 
political, and conceptual distance, even as a brief flurry of ships, gifts, and men traveled between 
the two. This chapter addresses the conceptual distance by studying the intersection of order, 
submission and expectation in the experiences of Hasekura and Santa Catalina's respective 
missions. Following a handful of increasingly unproductive encounters with Spanish 
representatives intended and accidental, Tokugawa leadership pivoted away from imperial Spain 
even as the most ambitious diplomatic outreach in the archipelago's history navigated the courts 
of Catholic Europe. Simultaneously, Philip's court struggled to articulate a coherent policy 
                                                             
7 The following summary derives from letters submitted by Diego de Santa Catalina and an anonymous friar, 
discussed later. Letter from Fray Diego de Santa Catalina to the viceroy of New Spain, 1617.02.24. DNS 12-12, 
CCXXXIII; “Relación de lo que sucedio a tres religiosos descalzos…escrita por uno de los mismos religiosos,” 
(1616?). DNS 12-12, CCXXI. The “Relación” is a lengthy document, and is the principal source for information on 
the reception of Santa Catalina’s reception in Japan. 
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toward an East Asian polity that had suddenly expanded the diplomatic theater to include the 
Americas and Spain itself. Philip could draw symbolic legitimacy from Hasekura in Europe and 
obstruct commercial forays to New Spain, but his rhetoric could not dictate terms in East Asia. 
There Tokugawa prerogative set the tone and determined the scope and scale of encounter, as the 
shogunate’s leadership managed relationships in accordance with emerging priorities. These 
diplomatic frameworks, the rituals of submission within them, and the legations sent between, 
form the basis for the yawning gap between Japan and Spain in their frustrated attempts to find 
common ground. 
 Suggesting incompatibility between Japan and the countries of Western Europe is 
provocative only to the extent that it appears a stumble backward rather than a step forward. The 
question of tension between Japan and Europe, East and West, motivates a number of studies in 
early modern world history and Japanese history. Press the issue too far and the study lapses into 
a description of assumed characteristics; press too lightly, and the contrasts between societies 
loses much of its instructive potential. Cultural and religious tensions animate studies of Japan's 
foreign relations, studies that take an undifferentiated West or a proxy country as its opposite. 
Here I emphasize the cultures of diplomacy active in Tokugawa Japan and Habsburg Spain, as 
well as the logistical realities structuring each. I also relieve Spain of any burden to stand in for 
the West or even Catholic Europe. Interrogating a monolithic East-West binary requires 
disaggregating both sides of the pair. Eurocentric histories of Japan emphasizing the archipelago 
as a culture set apart mobilize the severing of Japanese-Iberian relations as the foundation for the 
society's lamentable rupture with the West (as well as framing its post-Restoration pivot to 
modernity). But "the West," even as a gross referent, changed drastically between the early 
1600s and the 1850s. Abandoning relations with Philip III and exercising control over the first 
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estate does not equate to renouncing the Enlightenment, technology, or the perceived benefits of 
modern rationality. Studying the differing priorities of each constellation of authority on its own 
merits checks the impulse toward teleology. 
  The two parties' relationship to and reception within the diplomatic and ritual orders of 
their hosts differed considerably, but neither group achieved its goals. Hasekura and Sotelo made 
use of rituals of submission—to king, pope, and God—in order to build credibility, appeal for 
support, and thereby fulfill Date's charge. However, they were only able to leverage symbol into 
symbolic victories. The king attended Hasekura's baptism, but no longer entertained the 
possibility of opening New Spain to Japanese goods and ships. The pope proclaimed Hasekura a 
citizen of Rome, but offered little material aid. When kissing hands worked to no avail,8 the 
ambassador and his Franciscan guide opted to drag their feet, prolonging their time (and 
expenses) in Europe to the consternation of Philip and his Councils of State and Indies.  
 The Spanish monarch's three friars-cum-ambassadors arrived in Japan in August 1615, 
some eighteen months after the Tokugawa had expelled missionaries from the archipelago.9 Like 
Hasekura, Santa Catalina treated with multiple nodes of power, seeking audiences with Ieyasu in 
Sunpu and Hidetada in Edo. Unfortunately, in Tokugawa eyes Santa Catalina’s group carried the 
empty words of a tardy king and represented an unwelcome religion. Furthermore, the party 
brought little to recommend it to the nascent order the Tokugawa were building, one premised on 
an explicit political hierarchy with the shogunate at the center and at the top. While Ieyasu lived, 
their reception was chilly; when he died it froze. Where Philip and the pope valued Hasekura's 
                                                             
8 “Kissing the hand” indicated paying respect to that authority figure. An early memorial from the embassy used 
similar language. “Memorial Presented by the Embassy to the Viceroy of New Spain,” (1614). DNS 12-12, VII. 
9 Ieyasu issued the edict in February 1614. Gonoi Takashi presents a timeline of these and other related events in his 
Hasekura Tsunenaga (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2003), 265–273. 
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performances of submission, the Tokugawa asserted their authority by rejecting Santa Catalina 
and the tepid overtures of his king. Hidetada acknowledged the party through erasure, recognized 
it through denial, these negative acts contributing to the positive project of constructing a durable 
framework of commercial and diplomatic engagement. When the shogun sent everything and 
everyone back to New Spain back he did not bother sending a reply. Relations of a sort with the 
Spanish Philippines continued into the next decade, and Hasekura had yet to return to Japan, but 
Santa Catalina's experiences in 1615–1616 made it clear that after fifteen years of outreach, the 
Tokugawa program of diplomacy could no longer accommodate Spain.  
Parallel Paths to Frustration 
 From 1614–1617, Hasekura and Santa Catalina's parallel embassies traced a figure-eight 
path across the globe. The Viceroy of New Spain (Guadalcázar) delayed Santa Catalina’s voyage 
from New Spain to Japan, shaken up by the Japanese contingent’s unlooked-for arrival in 
Acapulco in early 1614. Though the two parties overlapped in New Spain, the extant sources do 
not preserve any record of the principals from each group ever meeting. It is easy to imagine the 
friars in each delegation conversing at a Franciscan monastery in Mexico, but perhaps the 
viceroy's prudency overcame the groups’ proximity. In the summer of 1614, Hasekura struck out 
eastward from Mexico overland to Veracruz and thence set out across the Caribbean and 
Atlantic. Santa Catalina and his party waited until the following spring to traverse the Pacific, 
keeping with Spain’s preferred sailing schedule. The two parties converged on New Spain once 
again in the autumn of 1617. Santa Catalina sighted the Americas again in February 1617, 
sobered by a hostile sojourn in Japan and a near-fatal crossing of the Pacific.10 Hasekura and 
                                                             
10 In Santa Catalina’s telling, the Bautista barely survived the crossing, which lasted over 100 days at sea. See DNS 
12-12, CCXXXIII, cited above. 
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Sotelo returned that October, departing Europe long after their hosts initially hoped to be rid of 
them. Both parties failed, but took very different paths to similar disappointment. 
 Hasekura and Sotelo spent nearly three years in Europe, variably assuming the roles of 
ambassadors, converts, pilgrims, irritants, and freeloaders. Date Masamune and Sotelo initially 
orchestrated a mission premised on piety, genuine or otherwise, and the friar doubled down when 
confronted with the Spanish crown's reticence to pursue trade with the daimyo of Sendai and so-
called King of Ōshū. Date's representatives never came close to realizing his diplomatic and 
commercial vision, but the arrival of a retinue from so far away disposed the crown towards 
hospitality, especially as it professed a love of God and goodwill toward Philip. The king 
attended Hasekura's baptism in Madrid in February 1615, looking on as the royal chaplain 
presided and Lerma served as godfather.11 The mission won its greatest victory soon after, when 
Philip overruled his Councils of State and Indies and granted the party permission and funding to 
continue to Rome and present itself to Pope Paul V. The trip provided a chance to demonstrate 
Hasekura's—and by extension Date's—commitment to the faith, and convince the pope to take 
up the embassy's cause. It was the legation's last best hope to convince the Spanish monarch to 
give ground, by appealing and submitting to an explicitly religious authority. However, Philip's 
councilors anticipated and subverted these efforts, briefing the papacy on the king’s positions 
                                                             
11 According to Amati’s Historia, Hasekura was baptized on 1615.02.17. See the relevant excerpt in DNS 12-12, 
LXII. The Papal Nuncio in Madrid also reported the baptism to Rome (DNS 12-12, LXIII). The valido, or court 
favorite, was the king’s preferred and most trusted advisor. Lerma is often cast as the progenitor of the position in 
early-modern Europe, followed by the Count-Duke of Olivares in Spain and Cardinal Richelieu under Louis XIV in 
France, with scholarly opinions divided on the efficacy and consequences of ruling through favorites. For 
explorations of Lerma’s role in Philip III’s court, see Antonio Faros, Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip 
III, 1598–1621 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) and Patrick Williams, The Great Favorite 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007). Lerma’s influence was beginning to wane by the time Hasekura 
and Sotelo arrived in Europe, but the embassy still wrote the valido multiple times. However involved Lerma was in 
policy vis-à-vis Hasekura, his presence in the paper trail is slight compared to the King’s councils and 
ambassadors—a trademark throughout his time at court, and he is consequently not discussed in detail here. 
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and expectations well before Hasekura entered the city and presented himself to the Holy Father 
in fall 1615. The pope honored Hasekura and praised Date, but did not assertively intercede on 
the mission’s behalf. 
 When Sotelo and Hasekura departed Rome in January 1616, their Spanish hosts saw little 
incentive for them to linger in Europe, and still less reason for a strained treasury to continue 
bearing the cost of their presence.12 Sotelo never abandoned the language of the leal servant, but 
there were no more baptisms to perform and no additional trips for the crown to fund. The 
mission's principals stalled for over a year, managing to remain in Spain until July 1617. A tug of 
war developed between the Council of the Indies urging its departure, and the mission’s repeated 
insistence on a formal reply from Philip to Date as a pretense to remain and negotiate some sort 
of agreement. Illness also interceded multiple times. Hasekura twice fell ill following his trip to 
Rome, and Sotelo broke his leg while still in Spain. King and Council refused them further 
accommodation in Madrid during this time, insisting the group make for Seville and sail on to 
New Spain.13  
 The party spent most of the next year lodged in the outskirts of that city, the site of its 
initial, and warmest, reception in Spain. The bulk of the mission's Japanese attendants left on the 
flota of 1616 per the Council's orders, but the two principals stayed on, citing a need for further 
clarification from the king.14 The two men weathered attempts to split them apart, and Sotelo 
insisted upon returning to Japan. From Seville, Hasekura and Sotelo lobbied the city government, 
                                                             
12 Financial struggles persisted throughout Philip III’s reign. In 1607, for example, the crown’s debt had climbed to 
20 million ducats. See Feros, Kingship and Favoritism. 
13 The mission contravened this order for a time, but departed to the friendlier city of Seville soon after.  
14 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1616.08.27. DNS 12-12, CLXXXIII. The flota sent out from Spain each year to its 
colonies in Latin America, delivering all manner of documents, personnel, and goods. Return voyages from the 
colonies brought back New World silver, and this “treasure fleet” was a prime target for pirates. 
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the Council of the Indies, and the king at least to consent to sending missionaries, provisions for 
the church, and supporting the appointment of a second bishop to northeastern Japan.15 The 
crown initially tied a reply to the mission's departure, informing the party that it would receive 
Philip's response to Date in the Philippines. The tactic both encouraged Hasekura’s departure and 
afforded the Governor-General in Manila the discretion to remit or withhold the letter as befitting 
the situation in Japan. The exasperated back and forth wrung an empty reply out of Philip not 
unlike that which he belatedly sent the Tokugawa through Santa Catalina. Two years after 
entering Rome to great fanfare, Hasekura and Sotelo arrived back in Mexico in October 1617, 
carrying letters yet returning empty-handed. 
 Santa Catalina hands' were just as full, and just as empty. Hidetada returned him to New 
Spain together with Philip's spurned gifts, mute testimony of the shogun's rebuke. Their time 
away shorter, their treatment harsher, and their voyage more dangerous, Philip's envoys charted a 
parallel path of futility in Japan. Date's ship brought the trio of friars to the archipelago in the 
summer of 1615. They arrived in Uraga near the growing shogunal capital of Edo, and for a brief 
moment the Bautista tethered Eastern Japan to the Americas commercially. Their hosts did not 
allow them to stray far, and the group remained in various states of house arrest or confinement 
throughout its stay. Nor was it given more than the barest provisions.16 In contrast, Philip's 
councilors repeatedly grumbled about costs but had coughed up the requisite funds to lodge 
Hasekura more often than not, especially early on. The Tokugawa had once provided for Rodrigo 
Vivero during his unexpected sojourn in the country half a decade earlier, but acted less 
                                                             
15 See, for example, Sotelo to Philip III, 1617.04.20. DNS 12-12, CXC. Hasekura also wrote the king in translation, 
no doubt with Sotelo’s aid. See DNS 12-12, CXCI.  
16 “Relacion de lo que sucedio,” DNS 12-12, CCXXI. 
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hospitably to Philip’s Franciscan delegation. The friars could not even leverage their own order's 
expulsion into grounds for taking their leave of Japan. The shogunate's Christian expulsion order 
mandated that all missionaries depart Japan, and that year officials began shepherding 
missionaries to Nagasaki for repatriation.17 Santa Catalina’s group petitioned for permission to 
do the same. Hidetada denied them.18 The Bautista remained in Uraga, with the missionaries and 
the Spanish crew—necessary to navigate the vessel—effectively held hostage until the vessel’s 
next departure.  
 Like Sotelo and Hasekura, Santa Catalina's embattled legation had to contend with 
multiple centers of power, most notably Tokugawa Ieyasu in Sunpu and Hidetada in Edo. The 
retired shogun and his son coordinated their responses to Santa Catalina to suit their ends, much 
as the Catholic King and Holy Father aligned their response to Sotelo’s entreaties. The party met 
Ieyasu first. The elder Tokugawa remained the recognized head of government, but his son acted 
as the public face of the shogunate. The arrangement permitted Ieyasu to take his measure of the 
situation and decide policy prior to any official meeting between the shogun and Santa Catalina's 
party. In the end, the Tokugawa determined that the three friars, their gifts, and Philip’s greetings 
did not merit a meeting with the shogun. 
 The climatic events of 1614–1616 in Japan did nothing to improve Santa Catalina's 
situation. In November 1614 Tokugawa forces laid siege to Osaka in an effort to remove the 
potential threat posed by Toyotomi Hideyori, the son of Tokugawa predecessor Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi.19 The castle fell in June 1615, ending any threat of a Toyotomi coup and confirming 
                                                             
17 Timon Screech, “The English and the Control of Christianity in the Early Edo Period,” Japan Review, no. 24 
(January 1, 2012),.9; Elisonas, “Christianity and the daimyo” (1991). 
18 Ibid. 
19 Hall, “The Bakuhan System” (1991), 142–47. 
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Tokugawa primacy. However, rumors of Christian missionaries and converts aiding Toyotomi 
forces only exacerbated suspicions about the foreign religion and its entanglements with 
domestic political dissent.20 Power passed from Ieyasu to Hidetada without incident when the 
elder Tokugawa passed away in June 1616, an accomplishment that had eluded his predecessors 
Hideyoshi and Oda Nobunaga. Now keeping his own council, Hidetada used his father's passing 
as a final pretext to decline any audience with Philip's envoys and ordered them gone. The 
Bautista's departure in September was the fourth and final time a vessel sailed for New Spain. 
 Hidetada demurred from sending Philip a reply, but he countenanced the dispatch of 
Date's ship and its hold full of cargo.21 The ship thus spoke for Hidetada and Date alike, even if 
the former’s message was communicated in flustered friars and rejected presents. Date penned 
letters to authorities in New Spain, their contents more straightforward about commerce and 
more taciturn about matters of the faith. The Tokugawa were represented, after a fashion, by 
Admiral of Ships Mukai Shōgen, who sent men on the voyage to accompany Date’s vassals. 
These unofficial representatives were likely meant to keep Mukai informed and to benefit 
commercially from the excursion. In sum, the Bautista would rid Hidetada of unwelcome guests, 
fetch Date's representatives back to Japan, and provide merchants and their sponsors an 
additional opportunity to reap the rewards of trade. Santa Catalina warned that Philip had 
prohibited any Spaniards from sailing directly between Japan and New Spain, but the friar's hosts 
paid these protestations little mind.22 The ocean proved as cruel as Hidetada had been cold, 
                                                             
20 Screech, “The English and the Control of Christianity in the Early Edo Period”; Michael S. Laver, The Sakoku 
Edicts and the Politics of Tokugawa Hegemony (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2011). 
21 SDS, doc. 299. 
22 “Relación,” DNS 12-12, CCXXI. 
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exacting a high price in lives and cargo on the half-year voyage back to the Americas.23 Santa 
Catalina, recuperating in a small village north of Acapulco, forwarded an account of his envoy's 
mistreatment, and his own brief report of the harrowing crossing.24 
 The two embassies’ itineraries converged once more when Hasekura and Sotelo returned 
to Mexico in the fall of 1617, the Bautista being at the time impounded in Acapulco and awaiting 
their return. Neither brought news or replies amenable to their sponsors, their missions defined 
by what they lacked rather than what they attained. Sotelo and Hasekura held a weak promise to 
send a few more missionaries to a land that had expelled them, but Philip’s letter made no 
mention of trade. Santa Catalina returned with a tale of rejection and rebuke, at stark odds with 
Date's continued petition for a stream of ships, men, and commerce. The apparent contradiction 
of Tokugawa insult and Date's outreach likely vexed the viceroy and his superiors in Spain. 
 Both missions failed because of their patrons’ divergent priorities and expectations. The 
priorities of each polity have been explored elsewhere. In this chapter, I bring attention to the 
expectations and etiquette framing the foreign relations of imperial Spain and the Tokugawa 
shogunate. Guided by Sotelo, Hasekura’s party embedded itself within court and religious 
protocol as best it could, while Santa Catalina's party never managed to secure stable footing on 
the shifting ground of the Tokugawa diplomatic order. Neither mission bore fruit, but comparing 
their efforts suggests the challenges confronting polities attempting to bridge distances between 
localities, ideas, and authority. 
                                                             
23 Ibid. 
24 DNS 12-12, CCXXXIII, cited above. 
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Rituals of Submission 
 Sotelo and Hasekura premised their mission on submission, and advocated their cause 
through piety. Date's representatives used deference to the secular and religious authority of 
Catholic Europe as a tool, and attempted to leverage their spiritual dedication into a material 
commitment by Philip III and Pope Paul V. Date signed off on this strategy, likely originating 
with Sotelo. The many Japanese-language letters the daimyo entrusted to the mission make this 
point clear. In 1610, Tokugawa Ieyasu and Hidetada dispatched Alonzo Muñoz to Spain with a 
letter each; three years later Sotelo and Hasekura carried Date's salutations and petitions to the 
secular and religious leaders of Spain, New Spain, and the Holy See. The northern daimyo 
penned letters to the Viceroy of New Spain and the head of the Franciscan order in Mexico. He 
wrote separately to the king and pope, as well as to the head of the Franciscans in Rome. Date 
also sent greetings and a gift of sword and dagger to the city of Seville, Sotelo’s hometown and 
the mission’s first host in Spain. The number of letters, their intended recipients, and perhaps the 
idea of pushing past New Spain to Europe originated with Sotelo.25 
 Date's 1613 writings extolled the virtues of the Christian faith while putting forth specific 
requests to aid his humble proxies along their way. The batch of letters bolstered the mission's 
claims to the spiritual sincerity of patron and ambassador alike. To all, the daimyo confessed his 
great respect for the word of God and fervent desire that his subjects convert to Christianity, 
even if "intransigent obstacles” impeded his own entrance into the communion of the faith.26 To 
the king he requested an influx of missionaries, and the personnel and trade to enable and sustain 
                                                             
25 Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 59–62. 
26 Jp. 難去指合 (sarigataki sashiai) Date Masamune to the Comisario General of the Franciscan order in New 
Spain, 1613.10.17. SDS, doc. 72. In his letter to the Viceroy (SDS, doc. 70) Date cited “baseless obstacles”: 無拠故
障 (yoridokoro naki koshō). 
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their transport between New Spain and Japan. To the viceroy Date explained his cause and 
entrusted his representatives into the latter’s care. To Seville he offered a similar message, while 
expressing his respect and best wishes for the city.27 The requested aid could be spiritual as well 
as material, as seen in the daimyo's letter to the Franciscan Comisario-General in Rome. After 
explaining his intent to send Sotelo and Hasekura before the pope, Date requested that "your 
Holy Worship add your prayers, and those of your brethren, to the success of the mission and the 
Grace of God.”28 Date adopted an appropriately humble voice when addressing the pope, writing 
of his desire to "retain the blessing of His Most Holy Father for the proclamation of the faith 
throughout my kingdom."29  
 The spectacle that attended the reception of Date’s letters in Spain and beyond 
compounded their effect. Delivery and presentation of a letter from so far away was an important 
affair, meriting public reception, and the recitation of a translated copy of the letter. The city 
council of Seville, for example, called an extraordinary session to hear an oration of Date's 
remarks soon after the mission's arrival in Spain.30 The letters thus displayed Date's spiritual 
sympathy and regard for temporal authority throughout the Spanish Catholic world, as well as 
his willingness to address and engage actors across institutions and on multiple levels.  
 Sotelo no doubt influenced the humble tone of these documents, well aware of the pomp 
and performance inherent to their presentation. Date’s deference to political and religious 
authority in these letters, beyond simple diplomatic common sense, provided a foundation for the 
                                                             
27 Date Masamune to the City of Seville, 1613.10.17. SDS, doc. 101. The flattery no doubt stemmed from Sotelo’s 
desire to enlist the aid of his hometown. 
28 Date Masamune to the Franciscan Comisario-General in Rome, 1613.10.17. SDS, doc. 142. 
29 Date Masamune to Pope Paul V, 1613.10.17. SDS, doc. 196. 
30 Actas Capitulares de Sevilla, 1614.10.26. DNS 12-12, XVII. 
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mission to build upon when expressing its own devotion. But the friar’s influence was not total; 
none of the letters could blot out the inconvenient fact that Date, however sympathetic to 
Christianity in his correspondence, had not converted to Christianity. Perhaps the multitude of 
letters and their epistolary humility functioned in part to make up for this faith deficit. Certainly, 
Hasekura and other members of the delegation tried to overcome the issue through baptism and 
other acts of devotion and spiritual submission. 
 Oration of Date's words in Seville and elsewhere raises the issue of their translation. The 
surviving textual evidence presents a high overall degree of fidelity whenever Japanese and 
Spanish-language versions of the same document exist. The one notable exception appeared in 
the formal terms Date proposed to Philip, a matter-of-fact list shorn of the diplomatic flourishes 
and humility evident in formal letters. Here, the translators, Sotelo undoubtedly among them, 
made two noticeable interventions. In the Japanese original, Date wrote directly to Philip, the 
“Great Emperor of the country of Spain” (ゑすはんやの国大帝王様, esupan’ya no dai teiō-
sama). Furthermore, the final article of the terms treated the daimyo and the king as equivalents, 
reciting the full title of each and proclaiming that no discord should come between them. 
However, the Spanish translation introduced the terms as a proposal Date made to the viceroy of 
New Spain, and omitted the final article listing Date and Philip together.31 The switch avoided 
the offensive suggestion that a subject of the Japanese "Emperor" (as the Spanish often referred 
to the Tokugawa) could address the sovereign of Spain on nominally equal ground. 
 The second major alteration in the same document strengthened the language concerning 
the Dutch. In Japanese, Date promised that “The English, Dutch, or anyone from a country Your 
                                                             
31 For the Japanese text, see Draft of Agreement sent by Date Masamune to Philip III, 1613.10.17. SDS, doc. 141. 
For the Spanish text, see AGS,EST,LEG,256,1,2. The title for the Spanish translations reads, “Capitulaciones y 
asienta de pazes entre el rey de Voxu Ydate Masamune y el Virrey de nueva España.”  
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Majesty deems an enemy who come [to Sendai] will not be respected in my realm,” but in 
Spanish the daimyo proved more bellicose: “[I] will have justice of all of them [the Dutch, etc.] 
and order them killed.”32 The translators—inevitably Sotelo and other friars—recognized that 
trade with Spain required renouncing the crown's rebellious subjects in the strongest possible 
terms. Their alternations positioned Date as a potential guarantor to the terms of the 1609 treaty 
banning Dutch activity in Asia in more forceful terms than the original. Date would thus uphold 
Spanish religion and the Spanish diplomatic order in return for direct access to New Spain. 
 In contrast to the statement of terms, the bulk of Date's 1613 correspondence introduced 
the mission to potential supporters and patrons, and appear to have been accurately translated. 
The letters made excuses for Date’s continued paganism but did not deny it. Beyond this 
unfortunate fact, the letters’ purpose and intended recipients derived from consultation with 
Sotelo, leaving little incentive for alteration or exaggeration. The translation of Date’s letter to 
the pope was made in Japan, the Latin script followed by Date's seal and the date in Japanese 
(see Image 8).33 The letter remains in the Vatican archives today. Similarly, the Tokugawa letters 
to the viceroy Sebastián Vizcaíno carried back to New Spain on the Bautista had also been 
translated in Japan with the aid of friars, Sotelo among them.34 
                                                             
32 Ibid. The Japanese reads “いんぎりす、おらんです、何も帝王之為敵国より参候者、我等国に而ハ崇敬申
間敷候.” The full quote in Spanish is as follows: “Iten, á los yngleses y olandeses y á qualesquier otros que fueren 
enemigos del Rey de España y si binieren á mi reyno haré justicia de todos ellos y los mandaré matar.” 
33 Confirming the translation process conclusively for each source is difficult. Some of the Japanese originals sent to 
Europe have been lost, and for others only copies of the translated letters survive. However, between Date's internal 
records and the holdings of European archives it is generally possible to obtain a Japanese and European-language 
version of each letter and compare. 
34 See DNS 12-9, pp. 959–981. Sotelo must have aided in the translation prior to his damaging falling out with 
Vizcaíno. Vizcaíno delivering these letters, the only missives from the Tokugawa on the Bautista, no doubt 
undermined Sotelo’s arguments that he spoke for the shogunate as well as accompanying Date’s mission.  
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 Sotelo and Hasekura augmented the proclamations of their not-quite-Christian lord by 
unequivocally demonstrating their own faith. To this end, baptism became a fixture of the 
mission's ceremonial life while abroad in the Americas and Europe. The Mexico resident and 
Nahuas chronicler Chimalpahin noted dozens of Japanese being baptized at a Mexico cathedral 
in April 1614.35 The registry of baptisms for the city of Rome records a Japanese being baptized 
in November 1615.36 Only a few Japanese journeyed to Rome, and Hasekura had already been 
baptized in Madrid, meaning that most if not all of the Japanese then present converted to 
Christianity. Scipione Amati's history of the mission corroborates the baptisms in Mexico and 
Rome.37 Still later, Date's appointed captain on the Bautista’s return, Yokozawa Shōgen, was 
baptized in Mexico during the vessel's second sojourn in New Spain.38 
 As it involved Date's principal Japanese representative, Hasekura's baptism offered the 
most symbolic import, and the mission planned accordingly. Hasekura sought his baptism not in 
Mexico or even Rome, but in Madrid, where the mission could incorporate Philip III directly into 
the ritual of its leader’s birth into the Christian faith. The group decided this course of action in 
New Spain, if not before. Chimalpahin's diary records that the "Japanese ambassador" originally 
intended to be baptized along with his brethren in Mexico, but then decided to hold off on the 
ceremony until the party reached Spain.39 Amati's History reported a similar reappraisal.40 Once 
                                                             
35 Domingo Francisco de San Antón Muñón Chimalpahin Cuauhtlehuanitzin, Annals of HisTime: Don Domingo de 
San Antón Muñón Chimalpahin Quauhtlehuanitzin (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).  
36 Register of Baptisms, 1615.11.15. DNS 12-12, CXXVIII. 
37 Amati’s Historia, Chapters 17 & 31. 
38 Letter from Luis Sotelo to the President of the Council of the Indies, 1618.02.03. DNS 12-12, CCI. 
39 Chimalpahin, Annals of His Time, 277. 
40 Amati, Historia, Chapter 17. 
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in Spain, the mission placed Hasekura's baptism at the heart of its diplomatic efforts. Hasekura 
purportedly expressed his desire to be baptized by the king's own hand during his audience with 
Philip, thereby integrating his spiritual well-being into the public ceremony of state.41 Baptism at 
the hand of the king promised to extend the public and ceremonial relationship between monarch 
and ambassador, ensuring another venue for contact with the royal person, and another 
opportunity to make an impression at court.42  
 Hasekura's request also exemplified the mission's use of strategic submission, tactfully 
raising its own profile through acts of religious and spiritual subservience. Specifically, Hasekura 
requested that Philip serve as his godfather in the ceremony, in the absence of any other relative 
or proxy to fulfill the role. The king would become the ambassador's spiritual father and sponsor, 
establishing a relationship with the potential for religious and material support. The petition 
blended the diplomatic goal of establishing the trust and goodwill of the monarchy with the 
spiritual justification for the mission's arrival and agenda. Hasekura devoting himself to the Lord 
above strengthened his ability to serve his secular lord’s interests in Spain. It also provided a 
potential bridge between the retainer's terrestrial patron in Japan and his spiritual godfather in 
Spain, a connection upon which Date and Philip might establish a relationship along the lines 
proposed by the former.  
 Philip demurred from Hasekura’s request, unwilling to involve the crown’s prestige in 
relations with Hasekura’s unproven patron. In the end Lerma served as Hasekura's godfather, 
                                                             
41 “Relación que propuso el Embajador del Japón al Rey de España…,” (1615). DNS 12-12, LIX. 
42 Direct contact with the king was a rare privilege. Following the mission's audience with Philip III, decision-
making was handled almost exclusively through communication via the Councils of State and Indies. Philip never 
received Hasekura in audience again. 
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tying the Japanese retainer to an important figure at court.43 The royal chaplain presided over the 
baptism in a monastery with the king and other luminaries looking on.44 Even if the king did not 
assume direct responsibility over Hasekura's spiritual life, Philip witnessed his conversion to the 
faith and gave it his blessing through his royal presence. Date's representative had demonstrated 
his submission to and acceptance of God, and had done so before the Catholic king charged with 
overseeing expansion of the Church across his formal empire and beyond. 
 Political calculation and the expression of devotion played off one another. The party 
consciously chose to "stage" Hasekura's baptism, and to do it at a place and in a manner designed 
best to serve the interests of the mission. Faith in God did not obviate the value of political 
theater, a fact the Catholic King and the Holy Father both recognized. Yokozawa's 1617 baptism 
in Mexico adopted a similar pattern of welding individual salvation to Spanish secular authority. 
Absent a king, Date's captain requested that the incoming Governor-General of the Philippines, 
Don Alonso Fajardo de Entenza, serve as his godfather in the ceremony. Fajardo agreed, and the 
service bound the Japanese captain of Date’s ship to the political head of the Spanish Philippines. 
Ultimately, the Bautista and the governor-general’s flotilla embarked together across the Pacific 
to Manila, and the baptism ceremony may have also facilitated coordination and communication 
on the long voyage. Sotelo noted Yokozawa's conversion and the governor-general's 
                                                             
43 Lerma's influence reached it apogee in the first decade of the seventeenth century. By 1615 the valido's grasp on 
the strings of government was more tenuous, though he would not "fall" until 1618. At the time of Hasekura's 
baptism Lerma remained the most prominent figure at court, and he helped direct the flow of information to the 
Councils of State and Indies as they responded to Date's mission.  
44 See Amati, Historia, Chapters 20–22; Letter from Papal Nuncio at Madrid to Cardinal Borghese, 1615.02.23. 
DNS 12-12, LXIII. 
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participation, in his final, desperate round of letters from Mexico in 1618 pleading for the 
crown's support following disappointment in Europe and worsening conditions in Japan.45 
 The friar's missives formed the backbone of the mission's correspondence while in 
Europe from 1614 to 1617, building on Date's carefully-worded introductions and the theater 
afforded by baptismal ceremonies and processions. Necessity, strategy, and his position within 
the mission allowed Sotelo to adopt the language of submission in both political and religious 
terms to a degree his patron and companion could not. Date spoke of the appeal of Christianity 
and flattered the recipients of his letters, but this language only carried so far, given that the 
daimyo had not formally converted. Just as importantly, Date wrote to propose contact with the 
king's missionaries and subjects, but did not pledge himself to the sovereign. As his proposed 
"term sheet" implied, he wrote as a potential partner for the king. The daimyo's 1613 letter also 
made reference to Japan's own teiō-sama (帝王様), the Tokugawa, indicating Date's 
simultaneous role as sovereign and subject, a factor that further complicated Spain’s response. 
 Sotelo's voice also drowned out Hasekura's, perhaps as much then as now. Hasekura 
addressed the king and called on officials, but always with Sotelo by his side to translate. I am 
not aware of any extant document recording the ambassador speaking in Spanish. Hasekura 
likely developed some facility with the language during his seven years abroad, but opted not to 
use it in any official capacity. Perhaps this was a conscious decision both to maintain the 
mission's dignity and to stoke curiosity about the man who had traveled from so far away. 
Hasekura also spoke with his composure, his body, and the performance inherent to his station as 
a foreign representative. By all accounts, he comported himself well, both in formal setting such 
                                                             
45 DNS 12-12, CCI & CCII. 
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as his baptism and in less formal visits to officials.46 However, meetings with the king proved a 
rare event; Philip officially met with Hasekura once in early 1615, despite the party spending 
over two and a half years in Europe.47 The back-and-forth of presenting petitions and lobbying 
for its cause required correspondence with the machine of government—primarily the 
Councils—and patrons who might intercede on the mission's behalf. This fact propelled Sotelo to 
the forefront of the mission and allowed him to set the agenda. 
 Sotelo's role as the mission's voice, his concurrent calling as a Franciscan friar, and his 
status as a subject of Castile allowed him to frame the mission in terms of service and 
submission to crown and church alike. Once in Europe, Sotelo presented Date as sincere, 
Hasekura as devout, and the mission as a spiritual undertaking and a great service to Philip III 
and Paul V. The friar's requests to the Council of the Indies in spring 1614 provides an example 
of his efforts to frame the mission in terms of the needs of the church. Responding to the 
Council's demand for a formal list of requests, Sotelo provided the following six: permission to 
travel to Rome along with funding for the journey and the journey back to Japan; the 
establishment of additional bishoprics in Japan not controlled by the Jesuits; permission for 
additional mendicant missionaries to be sent to Japan directly from New Spain; funds to 
purchase wine, altarpieces, catechisms, and other necessary materials; and construction funds for 
a seminary lodging for native converts; and finally, permission for Date to send trading vessels to 
New Spain.48 
                                                             
46 Officials in Seville, the head of the Spanish Casa de Contratación, and the Spanish ambassador to Rome all 
commented positively on bearing of Hasekura and his companions. For an example from Rome, see Spanish 
Ambassador at Rome to the King of Spain, 1616.01.08. DNS 12-12, CLVII. 
47 The king also offered his congratulations to Hasekura at the retainer’s baptism, but this encounter did not take the 
form of an audience. 
48 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1614.04.02. DNS 12-12, LXVI. 
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 Compare this list of pious requests to Date's proposed agreement between himself and the 
king (or the viceroy, depending on the translation used). The Spanish version contained eight 
articles: a request for missionaries to be sent to Ōshū; permission for Date's ships to anchor and 
trade in New Spain; the ability to hire Spanish pilots and mariners for the crossing; offer of safe 
harbor for Spanish ships in Date's ports; provisions and rigging at a fair price; the option for 
Spanish to build ships in Ōshū, again with materials at a fair price; the right for Spaniards to 
build houses and reside in Date's lands; refusing—and in the Spanish version, killing—any 
Dutch arriving in the daimyo's lands.49 
 Sotelo and Date's lists both concerned themselves with logistics, albeit of a very different 
sort. Date’s Japanese letters led with the missionaries, both in the terms above and in his letters 
to officials in Europe. In the latter he consistently downplayed commercial motivation, 
requesting permission to pack cargo of “items from that country [New Spain] for our use” (其国
之道具、我等用所之ためにて, sono kuni no dōgu, warera yōsho no tame nite)."50 However, 
all of the remaining articles, except the discussion of the Dutch, addressed the mechanics of 
Japanese and Spanish ships and goods moving across the Pacific. The daimyo prioritized 
managing the expected flow of people, goods, ships, knowledge, and technology that would 
attend the arrival of any missionaries.  
 Sotelo adopted the opposite approach in early 1615, dwelling on the specific 
requirements of the church in Date's "kingdom." The friar fleshed out his patron's straightforward 
                                                             
49 “Capituliaciones y asientos de pazes...,” (1614?). DNS 12-12, LX. This is the translation of Date’s proposal to 
Philip III (SDS, doc. 141). I summarize the Spanish-language text here as it was the document officials understood. 
50 Date to the viceroy of New Spain, 1613.10.17. SDS, doc. 70. The Spanish-language memorial drafted by the 
embassy similarly suggested that any commerce covering more than the price of the voyage “would be used on 
presents and items of this land [New Spain] for the service of his [Date’s] house” (se enplee en regalos y cosas desta 
tierra para el seruicio de su casa). See DNS 12-12, VII.  
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request for missionaries by addressing the needs of the religious and lay community, their 
standing within the Church's hierarchy, and the materials required to house, clothe, and properly 
instruct the faithful, new and old. Sotelo also assigned a specific value to these requests, laying 
out the costs of each, dealing in a level of specificity Date had diplomatically avoided.51 
However, the friar downplayed discussion of how these missionaries, resources, and money 
might reach their intended destination, in contrast to Date’s more focused proposal on how to do 
just that.  
 Sotelo also prefaced requests for the church in northeastern Japan with a more immediate 
petition that the mission be granted permission, passage, and adequate funding for a trip to 
Rome. In so doing, he cast the legation as a pilgrimage seeking the spiritual betterment of the 
mission's ambassador and sponsor, all for the greater glory of faith. Hasekura had come to “give 
obedience” (dar la obediencia) to the king and “kiss the foot” (besar el pie) of the pope in Rome 
in Date’s stead.52 These were common expressions of respect in European courts, but the use of 
this language, even in translation, contrasts starkly with earlier Tokugawa efforts.  
 Hasekura would build on his baptism by confirming his submission to the faith and its 
principal servant on earth. The remaining requests regarding the church in Japan proceeded from 
this original act of faith in Rome, linking the mission's actions in Europe to the service of God 
and his Catholic King in the Indies. "Service" was a common refrain among the king's councilors 
and petitioners. The latter defined their labors and requests in terms of the "service" provided to 
the king.53 Philip's councils sorted through information and issued advice in terms of how the 
                                                             
51 DNS 12-12, LXVI (cited above). 
52 Theses phrases are repeated in multiple letters. For an example of “dar la obediencia,” see Juan Gallardo de 
Cespedes to the King of Spain, 1614.10.14. DNS 12-12, XV. For “besar el pie,” see DNS 12-12, VII.  
53 DNS 12-12, VII contains one such example. 
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king might best be served. When the Council of State presented Philip with multiple options, 
they often closed with a refrain like “His Majesty will order that which would be best served” or 
something similar.54 Sotelo employed this language throughout his correspondence, defining all 
of the mission's activities and proposals in terms of their service to Philip. Here his double status 
as ambassador and subject of the crown allowed him to adopt a language of servitude not seen in 
Date's letters. The daimyo had written pious letters to the pope and other officials, well aware 
that his representatives would attempt the journey to Rome. However, in Date’s missives the trip 
to Rome was an assumed part of the mission’s itinerary. Confronted with official skepticism, 
Sotelo folded the excursion into the objectives of the mission, bundled together with support for 
the church in northeastern Japan and commerce between Ōshū and New Spain. Pointedly, though 
Date announced his representatives’ intent to go to Rome when addressing Philip, the daimyo 
did not frame the journey as dependent on the king’s good graces, and his proposed terms did not 
mention the trip at all.55 Sotelo, confronting the headwinds of Spanish officialdom, explicitly 
subordinated the mission’s movement to the king’s prerogative. The voyage became patronized 
by one European leader so that it might pay respects to another, and symbolized Hasekura’s (and 
by rhetorical extension, Date’s) submission to Spain’s political and religious authority.  
 Service, submission, and sponsorship featured in Sotelo's writings from the beginning, 
but his failure to establish himself as a Tokugawa spokesman turned piety into the friar's primary 
diplomatic currency. The Spanish crown remained unconvinced of his earlier claims to speak for 
the “Emperor” of Japan (Tokugawa Ieyasu), weakening the friar’s arsenal of secular arguments. 
                                                             
54 Consulta del Consejo de Estado, 1614.11.22. DNS 12-12, LI. 
55 Date did request Philip’s goodwill, but the trip to Rome is assumed, however humbly. That Sotelo had to lobby 
for the excursion is another sign of the mission’s ambivalent response at the court in Madrid.  
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Sections of Sotelo’s earliest writings during the mission had comprised a concise geopolitical 
manifesto on how commercial relations between Date's domain and New Spain could serve the 
royal interest. He argued that increased commerce with Japan would significantly decrease the 
amount of silver flowing west out of the America, augmenting Philip's coffers in a time of 
financial distress.56 He promised safer, reliable transport between Manila and Acapulco once 
Date's ports were integrated into Spain’s maritime network. Sotelo also asserted that Spain's gain 
in Japan would be the Low Countries' loss, as neither Date nor the Tokugawa would see the 
benefit in permitting the Dutch to remain active in the area. All of these arguments responded to 
contemporary critics who foretold Japanese piracy off the coast of New Spain, warned that Japan 
would drain silver away rather than provide it, and advised that Tokugawa hostility would make 
deeper commercial ties untenable.57  
 To be sure, Sotelo tethered these commercial arguments and political considerations to 
the potential benefits for the church, but he also tied them to his purported familiarity with and 
support from the Tokugawa. As argued earlier, Sotelo initially presented himself as a Tokugawa 
representative traveling in tandem with Date's ambassador, but his Spanish peers hotly contested 
these assertions and the crown never accepted them.58 The friar claimed Tokugawa credentials 
up until his arrival in Spain in the fall of 1614, but the following year Sotelo limited himself to 
speaking for Date and abandoned geopolitical rhetoric in favor of the spiritual potential of the 
mission. His petitions to Philip’s councils dealt less and less with commerce, and instead devoted 
                                                             
56 Sotelo to Philip III, DNS 12-12, III. This entire paragraph phrases Sotelo’s arguments to the king. 
57 Spanish attitudes toward the balance of trade among the Philippines, New Spain, and Asia will be discussed in 
more depth in Chapter 4. Vizcaíno voiced some of these concerns in his letters to Salinas and Philip. See DNS 12-
12, XLV & XLIX. 
58 See Chapter 2. 
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themselves to spiritual matters and their budgetary requirements, as seen above. Sotelo returned 
to political punditry later, but under more strained circumstances. 
 Stripped of the ability to negotiate between sovereigns, the mission requested favor 
through the role of pilgrim, believer, and servant. What the visitors from overseas could not 
bargain for as ambassadors they might be able to request as devout members of the faith. 
Devotion required demonstration, but might be rewarded with patronage.  
 The baptism and trip to Rome hewed this rhetorical line, but Sotelo pursued other lines of 
petition as well. In spring 1615, Hasekura requested that the king admit him into the Order of 
Santiago, a military-religious confraternity tasked with protecting the faith and protecting 
pilgrims on the Camino de Santiago.59 Formed in the twelfth century during the Reconquista, by 
the seventeenth century membership had been restricted to the nobility and the order itself was 
administered by the crown. Adding Hasekura to its ranks would establish one more institutional 
link to the monarchy, symbolically integrating Hasekura into Spanish nobility and recognizing 
him as a protector of his new faith. The Council would have none of it. The body pointed out the 
obvious, that Hasekura would have no way of fulfilling the Order’s functions from Japan. It 
pointed out the equally conspicuous fact that Sotelo was the source of the request.60  
 Even before Hasekura’s baptism in February 1615 the Council of the Indies was citing 
the costs of maintaining the embassy and the burden of housing it, and recommended that the 
party be dealt with quickly.61 The Council rebuffed the request for entrance into the Order; and 
advised against any trip to Rome. Well aware that Sotelo sought to play politics with piety, the 
                                                             
59 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1615.04.29. DNS 12-12, LXVIII. 
60 Ibid. 
61 DNS 12-12, LXI. Altogether, between twenty to thirty Japanese had ventured to Spain. 
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Council wanted the mission homeward bound as soon as possible. As for Sotelo's other requests, 
the advisory body sidestepped most of the issues—most importantly the question of establishing 
another bishopric in Japan—and released a fraction of the funds the friar requested.62 If the king's 
advisors had gotten their way, Sotelo and Hasekura would have been back on a ship to New 
Spain in 1615, attended by a few extra books, a few extra missionaries, and orders to return to 
Japan via the Philippines rather than the direct route Date sought. 
 But for once, Sotelo won the day. In the mission's greatest (and perhaps only) victory, 
Philip overruled his advisors and granted the mission leave to continue on to Rome, along with 
funds to support it on the journey.63 The king approved their voyage in the spring, and Hasekura, 
Sotelo, and roughly a half-dozen others departed for Rome in early fall 1615.  
 Hasekura's and Sotelo's entry into Rome lifted the mission to its high-water mark in 
Europe. Philip had kept the party waiting more than two months before receiving them in court, 
and then only once. Pope Paul V met Hasekura twice within a week of his arrival. The second, 
more formal reception took place in the Quirinale Palace. That November Spain's ambassador to 
the papacy, El Conde de Castro, favorably compared the legation's reception to that extended to a 
Persian embassy a few years prior.64 Castro reported that the reception differed little from that 
afforded to “the ambassadors of the [Holy Roman?] Emperor and the kings of France and Spain” 
aside from the pope's dress and the chamber used for the audience.65 The prominent Borghese 
family—of which the pope and his nephew, councilor, and cardinal  Borghese were both 
                                                             
62 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1615.04.02. DNS 12-12, LXVI. 
63 Ibid. The monarchy granted the party 4,000 ducats for the trip. For reference to this sum, see Memorial of Father 
Sotelo, 1615.08.06. DNS 12-12, LXXVII. 
64 Spanish Ambassador to Rome to Philip III, 1615.11.12. DNS 12-12, CXV. 
65 Ibid. 
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members—guided the party around the city and the grounds of the family villa.66 In mid-
November a Japanese member of the group was baptized in front of Cardinal Borghese, further 
cementing the patronage ties between the papacy and the embassy.67 Not a week later, the senate 
bestowed Roman citizenship upon Hasekura and five others, a mix of Japanese and their Spanish 
Franciscan guides.68 Inscribed on a sheet of rich vellum, Hasekura's certificate of citizenship is a 
visually striking document preserved today in the Sendai City Museum (Image 7). The document 
addressed Hasekura by his newly-acquired Christian name, in bold script: PHILIPPO 
FRANCISCO FAXECURA ROCVYEMON. "Philip" for the king he sought, "Francisco" for the 
order that guided him, recognized by the civil authority at the heart of Catholic Europe. The 
mission's patronage had thus been inscribed into the very name of its head delegate. 
 As in Madrid before, Sotelo attempted to use ceremonial acts of submission as grounds to 
pursue the mission's agenda. The group presented Date’s letter to the pope (Image 8), and Sotelo 
lobbied for the same points he had pressed in court: materials, missionaries, and a new bishopric 
in northeastern Japan.69 The legation also presented Paul V with a letter on behalf of the 
Christian community in Japan, declaring their faith and requesting his favor. Individuals from the 
area around Osaka, Sakai, and Kyoto, signed the document, presented by Sotelo and three 
Japanese Christians.70 The papacy duly recorded meeting with three Japanese acting as 
                                                             
66  Borghese’s art collection and estate now form the Villa Borghese, a prominent museum and park in Rome. 
67 Register of Baptisms, 1615.11.15. DNS 12-12, CXXVIII. See Amati, Historia, Chapter 31 (DNS 12-12, CXXV) 
as well. 
68 “Decreti di consegli magistrate e cittadini Romani,” 1615.11.19. DNS 12-12, CXL. One of the Japanese was the 
merchant Itami Sōmi. Scipione Amati, the author of the Historia, also received this honor. 
69 The papal response to Sotelo’s memorializing is extant. See “Answers to the demands of the Japanese embassy,” 
(1615) DNS 12-12, CXLVIII. 
70 Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 159–163. 
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"ambassadors of Japan's Christians," alongside Hasekura serving as the "ambassador of the 
Kingdom of Voxu [Ōshū].”71 Spain had never recognized any such “ambassadors,” suggesting 
the mission indulged in some improvisation or misinterpretation on the road to Rome. The group 
hoped that their letters, pleas, and faith would translate into papal intercession back in Philip's 
court. Sotelo needed to walk a very tight line, requesting the pope's intercession without directly 
complaining about their treatment at the hands of the king who had sponsored their journey to 
Italy. An undated memorial to the papacy likely drafted by Sotelo thus praised the Spanish king's 
hospitality while acknowledging that “on the matters of trade and communication with New 
Spain [the embassy has] seen difficulties in the councils for reasons and matters of state.”72 The 
document moved on to ask for papal favor, mercy, and honor without specifically requesting that 
the pontiff lobby for trade, its author content to elaborate on the benefits of the arrangement and 
trust the recipient to make the connection. Commerce and missionary work were the means and 
ends of the mission, but exactly which was which remained difficult to decipher. Stripped of 
secular authority, the group doubled down on piety as the only feasible means of negotiating on 
Date's behalf, in the process symbolically binding themselves to other patrons spiritual and 
secular alike. However, as the acknowledgment of certain “difficulties” attested, symbolic 
submission needed to inspire patronage beyond the realm of ritual.  
“Escaping with one’s life among such grand tyrants is like receiving it out of mercy” 
 Both missions asked their hosts for too much and offered too little. Sotelo and Hasekura 
asked Philip to reorganize relations between the Spanish Indies and Asia in exchange for the 
support of an unknown "king" who was yet uncommitted to God but apparently committed to 
                                                             
71 ASV, Sec. Brev., 532 195. 
72 ASV,Fondo Borghese,I,209,331V. 
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trade. Fray Diego Santa Catalina and his fellow friars asked the Tokugawa to extend their 
protection to a group whose presence they had outlawed in exchange for the gratitude of a distant 
sovereign who thought much of his God but much less of replying punctually or responding to 
any of the shogunate's proposals. In the face of a skeptical reception Sotelo pivoted to piety, but 
this was not an option for Santa Catalina and his companions. They had not come to submit to 
anything, but to deliver the message and gifts of their king. 
  It is unclear if Santa Catalina and his companions recognized how singularly ill-prepared 
they were to face the political climate in Japan. Philip III ordered them well-provisioned with 
gifts: portraits of royalty, crystal glass, soap, leather goods, and other fineries, but the group 
possessed little else of value.73 Philip neutered the group's letter when he ordered its revision and 
the omission of any language discussing or permitting trade. Santa Catalina spent a year in New 
Spain awaiting Madrid’s direction. The back-and-forth cost the group another precious resource: 
time. Even before Santa Catalina’s initial departure from Spain, the entire enterprise stalled a 
year as the crown paused to gather more information from Asia before it committed to sending a 
reply to the Tokugawa. When Rodrigo de Vivero departed on the first Japanese ship bound for 
New Spain in 1610, he promised a reply from the king of Spain within two years.74 Santa 
Catalina arrived three years late. Much had changed, and their hosts were impatient.  
 The embassy also traveled without its intended leader, Fray Alonso Muñoz. The friar was 
singularly qualified for the endeavor; Philip's court held him in high esteem and the Tokugawa 
shogunate had entrusted him with its letters to Spain in 1610. When illness and ill-timing 
                                                             
73 See Chapter for a discussion of these gifts. 
74 Josef Franz Schütte, “Don Rodrigo de Vivero de Velazco y Sebastián Vizcaíno en Japón (1609–1610, 1611–
1613),” inde la Torre Villar Ernesto, ed., La Expansión Hispanoamericana En Asia: Siglos XVI Y XVII (México: 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1980). 
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prevented Muñoz from departing Spain prior to Santa Catalina's departure the embassy lost its 
best potential mediator between the two polities. Absent Muñoz, the court pressed ahead with 
Santa Catalina and two other friars, three missionaries sailing for Japan just as the shogunate 
committed to their order’s expulsion in 1614. The Spanish court’s selection of friars appears to 
have been deliberate, an attempt to follow the precedent the Tokugawa themselves had 
established by dispatching Muñoz earlier.75 The gesture toward reciprocity actually worked 
against the party, which fared poorly in Muñoz's absence. 
 Worse, Philip’s letters to Ieyasu and Hidetada lacked substance, and did little to 
recommend Spain to Tokugawa leadership. The final version did not mention trade, even to 
equivocate or otherwise delay resolving the issue.76 In 1609–1610 Ieyasu and Rodrigo de Vivero 
had discussed specific issues—miners from New Spain, access to ports— that Philip rejected by 
refusing to acknowledge. Philip acknowledged, but paid little heed to Ieyasu’s 1610 
correspondence welcoming Spanish traffic to any port in Japan. Furthermore, in 1612 Ieyasu 
asked that the Spanish keep their Catholic God to themselves in a letter Vizcaíno brought back 
on the Bautista. Exchanges of men, technology, and provisions did not necessitate the presence 
of missionaries and their religion, at least in Tokugawa eyes. Philip responded to Ieyasu’s clearly 
stated position on Christianity by “affectionately entrusting to Your Serenity the missionaries in 
those kingdoms who live in service to our true God.”77 This language dated to Philip’s initial 
1613 draft reply. Given the opportunity to revise the letter the next year, the monarchy had 
omitted discussion of trade but opted to keep what it knew to be provocative language regarding 
                                                             
75 The choice of Franciscans as envoys is mentioned in the aforementioned anonymous report from one of the friars 
in Japan, DNS 12-12, CCXXI. 
76 Philip III to Ieyasu, 1613.06.20. DNS 12-12, CCXVI. 
77 Ibid. 
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Christianity. The Tokugawa would now have to decide what to do about the dimming trade 
prospects and their missionary guests. 
 The shogunate coordinated its response—official and unofficial—through the two poles 
of Tokugawa power: the “retired” Ieyasu's complex in Sunpu, and the shogunate's seat in Edo 
headed by his son Hidetada. Ieyasu remained in power until his death in June 1616, operating 
unconstrained as retired shogun (大御所, Ōgosho) while Hidetada served as the official head of 
government. The dual system served the shogunate well in addressing its unwelcome guests and 
unhelpful correspondence.78 Santa Catalina and his companions first traveled to Sunpu, where 
they delivered their letter to Ieyasu and the elder Tokugawa took his measure of them. This order 
reflected the reality of Ieyasu’s continued preeminence in Japan. Philip knew it as well, and his 
letter to Ieyasu was the more important document; he only wrote to Hidetada out of courtesy and 
on the advice of Muñoz back in Madrid. The separation between effective and official power 
allowed the shogunate to discern Philip’s intentions and disposition without granting his 
representatives an audience with the nominal head of government. Before they proceeded to their 
audience with Hidetada, Ieyasu traveled to Edo and conferred with his son.79 There was little 
incentive to permit an audience with the shogun, and Philip’s envoys never received one. By one 
friar's account Hidetada first delayed the meeting, and after Ieyasu's death used the mourning 
period for his father as a pretext to avoid the party. The same friar ruefully pointed out that 
Hidetada's grief did not prevent him from meeting the English and Dutch. The shogun also 
refused Philip’s gifts, and in time even those presents Ieyasu had accepted were returned.  
                                                             
78 Hidetada followed his father's example and "retired" to allow his son Iemitsu to ascend to the position of shogun. 
Iemitsu, however, served as shogun until his death in 1651. By that time Tokugawa succession was secure, and the 
practice of a retired elder coexisting with a reigning heir was discontinued.  
79 DNS 12-12, CCXXI. The rest of the paragraph cites details from this document. 
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 Such actions excluded Philip's embassy from the evolving Tokugawa diplomatic order, 
and denied the king’s mission recognition. Ieyasu's "retirement" allowed him to vet the embassy 
without the shogunate having to mount an official response. The party spent over a year in Japan 
fretting over its fate and trying to discern its hosts' intentions. By avoiding an audience and 
ignoring Philip’s gifts, Hidetada also circumvented the need to draft any formal reply. In Rome 
at this same time, Sotelo endeavored to play one sovereign against the other, only to be foiled by 
their coordination. Santa Catalina confronted two authorities as well, albeit within the same 
polity. In this instance two generations of Tokugawa worked together so that Philip’s letter could 
be received without being recognized. 
 The experiences of Santa Catalina's group stand in stark contrast to Vivero's time in 
Japan in 1610 and Vizcaíno's uneven stay in 1612–1613. Ieyasu's hardening toward the Spanish 
is evident in the manner of the men's reception. Vivero reported engaging in conversation with 
both Ieyasu and Hidetada when they each received him. In the former case, Vivero claimed to 
receive an apology of sorts before being led into Ieyasu’s audience chamber when an official told 
him not to take offense at the burdens of protocol. The accidental diplomat reported a similar 
scene with Hidetada prior: being led into the audience chamber, sitting at a respectful distance to 
the shogun's side, and conversing for a time. Pointedly, Hidetada and Vivero discussed Spanish 
shipping at some length.80 Vivero smoothed over tensions regarding matters of protocol in his 
account, wishing to cast himself and his relationship with Tokugawa leadership in a positive 
light. What he represented as formal but genial conversation may have been more restrained and 
regulated than reported, but did not leave the man feeling mistreated. 
                                                             
80 See Chapter 1, as well as Michael Cooper, An Unscheduled Visit: Rodrigo de Vivero in Japan, 1609-1610 (Tokyo: 
Asiatic Society of Japan, 2008). Details from this paragraph come from Cooper’s translations of Vivero’s account. 
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 Santa Catalina's audience was a different matter. His group was brought to Ieyasu, and its 
audience with the elder Tokugawa was a solemn affair with no direct interaction.81 The party had 
waited two months for this meeting, during which time it bore the cost of its own 
accommodation.82 If a subsequent account is to be believed, the three clergymen paid four times 
the rate of the other Spaniards who arrived on the Bautista, presumably on account of being 
friars. When finally granted an audience, they presented their gifts with their faces to the ground. 
They retreated silently, not a single word spoken for greetings, questions, or negotiations, to say 
nothing of a conversation. Lower officials told them they must now attend the court of the 
"prince" in Edo to receive an official response. That response never came. One friar compared 
the ritual of their reception to that of the Dutch, noting the deep bow and lack of any verbal 
acknowledgement, in stark contrast to Vivero’s friendly chats with Ieyasu and Hidetada. The 
rules were changing, and the shogunate had no qualms treating the Spanish throne and its 
rebellious subjects on equal footing. 
 The shogunate closely monitored and controlled the embassy's movement during the 
entirety of its stay. Santa Catalina and his companions were placed under the supervision of 
Mukai Shōgen, the principal point of contact between Date and the shogunate regarding the 
construction and dispatch of the Bautista. The group moved among Sunpu, Edo, and Uraga as 
needs dictated, at one point having to stay onboard the docked Bautista for want of 
accommodation. Seeing the situation for hopeless, the trio petitioned to journey south and book 
passage on a ship bound for the Philippines. This request too was denied, and the friars felt more 
                                                             
81 Geography likely played a hand in deciding the order of audience as well. Vivero shipwrecked off the cost of 
present-day Chiba prefecture, northeast of Edo (Tokyo). He thus had to pass through Hidetada's seat in Edo to get to 
Ieyasu’s stronghold in Sunpu, now Shizuoka City. Santa Catalina arrived in the Bautista and docked in Uraga 
southwest of Edo, between the shogunal capital and Sunpu. 
82 DNS 12-12, CCXXI. Unless otherwise noted, details from Santa Catalina’s time in Japan stem from this source. 
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like prisoners than envoys. Eventually the embassy settled in Uraga, where the Spanish crew of 
the Bautista was being detained.83  
 The leash provided Vivero and Vizcaíno had been much longer. Vivero received 
permission to journey to Nagasaki in search of a vessel bound for the Philippines, and freedom 
of movement had been integral to Vizcaíno's mission and soundings in Japan. Where Vizcaíno 
sailed on his own ship, and Vivero traversed much of the country by land and sea, the three friars 
stayed under close supervision, at their own cost, their fate uncertain. The friar’s account gave 
little notice to the Spanish sailors, but it appears that they were also restricted to Uraga and kept 
close to the Bautista for the duration of their stay. The ship would not return with a letter, but to 
return at all it needed sailors capable of navigating to the Americas. 
 Adam Clulow has noted that “while Ieyasu was alive, no embassy was turned away and 
no letter left unanswered,” but he may have broken precedent if he had lived another six 
months.84 Philip's embassy arrived in August 1615, Ieyasu passed away in June 1616, and the 
embassy departed for New Spain in late September of that year. The elder Tokugawa did receive 
Santa Catalina and Philip's gifts in fall 1615, but then ordered the party to journey to Hidetada 
for a response. Ieyasu also proceeded to Edo to consult with his son, and the party learned that 
Hidetada was disinclined to receive Philip's gifts. Furthermore, Ieyasu was not pleased with 
those he had received, nor did he appreciate the choice of envoys. The elder Tokugawa “had 
been very upset that we [friars] carried [Philip’s] message, as he was working to expel all 
missionaries from the kingdom.”85 Hidetada rejected the gifts presented by the embassy on the 
                                                             
83 Ibid. 
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advice of his father. Eventually Ieyasu’s death became Hidetada's excuse for refusing to 
acknowledge the embassy. If the elder Tokugawa’s life in power had been spent exploring every 
door open to him, his death served as a pretense to define the types of diplomatic and 
commercial relationships the shogunate could condone under his son and successor. 
 Though neither Philip's letters nor his envoys pleased, they did provide a rationale for 
another commercial voyage to the Americas. The shogunate could have granted the friars' 
petition to journey south to Kyushu and from there depart the islands. Instead, the shogunate kept 
the embassy, Date’s ship, and its mixed crew under control near its base of power. Santa Catalina 
and his companions learned of the diplomatic pretexts masking commercial aspirations, and were 
told that their presence on the Bautista would help ensure a warm reception in New Spain.86 The 
friars were but one side of the coin; the Bautista would also be charged with returning Date’s 
representative to Japan.  
 As before Date’s ship would concurrently serve the daimyo’s commercial interests and 
the shogunate’s diplomatic agenda. In an additional gesture of diplomatic goodwill, the 
shogunate released two imprisoned friars for the voyage back to New Spain. The idea apparently 
stemmed from a warning by the original triumvirate of friars that Hidetada’s poor hospitality 
would do little to endear the Japanese to officials in New Spain. Santa Catalina's letter to the 
viceroy upon arriving in New Spain confirms that two additional friars made the voyage back 
into Spanish territory.87 The longer Spanish missive commented that the Japanese though this 
gesture sufficient to merit a hospitable welcome in Acapulco, and dismissed contravening 
Philip’s orders that no Spanish return to New Spain on a Japanese vessel. Japanese sources do 
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not elaborate, but the shogunate may have calculated that the return of Philip's envoys, the 
release of two prisoners, and the need to ferry Date's representatives back to Japan would be 
enough to avoid conflict, but still provide commercial opportunity. 
 That the Bautista's voyage served a commercial function is beyond dispute. The friars 
reported the ship bursting to the seams with cargo, and recorded a discussion with a Japanese 
merchant regarding transport in New Spain.88 The friars anxiously warned of Japanese intent to 
drain New Spain of silver. Date’s 1616 letters to secular and religious leaders dropped any talk 
of piety, and frankly spoke of merchants (商人, shōnin) filling the Bautista with cargo.89 The 
Date chike kiroku (伊達治家記録, Record of Date House Governance) recorded that in late 
September the Bautista departed for New Spain from Sakai, an important commercial port near 
Kyoto.90 Sailing from Sakai suggests that the shogunate had moved on from developing Uraga 
into a viable port for foreign commerce, and instead integrated the Bautista into existing 
networks. Finally, a contemporary Dutch source spoke where others were silent and reported that 
some portion of the cargo consisted of porcelain and lacquerware.91 
 The Tokugawa and Date coordinated on the Bautista's second voyage. Mukai Shōgen 
remained in contact with Date over the Bautista even as he took charge of Santa Catalina's party 
for the shogunate. Date announced to Mukai his intention to send the Bautista back to the 
Americas, and two Mukai retainers departed to aid Yokozawa and to no doubt to report on 
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events.92 The diary of a shogunate official even recorded that “Mukai Shōgen will soon send a 
ship [to New Spain]” without mentioning Date.93 The Tokugawa jikki (徳川実記) aligns with 
Date records, stating that "Date House retainer Yokozawa Shōgen proceeded to Nanban from 
Sakai harbor on a ship (便船). [The voyage] stems from [Date's] request."94 The daimyo’s 1616 
letters to the Spanish note that he had carried the shogunate's seal or license (朱印状, shuinjō) to 
send the Bautista to New Spain. This assertion departed from his 1613 letters referring to Ieyasu 
as “The Sovereign of Japan” (日本之帝王 Nihon no teiō-sama), but not mentioning Tokugawa 
credentials.95 The tradeoff between the explicit invoking of Tokugawa authority and pious 
rhetoric is clear. The daimyo announced that he traveled with a Tokugawa license, but spoke in 
more baldy commercial and transactional terms. In sum, the daimyo’s letters to the Spanish, the 
tone of those letters, and the ongoing collaboration with Mukai all demonstrate the support and 
sanction of the Tokugawa even after Ieyasu’s passing.  
 The Tokugawa seal did more than sanction the Bautista's second sailing; it defined the 
endeavor according to the shogunate's terms. The aforementioned diary, by the Buddhist monk 
Ishin Sūden (以心崇伝, 1569–1633), provides glimpse from the shogunate’s perspective. The 
monk served Ieyasu and Hidetada as a scribe and advisor, drafting the trading licenses issued to 
domestic and foreign merchants. He drafted the 1614 Christian prohibition over the course of a 
single evening at Ieyasu's behest.96 A compilation of those records and Sūden's commentary 
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survive today as the Ikoku nikki (異国日記, Register of Foreign Affairs), a critical source in the 
study of early Tokugawa foreign relations, as does Sūden's diary Honkō kokushi nikki (本光國師
日記, Chronicles of Master Honkō).97 
 In late July 1616, an official asked Sūden whether shuin seals had ever been issued for 
passage to New Spain.98 Sūden replied that while “seals for letters of correspondence” (音信之
書簡之御朱印, onshin no shokan no go-shuin) had been sent to New Spain, he did not recall 
sending “travel seals.” (渡海之御朱印, tokai no go-shuin, lit. “seals for crossing the sea”). The 
monk was then charged with drafting one, as Mukai—again, Date was not mentioned—prepared 
to dispatch a ship to New Spain. Sūden dutifully set about his task and delivered the appropriate 
seal. No extant copy remains, but the scribe’s template for such documents listed the date, 
destination, and name of the recipient.99 Sūden's brief description of the seal he drafted for New 
Spain conformed to this pattern. 
 This episode encapsulates an important shift from 1610, as the shogunate had gone from 
issuing an invitation to a foreign power to producing a license to trade for a domestic actor. The 
need for a trade license emerged from the erosion of diplomacy. The San Buena Ventura had not 
required one in 1610. Direct outreach by the Tokugawa precluded the need for any additional 
sanction. Repatriating the former Governor-General Vivero offered additional diplomatic 
currency. In 1613, the Bautista departed under similar circumstances despite being Date’s vessel. 
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The ship repatriated a recognized envoy (in this instance, Sebastián Vizcaíno) who carried 
Tokugawa letters to the viceroy of New Spain. Date thus facilitated the shogunate’s diplomacy, 
even as he attempted to reach farther on his own. In 1616 however, Date operated alone, at least 
officially. There were no Tokugawa letters to transport, and there was no recognized envoy to 
return. The Bautista transported Santa Catalina back to New Spain, but Hidetada had denied the 
group—and by extension, its sovereign—diplomatic standing. If Date wished to trade with New 
Spain, he would need a license to do so, just as a ship would need in order to trade in Macao, 
Manila, Annan, or any other port. In issuing the pass the shogunate accomplished two objectives 
in one stroke: it confirmed Tokugawa authority over Date for both the daimyo and the Spanish, 
and it denied Philip’s diplomatic legitimacy. Such passes proceeded from the expectation that 
local authorities would treat the vessel and its crew with the respect the shogunate's sanction 
merited. Rather than continue an unproductive conversation with Philip, the shogunate assumed 
the power to open up one of the king's ports to its own ship. 
 Additionally, the shogunate moved from engaging with Spanish authority (even from a 
dominant position) to simply asserting its own at the monarchy’s expense. The trade license 
Sūden drafted contradicted Philip's order against Japanese vessels entering Acapulco. Santa 
Catalina and his companions explained to their hosts that returning to New Spain on a Japanese 
vessel would render their live forfeit, only to be told that the sovereign of Japan willed it, so it 
would be done.100 Word of Philip's prohibition traveled to other foreign communities as well. 
Richard Cocks, the head of the English East India Company factory in Japan, reported that Philip 
had closed Acapulco to all Japanese well before the Bautista sailed back in defiance of those 
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orders.101 When Santa Catalina returned to New Spain battered and bruised from the journey, he 
asked not to be punished for his disobedience, coming as it did through coercion.102  
 For Hidetada the voyage was one more way to deny Philip’s authority, by incorporating 
Acapulco, however briefly, into the constellation of ports where the shogunate's expected its 
prerogative to be recognized and respected. The arrival of Philip’s long-awaited reply had only 
demonstrated to the Tokugawa that the Spanish monarch had little and less to say. Where the 
shogunate lacked a committed partner in Spain, it did have a willing domestic partner in Date. 
Hidetada and Date paid scant attention to Santa Catalina's protestations and dispatched the 
Bautista once more in pursuit of their own objectives: return the monarch's envoys (along with 
two more unwanted friars), retrieve Hasekura and Sotelo, and mount another commercial 
expedition to New Spain. By granting Date a trading pass, Hidetada ensured one more voyage to 
New Spain that did not require either an audience with Philip's envoys or a reply to their 
monarch. By now the prospect of regular voyages between Japan and the Americas must have 
seemed remote to all involved, but the shogunate and daimyo calculated that officials in New 
Spain would not harass or otherwise impede Date's vessel in New Spain. Thus, in 1616 the 
Bautista sailed with the explicit Tokugawa sanction it lacked in 1613, but those credentials 
assumed compliance with a Tokugawa order and left no room for conversation. 
 Santa Catalina and his companions reciprocated the impulse to reject further diplomatic 
ties. The last section of the group's report autopsied Spain's eroding relationship with the 
Tokugawa, and blamed tension on Japanese arrogance and low opinion of Spaniards. The author 
lamented that "the concept they have of us is that which we have of Indians or blacks,” chafing at 
                                                             
101 Richard Cocks to John Gourney, 1615.12.16. DNS 12-12, CCXXVI. 
102 DNS 12-12, CCXXXIII. 
Joshua Batts 
Ch. 3 – Submitting to Orders 
188 
 
the insult to Spanish pride while oblivious to his own condescension.103 He also noted that 
Hidetada’s morning had not prevented him from receiving presents from the Dutch and English, 
and that an English pilot held Ieyasu and Hidetada's ear, a clear reference to Will Adams. Ever 
thorough, the same report contained a translation and analysis of Ieyasu's response to the viceroy 
in 1612 as evidence of the shogunate's low opinion of Spain. It concluded by cataloging the 
crown's economic losses in Japan, including Hideyoshi's confiscation of a vessel in 1596, the 
confiscation of much of the merchandise on Vivero's wrecked San Francisco in 1609, and even 
struggles by current sailors on the Bautista to receive fair payment for the precious few goods 
they had available to sell.104 The report either did not recognize or ignored the commercial 
importance of regular trade between Japan and Manila.  
 To remedy Japan’s mistreatment and condescension, "for reasons of religion as well as 
reasons of state," the author recommended prohibiting Spaniards traveling to Japan and Japanese 
traveling to Spanish territories. Cutting off contact would finally dispel the rumor that Christian 
missionaries in Japan worked to overthrow the political order. The missionary author contended 
that the situation could get no worse, as Christianity was prohibited throughout the country, 
"even in the lands of the lord who sent a mission to Spain.”105 In the author’s view, ceasing trade 
would force Japan to recognize its economic dependence on Spain and bring the country to heel. 
Once the Japanese were cowed, Spain could dictate terms favorable to trade, missionaries, and 
                                                             
103 DNS 12-12, CCXXI. Likewise for the remainder of this paragraph and the next, unless otherwise noted. 
104 The anonymous author noted that what the sailors had to sell was cloth, likely Spanish wool or silk textiles that 
had been imported into New Spain. This section of the report also includes an anecdote on the travails of a Spanish 
merchant based in the Philippines who was first cheated and then denied justice in a transaction involving silver. 
105 This was one of the few times the report mentioned Date, obliquely or otherwise. 
Joshua Batts 
Ch. 3 – Submitting to Orders 
189 
 
conversion. The author predicted that a ban of “a few years” would suffice to bring about the 
desired change in Japan’s attitude. 
 The mistaken assumption that Japan needed Spain (or more precisely, the Philippines) 
guided this series of warnings and recommendations. The Santa Catalina embassy report was but 
one voice grappling with the question of how to manage Spain's relationship with Tokugawa 
Japan. Not everyone shared its faith that severing connections would ensure swift resolution in 
the monarchy’s favor. Relations with Japan also touched on "domestic" issues, namely the place 
of the Philippines within the Spanish empire and their relationship with powerful neighbors in 
East Asia. The repeated appearance of Japanese vessels in Acapulco harbor brought the issue to 
fore by temporarily transforming Acapulco into a port of call for a major power in Asia against 
Spain’s wishes. The shogunate's trans-Pacific experimentation raised the issue of who needed 
whom, in what capacity and to what end. This debate continued upon the Bautista’s return to 
Acapulco in early 1617, to be explored in the following chapter. 
Containing and Dismissing Gentlemen from Afar 
 Piety cuts both ways. Where the mission attempted to use devotion and its attendant 
rituals as a means to negotiate concessions, Philip's councilors used the mission's stated faith to 
render it diplomatically inert. The king granted Hasekura leave to go Rome over the objections 
of his Council, but instructed his ambassador in Rome to treat the party as “foreign peoples from 
somewhere very far away” rather than as ambassadors empowered to settle matters of state.106 
The king would sponsor pilgrims, but he would not condone petitioning a separate sovereign on 
matters already decided.  
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 The Spanish monarchy countered Sotelo and Hasekura’s efforts to catch the pope's ear by 
getting in touch first. The king sent word ahead to the Spanish ambassador in Rome, Conde de 
Castro, briefing Castro on the mission's requests and the monarchy’s response. Thus informed, 
the ambassador could advise the papacy on Spain’s positions and trust the Holy Father to act 
accordingly. The king instructed that “in the event they propose or petition His Holiness on 
something of these points [concerning trade, support of the Japan mission, etc.], you are to 
impede them by prudent means.” The instructions also noted that the group had not come “with 
the order of the emperor but that of the said king of Ōshū (Date).” The party’s business should 
therefore touch on “the spiritual well-being of their souls but not on the matters of government.” 
Pilgrimage to Rome and matters of state would not be allowed to collapse into each other as the 
mission had planned. The instructions in effect neutered the mission by rendering its leaders 
private, albeit devout, individuals, rather than accredited ambassadors.107 
 Logistics and communication worked in the crown's favor. A letter penned in Madrid 
reached the ambassador three weeks later, allowing the crown to guide events more quickly, and 
efficiently than in the multi-year timeline inherent to communication with the Philippines. The 
Vatican Secret Archive today contains copies of Philip's correspondence with Ambassador 
Castro during this time, as well as the embassy’s request to the monarch and his response.108 It 
appears Castro forwarded or copied these letters for the Cardinal Borghese, and they remain 
among the latter’s papers today. The cardinal, a prominent figure in the records of the embassy’s 
                                                             
107 All quotes from Philip III to Conde de Castro, 1615.09.20. DNS 12-12, XCVI. This letter copies much of the text 
and sentiment of the Council of the Indies consulta that month (see above).  
108 Manuscript copies of most sources cited in this section are split between the holdings of the Fondo Borghese and 
Segr. Stato, Spagna. 
Joshua Batts 
Ch. 3 – Submitting to Orders 
191 
 
time in Rome, helped host the party with full knowledge of its hopes and the Spanish court’s 
expectations. 
 The summary of requests and response encapsulated the monarchy’s position: token 
support for the mission's spiritual pretensions while shelving anything requiring concerted 
action, especially on the issue of trade. An internal document drafted for brevity and clarity, it 
succinctly articulates Philip’s final position on matters the Council of the Indies had debated that 
year, cited earlier in the chapter. I paraphrase the seven requests and their respective responses 
[in brackets] below: 
1. Permission to go to Rome. [Granted.] 
2. Creation of more bishoprics beyond those controlled by the crown of Portugal. [The 
matter can be reviewed once the mission returns to Japan and reports on the state of 
Christianity there, including numbers of converts and their location.] 
3. Dispatch of as many Franciscan missionaries as possible to Japan, with Date 
assuming responsibility for the cost of their passage from New Spain. [Up to 20 
Franciscans to be sent from the Philippines at the discretion of the Governor-General 
of the Philippines and the Archbishop of Manila.] 
4. Funds for wine, books, clothes, medicine, altarpieces and other supplies for the 
mission in Ōshū. [2000 ducats granted for this purpose, the funding split between 
accounts in Spain and the Philippines.] 
5. Provisions for a seminary and lodgings for Japanese catechists. [Denied, as there is no 
way of determining the cost.] 
6. Permission for King of Ōshū to send ships to New Spain and trade there, and to be 
able to employ Spanish pilots and mariners for the trip. [Will wait to see that all in 
Japan agree to this in a manner the king (of Spain) can permit. As a precondition, 
Japan must completely cut off contact with Dutch.] 
7. Supplies for trip to and return from Rome. [4000 ducats granted.]109 
 
 The monarchy pushed any lasting decisions into an indefinite future, and most 
commitments were predicated on the embassy’s return to Japan. It wanted to discourage further 
entanglements with the “King of Ōshū” and provide incentive for the swift departure of his 
embassy. An additional twenty missionaries would be sent, but from the Philippines, obviating 
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Date’s involvement in transporting them. Even that number was left to the discretion of authorities 
in Manila, thereby absolving the crown of any firm commitment. The monarchy required a report 
from Japan to evaluate the prospect of additional bishoprics. 
 Similarly, the monarchy did nothing to encourage traffic between New Spain and 
northeastern Japan. Trade might be considered "when all in Japan were in agreement," a hint that 
Philip remained unconvinced that the Tokugawa and Date were in agreement, regardless of the 
shogunate's known interest in commercial and technological exchange with New Spain. The 
injunction that all in Japan agree to trade in a manner the king might permit referenced the 
deteriorating state of Christianity, and doubts that Date's welcome outweighed Tokugawa 
hostility. Similarly, requiring the missionaries depart from the Philippines emphasized that 
Manila remained the accepted gateway to Japan.  
 The clause on trade also highlighted Dutch activities in Asia, and the complications they 
posed for the monarchy's commercial relationship with Japan. Although the document spoke 
cryptically about authorities in Japan needing to be in agreement, it unequivocally stated that 
expanded trade depended on the archipelago cutting all ties with the Dutch. Hirakawa Arata has 
summarized the impasse between Japan and Spain as one of conflicting preconditions: Japan 
making trade a precondition to tolerating missionaries, Spain making the tolerance of 
missionaries a precondition to trade.110 The Spanish monarchy's stance here states a further 
precondition regarding the Dutch, a consistent demand over the course of its patchwork 
negotiations with the Tokugawa and its handling of Date's mission. Vivero tried to make Dutch 
expulsion a condition of bringing miners over from New Spain when negotiating with the 
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shogunate in 1609. Four years later Sotelo argued for the carrot over the stick, writing that 
stronger commercial relations with Spain would build goodwill with the Tokugawa and check 
Dutch advances in the area. Neither man successfully lobbied the Spanish court, but the 
monarchy and its subject all agreed on the Dutch threat even if their responses differed.  
 Philip had the Dutch on his mind when he permitted the mission's journey to Rome. 
Writing to overrule his Council earlier in the year, the king noted that "among the other positive 
effects that could be obtained [from the mission traveling to Rome] is that the heretics see that 
when they do not heed the pope, [others] come from great distances to prostrate themselves at his 
feet."111 In 1615, the most problematic "heretics" were the Dutch, and the king’s note closed by 
stating that trade between Japan and New Spain required their expulsion. The same language 
resurfaced in the memorial above. Philip also assigned symbolic importance to having Hasekura 
in Rome, a venture requiring little follow-up outside of Europe. The king granted only 2000 
ducats to provision of the mission in Date's domain, but allotted the full 4000 ducats requested 
by Sotelo for the trip to Rome. Thus the monarchy committed twice the amount of resources to 
sending Hasekura to Rome than it did to provisioning the religious mission in northeastern 
Japan, on whose behalf Date had nominally sent his retainer in the first place. 
 Following the party’s grand entrance and cheery reception in Rome, in January 1616 the 
papacy issued its own response to Sotelo and Hasekura’s lobbying. The Spanish monarchy’s 
advance outreach proved effective, as the pontiff aligned with or deferred to the Catholic King 
on the core issues. Paul V agreed that appointing a new bishop required further deliberation, and 
could not be decided before Date's mission returned. He reached this decision in consultation 
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with the Holy Congregation, an advisory organ of the papacy. The body sympathized with the 
need for additional bishops to oversee Japan's Christian community but tabled the issue, citing 
the need for more information on the state of affairs in Japan, the lack of any request from Spain 
for a new bishop, and Sotelo's own reports of persecution. On trade, the pontiff offered to bounce 
the party’s request back to Spain. Dispatching additional missionaries to Japan also required 
coordination with the Spanish crown, as any missionaries would depart from Spanish territory. 
The papacy advised its nuncio in Madrid of these decisions, ensuring that nothing would be done 
without the consultation or approval of the Spanish monarchy. As Philip had already staked out 
his position, any remaining hope of ships, goods, and missionaries traveling regularly between 
New Spain and Date's domain dissipated.112 
 Paul V also proved ambivalent towards the embassy’s requests for favor more clearly 
within the pontiff’s sole prerogative. The group had not been shy, and their petitions went far 
beyond the seven articles the Spanish court summarized for the papacy cited above. The party 
asked that Date be granted the blessed sword and hat, regalia presented to Catholic monarchs in 
recognition of their defense of the faith. It requested the pope to grant Date permission to found a 
holy order of knights. Echoing their earlier request to Philip that Hasekura be inducted into the 
order of Santiago, here the mission requested Hasekura and his descendants be granted 
knighthood and noble investiture by the papacy as counts palatine (Conte Palatino). Other 
requests made by those associated with the party included naming an archbishop for Japan, 
providing a pension for the mission's scribe Scipione Amati, and sainthood for the martyrs in 
Japan. The pope refused to honor Date as a Catholic king, citing the obvious fact that he had yet 
to convert. Paul V reluctantly agreed to invest Hasekura as requested, but would do so in a 
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private ceremony.113 Finally, he refused Amati his pension, ruled that Japan needed more bishops 
before it could have an archbishop, and declared that the canonization of martyrs could be 
investigated if the missionaries of Japan desired it.114 
 These disparate favors and the response to them demonstrate the limits of Sotelo's 
strategy to secure concessions through piety. It is difficult to believe that all of these varied 
petitions—notably investing Date as a Catholic monarch and protector of the faith—were made 
with the expectation that they would be granted. Sotelo sought to engage with the authority of 
the pope and the king on as many planes as possible in order to establish connections that might 
translate into concrete material support. But his interlocutors would only go so far. Paul and 
Philip were amenable to receiving or bearing witness to Hasekura's personal acts of faith and 
humbling himself—and by extension, his mysterious lord—before the established religious-
political order in Catholic Europe. They were also pleased to receive a visitor from so far away, 
especially one professing love for the Catholic God at a time when Europe remained wracked by 
religious tension. Philip witnessed Hasekura's baptism and hosted the party in Madrid, even 
though the king harbored little interest in treating with the "king" who sent them. Philip’s policy 
here reflected Varte’s (the head of the Casa de Contratación) advice to receive the embassy as a 
means to burnish the glory of the monarchy. In turn Paul V honored the “ambassador from 
Japan” with entrances and audiences, and the senate invested him as a citizen of the Eternal City.  
 Nevertheless, both Catholic sovereigns balked at the idea of honoring the mission or its 
patron in ways that integrated Hasekura or Date into meaningful institutional structures. Hence 
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Philip rejecting out of hand Hasekura's membership in the Order of Santiago, and the pope's 
refusal of the blessed cap and hat, among other honors. They would sponsor the pilgrim, and 
even host the ambassador, but they would not bind themselves to a polity half a world away, 
whose power, sovereignty, and motivations remained contested and ambiguous. Hasekura's 
professed faith in God could not overcome Philip's lack of faith in Date.  
 Date never obtained the requisite political or spiritual credentials to satisfy the Catholic 
King and the Holy Father despite the embassy’s willing participation in political and religious 
theater. In Rome, the embassy could never get around Date's unrealized conversion. The pope 
wrote a reply to Date in December 1615 that was suitably grandiose and good-willed, but also 
discussed Date’s spiritual life, enjoining the daimyo to build a Christian kingdom and to 
convert.115 Hasekura's faith could not stand in fully as a proxy for Date’s potential faith. 
Although the pope gave Hasekura a warm welcome, he did not celebrate mass with the embassy, 
again on account of the (lack of) faith of its patron.116 The pontiff imposed some distance, 
deferring to Spain on secular matters and denying Date the honors reserved for Catholic 
monarchs even as he welcomed the daimyo’s retainer.  
 For Philip, the daimyo was never quite sovereign enough, one of many kings in a land 
ruled by an "emperor." This subordinate status automatically disqualified his representatives 
from establishing commercial relations. Spain recognized Date's domain of "Voxu" as a kingdom 
subject to the paramount leadership of the Tokugawa, just as the Spanish monarchy ruled a 
                                                             
115 Pope Paul V to Date Masamune, 1615.12.27. DNS 12-12, CL. See also SDS, doc. 236. 
116 Gonoi, Hasekura, 148–49. 
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composite conglomeration of "kingdoms" in Europe and the Indies.117 The events of the Keichō 
Embassy demonstrate just how vigorously the crown attempted to regulate trade among its 
kingdoms. New Spain was not permitted to decide its own foreign trade policy, for example. 
Extending this logic outward, negotiating trade with Date without the express approval of the 
Tokugawa was a non-starter, the equivalent of allowing the viceroyalties of Peru or New Spain 
the leeway to decide Spain’s trade policy with Ming China. 
 The politics of piety in Spain and Italy did not solve the embassy’s problems. It is 
unlikely that even a fervently Catholic "king" from northern Japan could have secured the 
support and concessions Date pursued. Accusations that Date sought trade more than God landed 
with too much authority, and Sotelo's claims that the daimyo would provide for lay Christians 
and missionaries landed with all too little. Date could not be dismissed, but neither could he be 
treated as an equal partner or sovereign servant of the Lord. 
 The Keichō Embassy departed Rome in January 1616 aware that ceremony had not 
translated into results. Sotelo's letters to Philip on the return voyage from Italy spoke in glowing 
terms of their reception in Rome, but the Spanish ambassador painted a different picture. Castro 
reported that although the group had accorded itself well “the friar” (Sotelo) was not satisfied 
with the results of its petitions.118 Nor were the king’s councils satisfied with the friar's conduct 
when they learned of his attempts to involve the pope on issues Philip had already decided. The 
Council of the Indies recommended that the superiors in the Franciscan order reprimand him for 
                                                             
117 “Kingdoms” (reinos) was the term favored by the monarchy for areas we now commonly refer to as colonies. 
Even in Europe, Spain was a composite of kingdoms: Castile, Leon, Aragon, Portugal, etc. Many of these had their 
own viceroys, serving as the template for the viceroyalties in the Americas.  
118 Conde de Castro to Philip III, 1616.01.09. DNS 12-12, CLVIII. 
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working against the crown's interests.119 Both Indies and State wanted to send the mission back 
to Japan as quickly as possible—as had been their desire a year prior, but Sotelo and Hasekura 
were in no hurry to return empty-handed. Indies expected them gone on the summer 1616 flota 
to the Americas. A large portion of the party left, but the principals remained in the outskirts of 
Seville. Sotelo and Hasekura claimed that the latter had fallen ill, while reiterating their wish to 
obtain a formal letter from Philip to Date. The newfound frailty of both men continued when 
Sotelo broke his leg in spring 1617, and petitioned to remain in Europe yet another year to no 
avail.120 Having put off a return in 1615 and 1616, the group finally sailed for New Spain in 
summer 1617.121 By this time, the Council of the Indies had ordered officials in no uncertain 
terms to get Hasekura on a boat, whether Sotelo accompanied him or not.122 
 During this second, frostier tenure in Spain the mission's rhetorical strategy reverted back 
to political punditry, but this time by abandoning the Tokugawa shogunate rather than by 
drawing on its credibility. Faith still mattered, but now a larger, direr story of Christianity under 
siege came to outweigh rhetorically the narrative of the personal submission and conversion of 
one Japanese retainer. The news from the archipelago trickling into Spain in 1616 and 1617 
accounted for this strategic shift. The prohibition of Christianity and fall of Osaka occurred while 
the Keichō Embassy was abroad, and Sotelo futilely tried to spin these events in the mission's 
                                                             
119 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1616.04.16. DNS 12-12, CLXXVIII. 
120 For Hasekura’s illness, Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1616.08.27. DNS 12-12, CLXXXIII. For Sotelo’s leg, 
Sotelo to Philip III, 1617.04.20. DNS 12-12, CXC. Hasekura had earlier fallen ill on the return voyage from Rome, 
necessitating a stop in Genoa. Sotelo wrote the monarchy with news, and a request for more funds. See Sotelo to 
Philip III, 1616.02.08. DNS 12-12, CLXXIV. 
121 For the request to delay again, see Memorial of Father Sotelo and Hasekura (1617), DNS 12-12, CXCVII. Gonoi 
writes that the group departed in July 1617. See Gonoi, Hasekura, 202. All but a half-dozen or so of the party left on 
the 1616 flota. The decision reduced expenses, a necessity now that the group no longer received a royal stipend. 
Barred from Madrid, Sotelo and Hasekura spent their last year in a Franciscan monastery just outside of Seville. 
122 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1617.06.16. DNS 12-12, CXCVI. 
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favor.123 Sotelo’s missives and Hasekura's translated letters reported that Ōshū had become a 
haven for the archipelago's Christian community, and that Date stood as the lone lord still 
welcoming of the faith.124 But the flock needed shepherds, and with the rest of Japan now hostile 
territory, the only way to dispatch missionaries was via the direct ocean route between Date’s 
“kingdom” and New Spain. These last desperate memorials explicitly tied the success of Date’s 
mission to the future of the Catholic mission in Japan. 
 The pair’s urgency fell on deaf ears in the Spanish monarchy’s councils, which had 
learned to flavor Sotelo's words liberally with salt. By now the duo was nearly four years 
removed from being in Japan during a tumultuous time for Spanish interests in the archipelago, 
to say nothing of the embassy’s obvious partisanship. For the monarchy, escalated hostility and 
the expulsion of missionaries reaffirmed the need to move with caution rather than exposing 
New Spain directly to the vicissitudes of the Japanese political mood as it was imprecisely 
understood in Madrid.  
 In almost three years in Europe, Date's mission tried to graft itself to the sovereignty of 
the Tokugawa, the authority of God, and the potential of Japan's would-be Christian king. None 
had proved viable. In 1617, the embassy did finally receive a formal response from Philip III 
addressed to Date. Even this was a concession. The monarchy had actually drafted the letter in 
1616, but intended to relinquish it to the party only in the Philippines as an additional impetus for 
the group to leave. Instead Sotelo and Hasekura had used the lack of a letter as an excuse to stay. 
Meant as a sop to the party and its sponsor, the letter was friendly but its contents were short and 
                                                             
123 Ieyasu passed away during this time, but it does not appear that this news reached the embassy before it departed 
Europe. Sotelo and Hasekura would later comment on this development from New Spain. See Chapter 4. 
124 DNS 12-12, CXC (cited above); Hasekura to the Philip III. DNS 12-12, CXCI. The latter is in Spanish, 
undoubtedly written with Sotelo’s considerable aid and input. 
Joshua Batts 
Ch. 3 – Submitting to Orders 
200 
 
empty relative to group’s original expectations. The king spoke of his pleasure in receiving 
Hasekura and thanked Date for the kindness he offered Philip's vassals, but flicked away Date's 
requests for missionaries, mariners, and trade. The party had their letter, but when they left that 
summer their boons remained firmly in the realm of the spiritual and symbolic, their submission 
having been met with thanks, but not support. 
 The empty letter was the product of a harsh internal autopsy. Both documents were 
authored by the President of the Council of the Indies, and former viceroy of New Spain, the 
Marqués de Salinas. The monarchy had asked Salinas to advise it on the merits of replying to 
Date with a formal letter and granting the embassy money to purchase gifts for their sponsor. 
Salinas responded that they could have their letter, but that the monarchy need not devote any 
more funds to mission, “for [Spain] has amply fulfilled [any financial obligation] to this Japanese 
without having any duty to him [aside from his] being a stranger come from somewhere very 
[far] away.” The council President went on, listing the incurred expenses already devoted to a 
group “whose coming has been with such little foundation and of so little importance.” Salinas 
had downgraded Hasekura from an ambassador to simply “this Japanese,” and defined the entire 
mission as a frivolous and expensive waste of resources. 125 
 Salinas was both right and wrong. Neither the embassy nor its hosts were satisfied. The 
former failed to secure any part of its core mandate, and the latter resented the imposition of 
hosting and sponsoring a Japanese embassy without the clear sanction of the ruler of the Japan. 
But the monarchy had made of a point of denying the embassy any real status. Furthermore, as 
an event, the embassy had spurred substantive developments vis-à-vis the Spanish monarchy’s 
                                                             
125 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1616.06.04. DNS 12-12, CLXXX. The monarchy’s request in turn stemmed from 
memorials from the embassy on these points.  
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policy toward Tokugawa Japan. The Keichō embassy had clarified the conceptual distance and 
priority differences between the apex authorities of the two polities. Finally, the king and the 
pope readily used the spectacle of “this Japanese” to asset the appeal of their faith and their own 
roles as the secular and spiritual stewards of that faith. Paul V incorporated the embassy into a 
fresco cycle commemorating other recent visitors and figures from afar—Persia and Kongo 
among them—as part of the pope’s vision for a global church.126  
 Philip III’s vision was also global, and the Habsburg king perhaps engaged with and 
attempted to rule over more locales than any other monarch to that point in world history. Yet the 
deliberations over, response to, and ultimate dismissal of the Keichō Embassy reveal just how 
circumscribed and delineated Spain’s expansionist vision could be in practice. So the monarch 
supported the ceremonies that reinforced the Catholic faith and colonial rule, but demurred from 
the outreach premised on partnership, or at least equivalence, across the Pacific Ocean. A 
similar, if more overtly hostile, dynamic played out in Japan as the Tokugawa rejected an 
embassy that asked too much, offered too little, and represented potential threat to the 
shogunate’s own sense of control. 
 Salinas’ judgments and Philip’s orders aside, there remained the practical matter of 
shutting down the Japanese trade. Even as Ieyasu’s heir spurned Philip’s gifts, he authorized the 
Bautista to venture unbidden to Acapulco once more. Once back in the Americas, the vessel 
would reveal the tensions inherent to a composite empire stretched across the globe. Salinas’ 
replacement as viceroy would look to thread a needle, shutting down Japan’s route to New Spain 
without damaging the commercial livelihood of the Philippines. In dealing with the Bautista, 
                                                             
126 See Fujikawa, “Pope Paul V’s Global Design,” (2016). 
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officials in Acapulco and Mexico would attempt to define Japanese-Spanish relations on both 
sides of the Pacific, with decidedly mixed results. 
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4. The Gate Ajar 
The San Juan Bautista set out on its second and final voyage from Japan to New Spain 
early in the fall of 1616, departing Uraga on 30 September.  It was the fourth attempt to send a 
ship from Japan to the Americas in six years, and would be the third successful crossing. Date 
Masamune tasked his vessel with retrieving Hasekura and Sotelo, but also loaded down the 500-
ton galleon with cargo. The vessel’s appearance was yet another disruption and potential threat 
to Spanish control over its goods, its subjects, and the networks connecting them.  
In countering that threat, representatives from Manila, Mexico, and Madrid engaged in a 
Pacific calculus aimed at rebuffing Japanese expansion with minimal disruption to the 
monarchy’s existing intra-colonial trade. At the center of this stood Viceroy of New Spain and 
Marqués de Guadalcázar, Diego Fernández de Córdoba (hereafter Guadalcázar). The viceroy 
received orders from his sovereign across one ocean, and heard petitions from an official who 
had crossed the other, and the two were not always in agreement.  
The Bautista’s return spurred an ad hoc policy of obstruction mixed with concessions, 
meant to discourage further commerce without unduly antagonizing its sponsors. This required a 
delicate balance, resisting but not refusing requests to expand the commercial relations of New 
Spain, while working to protect the economic life of the Philippines and the islands’ relationship 
to its powerful Japanese neighbor. The tension between Japanese and Spanish interests, as well 
the tension among differing nodes of the monarchy’s overseas empire, came to the forefront on 
the issue of customs. However, even as he granted the Japanese a tax break, Guadalcázar looked 
to ensure no other Japanese vessel would follow in the Bautista’s wake. 
This chapter explores the concrete measures adopted by Spanish officials to rid 
themselves of the Bautista and the Japanese incursion it represented. The vessel remained in 
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New Spain over a year, during which time officials debated what could be traded, whether or not 
it could be taxed, the makeup of the Baustista´s crew, the ship´s final destination, and its 
ownership. Hasekura and Sotelo joined the proceedings from fall 1617, and pursued yet another 
round of petition in an atmosphere of distrust. In this last gambit to solicit on Date´s behalf, and 
in response to Ieyasu´s death, the embassy completely abandoned any appeal to Tokugawa 
authority. Philip III weighed in at a distance, only able to do so once while the Bautista anchored 
in Acapulco. This left Guadalcázar in charge of deciding the response to the vessel on the 
ground. He did so with the input of a representative of Spanish Manila, who took the side of the 
Japanese party in lobbying against levying customs on Date´s ship. 
I contextualize these events within the ongoing debate on the Philippines’ role in Spanish 
Asia and the Spanish empire, two interrelated but distinct spheres. The Spanish Habsburgs 
controlled the viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru, the Philippines, and Macau, and memorials 
from all of these locations weighed in on how to structure their relations with one another and 
organize their interactions with Asia polities, particularly China and Japan. Debate on these 
issues would continue long after the Bautista sailed away, but Spain committed itself to 
maintenance of the status quo, leaving the Philippines as the only destination for American silver 
and the primary Spanish outpost permitted to trade with Asia. The monarchy’s agents in the 
Pacific would then struggle to apply this status quo to Japan, whose leadership showed little 
interest in adhering to Spain’s vision. 
 The Bautista arrived leaden with contradictions. The ship carried Date’s friendly letters, 
announcing gifts, and requesting commerce, pilots, and sailors. Yet the vessel counted among its 
cargo Philip’s own gifts, rejected by the Tokugawa shogunate, and numbered among its 
passengers the monarch’s representatives, who reported a cold reception and poor treatment at 
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the hands of their hosts in Japan. The Bautista carried the expressed good intentions of a regional 
leader, yet brought proof of the increased hostility of the archipelago’s central authority. The 
mixed messages presented by the Bautista did little to assuage this concern, and again raised 
questions of who exactly he represented and how much his benefactor could be trusted. 
The Bautista’s second anchoring in Acapulco, the third arrival of a Japanese ship to a 
port in New Spain that decade, brought these concerns to a head. In the course of deciding how 
best to handle the ship’s return, king and viceroy together adopted policies that restricted the 
flow of silver, the movement of subjects, and access to ports. A similar program of constrictive 
polices carried out by the Tokugawa in the ensuing decades have laid the foundation for a 
narrative of Japanese insularity; the Bautista’s sojourn in New Spain encourages us to question 
the typically unilateral character of this assignation. 
Contrasting Visions for the Philippines, 1610–1620 
 The Philippines presented a persistent challenge to the logistical capacity and authority of 
the Spanish empire. Since 1565 the Spanish settlement in the islands—principally on the 
northern island of Luzon—connected American silver to the silks sold by the Chinese merchant 
diaspora. The islands also served as a way-point for Japanese merchants, who had their own 
supply of silver to exchange for Chinese silks. Trade grew steadily, and thousands of Chinese 
were active in and around Manila in the seventeenth century.1 The silver, however, came but 
once a year from the Americas. The “Manila Galleons,” or China Ships, as they were fittingly 
called in Spanish America, developed an annual rhythm. Ships departed Acapulco in early 
spring, sailing westward just north of the equator. They would arrive in the Philippines three or 
four months later. The eastern crossing out of Manila was usually attempted in late June or July, 
                                                             
1 William Lytle Schurz, The Manila Galleon (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1939), 80–81. 
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during the summer monsoon. To sail east, the returning ship first ventured north, eventually 
riding the Kuroshio Current along Japan’s Pacific coast before turning east at between thirty to 
forty degrees latitude. The ships turned south once they sighted the coast of New Spain (often 
present-day California) and arrived in Acapulco up to half a year after their departure.2 This 
silver thread stretched taunt over the ocean granted the Spanish Philippines access to Asian trade, 
but the islands remained dependent on the good graces of their powerful neighbors and the 
uneven trickle of men, material, and provisions dispatched by the court and the Viceroyalty of 
New Spain. 
 Despite keen demand in America for the silks and other goods brought back to Acapulco 
each year, the length of the voyage, the dangers involved, and most importantly, the monarchy's 
desire to maintain control of the trade, limited the volume of Spanish traffic. Both Philip II (r. 
1556–1598) and his son and successor Philip III (r. 1598–1621) attempted to control commerce 
between New Spain and its dependency across the waters. Their regulations are recorded in the 
Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias, compiled in the late seventeenth century.3  The elder 
Philip’s edicts date to the early 1590s.  In 1591 he forbade every American territory outside of 
New Spain (i.e. Peru, Tierrafirme, Guatemala) from trade with either the Philippines or China.4 
He restricted the volume of trade in 1593, ordering that goods shipped from the Philippines not 
exceed 250,000 pesos and limited the principal and profit that could be sent back to the islands to 
                                                             
2 Schurz, The Manila Galleon, chaps. 6 (216–250) and 7 (251–283), describes the route and its vicissitudes in detail. 
3 The Recopilacion was published in 1680, and spans two hundred and eighteen chapters across nine volumes. All 
laws cited here are from chapter forty-five of the ninth volume, “De la navegacion, y comercio de las Islas Filipinas, 
Chinas, Nueva, España, y Perú.” Here I note the law number in parentheses. Blair and Robertson provide an English 
translation in volume XVII of The Philippines Islands. 
4 The Philippine Islands were administered as part of the Viceroyalty of New Spain. However, Spanish sources often 
spoke of commerce and trade between "Nueva Espana" and "Las Filipinas," and I follow that usage here. 
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500,000 (Law VI). The crown consistently sought to curtail the flow of precious metals out of 
New Spain, decreeing the same year that no more than half of the 500,000-peso allotment be sent 
as "tipusque" (a coin of gold mixed with copper), and less than a third sent back in gold. Philip II 
also set the number of annual vessels to two ships with no more than 300 tons of capacity each, 
with a third ship held in reserve. Furthermore, no goods from the Philippines, especially Chinese 
silk, were permitted in any other part of the Indies, though they were allowed in peninsular Spain 
(Law XV).  
Philip III reissued the edicts of his father and added his own a decade later. In 1604, he 
ordered officials in Acapulco to keep a strict account of everything sent to the Philippines (Law 
XVI), while all goods arriving from the islands were to be inspected by the official treasury there 
and again in Mexico (Law LX). In order to avoid the undue loss of ships to storm or enemy, 
vessels were not be loaded beyond their intended capacity (Law XVII). The king issued multiple 
decrees forbidding the buying and selling of Chinese cloth in Peru specifically, outlining the 
punishments for transgressors and ordering that an auditor of the viceroyalty ensure enforcement 
(Law LXIX & LXXVI). In an example of micro-managing par excellence, Philip ordered that 
each sailor take no more clothes than were absolutely necessary for the voyage (Law LII). 
 These restrictions on the number and size of ships, the type and quantity of cargo, and the 
flow of Chinese textiles suggest the crown's porous control over the trade between the 
Philippines and the Americas at the turn of the seventeenth century. Smuggling was rampant. 
Given its clandestine nature, the volume of illicit trade can only be estimated, but the persistence 
of laws censuring the practice suggests an ongoing problem and consistent official concern.5 The 
                                                             
5 John J. Tepaske put the amount of illicit trade at roughly ten times the legal volume around the turn of the 
seventeenth century, equating to about 128,000 kg per annum. See Tepaske, “New World Silver, Castile and the 
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contraband trade in Chinese silks smuggled from New Spain south to Peru was so bad that by 
1636 Philip IV (r. 1621–1665) had issued a full ban on all commerce between the Viceroyalties 
of Peru and New Spain to staunch the flow (Law LXXVIII).6 The declared guidelines for the size 
of the galleons were also a far cry from reality. Philip III reissued his father's decree limiting 
each vessel to three hundred tons in 1604, but in the early 1600s the galleons displaced 1,000 
tons, with some climbing up to 2,000.7 
 The arrival of Japanese vessels and the implications of trade between the archipelago and 
New Spain become clearer in this context. The first ship from Japan, the San Buena Ventura, 
arrived in Acapulco on October 27th, 1610. It returned the former governor-general of the 
Philippines Don Rodrigo de Vivero, who had shipwrecked in Japan in 1609 on his way back 
from the Philippines. The 120-ton Buena Ventura also carried a party of twenty-three Japanese 
merchants, some from around Kyoto.8 Date sponsored construction of the Bautista three years 
later together with help from stranded Spaniards and input from Tokugawa representatives. The 
vessel displaced roughly 500 tons, and departed Date’s domain of Ōshū in northeastern Honshu 
in late October of 1613. It transported one hundred and eighty passengers, including Date’s 
ambassadorial legation, Spanish sailors, and once again, a contingent of Japanese merchants.9 
                                                             
Philippines, 1590-1800,” in Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, edited by John 
Richards (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1983), 435-6.  
6 Notation in the margins gives five ratification dates between 1604 and 1636. As Blair and Roberston point out, the 
final text of the prohibition mentions Viceroy Luis Jerónimo de Cabrera, who did not assume his post until 1629. 
The law was thus amended over time, though something like a full prohibition may have existed earlier.  
7 Schurz, Manila Galleon, 194. 
8 For the Buena Ventura’s voyage, see Takashi Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2003), 
32. 
9 Ibid., 52-55. 
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After completing its initial roundtrip, Date sent the ship to Acapulco a second time in 1616, 
again laden with a mix of merchants, sailors, and cargo. 
 All told, a Japanese vessel had arrived three times in the span of seven years at the 
empire's single American gateway to the commerce of East Asia, on the same cyclical route the 
Spanish themselves sailed but once a year. The second ship quadrupled the capacity of the first, 
and by itself represented roughly eighty percent of the cargo space permitted by the king's own 
decree a decade ago, lax enforcement notwithstanding. The vessels came and went from a place 
well beyond the control of Spanish authorities, struggling to rein in (or illicitly take advantage 
of) the trade between two nodes of their own empire. Furthermore, the Bautista sailed from a 
land with a reputation for aggression and, increasingly, persecution. The Tokugawa had also 
recently permitted the rebel Dutch to establish a factory in its territory, which served as another 
base from which to harass Manila.10 
 An ongoing discussion regarding the economic role of the Philippines ran parallel to 
official efforts to regulate trade by decree, with some questioning whether or not the Pacific trade 
should be allowed to continue. The king both solicited opinions and received memorials drafted 
independently. This debate continued throughout the second decade of the seventeenth century, 
while actors across the empire attempted to sort out their relationship with Japan. The perceived 
problems and proposed solutions varied, though most proposals proceeded from the assumption 
that the silver foundation of the China Ships required remedy. Three voices lending themselves 
to the discussion during the 1610s were a Dominican, an anonymous advisor, and the viceroy of 
Peru. 
                                                             
10 The Dutch factory was established in Hirado in southwestern Kyushu in 1609. See Adam Cluow, The Company 
and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). 
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 Writing from Manila in 1619, the Dominican Diego Audarte presented a plan to staunch 
the outflow of silver from New Spain but secure the Philippines' role as a mediator in the trade 
between China and Japan, recognizing that "the inhabitants of the said islands [the Philippines] 
have no other means of support than commerce."11 He advocated the cessation of the galleon 
trade in favor of increased commerce with Japan, and the abandonment of the Portuguese 
settlement at Macao.12 The former would ensure a silver supply for the trade keeping the 
Philippines viable, while the latter would eliminate one of Manila's competitors in the profitable 
enterprise of mediating the trade between East Asia's largest two economies. Audarte claimed his 
proposal would keep a greater proportion of American silver under Spanish control, though he 
did not discuss the risks of making a Spanish holding completely dependent on Chinese silk and 
Japanese silver. 
 He did however discuss the benefits of deeper ties to Japanese silver, to crown, church, 
and colony. Foremost among them were the economic and security advantages presented by 
closer ties to Japan. The voyage from Manila to the ports of the archipelago was shorter and over 
safer waters than that to New Spain, providing a more reliable return on commercial investments. 
Existing trade with Japan could also grow, for it was not subject to the 500,000 peso limit 
imposed by the king. Deeper commercial ties would strengthen security, making an ally of the 
people "who are more feared in the [Philippine] islands than all the other neighboring nations, 
for they are very courageous and arrogant."13  The Dominican suggested the Japanese might aid 
                                                             
11 Emma Blair and James Alexander Robertson, eds., vol. XVII of The Philippine Islands 1493–1803 (Cleveland: 
A.H. Clark Company, 1903), 194. Hereafter abbreviated B&R XVII. The paragraphs below use the entire letter, 
194-203. 
12 The Portuguese and Spanish crowns were united under Habsburg rule from 1580–1640, but their colonies were 
administered separately and considered distinct kingdoms, as these proposals make clear. 
13 B&R, XVIII, 195. 
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Spain in opposing Dutch sea power, despite the rebels' factory in the archipelago. Though 
Audarte allowed that two small ships from New Spain could continue to supply the Philippines 
with soldiers and goods from the West Indies (absent silver), the core of his proposal replaced 
the China Ships with the goodwill and silver of Japan. In lieu of a long, perilous journey, costly 
to the treasury, he recommended a closer market not reliant on crown resources to function, 
where increased commerce might invite increased security. 
 Audarte also provided ready answers to any who might balk at the suggestion to abandon 
Macao. He dismissed the settlement’s commercial importance and questioned its political 
loyalties and spiritual example.  The author alleged that the town was loyal to the Chinese 
emperor rather than the Habsburg crown, and brought no revenues to the empire. The trade it did 
carry out could be handled by ships directly out of Goa, which the Chinese would receive 
without hesitation. He claimed that the Portuguese had already lost the Indies to the Dutch, and 
that the will and means to fight the rebels resided more in the Philippines than Macao. Finally, 
the missionary charged the lax morals of Macao’s inhabitants with hindering the Christian 
mission in China. Missionaries could instead be sent from the Philippines to bolster evangelical 
efforts on the Chinese mainland. All the king need do to ensure the desertion of Macao was order 
that only silks from Manila could be sold to Japan, thereby robbing Macao of its market and 
causing its inhabitants to leave of their own accord. 
 An unsigned letter from around 1617 presented a very different remedy to the same 
problem.14 Where Aduarte discarded Macao, this anonymous author claimed that the constant 
flow of goods from China, Japan, and the Indian subcontinent through the settlement generated a 
stream of customs duties for the crown. In contrast, Asian trade through the Philippines relied 
                                                             
14 Found in vol. XVIII of The Philippines Islands, 57-64. The editors suggest its author was an advisor to the king. 
Joshua Batts 
Ch. 4 – The Gate Ajar 
212 
 
disproportionately on the simple exchange of silk for silver, providing fewer opportunities to fill 
royal coffers with customs revenue.  The author pointedly dismissed trade between Japan and the 
Americas as untenable, as each participated in the market as silver suppliers. He thereby 
proposed removing the Philippines from the Asian market entirely, ceding its share to the more 
favorable trade out of Macao. Consolidation through Macao would give the Portuguese a 
stronger bargaining position in their trade with Japan, by denying Japanese traders an alternative 
market for the purchase of Chinese silks.15 It would also put an end to Iberian in-fighting, 
damaging to the reputation and profits of Portuguese and Spaniards alike. The anonymous author 
suggested that the Philippines survive by exporting to New Spain the gold rumored to exist on 
the islands in exchange for necessary provisions. In sum, he proposed replacing an outflow of 
silver with an influx of gold, but the lack of gold deposits in the islands made the proposal 
untenable.16  
 In contrast to these voices advocating radical change to the galleon trade, Juan de 
Mendoza, Marques de Montesclaros and Viceroy of Peru, defended the existing trade between 
the Philippines and New Spain in a memorial to the king in 1612. The crown solicited his 
opinion following a petition by the merchants of Seville to open direct trade between Spain and 
the Philippines and discontinue the Manila galleons as a means of staunching the silver drain 
west out of New Spain. The Marques was uniquely positioned to weigh the merits of the 
merchants' proposal from the perspective of Spanish America, having served as the viceroy of 
New Spain from 1603–1607 before becoming the viceroy of Peru (1607-1615).  Montesclaros 
                                                             
15 At this time there was no officially sanctioned direct trade between China and Japan. 
16 The Spanish pursued rumors of gold deposits on the islands in the 1610s and 1620s, but met with little success. 
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rejected the wisdom of the Iberian merchants' proposal, drawing on a holistic perspective of the 
empire's internal dynamics and external relationships. 
 The viceroy adhered to a model of enforced dependence as the proper administrative 
model for Spain's composite empire. Montesclaros summarized his thought early in the 
memorial: 
It is recognized, Sire, that the chief means of keeping these kingdoms tranquil is 
to make them dependencies of España, in what pertains not only to distributive 
and commutative justice, but also to whatever else is necessary for the 
preservation of life, in the spiritual as well as the temporal...[however] it would 
[not] be excusable to molest and vex the subjects with what is not actually 
necessary, if the above purpose could be attained at less cost and vexation to 
them."17 
 
 This framework of enforced but benevolent dependence grounded Mendoza's defense of 
the Pacific trade as it then stood. He presented and dismissed in turn two commonly cited 
advantages to direct trade between Spain and the Philippines. The first argued that cutting off 
New Spain's trade with the Philippines would make it completely dependent on Spain proper, 
ostensibly in line with the Marques' own thought regarding dependence. This derived from the 
merchants' warning that trade between Spain and the West Indies had decreased in recent years, a 
threat to the crown's control over its colonies. Mendoza maintained that while profits had fallen, 
the volume of trade had not. Rather, the higher margins of earlier times had fallen victim to the 
growth in trade and greater competition. The Marques pointed out that New Spain's principal 
                                                             
17 B&R XVII, 214-5. The full text of the letter is found on pages 213–232. 
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imports from Spain and the Philippines were different, receiving wine, oil, and linen from the 
former and silks from the latter. Thus commerce with the Philippines did not threaten New 
Spain's economic ties to Iberia. The viceroy also dismissed the argument that direct commerce 
with the Philippines would be a boon to Spain. Iberia possessed few goods in demand in East 
Asia, and direct trade between Spain and the Philippines would result in an outflow of silver 
directly from the center of the empire, "where the harm would be greater."18  The Marques 
concluded that the cessation of trade would injure New Spain, and in his estimation, doom the 
Philippines. 
 Montesclaros' grim prognosis for the Philippines derived from the vulnerability of the 
Spanish settlement, surrounded by larger, potentially aggressive polities, and harassed by Dutch 
naval forces.  He described Japan and China as "powerful" foes, "one because of its strength and 
valor [Japan], and the other because of its incredible of multitude of inhabitants [China]."19 
These foes tolerated the Philippines because the islands served as a gateway to trade with the 
kingdoms of Spain. Severing the Philippines from New Spain would remove the islands' raison 
d'etre, a frank acknowledgement that the islands depended on the good graces of their 
formidable neighbors, regardless of the Marques' emphasis on maintaining dependence on Spain. 
Montesclaros' admission embodied his ambivalence toward both China and Japan, prevalent 
throughout his letter. He referred to both indirectly and directly as "enemies" multiple times, yet 
the Marques rejected similar claims levied by the merchants of Seville against China, writing 
that "it is a fact that the Chinese do us no other harm than to keep the silver [from New Spain]."20 
                                                             
18 ibid., 222-3. 
19 Ibid., 230. 
20 Ibid., 218-9. 
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He described the Japanese in more bellicose terms, but trade between the archipelago and Manila 
was "open and permitted to all who wish it."21 Iberian traders' calls for direct trade between 
Spain and Asia's two largest markets, beyond threatening the security of the Philippines, were 
not commercially viable. Spanish cloth would make no inroads in Asia, while imports of Chinese 
silk into Spain would undercut domestic silk production.  Silver could be sent from Spain, but 
this outflow of the precious metal was precisely the problem all were trying to avoid. In addition, 
the Pacific route remained largely free of enemies, whereas the Dutch posed a threat along the 
Cape Route eastward out of Spain. Encircled by volatile trading partners and traitorous rebels, 
Mendoza argued that the Philippines' commercial lifeline to New Spain sustained the islands' 
precarious existence on the perimeter of the Asian mainland. 
 In his defense of the trade Montesclaros also appealed to Castilian chauvinism, the 
monarch's mandate to rule, and its heritage of exploration. Mendoza  recounted to his king the 
origins of the "western route" pioneered by Magellan and sponsored by Philip's grandfather 
Charles I, and argued that maintaining the route paid tribute to the labors of the men who had 
developed it.22 This specifically Castilian endeavor mattered even at a time when the Habsburg 
crown controlled both the Portuguese East Indies and the Spanish West Indies, for the 
Portuguese, in Mendoza's eyes, "withhold the friendly intercourse that they owed to the 
Castilians as the vassals of the same sovereign."23  
 If tensions with the Portuguese suggested the importance of the Pacific route, Dutch 
commercial ambition served as an important rhetorical counterexample to the ideology of 
                                                             
21 Ibid. 224. 
22 Ibid., 224-6. It should be noted that Magellan was Portuguese. 
23 Ibid. 
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Castilian rule. "Our design must be more difficult to attain then theirs; for they content 
themselves with going where they are received, and of receiving what they are given, without 
caring much whether others enter that district, while your Majesty desires, as is right, to be 
absolute and sole ruler, and to shut the gate to all who do not enter under the name and title of 
vassals (emphasis added)." Mendoza's proprietary attitude toward the "western route" 
complemented his imperative to rule through control of the "gates" into Spain's varied kingdoms. 
Five years later, the same sense of propriety guided decisions taken by the viceroy of New Spain 
and the Philip III in response to the arrival of Japanese ships at the western "gate" of Acapulco. 
Like Mendoza, awareness of the Philippine's dependence on foreign polities tempered their 
concern with control.  
 Taken together, these proposals highlight the range of debate between 1610 and 1620 
regarding the role of Philippines and the activities of the empire in East Asia. In a ten-year span 
the crown's subjects and advisors variously proposed cutting the Philippines out of the trade with 
Asia in favor of Spain, cutting the islands out in favor of Macao, cutting Macao out in favor the 
Philippines, and maintaining the status quo for reasons of economy, security, and imperial pride. 
All expressed concern over the drain of American silver west over the Pacific instead of east 
over to Spain, however different their solutions. In addition, all dealt with the organization of the 
empire and access to its many "gates."  
 Debate over the status, scope, and beneficiaries of the Asia trade doubled as a debate over 
gates internal and external and the connections between them. It was Philip's prerogative to 
control access between his many kingdoms, an idea premised on the composite nature of the 
empire. Auduarte's denigration of the Portuguese, Mendoza's Castilian pride, and the unsigned 
letter suggesting the benefits of less mingling between the Iberians in Asia demonstrate the clear 
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distinctions made between the kingdoms of Portugal and Castile thirty years into their union 
under the Habsburg crown.  To this rivalry must be added the logistical challenges presented by 
an empire spread out across continents and oceans. The court debated the position of the 
Philippines within a web of connections including Macao, Portuguese India, the Moluccas, New 
Spain, and Peru. None of the authors here proposed—or likely even entertained the idea of—
allowing each region to engage in free commerce with all others. Royal decrees attempted to 
prevent trade between the Philippines and Peru, later extending to a full ban on trade between the 
viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru. Each proposal to restructure the galleon trade was based on 
the logic of substitution, not addition. As Mendoza asserted, one of the primary responsibilities 
of the monarchy lie in controlling the pathways between and into its kingdoms. The repeated 
injunctions against Chinese goods in Peru show how that control was far from complete. The 
debate regarding the role of the Philippines stemmed from the crown's inability to regulate these 
internal relationships to its satisfaction. 
 Beyond internal dynamics, the islands' ever-vulnerable position amidst the larger polities 
of Asia made sufficient central control all the more elusive. Mendoza defined proper rule as an 
enterprise built on the dependence of peripheral areas and central control over access to them, 
but admitted that the Philippines depended on the good graces of China and Japan. Auduarte 
advocated increasing this dependence by shifting the trade of the islands more towards Japan and 
rely on the security its aggressive reputation might provide. The author who lobbied on behalf of 
Macao premised his idea on the port's lucrative role in the Asian trade, and the benefits to both 
the coffers of the crown and the efforts of the church. All the petitioners were arguing over 
which part or parts of the empire would be allowed to knock on the gates of Asian markets. The 
Philippines occupied an important place in that debate, and the settlement's dependence on the 
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wealth and priorities of its more powerful neighbors posed an obstacle to the crown's efforts to 
manage the internal dynamics of its composite empire. 
 The arrival of Japanese ships off the coast of New Spain stretched the illusion of control 
even further, for they did not arrive at the "gates" as vassals. In the policy discussions and 
proposal discussed above, the archipelago factored in primarily as a trading partner for the 
Philippines or Macao. When Japanese vessels began dropping anchor in Acapulco, they 
disrupted the paradigm of Pacific trade Spanish officials were struggling to maintain. If 
permitted, regular commercial relations between Date's domain in Ōshū and New Spain would 
substantially alter the already unstable calculus governing the empire's commercial activity on 
either side of the South Sea. 
 The demands of geography and the limits of technology forced the debate over the 
Bautista to unfold along two tracks during the ship's year-long anchorage in Acapulco. The first 
followed the rhythm of correspondence imposed by the Atlantic Ocean, whereby the viceroy in 
Mexico and the king in Madrid penned letters to each other every few months as ships plied the 
waterways between them. Guadalcázar first reported the Bautista's arrival in March of 1617, 
Philip III issued orders concerning the ship in June, and Guadalcázar acknowledged them in a 
letter that October. Similarly, the viceroy told of the ship's departure and his final arrangements 
in a letter from May 1618, prompting discussion in Spain in October and November, and a 
formal reply in December, which the viceroy acknowledged in a letter from May 1619. 
Communication between king and viceroy addressed what could be traded, who could travel 
where, and contingency plans in the event any other Japanese vessels arrived seeking trade. 
Correspondence lagged behind events on the ground, leaving important decisions in the hands of 
the viceroy. 
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 In contrast, the debate over customs came to a head in the fall of 1617, soon after Manila 
solicitor Clemente de Valdes and Hasekura converged on New Spain from the Philippines and 
Europe respectively. Neither party dawdled. Valdes had submitted his own petition to revoke all 
customs on the Japanese vessel and gathered six supporting witnesses by the middle of 
December, and both Hasekura and Sotelo had penned memorials by the end of November. The 
crew of the Bautista may have balked at the idea of paying customs earlier in the year, but no 
records of any such protest remain. The viceroy reversed his initial decision in mid-December, 
immediately after Valdes' witnesses completed their testimony. The viceroy presided over the 
entire affair, rendering his decision without consulting the crown. In fact, almost a year would 
pass between the viceroy's proclamation rescinding customs and the court in Madrid reviewing 
that decision. Though not all of his councilors' were happy with Guadalcázar's decision to 
sacrifice treasury revenues, the king ultimately condoned the decision, for the crown's priorities 
lie less with what was received and more with what was sent away. 
Unfounded Concerns: Trying to Control the Silver Stream 
 When word of the Bautista's arrival reached the viceroy, he ordered the galleon 
quarantined in Acapulco and sent to Philip III for instructions. Guadalcázar confronted a host of 
vexing problems, foremost among them the friction between the vessel's stated intentions of 
friendship and the reported rough treatment of the crown's envoys. The ship was a contradiction; 
in port to pick up its own embassy while discarding another, gifts and all. The vessel's status and 
purpose demanded courtesy, but it arrived bearing insult. Unsurprisingly, Guadalcázar adopted a 
holding pattern, holding the ship in port until Philip could send instructions.24 
                                                             
24 Dai Nippon shiryō, vol. 12, no. 12. Letters from viceroy to Philip 1617.3.13 (document CCXXXIV) and 
1617.5.24 (CCXXXV). The Dai Nippon shiryō is an ongoing compilation of primary sources published by the 
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 The one decision Guadalcázar did make the crown belatedly attempted to block, 
primarily out of concern for bullion. In his initial letter announcing the vessel's bedraggled 
arrival off the coast of New Spain in March 1617, Guadalcázar stated his intent to allow the 
Bautista to engage in trade. A second letter followed in late May after the ship moored in 
Acapulco, stating that all trade would be subject to the same customs rates charged to goods 
from the Philippines.25 Three weeks after Guadalcázar penned this second letter to his monarch, 
Philip issued his response to the first, in late June. The monarch weighed in on the situation just 
this one time while the Bautista remained in Acapulco, handicapped by the near half-a-year lag 
between writing a letter and receiving its response. Philip sought to block the trade his viceroy 
had allowed, but also planned for contingencies. He ordered Guadalcázar not to permit the sale 
of any goods if trade had not yet started, but to allow trade to continue if it had already begun. 
However, in the latter case, the crown mandated that no payment for any goods be allowed in 
silver. Philip even provided an alternative cost-saving measure, suggesting that if the ship in 
question were actually Spanish the vessel itself could serve as payment to the Japanese for the 
merchandise they had brought for trade.26 Responding to these orders in October, Guadalcázar 
reported that while trade had already begun, he would prevent any exchange in silver. After the 
vessel departed in the spring of 1618, the viceroy confirmed that the Japanese had been 
prohibited from taking away gold and silver, and had traded in "the fruits and merchandise of 
                                                             
Historiographical Institute of Tokyo University. Volume 12-12 contains European-language sources as well, each 
assigned a roman numeral. This source will be abbreviated DNS 12-12, followed by the document number. 
25 ibid.  
26 ibid, CCXXXVI, King to Viceroy, 1617.6.20. 
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this land."27 Notably, Philip’s orders made no mention of customs, the king having not yet 
received the viceroy's letter discussing them, nor interested in raising the point himself.  
 The Bautista’s Japanese origin rendered Philip’s suggestion ineffectual, but the king’s 
response does illustrate the monarchy’s lack of enthusiasm at the prospect of an expanded Pacific 
trade between the archipelago and New Spain and its ongoing concern with the regulation of 
silver flows. The question of how much silver should leave the Americas and in what direction 
framed the memorials discussed earlier. This silver question shaped the debate over the viability 
and function of the Philippines within the greater Habsburg empire. The repeated attempts by 
Philip II and his son to curtail smuggling and assert control over the content and scope of the 
China Ships suggest the limits of the crown's reach. Unable to effectively regulate its own 
subjects, the crown held no interest in an additional Japanese silver corridor running out of 
Acapulco. Philip's instructions in the event trade had already begun reveal why he had attempted 
to prevent it in the first place. The monarch could give a little on trade more broadly, but 
maintained a hard line against any potential expansion of the silver trade. 
 Reticence on the supply side begs the question of demand, but it is not clear to what 
extent, if at all, the desire for silver brought Japanese traders to Acapulco. Japanese and Spanish 
documents related to the embassy provide scant evidence of what Japanese traders piled into the 
holds of the Bautista and what they wanted in return. However, oblique references in the extant 
record and the broader context suggest that American silver was not a high-priority commodity. 
 In the early seventeenth century the Japanese archipelago was second only to Spanish 
America as a producer and exporter of silver. The islands provided a steady stream of the 
precious metal into the regional economy from roughly 1570-1640, exchanging their silver for 
                                                             
27 ibid. CCXLI, Viceroy to King, 1618.5.25. “Fruits” here akin to “products” or “goods.” 
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the silk and other products offered by Chinese merchants and intermediaries in much the same 
manner as the Spanish in Manila.28 The Spanish Philippines enabled this trade at the time of the 
Keichō embassy, acting as a hub for both Chinese and Japanese traders.29 Estimates on the 
volume of Japanese silver exports vary. Kozo and Kamiki posit a range of 92,000-120,000 kgs 
per year for 1560-1640, a number Flynn and Giraldez accept as well, while de Vries gives half 
that amount, 59,300 kg per annum.30  American production outpaced that of Japan, but the 
volume from the latter tracked much higher than the 500,000 pesos (approximately 12,800 kgs) 
per year officially permitted in the galleons sailing to Manila from New Spain.31 Though Date's 
domain was not a center of silver production, the merchants on the Bautista represented trading 
houses active in Sakai, a major commercial center, and were well-connected to domestic trade 
networks. Neither they nor Date had reason to seek silver across an ocean when it could be 
obtained through internal trade routes.  
 Spanish sources are ambivalent on the potential of silver trade with Japan, and were at 
times motivated more by fear than fact. A Franciscan passenger on the Bautista's voyage to 
Acapulco witnessed the cargo being loaded into the vessel's holds shortly prior to its departure. 
The friar offered no specifics on particular items, but recorded that the overall volume was such 
that "it seemed naught but that they wished to carry [back] to their land all the silver of New 
                                                             
28 See Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, “Cycles of Silver: Global Economic Unity through the Mid-Eighteenth 
Century,” Journal of World History 13, no. 2 (October 1, 2002), 391–427. 
29 See Schurz, chapters 1 and 2 (63–128) for an overview of Chinese and Japanese activity in Manila. 
30 Flynn and Giráldez, 404–5. For Kozo and Kamiki's estimate, see Richards, Precious Metals, 329–362. For Vries' 
discussion, see Flynn, Giráldez, and Von Glahn, eds., Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470-1800 
(Burlington: Ashgate, 2003), 35–97.There is also general agreement that the volume of exports picked up in the 17th 
century. Kozo and Kamiki, state that three quarters of the silver exported from 1560-1640 came after 1600.  
31 Tepakse, 435-36. Most American silver flowed east to Europe. 
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Spain."32 In the friar's mind, the Japanese must have wanted silver, but he never provided 
evidence to support this assumption. Philip made the same assumption when he ordered that the 
Bautista not be allowed to trade for the precious metal. One counterexample is the anonymous 
author who proposed consolidating the empire's East Asian trade at Macao. In the same letter, he 
disparaged the potential of any trade between New Spain in Japan. He echoed the logic of supply 
and demand, writing that the route was "unprofitable, because there are not goods on which to 
secure gain either going or returning, except what they may get from the silks which they carry 
from China, to Japon [sic], and from some iron, copper cabinets, and similar articles."33  
 Regarding the concrete goods sought by traders on the Bautista, Date Masamune's formal 
letters to Spanish authorities and the internal records of his house offer little insight. The daimyo 
wrote to the viceroy upon dispatching the Bautista in both 1613 and 1616. In each, he employed 
the oblique term dōgu (道具, "tool," "utensil," or perhaps in this instance, "item") in reference to 
goods he hoped to exchange in trade.34 In 1613, Date wrote that he had loaded the ship with 
"items of Japan" (Nihon no dōgu, 日本 之道具), and wished to trade for "items of that country 
[New Spain]" (sono kuni no dōgu, 其の国之道具).35 The purpose of this trade was equally 
vague, with the daimyo remarking that it would be for “our [my] own use” (warera yōsho no 
tame, 我等用所之ため), perhaps trying to play down the commercial intentions of the mission.36 
                                                             
32 DNS 12-12, CCXXI, 417. The Spanish reads "no parece sino que quieren lleuar á su tierra toda la plata de la 
Nueva España." 
33 B&R XVIII, 60. Earlier the author asserted that the profit in trade with Japan lie in transporting its silver to China. 
34 DNS 12-12, pages 42–44 and 500–01 for Date’s 1613 and 1616 letters, respectively. 
35 Ibid., 43. 
36 Ibid., 43. 
Joshua Batts 
Ch. 4 – The Gate Ajar 
224 
 
Date described the gifts he sent to both the viceroy and the head of the Franciscan order in New 
Spain in a similar manner, referring to them for example as "three kinds of items from this 
country" (kono kuni no dōgu sanshoku, 此の国之道具三色) in 1616, without any further 
elaboration.37 The only other word used to denominate goods was nimotsu (荷物, "cargo"), 
which appeared in his second letter to the viceroy.38 Here he used the equally generic nimotsu to 
contrast the merchants' cargo with his own, again written simply as dōgu. Merchants were 
aboard the Bautista during its first crossing but went unmentioned; their inclusion the second 
time made Date's commercial intentions more explicit. The only concrete information on what 
the Japanese traded for comes from the diary of the Englishman Richard Cocks, head of the East 
India Company’s factory in Japan at the time. Cocks reported in a letter that upon its return from 
Acapulco in 1615, the Bautista had "brought good quantety of broad cloth, kersies, perpetuanos, 
and raz de Millan, which they offer at a loe rate."39 All of these were types of textiles, and Cocks 
made no mention of bullion or precious metals. 
 In addition to the "items" and "cargo" he wanted to trade, Date requested that the viceroy 
dispatch navigators and sailors to Japan. In his 1613 letter they were referred to as pirōto (ぴろ
うと, "pilot") and funeshu (舟衆) respectively, and in the 1616 letter, anjin yakusha (按針役者) 
and kogusha (こぐしゃ).40 Date explained that such persons would help ensure the smooth 
passage of ships between Ōshū and New Spain in the years ahead. The construction and 
                                                             
37 Ibid., 501. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., CCXXVI, Richard Cocks to John Gourney, 1615.12.16. 
40 ibid. Japanese terms are presented above as written, a mix of hiragana and Chinese characters. 
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navigation of the Bautista had only been possible with Spanish assistance, and the daimyo 
recognized the need for Spanish expertise in any commercial endeavor linking his domain with 
New Spain. Date's desire to acquire maritime skill mirrored the Tokugawa. Ieyasu had the 
Englishman Will Adams build two Spanish-style vessels for the shogunate’s earlier forays into 
commerce with New Spain.41 In his own letters, Date paired the request for extremely valuable 
and specialist knowledge with offers of safe passage, ample provisions, ready aid, and a warm 
reception for religious and secular alike in Ōshū.42 Beyond any material exchange, Date 
maintained an equal if not more fervent interest in a different type of commodity: the knowledge 
required to sustain American trade indefinitely. 
"They Have no Pilots": Setting a New Course for the Bautista 
 The potential for Japanese and Spanish vessels to traffic the route between Ōshū and 
Acapulco prompted discussion of control over access, technology, and the movement of the 
empire’s subjects. As with silver, officials in New Spain and Iberia jealously guarded their 
prerogative in these areas, but also tempered their actions out of concern for the Philippines and 
the empire’s broader relationship with the Japanese archipelago. Hasekura's sojourn in Europe 
complicated the issue of stronger ties with the archipelago, and the Bautista's arrival muddled the 
picture further. The vessel’s mixed messages produced an ambivalent response, as the king and 
his viceroy endeavored to impede commercial relations without expressly denying them. This 
                                                             
41 A brief account of Adams’ time in Japan can be found in C.R. Boxer’s The Christian Century in Japan 1549–
1650 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 285–292. See also William Farrington’s The English Factory 
in Japan: 1613–1623, and Derek Massarella’s A World Elsewhere: Europe's Encounter with Japan in the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Centuries. 
42 These promises are made in his letters to the viceroy cited above, but are more explicit in letters he wrote to the 
head of the Franciscan order in New Spain. See for example, DNS 12-12, 65–66. 
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ambivalence is clearly seen in their decisions regarding the final destination and fate of the 
Bautista. 
 The vessel's mission was undercut by the remnants, material and personal, of the shunned 
mission from New Spain it returned to Acapulco. The Bautista first departed Acapulco in 1615, 
transporting gifts from Philip and a trio of Franciscans bearing a letter from the king. The 
emissaries' reception was hostile from the beginning, and Tokugawa Ieyasu's death in 1616 
during their stay did not help matters. His son and successor Hidetada rejected Philip's gifts, 
denied the mission any formal audience, and unceremoniously sent all three back on the 
Bautista’s second voyage to Acapulco.43 One friar, Diego de Santa Catalina, wrote to the viceroy 
soon after making landfall in New Spain. Santa Catalina told of his mission's mistreatment and 
the plight of the ship and crew in crossing, bundled together with a more detailed letter 
describing his party's difficulties in Japan.44 Guadalcázar forwarded both to Philip in his March 
1617 letter reporting on the Bautista's arrival. Thus, when Philip issued his instructions to his 
viceroy in June of that same year, he did so with full knowledge of the fact that his gifts and 
representatives had been dismissed, and that the persecution of Christianity was intensifying 
across Japan.  
 In his June instructions, Philip concisely laid out his wishes regarding the vessel his 
viceroy had quarantined in Acapulco.45 As detailed above, Philip sought to avoid trade if 
possible, forbid payment in silver in the event trade had started, and suggested selling the ship to 
the Japanese as a means of avoiding payment—and trade— altogether. To further shore up 
                                                             
43 Their treatment is recounted by an anonymous friar in DNS 12-12, CCXXI. 
44 DNS 12-12, CCXXXIII. The experiences of these friars are discussed in Chapter 4. 
45 The following summarizes DNS 12-12, CCXXXVI. Philip III to the viceroy, 1617.6.20. 
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finances, the crown ordered that the gifts Hidetada rejected be sold back, and the money placed 
in a separate account in the treasury.46 The king ordered that the Japanese be treated well, but 
that the viceroy discuss with them the gravity of their own land’s poor treatment of missionaries. 
The ambassador Hasekura was to return to Japan on the vessel when it departed. However, Philip 
forbade any Spanish sailors from sailing the vessel back to Japan in light of increasing 
persecution.  Finally, he entrusted the viceroy to decide whether the vessel would return directly 
to Japan or via the Philippines. 
 The personnel and destination of the ship were closely intertwined, as Philip and his 
councilors suspected, and the viceroy certainly knew. Date owned the vessel and sponsored its 
construction, but the Japanese could not yet cross the Pacific unaided. Spanish labor helped build 
the ship four years earlier, and Spanish sailors and pilots navigated over the open waters. Santa 
Catalina praised the efforts of one such sailor in particular in his letter.47 The Japanese contingent 
of merchants and sailors were captained by Date's vassal Yokozawa Shōgen. Japanese and 
Spanish alike recognized his authority over the vessel, but he was not a pilot.48 Date's requests 
for pilots demonstrate the continued need for and interest in Spanish navigational skills for the 
open-water sailing inherent to trans-Pacific trade. Philip's order barring Spanish passage on any 
return voyage to Japan in 1617 served as an indirect rejection of Date's requests for "trade" in 
Spanish sailors and their valuable skills. Philip valued this expertise as well, and the empire 
                                                             
46 As with Date's "gifts," no specifics are given. As the gifts were sold, it can be inferred that they were goods from 
New Spain or Spain rather than particular items specifically commissioned. 
47 DNS 12-12, CCXXXIII, 436. 
48 Ibid. Santa Catalina refers to Yokozawa as the “captain” in his letter to the viceroy. Date house records also name 
Yokozawa when recording the Bautista’s final departure from Japan in the fall of 1616. See DNS 12-12, 495. 
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treated the maritime routes and nautical maps as state secrets at this time.49 In sum, Date asked 
for a technology the crown was disinclined to share, raised the specter of trading in a good the 
crown did not want to lose, and made an offer of welcome and protection to Spanish 
missionaries and ships that appeared more dubious with each new report. These considerations, 
together with the Tokugawa shogunate's chilly reception of the Santa Catalina legation, no doubt 
further dissuaded Madrid from allowing Spanish subjects to sail a Japanese ship back to the 
archipelago.  
 If the Japanese could not return on their own, and no Spanish were permitted to sail to 
Japan, the only remaining option consisted of a Spanish crew sailing the ship to the Philippines. 
Guadalcázar replied to the king to that effect, specifically citing the fact that the Japanese 
contingent had no pilots of their own.50 This resolution further thwarted the ambitions of Date's 
embassy, and sent yet another signal that the empire held no interest in Japanese commerce with 
New Spain. Sailing for the Philippines rather than Japan denied Hasekura's the very route 
between eastern Japan and the Pacific coast of Spanish America he had been charged with 
opening. It was also a clear rejection of the technological transfer underling Date's offer of 
commerce, provisions, and missionary work free of persecution. 
The Pull from Manila: The Bautista Gets a Tax Break 
 However, Philip and his viceroy did not shape policy toward the archipelago and its 
inconvenient ship alone. A representative from the Philippines islands played a prominent role in 
determining the conditions under which the Bautista would be allowed to trade. Where the king 
                                                             
49 J.B. Harley, “Silences and Secrecy: The Hidden Agenda of Cartography in Early Modern Europe,” chapter 3 of 
his The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2002). 
50 DNS 12-12, CCXXXVII, Viceroy to King, 1617.10.20. 
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ordered the viceroy to inhibit trade and transfer alike, a solicitor from Manila lobbied 
Guadalcázar to give the Bautista a tax break. Both the directions from on high and appeals from 
below, though seemingly oppositional, stemmed from a shared wariness regarding Japan and 
concern for the welfare of the Philippines. 
 The viceroy's back and forth with his monarch extended over half a year, but the appeal 
brought forth by Manila solicitor Clemente de Valdes was settled in less than two months, and 
without any input from the crown. Not long after Guadalcázar wrote the king acknowledging his 
orders, Hasekura’s party and Valdes converged on New Spain from opposite directions in fall 
1617, the former from Seville and the latter from Manila. Hasekura landed on New Spain’s 
Atlantic coast in late September or early October, and was in Mexico by the end of the month.51 
Valdes departed Manila in the latter half of July, and likely landed in Acapulco in late October or 
early November before journeying to Mexico himself.52 Hasekura’s party sent memorials 
requesting the revocation of customs at the end of November, while the viceroy heard Valdes’ 
appeal in the first half of December.53  
On December 19th, 1617 Guadalcázar granted their wish on his own authority, without 
consulting his monarch.54 The viceroy did not report his decision until nearly six months later. 
Writing the next year, Guadalcázar summarized the petition and explained that he acted as he 
                                                             
51 Gonoi, 203–204.  
52 This chronology is based on Valdes’ authorization as solicitor-general of the Philippines, signed in Manila on 
1617.7.12. He would have departed on that year’s voyage back to Acapulco soon after. Valdes’ testimony is found 
in volume 12–45 of the aforementioned Dai Nippon Shiryō, 8-13. Hereafter this volume is abbreviated DNS 12–45, 
followed by the page numbers. 
53 Ibid., 20–27 for Hasekura party letters, and 8–19 for Valdes' petition and witness testimony. 
54 DNS 12-12, CCXXXVIII.  
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thought the king would have wanted.55 The time required to consult the king made waiting 
impractical, even in the sensitive matter of foreign trade. Receiving a response would have 
entailed waiting half a year, but the actual delay in the ship's departure would have been twice as 
long. Once he decided the Bautista's course to the Philippines in the latter half of 1617, the 
viceroy arranged for the vessel to accompany the fleet being dispatched from New Spain the 
following year. Ships departed for Manila but once a year and followed a rough schedule; 
missing the outbound journey in 1618 thus meant a full year's delay, anathema to all involved. 
Instead, the viceroy settled the matter internally, pulled by concerns in Manila just as he was 
pushed by the agendas of those in Madrid.  
 Valdes grounded his petition to revoke all levies against the Bautista on three points: 
Philippine settlements relied on trade with Japan; up to this point that trade had been conducted 
customs-free; and levies imposed against the Japanese in New Spain would provoke disastrous, 
retaliatory duties against the Spanish in the Philippines. Valdes pleaded the fragility of the 
islands, and explicitly tied decisions in New Spain regarding the Japanese to their potential 
repercussions across the Pacific. He buttressed his appeal by gathering six citizens of New Spain 
with experience in the Philippines to testify before officials in Mexico. Valdes grounded his own 
right of appeal in a July 1617 document, signed in Manila, granting him the power to solicit on 
behalf of the city. Neither Valdes nor his witnesses put forth any arguments suggesting a direct 
material benefit to New Spain; instead his petition proceeded from the frank acknowledgement 
of the Philippine's dependence on its neighbors in a manner reminiscent of Monteclaros' letter in 
defense of the islands' trade. 
                                                             
55 Ibid., CCXXXIX, Viceroy to King, 1618.5.25. 
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 Valdes framed his arguments in terms of the necessity of and benefits to trade with Japan. 
Silver again featured prominently, with Valdes just as determined to keep the silver flowing into 
the Philippines as Philip III was to regulate the tap. Valdes sought to preserve the free flow of 
silver from the islands' other principal supplier, Japan. Wherever its origin, the precious metal 
attracted Chinese junks loaded with silk, and this exchange anchored the settlements' economy. 
Valdes thus began his petition by asserting that the well-being of the Philippines depended on the 
steady arrival of Japanese silver.56 The trade in silk and silver in turn made possible the islands' 
continued service to God and crown. In Valdes' formulation, contacts built through trade in the 
Philippines facilitated the Catholic mission in Japan, while the profits of the king's loyal subjects 
in Manila paid for the security of both secular and religious endeavors from the predations of 
pirates and the rebel Dutch. Valdes emphasized that this trade was free of any levies, either in 
Manila or the ports of Japan. He warned that igniting a tariff war with the Japanese to serve the 
treasury of New Spain would endanger the Philippine economy, and thereby threaten the 
religious missions and military security that trade made possible. These arguments proved 
convincing to the viceroy, and large portions of his proclamation revoking customs lifted 
sections of Valdes' appeal word for word.57 
 For their part, the six witnesses interviewed in support of Valdes' petition consistently 
testified that trade with Japan was conducted customs-free, and that retaliatory tariffs would 
follow should any taxes be levied against the Bautista58. Santiago de Uriarte was a citizen of 
Mexico who had lived in the Philippines in 1608. He testified that no tariffs were paid in either 
                                                             
56 DNS 12-45, 8–13. The rest of this paragraph draws on Valdes' letter on these same pages. 
57 Compare DNS 12-12, CCXXXVIII Order of the Viceroy, 1617.12.19 and DNS 12-45, 8–13 for Valdes' text. 
58 The witnesses' testimony is found in DNS 12-45, 14–20. I omit citation of all but direct quotes and adopt modern 
orthography for names. 
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Japan or Manila on entry or exit, and that this arrangement was a boon to the people of Manila. 
Blas Geronimo served as a scribe onboard the galleon Santana during a stop in Japan 1609. 
Geronimo testified that he had personally sold 25,000 pesos worth of goods in order to outfit the 
ship for the return voyage, and had not paid tariffs on anything. Juan de Urbina, a lathe operator, 
also worked aboard the Santana and sold textiles to the Japanese, again without tariffs. The 
surgeon Andres Martinez de Villaviciosa spent three years in the Philippines and Japan. He 
testified that no levies should ever be charged against the Japanese, and that doing so would 
result in a loss of trade for the Philippines. 
 All six were equally consistent on the threat of retaliation. They rooted their conviction in 
the temperament of their trading partners, whose bellicosity was matched solely by how 
indispensable they were to the Spanish settlements. The surgeon Villaviciosa warned of an 
excessive Japanese response to any tariffs "due to their uncouth and poor disposition."59 Ladron 
de Peralta, a man with nineteen years of experience in the Philippines, adopted similar language, 
as did the scribe Geronimo and Urbina the lathe operator. The most forceful statement came 
from the infantry captain Juan de Leoz, who swore that every real of tax collected by the Spanish 
in New Spain would be demanded ten times over by the Japanese on account of their forceful 
temperament. These men embodied the central tension between the potential for profit and the 
threat of conflict animating the relationship between Japan and the Philippines, citing their 
dealings with the "bellicose" people and warning of their aggression. Urbina and Geronimo 
explicitly mention trading in Japan, while the rest testified to having been there and described 
trade between Manila and Japan in general terms. All had likely participated in trade to some 
degree or another, be it with Japanese merchants in Manila or in the ports of southern Kyushu as 
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Urbina and Geronimo had done. To a man, they spoke of the Japanese as a people not to be 
trifled with. There was no explicit mention of military conflict between the Philippines and the 
archipelago, but the tone of all six witnesses, two of whom were soldiers, suggest that the 
outcome of any such conflict was neither favorable nor in doubt. The relationship with the 
Japanese was necessary, possibly manageable, but not one that the Spanish could hope to dictate 
unilaterally. 
 In describing Manila's dependency, two witnesses took the conversation beyond silver 
into the realm of basic provisions. Villaviciosa testified that vessels putting into port from Japan 
also carried quantities of flour, biscuits, bacon, and other supplies which helped sustain Manila.60 
The lathe operator Urbina echoed this, claiming that the ships from Manila loaded up on 
provisions in Japan, and that Japanese ships brought similar supplies to Manila.61 The two may 
also have been touching on the outfitting of those Spanish ships which by intention or accident 
sought refuge in Japanese ports during the hazardous voyages to and from the Americas. This 
was especially likely on the eastward Pacific crossing from Manila to Acapulco, when Spanish 
vessels sailed northeast on the Kuroshio ("Black current") off the Pacific coast of Japan on the 
initial leg of their journey before tacking east across the ocean at a more northern latitude. A 
disruption to the supplying of these galleons would have repercussions beyond the trade between 
Manila and the Japanese archipelago, possibly destabilizing the traffic connecting the Philippines 
to America, the settlements' principal lifeline to the empire. 
 Finally, like Valdes a portion of the witnesses touched on the Catholic mission in the 
Philippines, but the fate of any religious mandate was always couched in terms of the immediate 
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material threat to the islands' economic viability. Uriarte described the free trade of goods 
between Manila and Japan as good for the crown, a boon for its vassals in the Philippines, and a 
service to God.62 Villaviciosa  worried that any loss of trade would endanger the Japanese 
Christian community by similarly disrupting their contact with missionaries departing out of 
Manila.63 Peralta opined that a blow to commercial ties would in turn severe the ties between 
missionaries and the Japanese flock in its charge.64 However, Manila’s reliance on commerce 
with Japan and the current state of that trade framed each testimony, not the perilous position of 
Christian souls in the islands and the archipelago. The spiritual blow followed the commercial, 
augmenting arguments for the economic significance of trade with Japan, rather than serving as 
the foundation for arguments centered on the spiritual significance of the Philippines.  The 
remaining witnesses shared this same emphasis on commerce, but omitted any mention of the 
Church. Service to God was but one benefit of safeguarding trade, but not the principal reason 
for securing it. 
 Valdes and his assembled witnesses were not alone in weighing in on the matter. Sotelo 
and Hasekura submitted their own memorials appealing the viceroy's decision to levy tariffs on 
the Bautista toward the end of November 1617.65 Where the solicitor and his witnesses 
emphasized the economic stakes for the Philippines, the Hasekura contingent spoke of the 
diplomatic repercussions of charging tariffs. Unsurprisingly, it appears all of them were 
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65 The memorial Sotelo submitted with two other friars is dated 1617.11.28, while Hasekura's is undated. The text of 
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considered together. The viceroy's later proclamation makes reference to the legation's petitions, 
and all the memorials were subsequently archived as a single group. There is no mention of any 
explicit cooperation or coordination between Valdes' camp and that of the embassy, but each 
must have been aware of the other. The role of Yokozawa's group —i.e. those Japanese who had 
arrived on the Bautista in 1617 and were not part of Hasekura's entourage returning from 
Europe—is also unclear. The Japanese captain is mentioned in multiple Spanish sources but 
never speaks for himself in New Spain. However, it is clear from the content of Sotelo's and 
Hasekura's appeal that each had been briefed on recent events in Japan, suggesting that Date's 
lead representatives took point in the appeals process after consulting with the Bautista crew.   
 Sotelo's memorial, penned with two other friars, based its request to repeal customs on 
the ramifications for the Christian mission in Japan. The Franciscans discussed the mission’s 
prospects through a realpolitik analysis of events on the ground, Date's potential role in the 
leadership of Japan, and the opportunity to leverage the situation to meet Spanish (and celestial) 
ends. The authors relied on gross exaggerations and hearsay regarding Date’s influence 
throughout in order to buttress their points. They claimed that he was positioned to assist the new 
"emperor" (shogun) Hidetada as a coequal, or possibly assume rule of Japan as emperor in his 
own right. The friars peppered their document with anecdotes and examples to support this 
claim. They attributed the recent defeat of Tokugawa rival Toyotomi Hideyori at Osaka in 1615 
to both the Tokugawa and Date. The friars further claimed that Date was the only lord to ignore 
the Tokugawa's recent one-castle requirement, already possessing thirty fortifications and 
building new ones.66 Notably, they played up Date's relationship to the previous "emperor" 
Ieyasu, recounting a deathbed visit wherein the dying emperor supposedly entreated Date to be at 
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peace with his son and thereby maintain peace in the realm. This apparently followed an earlier 
episode recounted by the friars where Ieyasu refused his son's calls to launch an attack against 
Date.67  
 These anecdotes and the spin accompanying them sought to establish Date as a critical 
ally in furthering the spiritual and materials aims of the Habsburg Empire. In the memorial’s 
account, the Ōshū daimyo was uniquely qualified to intercede and perhaps check the rising tide 
of persecution against Christians at the hands of the new shogun. Favorable treatment of his 
representatives in New Spain and a friendly reply (i.e. support of further trade between Date's 
"kingdom" and New Spain) might convince the powerful lord to make just such an 
intercession.68 In the best-case scenario Date might convert or even seize control of all Japan, an 
instant boon to Christianity if the viceroy took the proper steps in maintaining good faith with 
this powerful figure.69 
 Having laid out the spiritual stakes, concerns, and possibilities, the friars elaborated on 
the practical solutions and consequences. As a service to God, a matter of importance to the 
realm, and for the good of all concerned, they asked that no tariffs be levied against any goods on 
the Bautista, for they all belonged to Date, his allies, and vassals.70 Taxing such a critical ally 
would be a diplomatic insult, and risk the goodwill of Christianity’s greatest benefactor. 
Furthermore, the troubled crossing forced the Bautista to abandon a good portion of its cargo, 
and the merchants and crew might lack the funds to outfit the ship for the journey home if made 
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to pay taxes on top of the loss of cargo. The authors also warned that the Dutch might point to 
Spanish tariffs levied in Acapulco in their efforts to convince Hidetada to levy taxes against all 
Iberian goods coming out of Manila and Macao. In the worst-case scenario, Hidetada could 
revoke all the protections his father Ieyasu previously offered the Spanish, and impound any 
vessels unfortunate enough to arrive in Japan save those which had the good fortune to be swept 
ashore in Date’s territory. The authors urged the viceroy to weigh these dire consequences 
against the comparatively minor tariff revenue he might extract from the Bautista. 
 Sotelo and his companions closed with the audacious recommendation that the gifts 
Hidetada rejected be repurposed and sent back to Japan, this time as gifts for Date.71 Failing that, 
the originals gifts could be sold and the funds used to purchase other items for the daimyo, or 
some money might be set aside in the Philippines for the purchase of items there. The friars cited 
the Japanese custom of always having gifts when going before a lord, especially when carrying 
the response of another ruler.72 In effect, they asked the viceroy to bear Hidetada’s insult and try 
again, this time with a more amenable partner. For any such gesture to be effective, it would 
need to be packaged with the revocation of tariffs, lest the viceroy commit an insult of his own. 
 In this discussion of gifts, Sotelo and his peers demonstrated familiarity with recent 
events in New Spain and across the Pacific. There is no record of Sotelo conversing with Santa 
Catalina, but given that both were Franciscans and tied to diplomatic relations with Japan, it 
seems likely that Sotelo had learned a great deal about his counterpart’s negative experience in 
Japan and sought to turn this information to the embassy’s benefit. The extended discussion of 
the new “emperor’s” hostility and gift suggestions demonstrated knowledge of Hidetada’s cool 
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reception of Santa Catalina and rejection of the crown’s tokens of goodwill. The proposal that 
money for the purchase of gifts be set aside in the Philippines implies that Sotelo already tacitly 
accepted that they would be returning to Japan via Manila. The viceroy wrote of his intention to 
arrange passage for the Bautista to the Philippines in October. Sotelo’s submitted his appeal a 
month later, and said nothing about the ships’ destination, indirectly conceding the point. Instead 
the trio of authors focused their energy on the portrayal of Date as a refuge and ally for the 
Christian mission, whose ongoing protection in spiritual matters hinged on the appropriate 
resolution of the secular concerns presented by the Bautista. 
 Hasekura’s own petition, or the petition bearing his name, attempted to situate the 
embassy and its ship among three leaders in its appeal to a fourth, the viceroy.73 Hasekura’s 
memorial bound the Bautista to his own diplomatic mission, in turn attaching the mission to 
Date’s dignity, Philip III’s honor, and the potential wrath of the “emperor” Hidetada. He claimed 
the Bautista had returned to Acapulco at his and Sotelo’s written request, and that the ship, its 
captain Yokozawa, and its cargo were all either Date’s vassals or the property of the daimyo and 
his allies.74 Hasekura pointed out, as had Sotelo, that the ship had lost the bulk of its cargo and 
could not bear the cost of taxes and still outfit itself for the journey home. Hasekura also directly 
invoked the Spanish crown. Mistreatment of the embassy—for the ship was part of the 
embassy—in Acapulco would insult Date and stain the reputation of the Spanish monarchy writ-
large. It would undo the goodwill the king had shown Hasekura during his time in Madrid and in 
                                                             
73 Ibid, p. 20-23.  The original is in Spanish but bears Hasekura’s signature. Sotelo and the other friars drafted the 
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Hasekura and Sotelo to return. See Gonoi, 206-7. 
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the Holy See in Rome. It might also insult and incite the Japanese emperor, here again a 
convenient foil to Date, the would-be benefactor. The distinction between Date and the 
Tokugawa, made even more forcefully by Sotelo, gave Hasekura purchase to raise the specter of 
Japanese retaliation while maintaining his distance from that threat. The description of the 
Tokugawa shogunate’s potential punitive actions here paralleled those listed by Valdes and 
Sotelo: retaliatory tariffs, revocation of fair treatment for and provisioning of Spanish vessels in 
the archipelago, and the possible confiscation of ships and their merchandise.75 The memorial’s 
final caution maintained the tension between a warning and an expression of good intentions. 
“Many are the times in which the strong winds of that sea [The Pacific] oblige [Spanish ships] to 
arrive where they don’t wish to be, and because this inconvenience can occur in no time at all, I 
warn Your Excellency of the risk that may occur in it [the decision to collect taxes on the 
Bautista] with love and openness.”76 Hasekura’s concluding profession of “love and openness,” 
if more strategic than genuine, still asserted a relationship with the king. The ambassador thus 
wore many hats: a representative of a prominent lord, a man favored by the viceroy’s own king, 
and a foreboding, yet sympathetic, messenger warning of the ire of Japan’s current ruler. The 
principal claimants to the viceroy made their appeal in relational terms, be it Valdes describing 
the economic relations of the Philippines, or Sotelo focusing on Date’s potential role as 
benefactor to the Christian population and coequal to the rulers of Japan. Hasekura followed suit, 
emphasizing the roles and concerns of multiple sovereigns, and by extension asking Guadalcázar 
to consider the same web of connections. 
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 Where it took the better part of a year for Guadalcázar to consult with Philip and confirm 
the overall response to the Bautista, the viceroy resolved the customs question in a few weeks. 
He and the treasury of New Spain together agreed not to levy taxes in December 1617, and the 
viceroy made a proclamation to this effect that day.77 The decision directly followed the 
testimony of Valdes’ six witnesses as recorded by an official in Mexico between the 14th and 19th 
of the same month. 
 Whatever the unofficial calculus undergirding the viceroy’s decision, his official 
statement framed itself as a resolution made on behalf of the Spanish in the Philippines.  The 
proclamation opened by responding specifically to the appeal of the “Procurador General de la 
ciudad de Manila,” giving Valdes pride of place among the petitioners. Large portions of the text 
were a direct copy of Valdes’ own petition citing the importance of Japanese silver to the 
Philippines, the absence of tariffs on the islands’ trade with Japan, and the important service to 
God and state rendered by the Spanish in the westernmost outpost of what was then still 
administered as a part of New Spain.78 The three friars, along with Hasekura (in that order) 
appeared later as corroborating witness, along with many of their arguments. The decree cited 
the disproportionate damage to trade in the Philippines that would result from the collection of a 
meager tax bill in Acapulco, the potential loss of Date’s favor, and the possible revocation of the 
security granted to Spanish ships in the area. The final consequence Sotelo and Hasekura warned 
of, as summarized by the viceroy, was telling: “it would break the peace that is so important to 
preserve.”79 After careful consultation and consideration of the petitioners, singling out Valdes 
                                                             
77 12-12. CCXXXVIII. 
78 Compare 12-12, CCXXXVIII and 12-45, 8–13. 
79 Ibid, 12-12, p. 444. “se quebraría la paz que tanto ymporta conserver.” 
Joshua Batts 
Ch. 4 – The Gate Ajar 
241 
 
again by name, Guadalcázar ordered the suspension of any and all customs from “the 
merchandise and things that the said Japanese, mentioned above, have sold and will sell in this 
kingdom.”80 Limited in scope to the “said Japanese” then in Acapulco, the proclamation said 
nothing about the prospects for future trade between New Spain and Japan, specifically whether 
or not customs would be expected of any other Japanese vessel. Though the text referred to Date 
and Hasekura, the proclamation made clear that tariffs had been rescinded primarily out of 
concern for the threat to existing relations between the Philippines and Japan rather than any 
potential relationship between New Spain proper and Date’s “kingdom” of Ōshū. In the end, the 
shogun’s wrath proved more persuasive than the daimyo’s goodwill. 
Though he likely never learned of it, Guadalcázar also risked the displeasure of his own 
superiors. The viceroy advised Philip of the decision as part of a report sent in May of 1618, half 
a year after concluding the matter. His summary was concise. The “Procurador General” of the 
Philippines had presented a petition requesting the suspension of customs “on account of the 
inconveniences that would result from it with regards to the trade of India and the said islands 
[the Philippines].”81 Guadalcázar included a full copy of his proclamation, but the short 
executive summary suggests the viceroy’s central concerns. Sotelo, Hasekura, and the mission 
were excised completely, and the viceroy represented the event as an action taken at the behest 
of representatives from the Philippines in order to avoid injuring the valuable trade of the Indies. 
 The proclamation reached the monarchy’s senor fiscal prior to its review by the Council 
of the Indies, the body established to advise the king and design policy for the monarch’s 
administration of its overseas territories. The fiscal was not pleased. He advised that the viceroy 
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be notified “that in no instance should he pardon the duties owed to His Majesty, but that 
likewise he order they [the duties] be paid in full despite what they [any claimants] say to him 
and whatever reasons they give for it.”82 The fiscal went on to warn of the harm to the royal 
treasury that would result from granting similar exceptions, and admonished the viceroy for 
exceeding his authority.83 The full Council convened in November 1618 to consider the fiscal’s 
remarks and the matter as a whole. The Bautista had long since departed Acapulco, leaving the 
organs of state in Madrid no opportunity to directly intervene. Instead, without commenting on 
the viceroy’s executive authority, the Council not only condoned his resolution but also 
expanded upon it, exempting from tariffs any Japanese trading ships that might arrive in the 
future. However, if one should drop anchor in Acapulco, the viceroy was to maintain an account 
of all customs duties that would have collected in normal circumstances and report it to the 
court.84  
In this way, central authorities could stay abreast of both the scope of the trade and the 
potential revenue for the crown and plan accordingly. Guadalcázar likely knew he was skirting 
the limits of his authority, one reason why he had limited his exemption specifically to the 
Bautista. In its response, the crown affirmed and extended the viceroy’s resolution, but also 
reasserted its own prerogative by ordering a record of taxes owed but not collected. This shadow 
ledger served as a contingency plan and allowed the court to weigh in on a process it had been 
cut out of initially. Finally, it demonstrated the ongoing attempts of the court to straddle the line 
between discouraging trade with the Japanese without explicitly rebuking or refusing them. Thus 
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technically the Bautista saga had resulted in an indefinite tax break and trade concessions, albeit 
for a group that would never learn of or act upon its privileged positon. The actions taken by 
both the court and the viceroy inhibited the capacity for further trade between Japan and New 
Spain, and nothing had yet been put in writing to encourage it. Neither had Spanish officials 
gone so far as to condemn it. Unofficially, the “gate” (in Montesclaros’ parlance) remained ajar, 
though that fact remained consciously hidden from any Japanese party that might think of 
approaching.85 In the end, the viceroy never made an entry in the shadow ledger, largely due to 
another fateful decision he made, not about the Bautista’s crew, cargo, or destination, but the 
vessel itself.  
 Philip’s original instructions concerning the Bautista suggested that the ship be sold to 
the Japanese in lieu of any merchandise, enabling “trade” without actually having to trade any 
goods. Unfortunately for Philip, the Bautista was a Japanese vessel, and trade—excluding 
silver—proceeded accordingly. Guadalcázar however, took the idea and ran with it. In his 
October 1617 response to the king, the viceroy reported arranging for the Japanese to sell the 
ship to the Spanish upon their arrival in the Philippines, where it could be put to good use against 
the Dutch. Unable to safely cross the Pacific without Spanish navigational expertise, the Bautista 
would form part of the armada escorting the new Governor-General of the Philippines Alonso 
Fajardo de Entenza to the territories under his charge. 
 The viceroy had hit upon an especially tidy resolution. The Philippines wrote annually for 
more troops, more guns, and more ships as Spanish forces struggled to contain the encroachment 
of the Dutch VOC in the waters of East Asia. The need was especially dire following the Dutch 
                                                             
85 “Ajar” being the favored parlance of Robert Innes in his influential dissertation on Japan’s foreign trade in the 
seventeenth century, “The Door Ajar: Japan’s Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century.” 
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victory against a joint Portuguese-Spanish force in the Moluccas in 1616, during which an illness 
had claimed life of the previous governor-general. Fajardo succeeded to the post in 1618, and 
soon had his hands full defending Manila itself against the Dutch.86 The new governor-general 
had arrived with funds, over a hundred soldiers, and the Bautista, but soon asked Philip for more 
reinforcements. He wrote in 1619 that the settlement claimed just four sea-worthy ships for the 
islands’ defense, the Japanese galleon numbering among them.87  
 Additionally, selling the Bautista removed the means for a quick Japanese return to New 
Spain. Date required a ship capable of a four-month voyage and a crew to sail it. The king and 
viceroy had just deprived him of both. Ships, Japanese or otherwise, would still sail between 
Manila and the ports of Kyushu in southwestern Japan, but the Bautista had originated much 
further north and east, and as the viceroy likely surmised, there was no fleet waiting to take its 
place. The sale also secured compliance with the king’s order prohibiting Spaniards from sailing 
on Japanese vessels. Some sailors might have been discretely convinced to sail to eastern Japan 
aboard the Bautista from the Philippines. Similarly, leaving the Japanese in possession of the 
ship left open the possibility that Spaniards could be pressed into service, as Santa Catalina 
alleged occurred for the Bautista’s second crossing. Neither was now an option. Finally, the sale 
would place the embassy more firmly under Spanish authority. The ship had been used as a 
diplomatic chip to appeal for concessions. The sale swept that leverage off the board. 
 How and why the embassy legation acquiesced to a sale so obviously at odds with their 
mission is unclear, and accounts of the sale conflict. Neither Date nor Hasekura ever referenced 
                                                             
86 See Arturo Giraldez, The Age of Trade: The Manila Galleons and the Dawn of the Global Economy (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 94-99 for an overview of Spanish-Dutch conflict in the Indies. 
87 B&R XVIII, 247-51. 
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the sale of the Bautista or gave an opinion on it. In a letter he wrote to the Council of Indies from 
New Spain in 1618, Sotelo stated that Hasekura volunteered the ship to Fajardo, but this 
anecdote clearly formed part of a last-ditch effort to curry favor in Spain, and may well have 
been Sotelo’s spin on the viceroy’s decision.88 Guadalcázar made no mention of Hasekura’s 
generosity. The governor-general reported on the sale to the king in the above-mentioned letter 
from 1619, writing that he had first borrowed and then purchased the ship at a very cheap price, 
but only after "a great deal of trouble" from its owners.89 A letter sent by an official in the 
Philippines at roughly the same time went into more detail. In the official’s telling, the Spanish 
originally offered to borrow the Bautista for battle and reimburse the Japanese for any damages 
or losses incurred. He cited the role of the Franciscans as intermediaries in the sale, and 
accredited Fajardo's own good standing with the Japanese as well. The official made no mention 
of trouble, but agreed with Fajardo that the Spanish purchased the vessel at a very cheap price.90 
Both accounts give the impression that the decision to purchase the vessel had been conceived of 
and pursued solely in Philippines, but the viceroy had mentioned the plan in October of 1617. 
Guadalcázar presented the matter as decided, with only the price still in debate.91 
 Japanese sources muddle the picture further. When Date learned of Hasekura's arrival in 
the Philippines he reported to the shogunate his intention to send a vessel down to Manila to 
retrieve the ambassador, and did not mention or explain the Bautista’s absence. Date addressed 
one such missive to Mukai Shōgen, the Tokugawa Admiral of the Fleet (船手奉行, funate 
                                                             
88 DNS 12-12, CCI. Sotelo to the President of the Council of Indies, 1618.02.03. 
89 Ibid. CCXLII, Fajardo to King, 1619.8.10. This quote is taken from Blair and Robertson, and is their English 
translation of the Spanish original. 
90 Ibid., CCXLIII, Don Juan de Alvarado Bracamonte to the King, 1619.7.28.  
91 Ibid., CCXXXVIII Viceroy to King, 1617.10.20. 
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bugyō) who had assisted in the approval and construction of the Bautista, yet made no mention 
of the ship. 
 The Bautista's sale and subsequent disappearance remains perplexing, all the more so 
because of its uniqueness. It was one of but two Japanese ships to successfully complete a trans-
Pacific voyage prior to the nineteenth century and the only one to do so multiple times.92 
Sponsored by Date, aided by Mukai, sanctioned by the Tokugawa, and built with the help of 
foreign expertise, the ship represented a coalition of regional, central, and external interests. 
However, as Yokozawa explained to Santa Catalina, ultimately it was Date's ship, and it is 
difficult to grasp why the daimyo appeared to accept the sale, at a cheap price, without comment 
or consequence for his representatives. Even bereft of hope at the prospect of ever opening a 
route between New Spain and Ōshū, the ship could have been repurposed for domestic trade or 
sent to the ports of the China Sea, locations that did not require Spanish navigational expertise to 
reach. That Hasekura and Yokozawa would countenance the sale of such a prized sea-going 
vessel also remains difficult to understand. Whatever the case, the Bautista soon vanished from 
Spanish records as well, and was not referenced again after the discussion of its sail and 
readiness for Manila’s defense in 1619.93 
 The surviving record does permit some tentative speculation on the circumstances and 
success of the sale. Fajardo may in fact have been on quite good terms with the Japanese 
contingent. While still in Acapulco, he served as the godfather for the Japanese captain 
                                                             
92 The other Japanese vessel, the Buena Ventura, had escorted Vivero across to Acapulco four years earlier. It was 
also sold to the Spanish, this time in New Spain. A separate article will consider the construction and fate of these 
two vessels and one other in more detail. 
93 B&R XVIII, 250. 
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Yokozawa's baptism, a solemn role of diplomatic utility to both sides.94 It is also possible 
Hasekura’s party considered the Bautista lost prior to leaving New Spain. Sotelo’s letter 
describing the pending sale, written just prior to their departure, may have simply been putting a 
brave face on acquiescence. The king's order to prohibit Spanish sailors on any direct return to 
Japan and the viceroy's decision to order a return via the Philippines as part of Fajardo's armada 
put the Japanese in the position of sailing between two Spanish ports, under the direction of a 
Spanish crew, as escort to a Spanish official. The ship and its Japanese passengers were quite 
literally in Spanish hands. The threat of not being able to return stood in for any explicit threat 
made by their hosts in New Spain or the Philippines. However, it is still probable that for 
whatever reason Hasekura’s party agreed to the sale of their own accord. If the fear of Japanese 
reprisal in the Philippines was great enough to alter the tax policy of New Spain, it seems 
unlikely that the same officials would feel comfortable commandeering the entire ship, even 
under the pretense of a sale. Thus Fajardo’s account of a negotiated sale, though short on 
specifics, was likely accurate. 
 There is also the possibility that Date himself was amenable to selling the ship. It may be 
remembered that in reporting the Spanish king's ban on foreign ships arriving in New Spain, 
Richard Cocks recorded that the "emperor" of Japan had issued his own parallel decree 
forbidding the Japanese from traveling to New Spain.95 Cocks is the only evidence of such an 
edict at this time, but it is certainly true that attitudes towards missionaries and Iberians in 
general continued to harden after the 1614 Tokugawa prohibition against Christianity, as Santa 
Catalina's experiences can attest. Perhaps Date received permission for one final journey to 
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recover his vassal and profit from any trade, while also ferrying Santa Catalina and the king's 
gifts back from where they came. There is no text to this effect, and one wonders why the 
Tokugawa would not just send the Santa Catalina party back to New Spain via the Philippines 
with orders for Hasekura to return via the same route on a Spanish vessel. The Bautista's rough 
crossing and loss of cargo had already cost Date and those onboard a great deal in lost revenue. 
If the ship was never going to set out to New Spain again, selling it may have been the best way 
to recoup losses. There is no record of what cargo and monies ultimately made their way back to 
Ōshū, aside from gifts to Date brought back by his embassy. Neither is there a record of what 
sum the ship fetched in the Philippines. Beyond the mission's diplomatic failure, the economic 
benefits of the Bautista's voyages, if any, remain difficult to ascertain.  Date’s willingness to part 
with the ship in the face of dimming prospects would explain his representatives’ agreeing to sell 
it, but for now remains squarely in the realm of speculation. 
 Finally, it is possible that the Japanese contingent parted with the ship as a last-ditch 
effort to demonstrate their goodwill and keep alive some dim hope that Philip might permit trade 
between Date's "kingdom" and New Spain. This aligns with Sotelo’s aforementioned account in 
his 1618 letter to the Council of Indies. Selling the means to conduct that trade might seem 
counterintuitive, but if Philip opened the gates, new ships might have been built, and not all the 
ships needed to be Japanese. Certainly, Fajardo appreciated the extra galleon in the midst of 
efforts to secure Manila and counter Dutch aggression. Date's representatives selling their ship to 
help Spain combat the Dutch threat might have been a strategy to further differentiate between 
the wroth "emperor" of Japan, rumored to be susceptible to Dutch influence, and the alternative 
presented by the more friendly and tolerant northern daimyo. Such an explanation accounts for 
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the bargain price Fajardo reported, but would also mean that Date’s embassy sacrificed their ship 
for the sake of the relationship it was meant to make possible.  
 Whether or not the Bautista was sold as part of such a gambit, its fate was sealed upon its 
departure from Acapulco, as was the fate of any further trade between Japan and New Spain. In 
this, the viceroy was both agent and prophet. The Bautista spent over a year in port, during 
which time Guadalcázar granted its passengers the privilege of customs-free trade while denying 
them a crew, destination, and in time, the vessel itself. His final report to Philip on the matter is 
telling. Having received the monarch's instructions on what to do in the event any other Japanese 
vessel arrived, the viceroy reported back with his compliance. But he was not overly concerned 
about enforcement. Guadalcázar told his king that he would do as was asked, “however for now I 
think that this correspondence [between Japan and New Spain] is closed."96 No other Japanese 
vessel would set out to cross the Pacific for over two hundred years. 
Conclusion 
 Spanish officials adhered to a policy that sought balance between obstruction and outright 
rejection when resolving the problems posed by the Bautista. The Japanese vessel and its 
passengers pressed the issue of a more open Pacific at a time when the contours and dynamic of 
a putatively Spanish Lake were still being debated. That debate, however, remained internal. 
Montesclaros and his contemporaries were discussing how best to exploit a closed system of 
imperial nodes for the monarchy’s benefit. Sotelo’s voice and Date’s mission remained the 
perspective of the minority. The crown opted against any fundamental restructuring of the 
relations among Macau, Manila, and Acapulco and their economic and logistical role in the 
Indies, which held until the restoration of an independent Portuguese crown in 1640. Handling 
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the Bautista required resisting Japanese efforts to pry open Spain’s closed circuit across the 
Pacific while maintaining the archipelago’s established relationship with that circuit.  
Guadalcázar’s decisions and correspondence reflected these priorities. The final customs 
decision evinced concern for protecting existing relations. The viceroy framed the decision as a 
response to Valdes’ petition, as a decision rendered for the benefit of the Manila settlement. 
Tariff policy in Acapulco preserved Manila’s commerce and security in East Asia. The Keichō 
Embassy’s role in New Spain paralleled its ineffectiveness in Europe, provoking policy debate 
with its presence but unable to wield much direct influence. Hasekura and Sotelo warned of the 
“emperor’s” anger in order to drive the Spanish towards Date, but the threat of Tokugawa 
displeasure instead drove them away from the daimyo and his ship. 
The viceroy granted the tariff exemption in the hopes of protecting Manila from 
retaliation and preserving its place in Asian trade; his supplemental decisions regarding sailors, 
the Bautista’s route, and the vessel itself prevented Japanese expansion. Denying Date’s ship 
Spanish sailors withheld personnel and knowledge that Spain might thereby retain exclusive 
control over. The crown and its lieutenants undercut any future voyages by refusing the 
technology transfer necessary to the endeavor. The dominoes fell from there. Dependent on 
Spanish mariners, the Bautista had to go where Spaniards could go, necessitating a crossing to 
the Philippines rather than Japan. The route to the Philippines also served as silent rebuke, 
avoiding the route the vessel’s sponsor had hoped to open. Finally, the ship changed hands, 
halting Japanese forays into the Pacific and serving Spain’s military needs against the Dutch. 
Collectively, these decisions removed the means to Japanese expansion without having to 
directly decry that project. 
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 The Bautista’s second sojourn in New Spain capped a multi-year effort by the Spanish 
monarchy and its officials to ward off unwanted encroachment from Tokugawa Japan. 
Guadalcázar successfully closed of the East Pacific, and Spain remained committed to a status 
quo preserving Manila as the fulcrum of Asia-America exchange and the gatekeeper to trade 
with the Japanese archipelago. 
 But Tokugawa Japan did not yet have a status quo, as leadership experimented with the 
geographical, conceptual, and material function of foreign commerce. Relations with the Spanish 
Philippines were inherited, not established, and were subject to change. Japanese leadership 
looked to organize its economic relations in the proprietary manner that polities often do, and 
with each year found less and less reason to engage their Spanish counterparts. The monarchy’s 
unofficial final offer did not amount to much: keep the eastern Pacific closed, keep the western 
Pacific open, and embrace a missionary population that the shogunate had already moved to 
expel. That Guadalcázar thought the Tokugawa might acquiesce to Spain’s vision of trans-
Pacific relations suggests the widening distance between expectations on either side of the ocean. 
 Decisions in New Spain also sent the Keichō Embassy to Manila, a place its members 
never intended to go. By the time Sotelo and Hasekura arrived in the Philippines in 1618, the duo 
had devoted half a decade to the possibility of strengthening ties between the monarchy and the 
shogunate. They arrived at the primary site of existing Japanese-Spanish relations for the 
previous half century. In Manila the actual and potential became enmeshed, and as the latter 
wound down the former fell apart. The Tokugawa would retaliate, not through crippling taxes, 
but by deciding the Spanish were no longer worth the trouble. 
 The Acapulco-Manila connection Guadalcázar and his peers worked to preserve is often 
thought of as the last link in a chain that enabled a truly global economy. Chains connect, but 
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they also constrict. The Bautista’s crossings and their wider context demonstrate how one 
prominent link in the global economy depended on strictly controlled space. Tokugawa Japan 
sustained two decades of considerable and consistent diplomatic and economic investment in 
opening up that space. Spain wanted to preserve a silver thread across the ocean; for a time Japan 
offered the alternative of a trans-Pacific network operating across polities. The Spanish never 
monopolized the Pacific, but the “global trade” they facilitated via that ocean derived from the 
maintenance of accepted networks within one political entity rather than the intensification of 
relations across multiple polities. These efforts ensured that the ocean remained a barrier, not a 
conduit, to formal diplomatic and commercial ties not premised on exploitation or colonization 
the rest of the century and beyond. The voyages of the Bautista suggest how European 
“expansion” in the early modern world could be tinged an insularity all its own.
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5. Lost at Sea: The Aftermath of the Keichō Embassy 
 It is difficult to diagram correspondence between Tokugawa Japan and Habsburg Spain. 
Letters, representatives, and vessels moved among nodes in a manner too complex and 
haphazard to support the binary implied by “Japanese-Spanish relations.” Thus, for example, in 
1614 Alonso Muñoz petitioned the monarchy to return to Japan, Santa Catalina and his 
companions stalled in New Spain, Hasekura and Sotelo arrived in Acapulco, and Vizcaíno 
returned to the Americas embittered and embroiled in conflict with his shipmates. 
 Communication between these two composite hierarchies functioned like sonar. Two 
poles of authority—Edo and Madrid—sent pulses across the ocean in the form of letters, 
representatives, and vessels. Each pole did so to orient themselves and locate interlocutors, to 
navigate relations. This communication never functioned as a simple call and response. Either 
pole might send another pulse before receiving a reply to the first. Hence, Ieyasu permitted Date 
to dispatch the Bautista before hearing back from Philip. Additionally, each pulse might produce 
ripples of its own, as when Salinas sent Vizcaíno to Japan independent of Madrid’s counsel. 
 These ripples spread and generated their own effects even as the two apex authorities 
moved on, much in the way ripples move across a pond long after the rock dropped in sinks to 
the bottom. Intermediaries found themselves solving problems that no longer existed. 
Guadalcázar adopted measures to impede future Japanese traffic to Acapulco even as the 
Tokugawa abandoned further investment in the enterprise. Edo and Madrid foreclosed the 
possibility of relations across the Pacific by the close of 1615, well before the pulses traveling 
between dissipated. Philip ruled against direct commerce prior to meeting Hasekura, yet Date’s 
retainer traveled on to Rome before embarking on the long route home. Ieyasu knew Santa 
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Catalina had little to offer soon after the friar’s arrival, but Date sent the Bautista out once more. 
It took a full decade for the water to be still.  
 This final chapter explores how intermediaries reacted to the fallout from their superiors. 
This fallout entails more than the Keichō Embassy’s return. It also touches upon the end of direct 
contact between the Japanese archipelago and the Philippines Islands, despite Manila’s best 
efforts. Vizcaíno had prioritized a search for mythical islands of gold and silver over realizing 
the potential of trade between Japan and New Spain; a decade later the unwinding of that 
potential relationship helped sever the very real link between the Philippines and the archipelago. 
For a decade, Manila had acted as the principal intermediary between the shogunate and the 
monarchy, but it had never proved capable of mediating the demands of its colonial superior and 
its powerful neighbor.  
 After 1609, negotiations between the two composite polities occurred over Manila’s 
head, and in 1618 the islands struggled with how to respond when Guadalcázar sent the human 
and material detritus of that aborted encounter— the Bautista, Hasekura, and Sotelo—to the 
Philippines. Date’s previously inseparable representatives took very different paths back to 
Japan, while Manila mounted its own campaign to preserve relations with the Tokugawa. Here 
again, the Spanish settlement proved unable to bridge the gap. 
 Sonar can be used to communicate, but the shogunate and the monarchy never managed 
to communicate effectively with each other. Sonar can also be used get one’s bearings, to 
understand one’s surroundings, to explore the depths. In these respects, the Tokugawa shogunate 
did what it needed to do. It spent the opening decades of the seventeenth century literally testing 
the waters. Sounding out Spain was an important part of this process, and by the 1620s the 
Tokugawa had gotten their bearings in East Asia sufficiently to make a decision, even one as 
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final as severing ties. Conversely, though Spain warded off advances into the eastern Pacific, it 
had to reconcile itself to losing a valuable relationship on the western shores of that same ocean. 
 The remnants of the Keichō Embassy arrived in Manila as part of the flotilla escorting the 
new governor-general Alonso Fajardo de Entenza in August 1618. Fajardo soon after took the 
Bautista off the party’s hands, leaving Hasekura and Sotelo in Manila without Date’s ship. Their 
principal duty now seemed to be getting back to the daimyo in Sendai, however disappointing 
their news. But this proposition proved complicated, especially for the ever zealous Sotelo. 
Circumstance and disposition held both men in Manila for multiple years, but in time their paths 
diverged. 
 The duo arrived at an unsettled juncture. The 1614 Tokugawa prohibition against 
Christianity presaged an unraveling of the relationship between the Philippines and Japan, but 
did not bring about swift and total change. At the close of 1614 the shogunate forced a number of 
missionaries to depart out of Nagasaki, but at least a few dozen chose to go into hiding. Still 
more continued to enter surreptitiously, often from Manila, such that the number of missionaries 
in Japan probably rebounded following their initial culling in 1614.1 Missionaries fleeing Edo 
and exiled Japanese Catholics also moved north, growing the church throughout the northeast 
region of Japan, Sendai included. 
 Trade between Manila and the ports of Kyushu also continued. Shuin vessels traveled to 
Manila until 1624. The population of Manila’s Japanese settlements grew throughout the second 
                                                             
1 Drawing primarily on Jesuit sources, Jurgis Elisonas records that forty-seven missionaries refused to leave in 1614, 
twenty-seven of them Jesuits. By 1621 the number of Jesuits active in Japan grew to thirty-six, with members of 
other orders undoubtedly entering Japan as well. See Elisonas, “Christianity and the Daimyo,” in Vol. 4 of The 
Cambridge History of Japan, eds. John Whitney Hall and James L. McClain (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 368.  
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decade of the century, peaking around 3000.2 Their numbers prompted the procurador of Manila 
to call for the expulsion of all Japanese from the settlement in a 1919 memorial to Philip III.3 Yet 
Manila continued to import provisions from Japan, including basic foodstuffs such as wheat and 
biscuits, into the 1620s.4 The ambivalent status of relations encompassed a disjointed mix of 
necessary provisions, unwanted missionaries, sanctioned trading passes, and disquiet over 
resident populations. 
 Unease with Japan intermingled with the direct threat of Dutch incursions. Despite the 
truce active in Europe, conflict between the Spanish Habsburgs and the Low Countries escalated 
in the East Indies. In 1616, Governor-General Juan de Silva mustered a large Spanish fleet in 
Asia to beat back the Dutch, but the expedition ended in disaster. Meant to coordinate with 
Portuguese force in Melaka, upon arrival the Spaniards learned that the Dutch had already 
dispatched their Iberian allies. Fever struck the fleet as it returned to Manila, claiming the 
governor-general’s life.5 A year later, the second battle of Playa Honda repulsed Dutch ships 
near Manila but at a loss of multiple Spanish vessels.6 Silva’s replacement as governor-general, 
Fajardo, had originally been tapped to lead a large flotilla from Spain to the Philippines via the 
                                                             
2 Iwao Seiichi, Shuinsen to Nihon-machi (Tokyo: Shibundō, 1962), 111–12. 
3 “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,” 1619. AGI,FILIPINAS,27,N.108 (Item 38). 
4 Birgit Tremml-Werner, Spain, China and Japan in Manila, 1571-1644: Local Comparisons and Global 
Connections (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 249; citing Iwao Seiichi, Nanʾyō Nihon-machi no 
kenkyū (Tokyo: Minami Ajia Bunka Kenkyūjo, 1941), 338. 
5 Arturo Giráldez, The Age of Trade: The Manila Galleons and the Dawn of the Global Economy (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 95. 
6 Ruurdje Laarhoven and Elizabeth Pino Wittermans, “From Blockade to Trade: Early Dutch Relations with Manila, 
1600–1750,” Philippine Studies 33, no. 4 (1985): 490. 
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Cape route and succor Portuguese and Spanish forces in the East Indies.7 The monarchy scuttled 
this ambitious plan by spring 1617, and so it was that Fajardo crossed the Pacific together with a 
vessel from an unknown lord in northern Japan.8 These setbacks fueled ongoing anxiety about 
insufficient military resources. Writing in 1618, a Jesuit in Manila complained that the islands 
had been waiting twenty years for the monarchy to send sufficient ships, to no avail.9 A renewed 
Dutch blockade of Manila that year brought military deficiencies to the forefront, as well as 
giving further urgency to Fajardo’s purchase of the Bautista. That the Dutch purportedly 
permitted red-seal vessels under the shogunate’s protection to skirt the blockade spoke to the 
VOC’s healthy respect for the Tokugawa while also raising alarm in Manila about the growing 
Dutch foothold in Japan.10 
 Leadership in Manila must have met Date’s embassy with trepidation. The group claimed 
the diplomatic sanction of Japan and returned to Asia with the courtesy—if not the 
concessions—of Manila’s supreme secular and religious authorities. If they were not 
immediately ill at ease, a certain member of the daimyo’s representatives soon gave them reason 
to be. As in Europe before, Luis Sotelo left a larger documentary footprint than his Japanese 
counterpart, and these sources reveal that Manila did not know quite what to do with a friar once 
again obscuring the source and sanction of the authority he claimed. 
                                                             
7 AGI,FILIPINAS,340,L.3,F.138V-140R. The flotilla was to consist of 1,600 infantrymen, eight galleons, two 
caravels, and a patache, a substantial investment in the military capacity of the Philippines.  
8 Philip notified Guadalcázar of the change in plans in a March 1617 letter. See AGI,FILIPINAS,329,L.2,242RV. 
Fajardo, originally meant to depart as the captain of the armada, was repurposed to serve as governor-general 
following the death of his predecessor. See for example, AGI,FILIPINAS,200,N.215, which comments on Fajardo’s 
new appointment. 
9 “Carta del Jesuita Juan de Ribera sobre situación estratégica,” 1618.12.02. AGI,FILIPINAS,20,R.12,N.80. 
10 Adam Clulow notes that the VOC let a shuin vessel pass the blockade in November 1618, a few months after 
Hasekura and Sotelo’s arrival in the city. See Clulow, The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with 
Tokugawa Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 146. 
Joshua Batts  
Ch. 5 – Lost at Sea 
258 
 
Maneuvering in Manila 
 Sotelo flummoxed his compatriots and fellow mendicants in Manila. Secular and 
religious leaders in the Philippines respected his experience, but worried about the strength of his 
zeal and the scope of his ambition. They also chafed at his grandiose claims to papal sanction 
and leadership over the mission in Japan. Once again, Sotelo summoned just enough credibility 
to draw attention but not enough to merit trust. The friar spent four years in the Philippines, 
consumed with returning to Japan. The Tokugawa prohibition complicated a return, though 
missionaries had flouted the ban by entering the archipelago through subterfuge. In addition to 
Tokugawa hostility, Manila officialdom also ardently opposed the Sotelo’s return. Its assessment 
of his motivations and potential varied, but the vast majority agreed that the friar had no business 
going to Japan.  
 Letters from Manila suggest officials there could not decide what to do with the friar, 
mirroring the struggle to establish a coherent policy toward Japan. After warding off Sotelo’s 
quick return in 1618, authorities passed an ambivalent four years curtailing his activity, 
requesting his expulsion, and recommending his talents. The friar began ministering to Manila’s 
considerable Japanese population, and by summer 1619 he oversaw an unauthorized seminary 
for Japanese residents. A Jesuit account from July reported that Fajardo and the Archbishop of 
Manila together removed the friar from his makeshift enterprise and confined him to a 
monastery.11 In contrast to this rebuke, that same month the Bishop of Zebu (today’s Cebu)—a 
settlement almost 600 kilometers south of Manila—wrote Philip to recommend Sotelo be 
                                                             
11 DNS 12-12, CCXLVII. This information comes from an excerpt of a Jesuit report on events in the Philippines 
from July 1618–July 1619.  
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consecrated as the bishop of eastern Japan.12 Monastery life did not bring an end to Sotelo’s 
maneuvering. Two years later, the Archbishop of Manila wrote the king of Spain (now Philip IV, 
r. 1621–1665) warning of Sotelo’s ill-advised desire to re-enter Japan and requested his 
apprehension and removal from the Philippines. The following year the Archbishop adopted the 
language of career adjustment rather than expulsion, writing that “[it] seems to me that [Sotelo] 
has aspects and the capacity to serve Your Majesty in any prelacy, as long as it is not in Japan.”13  
 Sotelo justified his actions in the Philippines by claiming papal support for assuming the 
title and responsibilities of bishop. Following the embassy’s audience in Rome, Pope Paul V had 
recommended the friar to the Spanish throne as a candidate for bishop of eastern Japan, should 
such a position be created. Philip’s Council of the Indies had tabled the issue earlier when Sotelo 
had earlier made the same request in Spain, and the pope’s letter did not change any minds.  
 Even if the Council of Indies had been sympathetic, installing an additional bishop in 
Japan required navigating the agendas of the papacy, the crown of Spain, and the crown of 
Portugal. The papacy conceded the right to nominate bishops in the Indies to the crowns of 
Castile and Portugal, a prerogative the Castilian crown jealously guarded and expanded 
throughout the sixteenth century.14 Thus the pope could recommend Sotelo but could not install 
him independent of the monarchy’s approval.  
 In addition, although the Spanish Habsburgs held the crowns of Castile and Portugal 
concurrently, they ruled them separately.15 Philip II established this precedent upon taking the 
                                                             
12 Bishop of Cebu to Philip III, 1619.07.30. AGI,FILIPINAS,76,N.10. 
13 For the 1621 letter, see DNS 12-12, CCLI. For the 1622 letter, doc. CCLII. 
14 This appointment system was called the patronato real, (“royal patronage”) in Spain. 
15 Present-day Spain was a composite of kingdoms, including the crowns of Castile and León, as well as the 
Kingdom of Aragon. 
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title of King of Portugal in 1580, and his successors continued to honor that principle. 
Portuguese and Spanish activities in Japan illustrated the complications stemming from the 
administrative divide. Portugal, not Spain, nominated the bishops of Japan, and uniformly 
nominated Jesuits.16  
 The rivalry between Jesuits aligned with Portugal and mendicant orders, including 
Franciscans, aligned with Spain mirrored tensions between Portuguese and Spanish commercial 
ambitions in the East Indies. In 1615, Philip III’s councilors worried that Jesuit and Portuguese 
interests would protest the establishment of a second bishopric through Spanish Franciscan 
channels. Coupled with the instability in Japan and insufficient trust in Date and his 
representatives, Philip and his advisors had no qualm deflecting Sotelo’s request to appoint 
additional bishops in Japan, citing the need for more complete information and for consultation 
with the Council of Portugal.17 
 The pope’s half-hearted and largely ineffectual recommendation did little to discourage 
Sotelo three years later and half a world away in the Philippines. Instead, he used Paul V’s 
conditional endorsement to justify a return to Japan and to legitimatize his missionary outreach 
in and around Manila. The 1619 Jesuit report described Sotelo ordaining significant numbers of 
Japanese at his makeshift seminary, “though we do not know with what title, nor with what 
authority.”18 The friar’s efforts advanced to the point that he had taken over a house, installed a 
church bell, and was giving mass before the Governor-General and Archbishop stopped him.19 
                                                             
16 This followed a 1575 papal bull declaring Japan a part of the Macao—i.e., a Portuguese-controlled—diocese. 
17 Consulta del Consejo de Indias, 1615.04.02. Chapter 3 discusses Sotelo’s various requests in more depth.  
18 DNS 12-12, CCXLVII. 
19 Ibid.  
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Regarding Japan, Sotelo evidently intended to return as bishop, papal representative, and 
commissioner general of the Franciscans.20 The last title conferred leadership over the 
Franciscan order in Japan. Assuming he could made it back to Japan, Sotelo’s claimed titles 
would have made him the principal figure in the Japanese Catholic Church outside Kyushu and 
the Portuguese-Jesuit orbit. These tireless efforts to promote himself and his vision of the Japan 
mission prompted consternation and censure, but nobody in Manila succeeded in dissuading 
Sotelo or sending him away. Ultimately, despite widespread agreement that the friar could not 
return to Japan, Sotelo managed to do just that in fall 1622.  
 Manila’s inability to check the friar effectively stemmed in part from Sotelo’s penchant 
for obfuscating and exaggerating his relationship to authority. The friar’s checkered history with 
leaders in both Japan and Spain raised concerns but probably insulated him from more-direct 
reprisals. By 1618, Sotelo was a dozen-year veteran of missionary work in the Philippines and 
Japan, and a central figure in a seven-year mission to the heart of Catholic Europe. He may have 
been the only person then alive—and perhaps the only person in history—to receive an audience 
with the shogun of Japan, the king of Spain, and the pope, giving him more direct experience 
with the Philippines’ Castilian overlords, papal superiors, and Japanese neighbors than anyone 
else on the islands.21  
 His escapades served as a rhetorical cudgel for his critics while shielding the friar from 
those same detractors. A 1618 memorial to Philip III blamed Sotelo for the diplomatic morass 
                                                             
20 Archbishop of Manila to King of Spain, 1621.07.30. DNS 12-12, CCLI. See also a 1618 memorial to Philip (DNS 
12-12, CCXLVI). Cited below, which complained of Sotelo’s pretensions and the danger of his ambitions. 
21 Hasekura does not appear to have ever been received by either Tokugawa Ieyasu or Hidetada. The friar Alonso 
Muñoz and the Japanese merchant Itami Sōmi are potential exceptions, though neither were as central as Sotelo at 
each juncture. If Muñoz ever met with the pope, he did not do so as part of a delegation from Japan. Similarly, while 
the Tokugawa shogunate issued a shuin trading pass to Itami prior to Date’s mission, it is unclear if Itami ever met 
Ieyasu or Hidetada. 
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with Japan, the 1613 martyrdoms in Edo stemming from his church activity, and Japanese 
interest in large, ocean-going vessels.22 This document started the trend of calling for Sotelo’s 
detention in or expulsion from the Philippines, as well as advising explicitly against the friar’s 
return to Japan. It also demonstrates Manila leadership’s reluctance to defuse the situation on its 
own. Philip III and the viceroy Guadalcázar had sent Sotelo and Hasekura to Manila without 
providing guidance on what to do with them. Sotelo arrived with no clear mandate from the 
crown, and his plan to return to Japan risked antagonizing its Tokugawa rulers. Manila residents 
were right to be skeptical. But the friar did carry replies, however empty, for Date, and he 
correctly claimed the pope’s endorsement, however ineffectual it was in practice. Cognizant of 
Sotelo’s various connections, leadership in the Philippines sought resolution higher up the chain 
of command. This hesitancy exacted a price, necessitating a multiple-year wait for a reply with 
no guarantee of a definitive solution. In the meantime, Sotelo remained in the Philippines, 
probing for a path back to Japan. 
 The Philippines’ ambivalent reaction to Sotelo echoed the islands’ unenviable position 
vis-à-vis Spain and Japan: occupying the front lines of the existing relationship but possessing 
limited input on its overall direction. Manila relied on imported Japanese provisions, while 
economic exchange with and among Japanese and Chinese merchants formed the city’s 
livelihood. In the spiritual realm, decades of evangelization had fostered an extensive Christian 
community in Japan that continued to draw missionaries from the Philippines. Following the 
1614 prohibition, Manila became a refuge for Japanese Christians who refused apostasy, 
                                                             
22 Memorial Presented to the King of Spain [1618]. DNS 12-12, CCXLVI. It will be remembered that Sotelo 
established a chapel in Edo in 1613 despite a Tokugawa prohibition against missionary activities and churches in the 
shogunal lands. The Tokugawa executed all involved except Sotelo, who was saved due to Date’s intervention. 
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including the Kyushu Christian daimyos Takayama Ukon and Naitō Tadatoshi.23 But economic 
activity and evangelical opportunity went hand in hand with the threat of military invasion, 
commercial withdrawal, and local outbreaks of violence and insurrection against outnumbered 
Spaniards. Similar concerns about illicit shipping and effective administrative control spurred 
official limits—always difficult to enforce—on the number of Japanese ships allowed in port 
from the time of Ieyasu’s first letters.24 
 Manila similarly found itself underwater diplomatically, unauthorized to address 
Japanese commercial expansion and apprehensive about being cut out of negotiations between its 
neighbors to the north and superiors in Mexico and Madrid. Date’s enterprise and Sotelo’s 
journey stemmed indirectly from the Philippines’ inability to meet Tokugawa demands for trade 
near Edo and direct commerce with New Spain. From 1614 onward, Manila’s missionaries 
confronted a growing Tokugawa intolerance that it could subvert but not deter. 
 While the prospect of truly trans-Pacific ties unraveled in the audience chambers of Edo, 
Madrid, and Rome, Japan’s growing mistrust of missionary intent and influence threatened the 
very real commercial exchange that had existed between the Spanish Philippines and Japan in 
some form or another since Manila’s establishment in 1571.25 Guidance and material support 
from Spain arrived sporadically, leaving Spanish settlements in the Philippines caught between 
the incompatible priorities of powerful neighbors and distant superiors. Sotelo’s presence 
brought these tensions to the surface: the desire for trade, the missionary impulse, the 
monarchy’s ambivalent response to Japan, the papacy’s limited prerogatives in the Indies, and 
                                                             
23 Tremml-Werner, Spain, China, and Japan in Manila, 303. 
24 See Chapter 1 for more detail. 
25 Tremml-Werner’s Spain, China, and Japan in Manila analyzes the development and characteristics of this 
“Manila System.”  
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the personal agendas of the intermediaries moving between the nodes of these composite polities. 
The Philippines’ inability to mediate between Edo and Madrid contrasts with internal political 
dynamics in Japan, where the Tokugawa permitted Date to be an intermediary to the Spanish.  
   In fall 1622, the friar made good on his promise to return to the one place very few 
wanted him to go.26 That October Sotelo found passage to Japan on a Chinese junk. He departed 
disguised as a layman, together with a Japanese priest and a Japanese youth from the monastery 
in Manila. By this time few captains were willing to smuggle missionaries into Japan, and there 
were reports that some missionaries played the part of merchants in Manila for days on end in 
order to secure passage.27  
 The voyage to Japan went well enough, but little else did. The ship arrived in Satsuma on 
Kyushu and the crew learned of the recent martyrdom of two other missionaries and a Japanese 
ship captain. The ill tidings spooked the Chinese crew, who resolved to hand over the three to the 
magistrate in Nagasaki. Likely the crew was already on edge, for six years earlier the Tokugawa 
had mandated that all foreign trade be conducted in the ports of Hirado and Nagasaki.28 The 
ship’s initial docking in Satsuma meant that the junk was skirting sanctioned trade, and suggests 
that Satsuma domain remained complicit in commerce outside of approved Tokugawa 
channels.29 Another friar’s efforts to get the trio off the Chinese junk failed, and they were 
                                                             
26 Unless otherwise noted, the following account of Sotelo’s return to Japan is taken from Léon Pagés, Histoire de la 
religion chrétienne au Japon, Book II, excerpted as DNS 12-12, CCLIII and SDS, docs. 354 & 362. The original is 
in French; I have drawn on the French and a Japanese translation in SDS for the summation here. 
27 Archbishop of Manila to the King of Spain, DNS 12-12, CCLI. 
28 Michael S. Laver, The Sakoku Edicts and the Politics of Tokugawa Hegemony (Amherst: Cambria Press, 2011), 
70. 
29 Robert Hellyer explores the interplay and tension between the shogunate and Satsuma domain over the scope and 
scale of foreign trade throughout the Tokugawa period in Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640-
1868 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
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arrested and brought before the Nagasaki Magistrate. Sotelo, no doubt prepared for this scenario, 
declared himself to be Date Masamune’s messenger returning with a reply from the king of 
Spain, and requested that the “Emperor” (Tokugawa Hidetada) be advised of his return. But 
Tokugawa law was unambiguous about missionaries in the country, and Sotelo’s freedom was 
forfeit. The magistrate imprisoned Sotelo and his two Japanese companions in the nearby village 
of Ōmura, and once again Sotelo needed Date to get him out of jail. 
The Bautista Fades Away 
 Apart from the men and letters it carried, the San Juan Bautista was an important 
intermediary in its own right. Guadalcázar had already marked the vessel for purchase; now it 
was left to Fajardo to execute orders. The viceroy had denied the vessel its own route. By 
making the Bautista part of the governor-general’s flotilla he also remanded the vessel into 
Spanish custody. Fajardo made the de facto the de jure when he purchased the ship from its 
Japanese caretakers. However, Fajardo did not purchase the vessel from its owner; nor with the 
owner’s knowledge and consent. Date remained silent on the matter after Hasekura’s return, 
apparently acquiescing to the loss of his singular ship without protest as the Tokugawa had 
before him. 
 The diplomatic calculus in 1618 differed from what it had been earlier in the decade. 
Spanish diplomatic actors, formal and ad hoc alike, had provided cover to previous Japanese 
voyages and vessels: Vivero in 1610, Vizcaíno in 1613, Santa Catalina in 1616. The preceding 
all traveled eastward from Japan. In the one instance in which Spanish authorities countenanced 
a Japanese vessel to cross westward from New Spain to Japan, Santa Catalina and his party were 
aboard with Philip III’s official responses to Ieyasu and Hidetada.30  Even then, the monarchy 
                                                             
30 Vizcaino sailed directly from New Spain to Japan in 1611, but on a Spanish vessel, the San Francisco. 
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had ineffectually ordered Spanish crewman aboard not to return to Acapulco via the archipelago. 
When the Bautista looked to depart Acapulco a second time in 1618, there were no Spanish 
representatives to send to Japan, but Fajardo needed to travel to Manila.  
 Separate from any symbolic value, it is difficult to pin down the economic loss incurred 
by Japanese actors as a result of the vessel’s sale. Clearly Date lost his ship, and Fajardo’s 
contention that he acquired the Bautista “at a cheap price” suggests Yokozawa and Hasekura 
took a financial loss as well.31 It is also unclear if Fajardo paid in cash, kind, or a combination of 
the two. But the ship also carried cargo, and Pacific storms may have been as damaging as 
Spanish protectionism. Back in New Spain, loss of cargo due to inclement weather factored into 
Japanese arguments against customs levies.32 The extent of these losses may have been 
overstated, but everyone agreed that the crossing from Japan to New Spain had been harrowing. 
Quantifying damage to cargo on the outbound journey is not possible with extant sources, but 
whatever cargo Japanese merchants possessed upon reaching Manila remained theirs to do with 
as they pleased. Date mentioned these merchants in his second batch of letters and even 
described his vessels as a “trading ship” (商船, shōsen); presumably some of these merchants 
traded on the daimyo’s behalf.  
 The allowances awarded to Hasekura and Yokozawa by the viceroy complemented the 
funds from sale of the ship and cargo. Guadalcázar had allotted 8,000 pesos to the “captain” 
Yokozawa and 12,000 pesos to Hasekura for securing provisions, and presumably goods, in 
Manila. By comparison, Gil cites Guadalcázar’s predecessor Salinas buying the San Buena 
                                                             
31  Governor-General of the Philippines to Philip III, 1619.08.10. DNS 12-12, CCXLII. Fajardo describes buying 
from “the Japanese,” making it unclear who actually sold the ship, or how exactly the proceeds were used. 
32 As argued by Sotelo and Hasekura on behalf of Yokozawa’s crew. See Chapter 4 for more details. 
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Ventura for 7,000 pesos in 1610. These gift allowances may have helped offset the cost of the 
ship. They might also be seen as the accepted cost of getting the Japanese out of the Pacific. 
 For Date and his subordinates, the sale was likely unwanted but also unsurprising. The 
dimming prospect of trade with New Spain similarly weakened the case for maintaining the 
Bautista. Without the promise of Spanish vessels harboring in his domain Date was isolated; 
integrating Sendai into existing foreign commercial networks to the southwest would have been 
costly and complicated. Furthermore, both Date and the Tokugawa understood their dependence 
on Spanish navigational expertise. No ship had crossed the Pacific without the aid of a Spanish 
crew, and at all levels the Spanish monarchy remained protective of its knowledge. Japanese 
sailors would have acquired sufficient skill in time, however reticent their tutors, but in 1618 
there was neither enough time nor a welcoming destination. Furthermore, the Spanish had 
established a precedent by purchasing the San Buena Ventura in 1610.  Still, the Japanese 
contingent did not appear happy to part with its vessel. Fajardo noted that the sale had been made 
grudgingly, and while Guadalcázar and Sotelo mentioned selling the vessel to the Spaniards 
while the Bautista remained in New Spain, there is no mention of a Japanese agent suggesting 
the idea. Sotelo may have just been putting a positive spin on a fait accompli.  
 Despite the loss of his ship in Manila, Date’s response demonstrated more concern for his 
standing with the shogunate and replies from Europe than with the vessel that enabled the 
daimyo to act as an intermediary between the two. In October 1618 Date received word of the 
Bautista’s return and two days later reported developments to Mukai Shōgen, his longtime 
collaborator in the shogunate.33 Date’s missive contained grim news and a request. Mukai’s 
                                                             
33 Date Masamune to Mukai Shōgen, 1618.10.11. SDS, docs. 327 & 328. SDS excerpts versions from two Date 
house records, the Masamune-kun kiroku inshōki (doc. 327) and Date chike kiroku (doc. 328). The remaining 
summary in this paragraph draws on these sources. 
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retainers had died on the outward journey to New Spain, a potentially delicate matter to bring up 
given that Date’s chief representatives survived. Because news from Manila had to pass by Edo 
to get to Sendai, Date may have reported information that Mukai already knew. Secondly, Date 
asked to send a ship to Manila to pick up his representatives and to fetch the letters they carried. 
The daimyo addressed the Bautista by omission; the need for another vessel implied that Date’s 
galleon was no longer available. He never directly commented on the vessel’s sale. Date’s appeal 
provides more evidence for the collaborative nature of the Keichō Embassy, especially with 
regard to the journeys and status of the Bautista. Date weathered the loss of his ship with little 
comment; now he wished to hear the tidings from his representatives, and as we shall see, 
perhaps wanted to hear from one more than the other. 
  The Bautista faded quickly from the Spanish record. In summer 1619, Fajardo counted 
the vessel among Manila’s four ships large enough to defend the settlement against continued 
Dutch provocation.34 The vessel is not mentioned again. But the lack of comment on the ships—
Buena Ventura, Sebastian and Bautista alike—should not drown out the statement made by their 
construction. The three vessels built by Tokugawa and Date were the most sustained investment 
in trans-Pacific commerce outside of Spain prior to the eighteenth century, and perhaps the only 
such investment prior to the nineteenth century not premised on piracy, extraction of natural 
resources, or exploitation of other societies.35 The stories of these vessels exhibit both the depth 
of early Tokugawa commitment to trade with New Spain and the resolve of Spanish 
                                                             
34 Alonso Fajardo to Philip III, 1619.08.10. B&R XVIII, 250. 
35 Russian expansion into the northern Pacific fur trade depended on the exploitation of indigenous peoples, while 
Cook’s voyages farther south focused on exploration and scientific study rather than establishing sustained trade. 
Later American ventures centered around whaling, the fur trade, and in time, trade with China and Japan. For a 
recent overview of the field of Pacific history see Matt K. Matsuda, “The Pacific,” The American Historical Review 
111, no. 3 (2006): 758–80.   
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administrators to foreclose the possibility. The early Tokugawa vision of trade and diplomacy 
extended to the coast of the Americas, while the monarchy’s vision of its empire continued to 
prioritize the monopolization of sea lanes between its disparate territories and the flow of goods 
and people among them. 
“Strange Tales” and Foreign Portraiture: Hasekura Comes Home 
 In his 1893 account of Date Masamune and the Keichō Embassy, the historian Colyer 
Meriwether could not account for Hasekura’s whereabouts between the representative’s 
departure from Italy in 1615 and his return to Sendai in 1620, but doubted that the omission 
mattered. “Nothing of importance seems to have occurred [from 1615 to 1620], or at least there 
are no records accessible that give more than the bare statement of their [the embassy party’s] 
return. They must have been delayed at some place, as they discharged the purpose of their 
mission at Rome in the latter part of 1615, and yet Hasekura does not arrive at Sendai until Aug. 
1620.”36 The intervening years have yielded more historical sources, notably on Hasekura and 
Sotelo’s second sojourn in New Spain. However, the return journey remains less documented, 
and Hasekura remains a taciturn figure. His near-silence echoes the sparse record of events left 
by Date and Tokugawa leadership, in contrast to the reports, memorials, deliberations, and 
proclamations generated by Spanish officialdom in reaction to successive waves of Japanese 
outreach. Actions may speak louder than words, but Spain left most of the words historians use 
to frame the actions of Japanese leadership. 
 However, it was never Hasekura’s role to chronicle, petition, or speak to begin with. If 
the embassy “discharged its purpose” in Europe, that purpose required Hasekura’s presence, not 
                                                             
36 C. Meriwether, “A Sketch of the Life of Date Masamune and an Account of His Embassy to Rome,” Transactions 
of the Asiatic Society of Japan 21 (November 1893), 53. An American employed by the Meiji government, 
Meriwether (1858–1920) was stationed in Sendai, historical home of the Keichō Embassy, in 1889–1892. 
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his eloquence. Date spoke for himself, penning letters to the secular and religious leadership of 
the Spanish monarchy and the Catholic Church. The daimyo was downright verbose compared to 
earlier Tokugawa efforts. Additionally, although Date mentioned Japanese messengers, he 
entrusted on-the-ground communication to Sotelo. Hasekura served as substitute rather than 
spokesman. Tokugawa Ieyasu dispatched Muñoz to deliver a license, while Date sent a retainer 
to embody his conviction and commitment. Hasekura performed this duty many times over: in 
his audience with Philip III, at his baptism in Madrid, during his procession into Rome, and in 
his encounters with Paul V. These actions “worked” insofar as European authorities understood 
the value of Hasekura’s presence and integrated him into local contexts of authority, prestige, 
and presentation. Hasekura’s contributions were based on corporeal symbolism rather than direct 
negotiation or repeated petition. Occasional memorials and letters do appear with Hasekura’s 
seal and signature. At times, he appended his mark to European-language letters drafted by 
others. In those few instances when Hasekura sent letters in Japanese, they almost always 
traveled together with memorials from Sotelo, and the retainer echoed the sentiments of the friar. 
Observers in Spain and Rome commented approvingly on Hasekura’s bearing, but this personal 
approval never translated into tangible benefits for Hasekura’s lord. 
 To his European audience, Date’s domestic standing was meant to impress, his devotion 
was meant to persuade, and his words were meant to seal trade between New Spain and Japan. 
Unfortunately, the domestic standing of the “King of Ōshū” did not register clearly abroad, his 
devotion remained an open question, and the chosen conduit for his words—Sotelo—stirred 
controversy rather than building trust. Hasekura provided a vessel, but his personal integrity 
could not accomplish diplomatic ends so long as his overlord’s character remained shrouded in 
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doubt. Nor could Hasekura overcome the red flags raised by the Bautista sailing into Acapulco. 
Messenger and patron alike were undone in part by their preferred means of transit. 
 Hasekura adhered to a broader trend in Japanese-Spanish relations, whereby frontline 
operatives did not prioritize establishing a written record. Nor did they regularly adopt written 
appeal or treatise to achieve the objectives of their superiors, who endeavored—not always 
successfully—to speak for themselves.37 This partly explains the oversized role of friars in 
chronicling these missions, and suggests why Sotelo spent less time translating the opinions and 
greetings of his Japanese companions and more time explaining Date’s purported objectives. The 
principal communicative burden of diplomatic outreach lay in translating and explaining the 
wishes of Japanese patrons to a foreign audience. Missionaries were invariably better suited for 
this task given their residence in Japan and their standing in Europe. In the words of Ieyasu, 
Hidetada, and Date alike, Muñoz and Sotelo were “details” (isai 委細 for Ieyasu, ikyoku 委曲 for 
Date) men, in service of the broad strokes their patrons outlined.  
 Half a world away, theory yielded ground to reality, but Japanese leadership retained 
control of the big picture and did not formally embrace the language of debate. Ieyasu left little 
to negotiate in his 1610 “letter” to the Duke of Lerma. He merely offered what was his to give, 
and expected Spain to accept on the terms presented. Date used the rhetoric of religious fervor to 
strengthen his credentials as a potential trade partner, but similarly offered terms rather than 
empowering proxies to negotiate. Rhetorically at least, any such debate belonged to the realm of 
“details,” a convenient way for both the Tokugawa and the Date to retain distance if necessary. 
                                                             
37 For example, the Sō of Tsuhima altered correspondence between the shogunate and Joseon Korea to help 
reestablish ties and benefit from mediating between the two. Sotelo also inserted his voice and priorities into Date’s 
mission.  
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Sotelo emerged as a persistent negotiator and petitioner only in response to the group’s lackluster 
reception throughout Spanish officialdom. 
 Japan’s on-the-ground representatives thus often eschewed formal appeal in favor of 
putting into practice the relations envisioned by their sponsors. Commercial agents illustrate this 
dynamic especially well. Tanaka Shōsuke appears to have led the group of Japanese merchants 
aboard the San Buena Ventura in 1610.38 Ieyasu sought commerce between New Spain and 
Japan, so Tanaka and his peers tested the market in Acapulco. Such an endeavor required 
intrepidness, haggling, and likely a few exercises in cross-cultural conflict resolution. In 
Tanaka’s case, it also required rubbing shoulders with local elites, including the viceroy 
himself.39 Undoubtedly, these interactions included exchanges of opinion and information, but 
Tanaka never spoke on behalf of the shogunate. He was expected to trade, not to chronicle or 
petition. Tanaka returned to Japan and presented the Tokugawa with tributary goods acquired in 
New Spain, not a diplomatic missive. In 1616, Yokozawa Shōgen likely served the same 
function on Date’s behalf, as did the retainers whom Mukai dispatched as part of the same 
mission.  
 Date adjusted Hasekura and Sotelo’s roles to accommodate the prolonged journey, the 
demands of meeting foreign heads of state, and the daimyo’s own role within the Japanese 
political order. These adjustments made Hasekura more visible as a symbolic figure but required 
little active petition considering Sotelo’s presence.40 Date planned his communication strategy 
                                                             
38 Gonoi Takashi, Hasekura Tsunenaga (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2003), 32–33. 
39 Domingo Francisco de San Antón Muñón Chimalpahin Cuauhtlehuanitzin, Annals of HisTime: Don Domingo de 
San Antón Muñón Chimalpahin Quauhtlehuanitzin (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 173. 
40 The friar helped define Hasekura’s role, and likely drew upon the precedent established by the Jesuit-sponsored 
Tenshō Embassy from three decades prior. In 1582, Alessandro Valignano collaborated with the Kyushu Christian 
daimyo Ōtomo Sōrin to send four Japanese youth to Europe as part of a propaganda effort on behalf of the mission 
in Japan.  See Michael Cooper, The Japanese Mission to Europe, 1582-1590: The Journey of Four Samurai Boys 
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with Sotelo, evidenced by his choice of letters to leadership in New Spain, Spain, and Rome, as 
well as the friar’s hometown Seville. This process gave Sotelo sway in the daimyo’s 
correspondence, but it also permitted Date to frame a consistent message to actors across the 
Spanish monarchy and present himself as friendly, informed, and engaged.41 Hasekura and 
Sotelo departed with letters for the Roman pontiff, the King of Spain, the city of Seville, the 
viceroy of New Spain, and the heads of the Franciscan order in Mexico and Rome. There was 
not much left for Hasekura to say. Sotelo departed from Date’s stated intentions and rhetoric 
early and often, but in response to adverse circumstance and to little effect.  
 With regard to petitioning foreign authority, it is more fruitful to consider Date, not 
Hasekura, as the Japanese intermediary reaching out. Date did so nominally on behalf of the 
Tokugawa, and practically for his own gain. In his efforts, he adopted rhetoric the Tokugawa 
could not use, made promises the Tokugawa could not make without retracting earlier edicts, and 
engaged Spanish authority on multiple levels in a manner not appropriate for the pinnacle of the 
budding Tokugawa political order. These measures parallel the Sō clan of Tsushima’s active 
mediation of relations with Joseon Korea, as well as the Shimazu clan of Satsuma’s 
“management” of relations with the Ryukyu kingdom via conquest. The Tokugawa condoned, or 
at least accepted, the measures taken by these approved intermediaries. Date, likewise, was 
empowered to speak. Hasekura was one step removed from this process, though his seven-year 
sojourn and symbolic presence have raised his profile among historians. Chapter 1 began by 
discussing a letter from another Tokugawa deputy, the Nagasaki magistrate Terasawa Hirotada, 
                                                             
through Portugal, Spain and Italy (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2005). It should be noted that Otomo did not seek 
commercial concessions from European leaders. The Tenshō Embassy also traveled on Portuguese vessels over 
established Portuguese sea lanes, and thus did not posit a new commercial relationship between Japan and Portugal. 
41 For example, Date would have been unlikely to draft a letter to Seville in Sotelo’s absence. 
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writing the governor-general of Manila. Pondering Hasekura’s near-silence is akin to asking why 
the man who delivered Terasawa’s letter to the Philippines did not make his own appeal to 
Spanish authorities. Messengers, by nature, deliver the words of others.  
 Hasekura did draft a letter soon after his arrival in Manila, and his choice of interlocutor 
highlighted the distinction between himself and Sotelo. Hasekura wrote his son, not his lord. He 
hastily penned a letter two days after the Bautista’s landing in August 1618, apparently in reply 
to a letter received in New Spain.42 Hasekura’s missive contained warm wishes for his family, 
updates on the journey from New Spain (“uneventful”), and his current location in Luzon. Most 
notably, Hasekura wrote that he could not return to Japan that year, but promised to do so the 
following summer.  
 His two stated reasons stand out: he needed to make purchases on behalf of his lord 
(tonosama onkaimono tomo itashi, 殿様御かいものともいたし,), and he needed to ready a 
ship (fune nado koshira[u], ふねなとこしら[う],).43 The first reason defined his obligation to 
his lord as carrying out commercial transactions in Manila, and marks the only time Hasekura 
referred to Date in the letter. The second reason appears to reference the fact that Hasekura was 
now without a ship.44 Perhaps he intended to outfit a ship to return directly to Sendai or Uraga, 
an unlikely destination for vessels out of Manila, or he may have hoped to replace the recently 
lost Bautista with a comparable vessel. This letter is the single statement of Hasekura’s 
                                                             
42 Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 218. 
43 Hasekura Tsunenaga to Kanzaburō (Hasekura Tsuneyori), 1618.08.12. SDS, doc. 324. 
44 The verb koshirau (拵う, in modern Japanese koshiraeru or kosaeru [拵える]) leaves room for interpretation. It 
can mean “manufacture” or “prepare.” Thus Hasekura could have been writing of the need to build or ready a new 
ship or provision or “prepare” the Bautista. In the latter case, the governor-general would have not yet have 
purchased the ship. Given that Guadalcázar and Sotelo spoke of selling the Bautista before it left New Spain, I think 
it more likely that Hasekura was discussing the need for a new vessel. 
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intentions from his time in Manila, and was penned within a week of his arrival. He wrote in 
haste for a reason, for the next day his letter was onboard a ship bound for Japan.45 
 As Hasekura closed the distance back to Japan, and then to Sendai, the record of his 
actions dilutes further. Yokozawa and the rest of the Japanese merchants and Bautista crew 
aboard the Bautista, now without a ship, presumably found passage back to Japan along with 
their goods. It is unclear if they engaged in another round of trading with Chinese or Spanish 
merchants in Manila before returning to the archipelago. But Hasekura remained. Gonoi Takashi 
speculates that Hasekura delayed so as to avoid separating from Sotelo.46 Hasekura’s presence 
may have provided Sotelo some cover had the friar been successful in leaving for Japan before 
1620. The Tokugawa prohibition against missionaries complicated that proposition, and the 
friar’s confinement to a monastery in summer 1619 dampened it further. Still, Hasekura lingered 
an additional year before finally departing Manila in August 1620. His two-year sojourn in the 
Philippines stands out all the more when considering how long the retainer kept his lord waiting. 
Date received word of the Bautista’s arrival in Manila by October 1618, a full twenty-two 
months before Hasekura departed the Philippines. 
 It was left to Sotelo, not Hasekura, to update Date. Hasekura’s letter to his son appears to 
have traveled to Japan together with Sotelo’s letter to the lord of Sendai. The content of Sotelo’s 
letter is unknown, but Date received it in October 1618, along with a gift consisting of fifteen 
candles and a bottle of wine.47 The friar Francisco Gálvez delivered the letter and presents to 
Date in his great hall, suggesting the continued ability of missionaries to move around Japan in 
                                                             
45 Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 218. 
46 Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 225–26. 
47 Date chike kiroku, Genna 4.08.21 (1618.10.09). SDS, doc. 326. 
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the years following the Tokugawa edict.48 Gálvez also reported Sotelo’s intention to return to 
Japan. Two days later, Date wrote Mukai Shōgen to announce the Bautista’s arrival in the 
Philippines and the death of Mukai’s retainers, while requesting to send a messenger to Manila.49  
 Date house records noted receiving word from Sotelo, but said nothing of Hasekura at 
this time. Similarly, the daimyo’s letter to Mukai mentioned the Bautista but did not name Sotelo 
or Hasekura. The flow of information reinforces the fact that Sotelo, not Hasekura, took charge 
of communication, even with Date. Once in the Philippines Hasekura appears to have acted as a 
commercial agent on behalf of his lord. Hasekura remained absent from Date records until his 
return in September 1620, accomplished without the daimyo’s intercession. 
 The lengthy stay and apparent lack of urgency implies there was little left for Hasekura to 
do, or at least little immediate value to Hasekura hurrying home on his own. In contrast, there 
was specific value in Sotelo returning and reporting to Date. The replies from the monarchy that 
Sotelo carried required translation, a service Hasekura could not provide despite his long time 
abroad. Matsuda Kiichi suggests that friars discouraged foreign acquisition of the Spanish 
language by their Japanese peers during the mission to preserve the missionaries’ central role in 
communication.50 These linguistic arrangements obliquely support the notion that Date did not 
envision a communicative role for his retainer.  
 By summer 1620, Hasekura felt compelled to go. The circumstances of his departure 
reinforced his role. Hasekura took with him personal artifacts acquired in Europe, documents 
                                                             
48 Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 218. Date sources refer to Galvez as “Shinyoro” (志如呂), possibly an 
approximation of the Spanish Señor. 
49 Date chike kiroku, Genna 4.08.23 (1618.10.11). SDS, doc. 328. 
50 Matsuda Kiichi, Keichō kenʾō shisetsu: Tokugawa Ieyasu to nanbanjin (Tokyo: Chōbunsha, 1992), 209–10. 
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presented to him as an individual, and gifts purchased for his lord using the funds stipulated by 
the viceroy. The man entrusted with overseeing the economic and symbolic transaction between 
Date’s Sendai domain and Catholic Europe returned to Japan with the fruits of those 
transactions. But the words—that is to say, Philip’s reply—remained with Sotelo in Manila. 
 Nor did Date’s retainer find his voice back in Sendai. More accurately, when he finally 
spoke, his words were not deemed worthy of recording. The following is the bare account of the 
Date chike kiroku (伊達治家記録, Record of Date House Governance) regarding Hasekura’s 
return to Sendai in September 1620, in its entirety:  
Today, Hasekura Rokuemon Tsunenaga and others returned to court from the 
Country of the Southern Barbarians. This person was sent across the ocean in the 
eighteenth year of the former Keichō Era in consultation with Lord Mukai Shōgen 
Tadakatsu. [He] went as far as the capital of the Southern Barbarians, and had an 
audience with the King ‘Paapa’ (the pope). He stayed [abroad] several years and 
recently returned from abroad on a vessel from Luzon. He bears a portrait of the 
king of the Country of Southern Barbarians (Pope Paul V) as well as a portrait of 
himself, among other items. He was conferred these Southern Barbarian-style 
pictures. As for the affairs of the Country of Southern Barbarians, Rokuemon’s 
strange tales are most numerous.51 
 The attention to particular items that Hasekura returned with contrasts with the brief 
comment on the retainer’s “strange tales” as “most numerous” (kikai mottomo ōshi, 奇怪最多
し). European-style portraits made for striking visual objects, worthy of comment. The portraits 
                                                             
51 Date chike kiroku, Genna 6.08.26 (1620.09.22). SDS, doc. 334. 
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of Hasekura and Paul V (Images 3 &4) remain central display objects in museum exhibits and 
catalogs to this day. The content of the portraits may help explain the lean account of Hasekura’s 
return. One depicted Hasekura kneeling before a crucifix in worship. His hands are slightly 
spread, but his fingertips come together in prayer. Hasekura’s eyes track upward to the figure of 
Christ before him and look on in solemn but alert devotion. Sartorial choices were blended, the 
collar and sleeves of a doublet visible beneath what appears to be a dark, Japanese-style robe.52 
Hasekura also broadcasts his status as a Japanese warrior and retainer in the portrait. His hair is 
up in a topknot, and he kneels before the crucifix armed with a wakizashi blade.53 Thus, 
Hasekura returned bearing a portrait of a member of Japan’s ruling status group worshipping at 
the altar of a foreign, prohibited God. 
 The other portrait was no less layered in meaning. It depicted the leader of the Catholic 
Church and the ultimate earthly authority of the various missionary groups no longer permitted 
in Japan. Paul V occupies the portrait alone, appearing against a monotone dark background. His 
bearing is regal, and he confidently meets the eyes of his audience. His focus is directed outward 
not upward; he leaves the worship and adoration to Hasekura. It is a portrait of a leader. Whether 
or not Date interpreted the two images in quite the same way, he must have understood that he 
had been presented with one image of a foreign religious and spiritual leader and another of his 
own retainer worshipping a religion no longer permitted. The two images were probably met 
                                                             
52 It is possible the robe was also some form of European dress. I base my assertion here on Hasekura’s appearance 
in a different portrait that stayed in Europe. In the latter, Hasekura dons bright Japanese dress robes with distinct 
patterns, most notably the deer that were an emblem of his family (see Image 5). However, in this full-body portrait 
as well, the collar and sleeves in European style are visible underneath the robes. 
53 Hasekura dons both swords in his other portrait, cited in the note above (Image 5). The lack of a hilt and the 
shorter grip strongly suggest that Hasekura is wearing only his wakizashi in the portrait under discussion here. 
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with some combination of fascination and unease.54 Moreover, no promise of an ongoing 
commercial relationship accompanied these problematic objects. In this context, there was no 
benefit to recording Hasekura’s statements at length or in depth, but there was a distinct risk of 
valorizing contact the Tokugawa would no longer countenance.  
 So Date made a statement of his own. The daimyo responded to Hasekura’s strange tales 
and loaded imagery by issuing a three-article ban on Christianity.55 Date ordered all Christians in 
his domain either exiled or executed, offered rewards for anyone providing information on 
Christians, and mandated all missionaries to apostatize or depart. Even though the Tokugawa 
edict of 1614 applied to all Japan, enforcement remained patchy, especially outside of the large 
Christian communities concentrated in the southwest of the archipelago. Similarly, persecution 
did not immediately intensify in northeastern Japan after Date’s edict, but he set the stage for a 
crackdown on the religion in the decade ahead. The daimyo also needed to demonstrate 
compliance to the shogunate. He announced the ban on Christianity two days after Hasekura’s 
return, but waited a month to announce his retainer’s arrival to the shogunate.56  
 Nevertheless, Date still faced the thorny issue of retrieving Sotelo. Despite the daimyo’s 
newfound public aversion to Christianity, he would spend the next few years lobbying the 
shogunate for Sotelo’s return even as the friar contemplated how best to break free of Manila. 
Hasekura Tsunenaga factored little, if at all, in the angling of his lord and in the return of his 
                                                             
54 The fascination should not be discounted, as Date and his successors preserved these portraits and the other items 
Hasekura brought back—some with clear religious connotations—for the remainder of the Tokugawa period. 
55 Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 230–31. 
56 Date Masamune-kun kiroku inshōki, Genna 6.09.23 (1620.10.18). SDS, doc. 335.  
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companion. He died within two years of returning to Sendai.57 Having embarked in part to atone 
for the sins of his father, Hasekura successfully preserved his family’s status as landed retainers, 
but the family fortunes continued to vacillate wildly through the seventeenth century. Hasekura’s 
son Tsuneyori continued in Date’s service, numbering among the guard for the Daimyo’s Edo 
residence for a time.58 However, Tsuneyori’s wife was executed in 1637, and Tsuneyori himself 
in 1640, both on account of their Christian faith. By 1640, open practice of Christianity had been 
all but eliminated in Japan, and the shogunate had just put down a large uprising in Kyushu it 
saw as motivated by Christian rebels.59 Tsuneyori and his wife’s death were geographically very 
distant from these events, but a product of the same context of official intolerance. In 1670 
Hasekura’s branch recovered, as Tsuneyori’s heir was granted a parcel of land and the family 
settled into a more stable existence.60 
 Hasekura’s 1620 return exemplified the division of diplomatic labor between himself and 
his Franciscan companion. Date’s retainer returned with presents, mementos, and stories. 
Presumably, he had also overseen the “shopping” for his lord detailed in the letter to his son. He 
returned with portraits and personal accolades, and perhaps a newfound faith, but he did not 
return with any official reply from the monarchy or the papacy. When Hasekura and Sotelo 
finally parted ways in 1620, the letters stayed with the friar, despite authorities in Manila, 
                                                             
57 There is some debate about whether Hasekura passed away in 1621 or 1622. Contemporary missionary reports 
suggest the latter date, and the family genealogy lists 1622. Takashi Gonoi discusses the issue in some detail before 
asserting a 1621 death. See Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 242–44. 
58 Records of Tsuneyori’s service to Date can be found in SDS¸ docs. 366–68.  
59 The Shimabara Rebellion (1637–38) was a rural uprising in present-day Nagasaki Prefecture, touched off in 
response to the excessive tax burdens imposed by the local lord. I discuss the rebellion in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
60 The family’s fortunes in the seventeenth century, including the execution of Tsuneyori and his wife, are discussed 
in more depth in Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 243–248. 
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Nagasaki, and Edo united in opposition to Sotelo ever traveling to Japan. Date’s proxy had 
fulfilled his duty, and Date’s spokesman would not be separated from his. 
Crossing Over 
 Luis Sotelo’s 1622 return to Japan provoked one final round of maneuvering, this time by 
Date Masamune. For half a decade the friar had adopted an obstinate flexibility in his efforts to 
represent the embassy, present its chief Japanese retainer, and either draw upon or reject 
Tokugawa authority in discussions with Spanish leadership. Now Date treaded carefully in 
positioning his relationship to Sotelo, first in the hope of aiding the friar’s passage to Japan and 
later in the hope of releasing him from jail. 
 But 1622 presented Date with very different circumstances than his 1613 petition to free 
the friar. The Tokugawa ban on missionary activity in the archipelago was eight years old, and 
Sotelo’s clandestine entry into Kyushu via Manila was the conduit most disconcerting to the 
shogunate. The missionary claimed to hold replies from Philip III and Paul V, but the Tokugawa 
had dismissed the Spanish monarch earlier, and felt little need to correspond with the pope. 
Moreover, the shogunate was also six years beyond the death of Ieyasu, the architect of its 
outreach in the early seventeenth century. Sotelo’s presence was a crime, the letters he carried 
were from sovereigns the shogunate had already rejected, and the original sponsor of outreach 
across the Pacific was dead. There was little reason to accommodate the friar, or the requests of 
his patron far to the north. 
 In fall 1620, a letter from Date to Doi Toshikatsu, an influential advisor to Tokugawa 
Hidetada, announced Hasekura’s return and asked how to proceed with Sotelo, still in Manila at 
the time.61 It is telling that Date did not address this letter to Mukai Shōgen, the admiral of the 
                                                             
61 Date Masamune to Doi Toshikatsu (draft), SDS, doc. 335. 
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fleet, his usual interlocutor for matters related to the embassy. The friar’s passage to Japan would 
violate the 1614 Tokugawa prohibition, and Date sought intercession from the top.  
 In seeking an exception to the shogunate’s law, Date invoked its involvement in the 
outreach to New Spain. The daimyo framed the Bautista’s departure for “Nanban” (南蛮) as 
born out of consultation with Mukai.62 Date also connected the project to the actions of 
Tokugawa leadership, stating that at the time the Bautista sailed, the shogunate sent 
correspondence, armor, and folding screens (byōbu). Here Date referenced the letters and gifts to 
the viceroy of New Spain that the Ieyasu and Hidetada had sent back with Sebastián Vizcaíno. 
Following discussion of the vessel and Tokugawa efforts, Date added that he had sent a retainer 
all the way to “Inner Nanban” (Europe) who had recently returned via a vessel from Luzon. All 
of this accurately reflected events, but did so in a manner emphasizing the daimyo’s 
collaboration and consultation in a project in which the Tokugawa shoguns themselves had 
participated. Hasekura’s departure and return became just one facet of a larger endeavor, in turn 
underplaying Date’s individual involvement and initiative. 
 On the prickly point of Sotelo’s return to Japan, Date found it prudent to insert some 
conceptual and syntactic distance between himself and the missionary. He did so principally by 
marooning the friar, depriving him of a clear sponsor at a time when sponsoring foreign 
missionaries was no longer in vogue. Everything that had traveled to any part of Nanban—the 
Bautista, Tokugawa gifts, Hasekura—were all “sent” there, Date using the transitive verb 
tsukawasu (遣わす, to send or dispatch) in each instance. Just who did the sending was also 
quite clear: Date sent the Bautista, Ieyasu sent his gifts and letters, and Date sent a retainer. The 
                                                             
62 Ibid. Discussion of this source extends over the next several paragraphs. 
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exception was Sotelo, who “crossed” to Nanban. The intransitive verb “cross” (wataru, 渡る) 
left it unclear who facilitated that crossing, and Date made no effort to clarify. In contrast, 
although he again saw no need to name his retainer, the daimyo took ownership of sending 
Hasekura: “At that time (of sending the Bautista), I sent one of my own men.”63 The Japanese 
language, then and now, has a high tolerance for omitting grammatical subjects, but Date made 
sure to include a word for “I” (sessha, 拙者) in this clause. By contrast, he brought up the friar as 
a “person from Nanban called Sotelo who stayed in Edo for some years.” In this account, no one 
was directly responsible for Sotelo, but invoking the friar’s residence in Edo implied a stronger 
connection with the shogunate than with the daimyo.  
 Date also treaded carefully around the matter of Sotelo’s profession. All previous letters 
by Date and the Tokugawa referred to the man as a bateren (伴天連), from the Portuguese word 
“padre,” indicating his status as a missionary. Here though, Sotelo was just a Nanbanjin, “a man 
from Nanban.” Although unstated, Sotelo’s Christian faith remained a central concern. Date 
reported Sotelo’s wish to return to Japan the following the year (1621) from Luzon, but that the 
“man from Nanban” had also heard of the Christian prohibition while in the Philippines. The 
letter reads as a descriptive relay of information from and about Sotelo, a man who crossed to 
Nanban, rather than a report on the status of a messenger, sent over the sea. If anything, Date 
appears as a messenger or conduit for Sotelo rather than the other way around. Date closed the 
letter by asking how to respond to Sotelo’s wish to return, framing the matter in terms of Sotelo’s 
actions and avoiding any explication of the obvious connection between the two men.  
                                                             
63 Jp. Sono migiri sessha uchi no mono tsukawashimōshi sōrō (其砌拙者内之者遣申候). Here “one of my own” or 
“member of my house” referred to a vassal, not to a member of Date’s immediate or even extended family.  
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 Downplaying Sotelo’s faith and sidestepping the issue of patronage permitted Date to 
focus on his real concern: retrieving the letters Sotelo carried. The letters from Philip III and Paul 
V grounded Date’s appeals before and after Sotelo’s imprisonment. Their presence justified the 
daimyo’s appeal to the shogunate, even as Date distanced himself from the circumstances of 
their acquisition. “[W]ord comes [from Sotelo] that there are replies from Nanban,” Date 
reported, omitting to what—and to whom—the replies were. The only letters from Japan that 
Date mentioned were those sent by the Tokugawa, as the daimyo noted sending just the ship and 
his retainer. The note was oblique enough to suggest that Sotelo might carry letters for, or at least 
of great interest to, the Tokugawa.  The shogunate harbored no illusions about Date’s interests, 
but the daimyo did his best to position those interests as shared.  
 Unfortunately, when it came to Sotelo, Date and Tokugawa interests were no longer 
mutual. In some ways, the situation paralleled the Keichō Embassy’s credibility issues in Europe. 
Sotelo again carried letters to a destination where the larger issues had already been decided. 
Ieyasu and Hidetada had together concluded that the Spanish monarchy no longer warranted 
diplomatic engagement and recognition. There was little reason to accept letters intended for a 
daimyo, especially if they were, again, carried in the hands of a missionary. Doing so would 
require a reversal of the precedent the shogunate established when dismissing Santa Catalina in 
1616, as well as making an exception to an important domestic policy. Sotelo’s prior experience 
in Japan and Date’s desire to receive a reply did not merit such reversals. Finally, Spain had not 
signaled any shift on the core issues of trans-Pacific commerce, technology sharing, or a 
curtailment of missionary efforts. Empty words to an inferior in the hands of a missionary 
addressing issues already asked and answered held little appeal. 
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 Conversely, for Date the letters offered prestige, validation, information, and perhaps a 
remote chance at a potential path forward. The Keichō Embassy had offered the opportunity to 
reshape and expand his place in a developing order the Tokugawa were constructing at home and 
abroad. Foreign engagement would have shaped his domestic role, as well as providing the 
material benefits of trade. By 1620, Date knew that opportunity had almost certainly vanished, 
but he also knew that no other letters from foreign sovereigns would be forthcoming, nor would 
he be permitted to write any more of his own. 
 The daimyo’s efforts persisted after Sotelo’s foiled infiltration and prompt incarceration 
by the Nagasaki magistrate, and the letters remained his top priority. A senior Sendai domain 
official, Ishimoda Muneyori, wrote to the imprisoned friar in August 1623, informing him of 
Date’s continued efforts on his behalf.64 Ishimoda explained plans to contact Doi Toshikatsu 
once more as well as the Nagasaki magistrate. As before, the petition to the former would focus 
on the fact that Sotelo carried replies from abroad. As for the friar’s fate, the direction had 
reversed, with Date requesting that he be sent back rather than let in. There was no talk of Sotelo 
proceeding to Sendai. Ishimoda closed by telling to Sotelo to wait for further word.  
 It is unclear if further word ever came while the friar lived, as the record grows sparse. 
Any additional appeals to Doi or other shogunate officials in Edo yielded no practical effect and 
no record. A reply from the Nagasaki Magistrate to Ishimoda was non-committal. The latter was 
drafted in October 1623, but Sotelo lingered in jail almost another full year.65  
                                                             
64 Ishimoda Muneyori to Sotelo (draft), 1623.08.20. SDS, 355. Ishimoda was responding to two letters Sotelo had 
sent from prison, no longer extant. 
65 Hasegawa Genroku to Ishimoda Muneyori, 1623.10.21. SDS, 356. 
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 The missionary chose a singularly ill-timed occasion to return to Japan. From 1622 to 
1624 the shogunate moved definitively from stating intentions to demonstrating enforcement. In 
September 1622 the Tokugawa put to death fifty missionaries and lay Christians in Nagasaki, a 
month before Sotelo’s return. In December 1623, another fifty were executed in Edo.66 The latter 
executions carried important political ramifications. The execution grounds were just off the 
main road into the shogunate’s capital from the south, and sent a clear signal to all who 
entered—including southern daimyo ruling over areas of Christian influence. The executions 
were likely also meant to demonstrate the resolve of the third shogun Tokugawa Iemitsu, who 
assumed the position that year following Hidetada’s retirement.67 
 The martyrdoms in Edo probably ended all efforts to intervene on Sotelo’s behalf. The 
two best-known missionaries martyred that day were the Jesuit Jerome de Angelis and the 
Franciscan Francisco Gálvez, both active in northern Japan. Angelis is thought to be the first 
European to have traveled to Hokkaido, and his reports from Ōshū contained speculations on the 
motives behind Date’s embassy.68 Gálvez had in fact been the friar who delivered Sotelo’s letter 
to Date in 1618; he stayed in the area for time afterwards to minister.69 
 Iemitsu’s intended audience was not limited to the south. Date was present in Edo for the 
executions, as were other northern daimyo ruling territories with a Catholic presence. The 
Christian populace in the north grew after 1614, fueled by earlier lay exiles and incognito 
                                                             
66 Unless otherwise noted, details of the Edo Martyrdom and its aftermath rely on Hubert Cieslik, “The Great 
Martyrdom in Edo, 1623: Its Causes, Course, Consequences,” Monumenta Nipponica 10, no. 1/2 (1954): 1–44. 
67 As with Ieyasu before him, Hidetada wielded effective power in retirement. Hidetada came to Edo and consulted 
with his son before the death sentences were announced in Iemitsu’s name. See Cieslik, “The Great Martyrdom,” 25. 
68 Ibid., 3–7. 
69 Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 218. 
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missionaries—Angelis and Gálvez among them—operating after the prohibition. Enforcement of 
Date’s own 1620 ban on Christianity had been half-hearted. But Iemitsu now left no room for 
ambiguity. The new shogun summoned Date to the Tokugawa castle in Edo in January 1624, and 
discussed over tea the need to suppress Christianity in Edo and the north.70 Within a month seven 
Christians had been put to death in Sendai. Date’s daimyo peers launched similar campaigns of 
persecution, and 1624 marked a demonstrable decline in Catholic activity across northern Japan. 
Communication by Sendai officials with or on the subject of Sotelo appears to end in fall 1623. It 
is likely there was nothing left to say.  
 Whatever the shogunate’s deliberations regarding its one-time diplomatic agent and 
current prisoner, by summer 1624 it had made up its mind. On 25 August, Sotelo, the Japanese 
friar, the youth who had traveled with him from Manila, and two other missionaries were led to 
an execution ground in Kyushu’s Ōmura. Nagasaki officials oversaw the proceedings. All five 
were tied to posts and burned alive. Leon Pages’ nineteenth-century account records that Sotelo 
was one of the last to die, asphyxiating on the smoke around him. The Catholic Church 
recognizes all five as martyrs. Additionally, in 1867 Pope Pius IX beatified 205 martyrs in Japan 
who died between 1617 and 1632, including Sotelo and the four men with him. 
 The day before his execution Sotelo purportedly entrusted the replies he carried to 
another missionary with instructions to forward them to Date at the appropriate time.71 Date 
house records make no mention of receiving them, nor do Tokugawa sources note either 
confiscating or disposing of them, and they are not mentioned again. 
                                                             
70 Cieslik, “The Great Martyrdom,” 36. 
71 Gonoi, Hasekura Tsunenaga, 249. 
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 The fate of these letters and their failure to reach the intended recipient paralleled the 
decay of Tokugawa-Habsburg relations following Japan’s first forays across the Pacific. The 
king did not want to write them, the shogun did not want to read them, but intermediaries labored 
for a decade trying to get them across the oceans between. Despite their symbolic importance 
and ceremonial presentation, the letters traveling back and forth were never the most effective 
tools. Although never acknowledged as such, from 1610 onward the most efficacious diplomacy 
had been conducted via ships: their dispatch and detainment, their purchase and destination. Self-
interested and self-important as he may have been, Sotelo had been the most vociferous human 
intermediary between Tokugawa Japan and Habsburg Spain. However, he was never able to 
overcome the Bautista’s impact, be it the arrival of the vessel itself, the news it carried, or its 
guarded reception in New Spain. 
 Sotelo’s 1624 death represented one end for the Keichō Embassy, but Philip III and the 
Tokugawa hegemons had decided the issue through their mutual disinterest in each other’s 
priorities and the visions undergirding them, even if it took a few years for all to realize. 
Superficially this impasse left Japanese-Spanish relations in 1624 in the same place they had 
been at the time of Terasawa’s 1601 letter: anchored by the connection between Manila and 
southern Kyushu. Two decades of outreach and avoidance, together with a decade of intensifying 
persecution, cast the future of that connection in serious danger. Even as Sotelo futilely arranged 
to get his letters to Date, Manila attempted to salvage a rapidly fraying relationship. 
Final Outreach and Aftermath 
 Governor-General Alonso Fajardo de Entenza took up his post in Manila at a troubled 
time. Dutch aggression capped a decade of maritime conflict between the Iberian crown and its 
rebellious subjects from the Netherlands. Fajardo’s route to the Philippines exemplified the 
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strained state of Spain’s military, fiscal, and administrative architecture. Stripped of his flotilla 
and soon at the receiving end of a Dutch blockade, Fajardo saw his purchase of the Bautista as a 
strategic necessity.72 
 In some ways, the Bautista’s 1618 arrival in Manila should have signaled victory for the 
city, removing the specter of Japanese competition across the North Pacific. However, Date’s 
vessel and the news it carried also signaled Madrid and Mexico’s withdrawal from direct 
diplomatic engagement with Japan. Japanese-Spanish relations now collapsed back into the 
single theater of the western Pacific, where the shogunate could dictate the terms of engagement. 
Manila’s representative had intervened on customs levies to prevent Japanese retaliation against 
the Philippines, but now the islands would have to deal with the diplomatic blowback resulting 
from two decades of unsuccessful and unwelcome Japanese outreach. Combined with the 
worsening commercial ramifications of religious persecutions, the islands now shouldered the 
full diplomatic burden at a difficult time. Leaders would be hard-pressed to enjoy anything but a 
pyrrhic victory at the closing of the Pacific. As Sotelo endured prison, relations between the 
islands and the archipelago quickly unraveled. 
 Manila reached out in two consecutive years employing two different strategies, but only 
succeeded in confirming the shogunate’s dismissal. In 1623, Manila dispatched a final 
diplomatic mission to the Tokugawa, perhaps timed to coordinate with the accession of the third 
shogun, Hidetada’s son Tokugawa Iemitsu (1604–1651, r. 1623–1651).73 The Philippine treasury 
                                                             
72 Fajardo counted the Bautista among the four vessels on hand for defense against the Dutch in 1619. This appears 
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invested 59,800 pesos in the endeavor, a substantial commitment of financial resources.74 
Fernando de Ayala led the mission, carrying a letter and presents for Iemitsu. Cognizant of the 
climate, Manila pointedly avoided deputizing a religious figure to pursue the mission. Well-
outfitted, well-provisioned, offering trade and goodwill with the full support of leadership, Ayala 
represented Manila’s best effort. Even so, Iemitsu summarily turned him away, brushing him 
aside more quickly than his father and grandfather has dispensed with Santa Catalina a decade 
prior. The shogunate denied Ayala permission even to enter Edo.75 He returned to Manila in 
1624, and the expense of his embassy came to naught.  
 The final blow arrived the next year, when Manila abandoned all pretext of official 
channels and dispatched a ship solely for trade. This last gesture proposed a simple transactional 
relationship, stripped of the friction of diplomatic protocol. The arrangement modeled the 
Tokugawa relationship with Ming China: no diplomatic relations but steady private trade through 
approved channels. Yet the results were no different. Authorities turned the vessel away without 
permitting any trade.76 The message was clear: Spaniards were no longer welcome in Japan.  
 The degradation in relations stemmed from an implicit disagreement about whether 
Manila best functioned as a way-station or a destination. In reaching out across the Pacific, the 
Tokugawa shogunate and Date implicitly envisioned the former. The archipelago’s leadership 
proposed replacing a single route with a network incorporating multiple nodes on the western 
rim of the ocean. Traffic between Manila and Acapulco would continue, supplemented by 
additional traffic across from Japan. Manila would have two points of contact with the 
                                                             
74 Juan Gil, Hidalgos y samurais: España y Japón en los siglos XVI Y XVII, Alianza Universidad 675 (Madrid: 
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75 Nagazumi Yōko, Shuinsen (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2001), 120. 
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archipelago: the existing trade concentrated in the southwest and an additional trade and supply 
route rooted in ports like Uraga farther north and east.  
 This prospect contrasted with the vision for the Philippines that won out within official 
Spanish discourse. Opinions on the role of the Philippines varied within the monarchy, but 
ultimately those who advocated for Manila as the singular destination for Spanish commercial 
traffic into and out of Asia carried the day.77 Nowhere was this more the case than in the islands 
themselves, where voices consistently worked to preserve Manila’s commercial prerogative 
against a backdrop of geopolitical vulnerability. 
 Anachronistically, the above vision “worked” insofar as the Manila circuit endured for 
multiple centuries, but a misunderstanding of Japanese motives undercut the commercial 
relevance of the islands, even as continued spiritual malfeasance (as seen from the shogunate’s 
perspective) endangered the islands’ very real and very important trade relationship with Japan. 
Manila never fully grasped its competitive advantage in the eyes of Tokugawa leadership relative 
to other Asian ports, nor did it understand the consequences of refusal. Observers then and 
scholars recently have focused on two things Manila provided: access to Chinese merchants and 
a source of American silver. Japanese were not interested in importing silver but were keen on 
access to Chinese merchant networks. Even here though, Manila was but one point of access. 
Japan had access to Chinese goods via merchants trading in Nagasaki, the annual Portuguese 
carrack out of Macao, and the extended network of shuin trade authorized by the shogunate. 
From the second decade of the century onward the recently-arrived Dutch and English were also 
attempting to build capacity and access to Chinese goods and markets, though at this early stage 
neither enjoyed much success.  
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 Manila, and the Spanish more generally, uniquely offered two possibilities: establishing 
foreign trade in eastern Japan, and access to American markets, materiel, and expertise. The 
Philippines never committed to the former, while fears of a silver drain, concerns over the loss of 
a maritime monopoly, and jealousy over critical technologies stymied the latter. By rejecting 
Pacific commerce, Manila reduced itself to simply one of several venues for the trade in textiles 
and other commodities in East Asia. Manila sabotaged its utility in the eyes of the shogunate, and 
only compounded the problem with its continued support of Catholic missionaries. Having 
denied Japan’s terms of engagement for a quarter century, by 1625 there was little to recommend 
the islands to the Tokugawa. 
 Diplomatic relations may have ended, but entanglements persisted into the next decade 
and were defined by the potential for conflict and the threat of invasion. Shuin vessels stopped 
calling on Manila in 1624, but the system of licensed trade did not wind down fully until 1635, 
leaving Japanese and Spanish vessels active in the same sea routes a decade after the cessation of 
formal ties. In 1628 a Spanish fleet attacked, plundered, and destroyed a number of ships off the 
coast of Ayutthaya in Siam, among them a newly-constructed shuin vessel belonging to Takagi 
Sakuemon, a prominent Nagasaki merchant.78 The Spanish had hoped to land a blow against the 
Dutch, but when the VOC failed to appear the fleet shifted its attention elsewhere. The Spaniards 
set fire to Takagi’s ship, but not before making off with the vessel’s cargo of deerskins and 
sappanwood and sending forty-two Japanese sailors on to Manila as captives.79 
 The Spaniards’ disregard of the shogunate’s authority required a response. A ship out of 
Nagasaki called on Manila soon after, demanding recompense and the return of forty-two 
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Japanese taken captive in the raid.80 Manila complied, sending the Japanese back on a Chinese 
junk. Not long after, another Japanese vessel arrived on behalf of the daimyo Matsukura 
Shigemasa (1574–1630), daimyo of Shimabara, under the auspices of reopening trade. Its 
surprise arrival in turn raised suspicion in Manila that the Japanese were actually planning an 
attack. These suspicions were warranted. Matsukura did seem to be preparing for an invasion 
before his untimely death in 1630 brought an end to any such plans.81 
 Seven years later, revenge still seemed to be on the mind of Nagasaki officials. They 
began pressuring the Dutch to provide naval support in a potential Japanese attack on Manila as a 
form of “service” to the shogunate. Having adopted the language of vassalage to stay in 
Tokugawa good graces, the Dutch were trapped, and were reluctantly prepared to divert precious 
naval resources to a gambit on Manila.82 It appears the impetus for the endeavor did not extend 
to Edo, but remained stemmed from Nagasaki officials who still cited the Spanish aggression in 
Siam.83 This time, however, domestic rebellion precluded foreign invasion. In late 1637, the 
Shimabara rebellion broke out, as thousands of Kyushu farmers revolted against onerous 
taxation. To the shogunate’s additional alarm, the rebellious farmers had rallied around a 
Christian standard, implying resistance not just to one capricious daimyo but to the entire 
ideological order of the shogunate. Putting down the rebellion required a siege of Hara Castle. 
                                                             
80 Ibid. Another ship traveled to Portuguese Macao, the shogunate having lumped the Iberians together due to their 
shared monarch. Both ships were Portuguese vessels with a skeleton crew. It appears that some Iberians were held 
as captives in Nagasaki until the shogunate received redress. 
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The Dutch credibly provided “service” by shelling the castle, shogunate forces stormed and 
sacked the stronghold in April 1638, and any plans on Manila were discounted.84 
Conclusion: Competing Visions & Incompatible Offers 
 In a simplistic summary of events, the Tokugawa shogunate spent ten years trying to 
propose trade, the Spanish monarchy spent five years saying no, and everyone subordinate to 
either pole spent another decade sorting through the implications of this unsatisfactory exchange. 
Each polity asked for too much, and neither offered enough. Layers of authority compounded 
problems of geographical distance, as did each polity’s approach to delegated authority. The 
intermediaries charged with navigating the space between endured these challenges while adding 
complications of their own. This final section of the account steps back to evaluate the terms 
each polity proposed, their manner of presenting these terms and representing the authority 
behind them, and the imperfect intermediaries charged with bridging the oceans between.  
 For Japan and Spain alike, there existed a large gap between the superficial content of 
proposals and their deeper implications. Nominally, Tokugawa and Date offered expanded trade, 
safe harbors, affordable provisions, land and accommodations, and maritime aid. By means of 
these same proposals Japanese leadership also implicitly proposed coopting the Spanish 
monarchy’s intra-colonial commerce and gaining mastery of state technologies like navigation, 
ship construction, and mining. Japanese leadership also rejected the evangelical project 
embedded in Spain’s colonial impulse, Date’s letters and Sotelo’s rhetoric notwithstanding. 
 Spanish authorities and their intermediaries pitched a similarly high price while offering 
even less. The monarchy briefly supported extending Pacific commerce to include direct trade 
with Japan, provided Spanish vessels monopolized the route, and by extension, the knowledge 
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required to complete it. Additionally, the monarchy required tolerance of Christianity and 
expulsion of the Dutch. These two provisions impinged on Tokugawa authority by dictating to 
the shogunate its trading partners and requiring the acceptance of an alternative ideology. These 
provisos came precisely at the time when the Tokugawa labored to establish legitimacy in the 
domestic sphere and abroad. When confronted with Date’s ambition, the monarchy scuttled even 
its temperate approval of commerce across the Pacific. 
 The waters of early modern East Asia facilitated encounters on what we often term a 
“global” scale, but maintaining those connections became difficult in the absence of shared 
appeal. The particulars of trade between Japan and the Americas remained hazy, with no obvious 
economic incentive to help overcome friction in other spheres. Chinese thirst for silver combined 
with Spanish desire for textiles and other goods from Asia to keep the Manila galleons sailing 
each year. China’s two largest sources of silver, Japan and Spain, had no immediate and obvious 
product to trade with each other. Japanese armor and folding screens, Spanish wine and wool 
could fuel curiosity and experimentation, but they could not power sustainable trans-Pacific 
relations in the absence of official enthusiasm. 
 The issue of who and how compounded the problem of what. Edo and Madrid were apex 
authorities atop composite hierarchies. This fractured the geography of relations on either “side,” 
rendering each more complex. In the early 1600s, the shogunate and daimyo split the 
administration and execution of foreign trade and relations, while the Spanish monarchy 
enforced a chain of colonial command stretching from Madrid to Mexico and then across to 
Manila. It took years of maneuvering for the (retired) shogun to communicate with the king, and 
years of waiting to get a response. Technically, Philip III’s letters to Ieyasu and Hidetada were 
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the only instance in which the central leadership of one polity directly addressed that of the other 
during the entire time period under discussion here. Fittingly, they were rejected. 
 In lieu of direct correspondence between Edo and Madrid, each polity adopted differing 
approaches to the delegation and suggestion of its authority. Date operated under Tokugawa 
sanction but with a great deal of flexibility, sending an embassy in his own name as the “King of 
Ōshū.” The daimyo’s effort spared the shogunate the risk of material loss and permitted appeal to 
foreign leadership and religion in a manner Tokugawa dignity could not allow. The shogunate 
affirmed its writ at home by permitting the daimyo to reach out abroad, with both the Tokugawa 
and Date standing to benefit from the establishment of commercial ties. 
 Conversely, the Spanish monarchy’s delegates continually reinforced and deferred to the 
authority of their king. They pushed the responsibility of commitment ever upward. The 
monarchy possessed the administrative capacity to reach out but proved ill-equipped to handle 
the polities that reached back. Manila might independently communicate with Japan, for 
example, but nobody had a ready answer to the challenge of Japanese ships arriving in the 
Americas. The monarchy’s delegates could stall, pause, or otherwise preserve the status quo, but 
hesitated to do anything else without Madrid’s guidance. In 1611 the viceroy of New Spain 
unilaterally sent Vizcaíno to Japan, but only to offer thanks and collect more information. He 
offered no commitment, and all would have to wait on the ruling of the king. 
 A series of imperfect intermediaries conducted the textual and rhetorical dialogue 
between two apex authorities increasingly disinclined to listen. Date Masamune proclaimed 
friendship, but he never overcame his dubious diplomatic and spiritual credentials. Luis Sotelo 
attempted to blend the commercial and spiritual ends of the Keichō Embassy to overcome his 
patron’s legitimacy gap, but his half-truths and persistent ambitions proved more annoying than 
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effective. Hasekura Tsunenaga served as a mostly silent and mostly symbolic envoy, hemmed in 
by Date’s dubious status and Sotelo’s dubious arguments. Sebastián Vizcaíno was a haughty but 
mostly impotent representative in Tokugawa eyes, and prevented any semblance of a united front 
among the Spanish contingent upon the Bautista’s arrival in New Spain. Even Vivero, perhaps 
the most vivid combination of good intentions, considerateness, personal investment, and 
individual expression, put too high a price on commercial and technological exchange in Japan 
and exerted little influence upon his return. 
 The contrast in diplomatic strategies and the pitfalls of individual tactics inhibited 
outreach. Date’s endeavor raised questions of credibility that his deputies never overcame. 
Similarly, hesitation and deferral by a series of Spanish officials dampened Tokugawa interest in 
pursuing trade, even as missionaries continued to test the shogunate’s tolerance in other arenas. 
With the messengers undermined, the two polities carried out a passive-aggressive ship 
diplomacy that stood in for the explicit rejection or repudiation of each another. The Tokugawa 
sent a vessel; the viceroy purchased it. Date sent a vessel; the next viceroy rerouted it, and the 
governor-general took it off the daimyo’s hands. The ships sailing the waters formed a proxy 
dialogue, one that always proved halting and eventually succumbed to distrust and disinterest. 
 As a result of its inability to establish trust, Date’s mission undercut the Tokugawa effort 
as much as Tokugawa persecution undercut the daimyo. Sotelo and Hasekura proved most 
impactful as they journeyed toward Europe and the monarchy used the reports and memorials 
that their movement generated to formulate policy toward the shogunate. The Keichō Embassy 
indeed influenced contemporary events, just never in the way its participants and sponsor 
envisioned. 
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 By electing to keep Acapulco closed, Philip III become one of the very few leaders to 
reject Tokugawa outreach. The other notable exception proved to be Ming (and later Qing) 
China, as the shogunate opted not to reconcile itself to China’s own hierarchical ordering of the 
world. The Chinese model also cast a shadow over the normalization of relations between Joseon 
Korea and the new shogunate. Only by extracting both sides from Chinese terminology and 
protocol and establishing their own were the two polities able to talk to each other, along with 
the aid of some well-timed forgery.85 Though relations subsequently operated on a basis of rough 
equality, the new status quo was a victory for Japan’s own emerging diplomatic order. 
 Tokugawa Japan’s difficulty normalizing relations with China and Spain speaks to the 
challenges confronting polities that articulated a “global” diplomacy. The Chinese Middle 
Kingdom has remained an archetype for such a polity throughout much of its history, spawning 
studies and comparisons for generations.86 The Tokugawa break from this order has similarly 
defined the subfield of Japan’s foreign relations. Japan’s outreach coincided with the Pax 
Hispanica in Europe (1598–1621), brokered by a flurry of Spanish diplomatic engagement in the 
decades before the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). That Europe’s own “Middle Kingdom” 
could not find common ground with the Tokugawa’s developing “Japanocentric World Order” 
suggests the struggles of polities to engage one another when both make claims to expansive, 
apex power outside the familiar dichotomy of European empires and Sinocentric hierarchy. The 
brief window when Japan expanded out into the Pacific highlights this dissonance. More robust 
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comparisons with other cases beyond East Asia and Europe might yield further understanding of 
how apex authorities navigated encounter in the early modern world. 
 Speculative conceptualizations aside, the fraught Tokugawa-Habsburg encounter had 
more immediate effects. Following the withdrawal of Japanese vessels, the Pacific Ocean 
remained a barrier to inter-polity commercial trade for well over a century. The ocean did of 
course facilitate the commercial and material exchange provided by the Manila galleons. 
Additionally the North Pacific, in particular, would carry (and occasionally claim) an increasing 
number of fur traders, explorers, pirates, and whalers. The ocean was never empty, above or 
below. But new incursions across the Pacific following the Bautista principally looked to exploit, 
explore, and extract. Bilateral trans-Pacific trade came much later, and Ieyasu’s nineteenth-
century successors would be coerced into joining.  
 The Bautista’s sale also helped lock into place Tokugawa Japan’s sites of foreign trade 
and the daimyo involved in their operation. The approved “portals” into Japan were being 
decided, and Date’s Sendai domain would not number among them. Even before the Bautista’s 
first voyage in 1613, Satsuma, Tsushima, and Matsumae had all established themselves—if not 
yet firmly—as the intermediaries for the Ryukyu Kingdom, Joseon Korea, and the indigenous 
people of Ezo (present-day Hokkaido), respectively. Nagasaki continued to be the primary port 
of foreign commerce throughout the rest of the Edo period. Following Date’s gambit, the most 
significant adjustment regarding daimyo and the sites of trade was the Dutch presence in Hirado 
domain. There, the Matsuura clan managed relations between the VOC and the shogunate for 
over three decades until the Tokugawa famously mandated that the company inhabit the man-
made island of Dejima in Nagasaki, following the expulsion of the Portuguese from the same 
locale. 
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 Shedding competing “global” frameworks helped the shogunate establish comparatively 
firm control of their borders and the people permitted to move through and approach them. 
Having sorted relations with neighboring Asian polities in the first two decades of the 
seventeenth century, the Tokugawa spent the next two sorting out relations with the “Southern 
Barbarians.” The English departed in 1623 of their own accord, unable to turn a profit. Spanish 
intransigence on trade with the Americas, the Dutch, and Christianity negated the possibility of 
access to new markets in the Western Hemisphere. The Portuguese fell victim to their 
association with the Habsburg crown and their relationship to Catholic missionaries. The 
Tokugawa relationship with the Dutch remained rocky, and even ceased for a time, but the 
shogunate “tamed” the VOC in time, checking the company’s problematic impulses towards 
violence and sovereignty in a manner more conducive to the Tokugawa’s hierarchical vision of 
relations.87  
 Culling trading partners did not curtail commercial activity. In terms of trade volume, 
Japan’s foreign commerce peaked in the late 1630’s, well after regular commerce with Manila 
came to an end. Before expelling the Portuguese in 1639, the shogunate asked the VOC if it 
could make up the difference, to which the company assuredly responded that it could. Trade 
continued at near-peak levels in the ensuing decades, before the shogunate’s own tinkering with 
bullion flows and import substitution effected a reduction decades later.88 This Tokugawa control 
over access has shaped notions of Japanese isolation and insularity in the popular and academic 
imagination alike, but Philip III and his officials would have envied the accomplishment. To 
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make the drive for control over foreign encounter a Japanese proclivity overstates the case for 
isolation, just as ruminations on the archipelago’s withdrawal in the seventeenth century 
overstates what “the world” had to offer and its willingness to do so. 
 For the Spanish monarchy, at least, Tokugawa Japan posed the dual threats of exclusion 
and expansion. In attempting to prevent the latter, Spanish officials helped bring about the 
former. Additionally, the specter of Japanese commercial expansion posed an especial threat to 
Spain. In the 1590s, Japan’s territorial ambitions under Tokugawa predecessor Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi brought the country into direct conflict with Joseon Korea and Ming China. By 
contrast, the resumption and expansion of trade among these polities under the Tokugawa 
operated as a palliative alternative to direct violence. For other European communities raiding, 
trading, and cajoling their way into Asian trade networks, Japan’s commercial participation was 
an opportunity, not a threat. 
 Furthermore, only for the Spanish monarchy did Tokugawa commercial expansion 
register as an acute “domestic” threat. Distinct from other European interlopers at this time, 
Spain operated as a settler power in Asia. Its network depended on colonies, not factories. It 
participated in foreign trade via domestic bullion. Manila served as an important gateway for a 
variety of Asian products, but it was the lure of Spanish silver that brought Chinese merchants 
there, and the lure of Chinese merchants that attracted Japanese and others. The monarchy’s 
unique geographic and economic position in East Asia is both what piqued Ieyasu’s curiosity and 
what prompted Philip’s possessiveness. 
 Stated differently, the Spanish monarchy emphasized maintaining its proprietary flow of 
goods rather than developing new networks of commercial partners. In contrast, the Tokugawa 
looked to repair, expand, and secure their trade relations. Bringing these contacts under the 
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shogunate’s management helped assert domestic authority at a time when central authority 
governed a federated group of regional lords rather than ruling in uniform fashion across the 
archipelago. Both polities emphasized control over access, an unsurprising observation. 
However, despite our narratives to the contrary, in seventeenth century East Asia the Spanish 
monarchy shaded more toward exclusion, while the Tokugawa pursued a program of cultivated 
























 The library staff presented Iwakura Tomomi and his colleagues with a surprise during 
their tour of the Biblioteca del Reale Archivio di Stato in Venice. It was May 1873, and Iwakura 
and his companions were touring Europe as ambassadors of the recently established Meiji 
government. Their Venetian hosts told them the archive held two letters from one “Hasekura 
Rokuemon [Tsunenaga],” who had written the city at the beginning of the seventeenth century. 
At Iwakura’s request the archivists retrieved the curious documents, two letters written in Latin 
with an unmistakably Japanese signature adorning the bottom. The nineteenth-century 
ambassadors had no firm idea of who their countryman and predecessor might be.1  
 It did not stop the group from speculating. Iwakura’s secretary and mission diarist Kume 
Kunitake recorded a number of theories as to Hasekura’s origin. The chronicler’s official record 
stated that Hasekura was a legate of Ōtomo Sōrin (1530–1587), a prominent Christian daimyo of 
the late sixteenth century. Kume’s more personal reflections followed, and contained additional 
musings. Perhaps Hasekura had been an exiled Christian. Another line of thought supposed that 
he was a Toyotomi loyalist who had fled the battle of Osaka and may have hoped to enlist 
foreign aid in overthrowing the usurping Tokugawa. A final stray thought noted a rumor that 
Hasekura was a retainer of the northern daimyo Date Masamune. However, such an origin 
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appeared unlikely to the author, as there “seem[ed] to be some doubt as to whether Date was 
even in contact with the West.”2 
 They were not going to solve the mystery while in Italy. Iwakura bid Kume to make 
copies of the documents, and four days later the mission continued on to Austria. The group 
intended to augment its tour of southern Europe with a sojourn in Spain, but political unrest 
following the declaration of the Republic of Spain in February 1873 disrupted those plans, and 
Kume had to content himself with drafting a brief profile of the country from outside its borders. 
Upon the group’s return to Japan in September 1873, Iwakura spearheaded the rediscovery and 
reexamination of the Keichō Embassy, including the material remains of the mission preserved 
by the Date clan for over two centuries. The Meiji emperor viewed the collection during his 
progression to the northeast in 1876, and newspapers and museums began playing their parts in 
publicizing the endeavor for the new nation.3 
 The Iwakura Mission arrived in Europe with different goals, different expectations, and a 
different relationship to domestic authority than its seventeenth-century predecessor. It hoped to 
undo previous agreements rather than establish new ones. In the years before and after the 1868 
Meiji Restoration, the Euro-American Great Powers had forced Japan to ratify a series of 
unequal treaties, forcing open ports, establishing foreign enclaves, and granting extraterritoriality 
to the states striding across the globe with the easy confidence that imperialism offered.4 
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4 For analysis of the Iwakura Mission see, Ian Hill Nish, ed., The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe: A New 
Assessment (Surrey: Japan Library, 1998). See also, Michael R. Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal 
Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). 




 Iwakura and his fellow ambassadors did not face the questions of credibility that plagued 
Hasekura and Sotelo. The nineteenth-century mission solved the problem of imperfect 
intermediaries by eliminating them. The Iwakura Mission was the Meiji government as much as 
it represented it. Iwakura, the plenipotentiary ambassador, was the most important leader of the 
Meiji Restoration drawn from the court nobility in Kyoto. Three of the four vice-ambassadors 
cast an even longer shadow over the country’s history, and number among the most important 
figures of Meiji Japan. Ōkubo Toshimichi and Kido Takayoshi formed two-thirds of the 
triumvirate that had structured the provisional Meiji state in 1868, while Itō Hirobumi, already a 
high-ranking official by 1871, went on to chair the body that drafted the Meiji Constitution 
(1889) before serving as prime minister on four separate occasions. Even had Date traveled to 
Madrid himself, he could not have come close to matching the domestic standing Iwakura, 
Ōkubo, and their companions enjoyed in 1871.   
 The Iwakura Mission also represented a very different government. Like the Tokugawa 
two hundred and sixty years prior, the Meiji state was yet unsettled, but unlike the shogunate it 
claimed uniform, centralized control of the archipelago. The national government had abolished 
the domains in early 1871, with Iwakura, Ōkubo, and Kido among the group that enacted the 
plan to decisively shift power to a newly imperial Tokyo. From then on, there was a single 
Japanese state that held no interest in outsourcing diplomacy to regional daimyo or deputies. 
This issue had been contested less than a decade prior, when Satsuma domain presented its own 
pavilion separate from that of Tokugawa Japan at the International Exposition of 1867 in Paris.5  
                                                             
5 Robert I. Hellyer, Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640-1868 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2009), 201–02. 




 However, the Iwakura Mission did share something with the Keichō Embassy: it failed. 
The mission’s time in the United States and Great Britain made it clear that the Great Powers felt 
no inclination to revise the onerous treaty regime they had imposed, and Japan lacked the 
leverage to make them reconsider. Unable to achieve this goal, the group doubled down on 
another aim, making the most of its first-hand experience to learn how the Western powers 
structured domestic society and global orders in line with their “advanced” understanding of 
industry, sovereignty, and civilization. The mission became a hallmark of Meiji-era initiative, 
part of a longer narrative of Japan’s industrialization and modernization, as well as its ability to 
adopt the features and flaws of imperial nation-states. It is remembered as a great success. 
 Helping to shape the course of Meiji Japan frames the Iwakura contingent as national 
figures. In contrast, the Keichō Embassy enjoys a nation-wide profile but remains strongly 
associated with a particular area. Popular history and culture have made Date Masamune a 
household name, but one tied squarely to Sendai domain and the present-day Tōhoku region.  
 The twenty-first century has turned Hasekura and his patron into symbols of hope. In fall 
2013, a series of events in Miyagi prefecture commemorating the 400th anniversary of the San 
Juan Bautista’s initial sailing adopted the theme “Connecting to the Future on the Winds of 
Hope” (未来へつなぐ希望の風, Mirai e tsunagu kibō no kaze).6 In November of that year, 
Sendai City hosted a “Winds of Hope” Forum. Participants included the heads of the Date and 
Hasekura families, the governor of Miyagi, and the ambassadors of Mexico, Cuba, and Spain.7  
                                                             
6 Keichō ken’ō shisetsu shuppan yonhyakunen kinen jigyō, “Mirai e tsunagu kibō no kaze” (Sendai: Keichō ken’ō 
shisetsu shuppan yonhyakunen kinen jigyō jikō iinkai), 2011. 
7 Ibid. A representative from the Italian Embassy also attended. 




 Hope invokes a darker backdrop. The forum welded the instructional and inspirational 
example of the embassy to ongoing efforts for the recovery and revitalization of Tōhoku 
following the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accidents that have devastated the area. 
Organizers and participants constructed Date and Hasekura as models of dynamic engagement, 
connecting the embassy’s history to a brighter, aspirational future for the region. These 
narratives in turn form part of the ongoing debate in Japan about its cultural, economic, and 
diplomatic relationship to the rest of the globe. 
 This engaging and positive account is inspiring, while suggesting at the same time that 
Japan might still need to overcome itself. If Date and Hasekura are now used to motivate 
connections between the local and the global, there remains the sense that the nation has run 
interference. Granting the two men foresight necessitates diagnosing the country as myopic. Date 
and Hasekura are often made the victim of Tokugawa intolerance as much or more than Spanish 
disinterest. The interest and opportunities presented by “the world” are assumed, as is Japan’s 
supposed difficulty in recognizing them. Valorizing the men and their mission risks detaching 
them from the context of Tokugawa outreach that helped determine the contours of Pacific trade. 
 The instructional potential of this outreach is not limited to Japanese history, nor to 
considerations of those putatively exceptional instances when Japan considered the world. Often 
early modern Japan seems to be acknowledged as in the world but not quite of it. The keynote 
address at the “Winds of Hope” forum reflected this trend, titled “Japan within the World and the 
Keichō Embassy” (Sekai no naka no Nihon to Keichō ken’ō shisetsu, 世界のなかの日本と慶長
遣欧使節).8 “Japan within the World” maintains “the world” as open and undifferentiated, and 
                                                             
8 Hirakawa Arata, “Sekai no naka no Nihon to Keichō ken’ō shisetsu,” (lecture, Kibō no kaze forum, Sendai, 
November 1, 2013). 




evokes context rather than dynamism. This dissertation has attempted a little of both, providing 
context in order to demonstrate the impact of Japanese experimentation in the worlds of the 
Spanish monarchy, the commercial networks of East Asia and the Pacific, and the models of 
diplomatic engagement that these polities elected to pursue. 
 Tokugawa and Date outreach also raises questions about expansion, another recurrently 
defining feature in our accounts of the world. Narratives of expansion often adopt a European 
hue, prioritizing the experiences of and reactions to European empire. But expansion was not a 
given, nor was it always proposed by Europeans. Furthermore, the most expansive European 
empire of the seventeenth century proved quite guarded in its response to just a few vessels 
sailing where they were not expected. Pacific diplomacy between the Tokugawa and Habsburgs 
also suggest how carefully delineated, even circumscribed, “expansion” was in practice. 
Competition, aggression, and mercantilism among successive European powers is a familiar 
story, but here the threat of competition came from outside of Europe, provoking different 
responses in the absence of familiar solutions and the methods for obtaining them. 
 Tokugawa Japan’s experiments with expansion also contribute to the larger project of 
analyzing efforts by non-European polities to press against and explore the boundaries of the 
early modern world. The Tokugawa were not alone in reaching out and reaching back; the early 
Ottoman Empire and Zheng rule over part of Taiwan are two other examples.9 Comparison 
among different case studies remains a wide avenue of potential inquiry beyond an East-West 
framework still difficult to evade entirely, this dissertation included. Finally, Japan’s Pacific 
outreach can help foster reassessments of encounter not by assuming expansion and reaction but 
                                                             
9 See, respectively, Giancarlo Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Tonio Andrade, Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China’s First Great Victory over the West (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011). 




by exploring the priorities of a variegated set of policies and their capacities to meet them. In 
these ways Date and Hasekura alike serve as instructive examples not just for situating Japan in 
the world, but for exploring the dynamics animating human experience the world over. 
 A tension exists that makes it difficult to hold the Keichō Embassy, Japan, and “the 
world” together in conversation. Date’s mission is construed as a romantic curiosity, a rare 
instance when a Japanese leader sought to strengthen the archipelago’s ties with new peoples and 
new lands. However, appreciating the embassy on those terms requires distancing the embassy 
from the course of a seemingly insular history of Japan. Holding the Keichō Embassy up for 
increased attention has also relegated the embassy to a detached limbo, inhabiting the perceived 
space between the Japanese archipelago and the rest of the world. This account has sought to 
bridge the distance between all three.  
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Map 1. Tokugawa Japan, 1610 
 














































Image 1. Tokugawa Ieyasu’s letter to the Duke of Lerma, 1610 (AGI, Seville) 




Image 2. Tokugawa Ieyasu’s trading pass to Dutch VOC, 1609 
Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org /w/index.php?curid=7728386 











Image 3. Portrait of Hasekura, 1615 [?] (Sendai City Museum) 


















Image 4. Portrait of Pope Paul V, 1615 [?] (Sendai City Museum) 
Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PaoloHasekura.jpg 
 
 













Image 5. Portrait of Hasekura by Claude Deruet, 1615 (Private Collection) 
Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hasekura_in_Rome.JPG 











Image 6. Rokuemon Hasekura, Luis Sotelo, and Japanese Companions, by Agostino Tassi, 
Giovanni Lanfranco, Carlo Saraceni, and others, 1616–17Quirinale Palace, Rome) 
Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:HasekuraQirinale.jpg 











Image 7. Hasekura’s certificate of Roman Citizenship, 1615 (Sendai City Museum) 





























Image 8. Date Masamune’s Letter to Pope Paul V, 1613 
Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DateMasammuneToPope.jpg 












Image 9. Full-Scale Replica of the San Juan Bautista in Ishinomaki, Japan 









Appendix C: Timeline 
 
Figure 1. Vessel Traffic between Japan and New Spain, 1610–1620 
 
Departure  Vessel Name Vessel Origin Route Principal Passengers 
1610.08 San Buena Ventura Japan Uraga – Acapulco Rodrigo de Vivero  
Alonso Muñoz 
Tanaka Shōsuke 
 *Vessel purchased by the viceroy of New Spain. 
1611.03 San Francisco New Spain Acapulco – Uraga Tanaka Shōsuke 
Sebastián Vizcaíno 
 * Vessel damaged by storm in 1612, rendered unfit for further travel. 
1612.10 San Sebastian Japan Uraga – N/A Luis Sotelo 
 *Foundered within a day. 
1613.10 San Juan Bautista  
(1st crossing) 






1615.04 San Juan Bautista  
(2nd crossing) 
“     ” Acapulco – Uraga Diego de Santa Catalina 
 
1616.09 San Juan Bautista  
(3rd crossing) 
“     ” Uraga – Acapulco Diego de Santa Catalina 
Yokozawa Shōgen 
1618.04 San Juan Bautista 
(4th crossing) 
“     ” Acapulco – Manila Hasekura Tsunenaga 
Yokozawa Shōgen 
Luis Sotelo 
 *Vessel purchased by the governor-general of the Philippines. 
  
Chronology adopted from Gonoi Takashi, Hasekura Tsunenaga (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 
2003), 265–273. 
 
